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               ABSTRACT 
 
Globalisation has created new market opportunities for Nigerian traders, resulting in the growth 
of international trade in Nigeria. However, the opportunity of a wider market and a broader 
range of goods, means that Nigerian traders have to grapple with the complexities and 
transaction costs of foreign laws of different jurisdictions, which are a hindrance to trade.  
Given the above, there is a need for a uniform framework capable of regulating international 
trade transactions. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) is capable of resolving such conflicts and reducing transaction costs. However, 
the CISG has not been adopted in Nigeria.  
In light of this, the thesis considers the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. 
The thesis evaluates the Convention to determine if it is successful based on established criteria. 
Using the legal transplant theories, the thesis draws up a typology to determine whether the 
CISG can be considered a successful transplant in Germany and U.S. where it has been adopted. 
The thesis then examines the possibility, and effects of transplanting the Convention into 
Nigeria. The thesis also measures the level of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria and the 
disposition of the key legal actors towards the Convention, which serves as a determinant of 
adaptability and receptivity of the CISG in Nigeria, where it is adopted.  
The thesis adopts a doctrinal approach, historical, socio-legal and comparative research 
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  CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis seeks to understand the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria and the 
possibility, and effects of transplanting the Convention into Nigeria, using legal transplant 
theories. The thesis also seeks to measure the level of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria and the 
disposition of the key legal actors towards the Convention, which serves as a determinant of the 
receptivity of the CISG in Nigeria.  
The current chapter presents the background to the research and the justification for 
undertaking the research. The aims and objectives of the research are presented first, followed by 
the research and the structure of the thesis. The methodology and the research design are 
described with detailed information on the empirical data, that is, what data is presented and how 
the data was obtained and how it is presented in the thesis. 
1.0 Research Background 
There has been tremendous growth in international trade in the last decades. This is a cause and 
result of globalisation. Trade increased from $296 billion in 1950 to about $8 trillion in 2005.1 
Such increase would benefit from a harmonised law, given the varied and disparate domestic 
laws on trade. A uniform law is particularly needful considering that private parties have to 
bargain over the legal regime that will govern their transactions. However, the variation and 
discrepancies of national rules in approach and concept on any law, particularly on the law of 
sales, creates legal uncertainty, unequal bargaining power resulting in hardship for one party, 
increased transaction costs and legal risks. Given this, the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for International sale of Goods (CISG)2 was created after many decades to harmonise 
law on international trade by reducing transaction costs, resulting in improved efficiency of cross 
border sales for commercial parties in different jurisdictions.  
                                                          
1 World Trade Organisation, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/stat_arc_e.htm (WTO, 2007) (WTO, 
2013) accessed 14 April 2014. 
2  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. 




Nigeria is considered the 24th largest economy in the world and Africa’s largest economy.3 With 
respect to international trade, from 2007 to 2011, Nigeria’s exports increased on average by 23.5% 
each year amounting to $125.6 billion. During the same period, imports increased on an average 
by 18.6% each year to $64.0bn.4 More recently, the Nigerian economy has grown significantly; 
with the GDP doubling to more than $500bn from $307bn. 5  Nigeria is also seeing more 
investments in the economy.  
Functional public and private laws are necessary towards sustaining economic growth. A 
majority of international traders in Nigeria are involved in the bulk importation of goods usually 
resold to consumers. Apart from exportation of crude oil, Nigeria is more import oriented, 
especially amongst Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME). Thus, an appreciable percentage 
of Nigerian traders buy already made goods and resell them. Irrespective of the trade growth in 
Nigeria, there are hardly sturdy legal frameworks, and consolidated policy systems to regulate 
trade. This leads to an unstructured trade environment, and ultimately to unequal bargaining 
powers of traders in Nigeria. Despite the interest in foreign trade, the unstructured trade 
environment makes foreign traders sceptical about dealing with their Nigerian counterpart. In 
cases where the Nigerian parties may have the stronger bargaining power, the dated 1893 Sales 
of Goods Act6 still applicable in Nigeria is hardly considered.  
The choice of law clause between traders stipulates the law applicable to the contract. This law 
would govern the interpretation of the contract, performance of it, how variations to the 
contract may be made and other factors. Parties in a contract are free to select the law, which 
applies to their contract. The Nigerian parties, normally the buyers in transactions are subject to 
the seller’s law since the terms of the contract are already stipulated. This is especially the case 
with Eastern traders, where have templates of their contracts, which hardly offer any choice to 
buyers. Regarding trade with EU countries, in the absence of a choice of law clause, the Rome 
Convention as enacted by the Contracts (Applicable law) Act 1990 and after it, the Rome 1 
Regulation 593/2008 (which applies to contracts entered into after 17 December 2009) becomes 
applicable.  
                                                          
3  Claire Provsot, ‘Nigeria becomes Africa's Largest Economy – Get the Data’ (The Guardian, 7 April 2014) 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/datablog/2014/apr/07/nigeria-becomes-africa-largesteconomy-
get-data accessed 02 February 2015.  
4 U.N Data, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=NIGERIA#Trade accessed 15/10/2013; Editorial 
Staff, ‘Nigeria: Trade and Economic Partnerships 2012’ (Afribiz, 14 May 2012) 
http://www.afribiz.info/content/nigeria-trade-and-economic-partnerships-2012 accessed 15 October 2013. 
5
J.O’S ‘How Nigeria’s Economy Grew by 89% Overnight’ (The Economist, Johannesburg April 7 2014) 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economist-explains-2 accessed 9 July 2014. 




Considering this, foreign traders leverage on the instability of the trade structure in Nigeria, and 
their stronger bargaining power, to insist on the governing law of their choice. Thus, hardly 
allowing the Nigerian trader to negotiate his terms and who eventually signs the contract without 
reading it. Any breach in such circumstances will hardly be remedied, since the Nigerian trader is 
unlikely to afford the costs and may have little or no knowledge of the governing law and the 
procedural rules of a court located in a foreign country.  
The above situation is not only discouraging for the sole traders and SME’s; it is deleterious to 
the economy. In the event of a breach of contract, Nigerian traders are forced into alternative 
ways of mitigating losses, such as setting inordinate prices for consumers of subsequent goods. 
The final consumer bears the brunt of the consequence of such transactions. Where this practice 
is protracted, it will result in inflation. 
In light of the above, a functional framework familiar to parties in international trade transaction 
is needed. The CISG is one such law, capable of providing a framework of private rights for 
businesses, to facilitate transactions, enhance credit facilities and reduce transaction costs. It is 
also a means of modernising the 1893 SGA and possibly reforming sales law in Nigeria 
considering the local situation to suit modern requirements of trade. 
Despite the glaring benefits of the Convention, there is reluctance by developing countries, 
including Nigeria to adopt it. In light of the benefits of the CISG, the thesis considers the 
reasons for the reluctance of developing countries, especially Nigeria to adopt the Convention.  
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
This thesis aims to understand the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. The 
thesis proceeds on the assumption that the CISG may be useful, although an assessment is 
undertaken, and the belief that there is a clear nexus between economic and social development 
and trade law reform. The thesis then seeks to conceptualise the transplantation of the CISG in 
Nigeria.  
In order to successfully achieve these aims, the following objectives are necessary: 
1.1.1 Critically evaluate the purported success claims of the Convention in order to determine 
whether the Convention is indeed a success.   
1.1.2 Through answers gleaned from empirical research, examine the plausibility of the reasons 




1.1.3 Consider the experiences of other countries that have adopted the CISG using legal 
transplant theories, to determine if the Convention can be considered a successful 
transplant and drawing from their experiences to make a case for the CISG in Nigeria.   
1.1.4 Undertake a conceptual analysis of the transplantation of the CISG in Nigeria to 
determine whether or not it will be a successful transplant.    
 
1.2 Research Questions  
The following questions will help in carrying out the aims and objectives set out above  
1.1 Is the CISG a successful framework for trade? 
1.2 Why has Nigeria not adopted the CISG? 
1.3 Does Nigeria need the Convention? 
1.4 Can the CISG be transplanted to Nigeria?  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis  
Over five chapters, this thesis examines the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria 
and the possibility of transplanting the Convention to Nigeria. Apart from the current 
introductory chapter, which presents an overview of the thesis, including the aims, objectives 
and methodology of the thesis, chapter two considers the CISG holistically by undertaking a 
brief historical analysis of the CISG. This is in order to determine the reasons for, goals and aims 
of the Convention, which consequently provides an understanding of why the CISG may be a 
useful tool for international trade in Nigeria. The process of drafting the CISG is examined in 
order to determine its neutrality especially to understand whether the interests of developing 
countries are equally represented. This is important given the spectrum of countries the 
Convention aims to represent, from different jurisdictions and their varied levels of development.  
Chapter Two also measures the level of success attained by the CISG, based on its goals and 
aims. This is done on the basis of certain criteria which have been used to judge the Convention 
successful, in order to ascertain the extent to which these claims are valid. The chapter also 
considers the impediments to the success of the Convention. Suggestions are made on how to 
overcome the problems especially in the Nigerian context. The chapter further assesses the 
success of the CISG in the Nigerian context in order to determine its implications for Nigeria. 
Chapter Three provides theoretical and empirical reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in 




actors in Nigeria; Government Parastatals (The Department of International and Comparative 
Law and the Ministry of Trade), legal practitioners, legal academia, trade associations and the 
UNCITRAL. These findings are examined in order to determine whether they are justifiable, and 
to find out if there are ways to overcome the obstacles. 
Chapter Four provides an analysis of the theory of legal transplant. This includes an explication 
of the relevant debates, justifications for and typologies of legal transplants. This is done, bearing 
in mind the categorisation of the CISG in this regard. The theory is used to conceptualise the 
adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. The chapter also builds the framework for the conceptual 
application of the CISG in Nigeria, which is discussed in the next chapter.  
Given the goal of the CISG to negotiate between international and domestic laws, it is expected 
that the Convention should function cohesively with any legal system, particularly, the two 
prominently recognised legal systems in the world - civil law legal system and common law legal 
systems. In light of this, the chapter considers the experiences of Germany and the United States, 
which have ratified the CISG.  
Chapter Five conceptualises the transplantation of the CISG in Nigeria. The chapter considers 
the reasons why the CISG should be adopted in Nigeria, the benefits of adoption and the effects 
of the CISG in Nigeria. The chapter examines the way the Convention will interact with the 
existing legal and social system in Nigeria, including the extant framework for international trade 
in Nigeria, the SGA 1893. Particularly, common law concepts, which may be inharmonious with 
the CISG, are considered with propositions of how to overcome any conflicts. 
Chapter Six draws together the findings within chapters’ two to five to make recommendations 
on what steps Nigeria should take regarding the adoption of the Convention and how to ensure 
the CISG functions maximally, if it is adopted.  
1.4 Methodology   
The thesis primarily adopts a doctrinal approach. The key primary source material examined is 
the CISG. The Convention’s concepts are examined in order to determine the precise state of 
the law, evaluate their functionality in practice, the extent to which the CISG meets its aims, the 
application of the law and the concerns regarding its coherence. The examination of legal 
concepts embodied in the SGA and trade laws of other jurisdictions and their compatibility with 
the CISG is also doctrinal in nature. Secondary sources which include journal articles, books, 
written commentaries on the CISG, case laws, conference papers and policy documents in the 




CISG and the problematic areas of the law. The approach enables the author to examine the 
relationship between rules of the CISG, the areas of difficulties and ways to resolve them. These 
materials, both the primary and secondary sources are retrieved from various libraries in the UK 
as well as electronic repositories such as the CISG Pace University Website, UNCITRAL website, 
Jstor, Heinonline, Westlaw, Lexisnexis UK, amongst others.  
The thesis also adopts a historical approach, which allows for systematic and objective location, 
evaluation and synthesis of evidence related to the CISG in order to establish facts about the 
CISG.  The historical approach is employed in order to understand the motivation for uniform 
laws, and consequently the reasons for the goals and aims of the Convention. This approach 
enables a holistic analysis of the Convention, shedding light on why the Convention has certain 
characteristics, and why it was drafted in specific ways. It also enables an examination of the 
drafting history of the CISG in order to establish the level of representation of developing 
countries in the drafting process. This allows for more understanding of the need for the CISG, 
and its suitability for Nigerian international trade market. The historical approach also allows for 
an exposition on the background to the CISG, which can be a foundational interpretive tool for 
persons charged with its interpretation. Thus, it enables solutions to contemporary problems of 
the CISG to be sought in the past. Materials enabling the historical enquiry include the UN 
working Group documents (reports and commentaries) and the draft Convention.  
One of secondary approaches adopted to supplement the doctrinal approach is the socio-legal 
methodological approach. The socio-legal methodological approach, through empirical research 
such as semi structured interviews and surveys allowed for acquisition of opinions from legal 
actors on the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. Through this approach, 
findings on the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG are reported objectively, and from a 
neutral perspective. Although there are theoretical examinations on why certain countries have 
not adopted the CISG, because of the particularities of each country, this approach allows for a 
true understanding of reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria and the perceptions 
of legal actors. The interviews allow for an in-depth understanding of views and opinions of 
stakeholders whilst the surveys enable the measurement of the disposition of actors towards the 
CISG, in the event that it is ratified. Through the socio-legal approach the way the CISG works 
in other countries is measured, typically concerned with law in action.7 This is gleaned through 
statements and phrases in case analysis, and secondary empirical data by other scholars such as 
                                                          




surveys measuring the disposition and inclination of legal actors towards the CISG i.e. judges, 
lawyers and multinationals. This enables an assessment of the level of functionality of the CISG. 
Another approach adopted in the thesis is the comparative methodological approach. This 
approach complementing the doctrinal approach is needful because it provides an opportunity of 
examining the CISG in context of different jurisdictions, thus allowing for an evaluation of its 
level of functionality and practicability. Two jurisdictions are chosen for the comparative analysis, 
Germany and the United States. They are chosen because they represent the two prominent legal 
systems in the world; civil and common law. As the CISG claims to be a neutral law, suitable for 
the any legal system, this investigation is necessary in order to determine whether the 
Convention interacts suitably with the concepts and practices peculiar to these jurisdictions. 
Their experiences are considered in the light of the CISG as a transplanted law. The reactions of 
key legal actors; their attitudes, disposition, interpretation and interaction with the Convention is 
assessed in these countries to determine whether or not the CISG is successfully transplanted 
based on criteria adopted as the definition of a successful transplant. Thus, the performance of 
the CISG against each of these criterions is measured in each jurisdiction and compared against 
the other jurisdiction.  
The US is a common law system, which is the same legal system as Nigeria. This permits a 
comparative analysis of how common law concepts are interpreted by legal actors and their 
interactions with the CISG. It also allows for an examination of how common legal systems 
interpret civil law concepts under the CISG. Germany on the other hand, being a civil legal 
system allows for an examination of the interpretation of civil legal concepts, in the way they 
ideally should be interpreted. It also allows for examination of the interpretation of the common 
law concepts to gauge the level of uniformity in interpretation.      
The countries are also chosen because they offer a plethora of easily accessible material to make 
the comparisons. It is recognised that countries on the same developmental index and with 
similar legal history and system, especially African countries, may have been preferred. However, 
there is a dearth of materials on the application of the CISG in these countries. 
The comparative approach of the CISG in other systems thus allowed for a distillation of the 
potential problems and pitfalls, which Nigeria may face, where the CISG is adopted based on the 
experiences of the Convention in different jurisdictions. This provides a platform for the proper 




 The thesis adopts a conceptual style analysis. Thus, for every analysis or example gleaned from 
countries situation regarding the CISG, there is a conceptual analysis based on the existence of 
the Convention in Nigeria. This allows for practical evaluation and for appreciation of potential 
problems, which might be experienced in Nigeria.  
1.5 Research Design 
The research adopts both the qualitative and quantitative research methods. Adopting both 
methods whilst enabling the rich and context specific answers, allowed for measurement of the 
disposition of the stakeholders towards the CISG. Qualitatively it combines doctrinal, problem, 
and law reform categories of research. This is because the thesis examines the CISG, the 
problems affecting its application in various jurisdictions and the proposal for law reform in 
Nigeria. Since the thesis seeks to understand why the CISG has not been adopted in Nigeria, it 
seemed indispensable that the opinions of stakeholders are sought. This is in accordance with the 
core feature of qualitative research methods, that ‘satisfactory explanations of social activities 
require a substantial appreciation of the perspectives, culture and worldviews of the actors 
involved’.8  
As the thesis sought to gain a detailed insight into the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG 
in Nigeria, the semi structured interview method was chosen because it allowed a great deal of 
leeway in how the respondents replied. The synergy built from comments amongst key 
stakeholders from different legal arena in Nigeria resulted in insightful results. As evidenced by 
the interview questions attached, questions did not necessarily follow the interview guide as some 
of the following questions were asked following the responses of the interviewees.  
The quantitative research design particularly, surveys were employed in the thesis to measure the 
level of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria, the level of dissatisfaction with the current trade law 
and the disposition of legal practitioners towards the CISG.  
1.5.1 Sample  
The sample process adopted for the interview and survey is the non-probability sampling 
technique. 
i. Interview Sample 
The fieldwork exercise, which involved the researcher conducting a total of 33 semi-structured 
interviews, was done to gain the opinion and perspectives of stakeholders. Purposive sampling, 
                                                          




based on interviewing people relevant to the research questions was adopted. 9 Respondents 
included academics, legal practitioners, directors of relevant government parastatals and 
international organisations.   
The academics were chosen based on their teaching specialisation whilst the directors were from 
particular parastatals; Ministry of Trade and Investment, 10  Department of International and 
Comparative Law, Ministry of Justice, 11  Manufacturers Association of Nigeria and the 
UNCITRAL.12  
The DICL is responsible for vetting international agreements and overseeing the ratification of 
international agreements. As a result of their responsibilities and experience, they were able to 
provide relevant information on Nigeria’s non-adoption of the CISG. Representatives from the 
FMTI charged with formulating and implementing policies and programmes to attract 
investment, boost industrialization, increase trade and exports, and develop enterprises were 
chosen because their responsibilities meant that they liaise with the SMEs and therefore 
understand their needs, whilst also serving as a conduit between the Nigerian people and the 
international trade community. This makes them best suited to offer knowledge from varied 
perspectives on the reasons why uniform laws such as the CISG have not been adopted in 
Nigeria. 
The legal practitioners were chosen because of their experience in international trade practice 
and their representation of Nigerian traders. Their area of practice, international trade and 
commercial law was germane in making the choice. The legal practitioners interviewed were 
from nine law firms recognised as having expertise in corporate and commercial law.13 As a 
result of their exposure to the dynamics of contractual agreements, they provided information on 
the bargaining strengths of each transacting party. They were also able to provide insights on the 
problems with trade and the 1893 SGA in Nigeria.  
The specialisation of the legal academics enabled them to provide details of the gaps in the 
frameworks and the problems of ratification from an academic perspective. 
                                                          




13 The following firms recognised as top commercial firms were contacted Olaniwun Ajayi, Banwo & Ighodalo, 
Aluko & Oyebode, G. Elias, Ajumogobia & Okeke, Streamsowers & Kohn, Aelex, Punuka Firm, Olawoyin & 
Olawoyin, Alliance Law firm. See Chambers & Partners, 




The UNCITRAL was chosen because of its experience working with African countries and the 
ability to provide information on the hindrances to adoption of the CISG. The organisation was 
also chosen because the staff experience meant that they could provide suggestions on ways to 
promote the CISG and show its advantages to developing countries.  
The MAN, which is the collective voice for manufacturers in Nigeria, and the Nigerian 
Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture, 14  the umbrella 
organisation for all the State and Bilateral Chambers of Commerce within Nigeria,15 a private 
initiative that seeks to create an investment friendly environment in Nigeria through formulating, 
making known and influencing general policy in regard to industrial labour, social, legal, training, 
and technical matters were interviewed. As a forum for manufacturers in the private sector to 
formulate and articulate policy suggestions that would be complementary to government’s 
efforts at policy formulation,16 they were able to provide insights on the problems faced by 
traders in international trade transactions.  
The positions, specialisations and responsibilities of the stakeholders made them the most 
suitable candidates for the interview, particularly in light of the objectives of the thesis. This and 
their willingness to participate in the study and to give informed consent for use of the data 
made them the best choice of participants.  
ii. Survey Sample 
The survey was chosen to augment the data obtained from the interview. In line with the 
research objectives, particularly with regards to the conceptual analysis of the CISG in Nigeria, it 
sought to measure the level of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria, the likelihood and willingness 
of the actors to engage with the Convention. In order to do this, sample was taken from legal 
practitioners in the top commercial law firms in Lagos, Nigeria. The measure made on the 
sample obtained is used to estimate the general level of awareness and disposition of commercial 
lawyers in Nigeria towards the CISG. 96 questionnaires were distributed amongst the legal 
practitioners in the commercial law sector, and 71 responses were received. The surveys 
distributed amongst the legal practitioners in the law firms were based on their availability at the 
time the questionnaires were administered. This is one of the shortcomings of the data collection 
process, as some of the intended respondents were away at the time of distribution. The number 
                                                          
14 Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA). 
15  Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (KADCCIMA), 
KADCCIMA http://www.kadccima.org.ng/content/nigerian-association-chambers-commerce-industry-mines-and-
agriculture  accessed 22 January 2014.   




of responses obtained was out of the researcher’s control as she was given a specific date and 
time to distribute the questionnaires. The sample size was a compromise between the resources 
and the need for generalisable results. Considering that the questionnaires were distributed 
amongst at least seven of the top ten commercial law firms in Nigeria, the number of responses 
gotten can be considered representative of the opinions of the practitioners in commercial in 
Nigeria.   
1.5.2 Sample Size 
i. Interview  
The 32 interviews were conducted in Nigeria, (Lagos and Abuja) and 1 interview online via 
Skype. The breakdown of the interviewees is as follows: 
a. Twenty Five legal practitioners practicing in the corporate and commercial law (some 
are academics) 
b. Six academics teaching in commercial law 
c. Two officers from the Ministry of Trade Nigeria  
d. One legal officer with the UNCITRAL 
e.  One assistant director from The Department of International and Comparative Law, 
Federal Ministry of Justice Nigeria  
f. One Acting director of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria  
 
For the representatives of the government agencies and international organisations, their 
positions ensured that not more than one person was needed since they have the authority and 
information to speak on behalf of the organisation or body, which they represent. This made it 
needless to corroborate their interviews.   
The twenty-five legal practitioners interviewed, not only fits within the acceptable number for 
publishing a qualitative research,17 their opinions had reached theoretical saturation. One of the 
challenges faced was in respect to obtaining interviews from the legal academia. Although the 
interviews had been scheduled weeks ahead, when they were supposed to take place, the 
National University Commission had just declared a strike in Nigeria and therefore, most of the 
academics were not available for the interview. Thus, the author acknowledges that data obtained 
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with respect to the academics is not representative, given that the institutions were on strike at 
the time the data was obtained.18 
ii. Survey  
Given the time and resources, 96 questionnaires were distributed amongst the legal practitioners 
in the commercial law sector, however, 71 responses were received.  
1.6 Data Collection Process 
i. Interviews  
The semi-structured interview was employed as the data collection instrument for the purposes 
of the research. It allowed for an in depth discussion on the opinions and views of the 
respondents. Although an interview guide was utilised, because of the flexibility associated with 
the semi-structured interviews, the questions were not regimented. The follow up questions 
allowed for clarification of certain points though leading to less harmony since different 
participants raised different issues.  
The researcher travelled to Nigeria in June 2013 and December 2013 to conduct the interviews. 
All the interviews took place from June 2013 to February 2014. The face to face interviews were 
conducted in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria. The telephone interviews were conducted in Lagos and 
Abuja, Nigeria and Durham, whilst the Skype interview was conducted in Durham, England.  
The participant information sheet was read and signed by all the interviewees before each 
interview. By signing the consent form, they agreed that interviewee was their choice, they 
understood that the thesis would be made publicly available, that the interview would be 
recorded and that their names could be used in the thesis.19    
The interview started with the researcher introducing herself, the aims and objectives of the 
study, provision of the participant information sheet and affording them the opportunity to ask 
any questions or voice their concerns before the interview. The interview then proceeded with 
the questions set out with each interview lasting from about 45 to 120 minutes.  
ii. Surveys  
The researcher used the questionnaires to garner answers on issues dealt with in the research. 
The questions were constructed to elicit information on the awareness of the CISG amongst the 
                                                          
18 Charles Abah and Others, ‘Parents, Students Jubilate as ASUU Ends 169-Day Strike’ (The Punch, 18 December 
2013) http://www.punchng.com/news/parents-students-jubilate-as-asuu-ends-169-day-strike/ accessed 8 February 
2015. Six people in the legal academia in Nigeria were interviewed, because of the on-going University strike which 
was called off subsequently in December 2013. 




legal practitioners. Two main kinds of questions were adopted; open-ended and pre-coded. The 
open-ended questions were adopted where the researcher had no idea what the answers would 
be and thus left them up to the respondents for instance ‘where, when and how did you hear of 
the CISG?’ However, a majority of the questions were pre-coded, providing a list of answers 
from which to choose. Attitude scales were adopted, giving the respondents the opportunity to 
choose options that best described their disposition towards the Convention amongst other 
measures. This was done to evaluate the level of acceptance, likelihood and willingness to 
engage with CISG where it is adopted. The attitude scale allowed for gradation in responses and 
minimisation of bias by covering the same range of positive and negative evaluations.  
The researcher was given a specific date and time to administer the questionnaires, which were 
in paper format. In some cases they were handed out by the researcher to respondents whilst in 
other cases, they were handed to administrative staff or legal practitioner in the law firms and 
the researcher waited or was asked to come on a specific day to collect the responses. As a result, 
even where the researcher noticed some unanswered question, probably because of lack of 
understanding of the question by the respondent thus, requiring clarity, there was no 
opportunity to clarify. This was part of the limitation of the survey. Other limitations include the 
lack of availability of some of the participants and the lack of response to some of the question 
1.7 Original and Significant Contribution to Knowledge  
Legal scholarship within the area of the CISG, have addressed reasons why countries such as 
South Africa, United Kingdom etc. have not adopted the Convention. A perusal of these articles 
suggests distinctive reasons for the non-adoption of the Convention in particular jurisdictions. 
Despite the plethora of articles in this regard, there are none examining the reasons for the non-
adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. Bearing in mind the distinction and particularism of each 
country, such as development level, one cannot adopt a one size fits all cap approach in 
explaining the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in countries, even countries with 
geographical proximity. Thus, there is a gap in legal scholarship, in that no article provides the 
reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria.  
In light of the above, the thesis sought to fill the gap in extant literature, and contribute to legal 
scholarship in the area of the CISG, by undertaking an in-depth study on the reasons for the 
non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. The thesis makes an original contribution by providing a 
holistic understanding on the reasons why the CISG has not been adopted in Nigeria. This 
understanding is gained through empirical and theoretical exploration. Empirically, qualitative 




the Convention and their reasons for non-adoption. Quantitative research (surveys) is adopted to 
establish the level of awareness and attitude of key players in Nigeria towards the Convention, 
and whether or not the Convention is needful in Nigeria. 
The research has several practical and policy implications. As there is currently no uniform 
international trade law governing international sale of goods in Nigeria, the thesis has made a call 
for the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. This call is made on the basis of a comparative analysis, 
which demonstrates the compatibility of the CISG with the Nigerian sales law (1893 SGA) and 
in the Nigerian trade environment. 
The thesis further makes an original contribution by providing a conceptual analysis of the effect 
of transplanting the CISG in Nigeria, i.e. its effects on actors and different juridical institutions in 
Nigeria. It is shown that the CISG as a legal framework, addresses issues with respect to 
international trade faced by Nigerian traders, provides a sturdy framework, which can be used to 
address these issues, and puts them on par with their foreign counterparts.   
 The thesis has drawn from the experience of the CISG in other jurisdiction on actors, and 

















             The CISG 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the CISG by providing a brief history of the Convention and assessing its 
success. A historical analysis is important in order to understand the reasons, goals and aims of 
the Convention, which provides an understanding of why the CISG may be a useful tool for 
international trade in Nigeria. Thus, the reasons for undertaking such endeavour, the drafting 
process of the Convention are examined. The emergence of, composition of and methodology 
adopted by the Commission, UNCITRAL, is also examined in order to establish the level of 
representation of countries worldwide and degree of neutrality of the substantive provisions of 
the Convention. The scope and structure of the CISG is analysed in order to understand the 
effects of the drafting style for Nigeria. 
The chapter also examines the claims of success of the Convention based on the number of 
adoptions,1 the percentage of coverage of world trade2 and its increasing applicability by States 
and arbitral tribunals.3 Concededly, these parameters may be indicative of ‘success.’ However, 
other vital parameters on which the success of the CISG must be measured against, are necessary 
to determine the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. This is done in order to determine whether 
the Convention can be considered a success, and as such suitable for Nigeria. 
2.2 Harmonisation and Unification Concepts 
The concepts of unification and harmonisation have been recognised by scholars as being 
different, although they arguably have meeting points. The CISG may be considered an 
embodiment of the two concepts. However, the meanings of the two concepts shall be explored 
to arrive at this conclusion. 
                                                          
1  Currently there are 83 states that have ratified the CISG, The Pace CISG Database 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html accessed 27 April 2014. 
2 John C Kleefeld, ‘Rethinking "Like a Lawyer:" An Incrementalist's Proposal for First-Year Curriculum Reform’ 
(2003) 53 (2) Journal of Legal Education 254, 262; Michael van Alstine, ‘Dynamic Treaty Interpretation’ (1998) 146 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 687, 689 in Franco Ferrari, ‘What Sources of Law for Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods? Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG’ (2005) 25 International Review of Law and 
Economics 314, 315. 




Unification may be considered as ‘the adoption by States of common legal standard governing 
particular aspects of international business transactions’ 4  or “the intentional introduction of 
identical legal rules in two or more legal systems”.5 For Kamba, it signifies “the process whereby 
two or more different legal provisions or systems are supplanted by a single provision or system; 
it creates an identity of legal provisions or systems”6 and for Kastely, unification means “to 
subject people around the world to a single set of rules and principles and to have them 
understand and conform to these rules and principles as they would to the law of their own 
communities”. 7  Crystallizing these definitions Osborne concludes that for the existence of 
unification, “there has to be the intentional substitution of domestic laws in two or more 
jurisdictions by a single, international-based, body of norms, which is interpreted and applied 
uniformly”.8 
Based on the goals and aims of the CISG, there is no doubt that it can be considered a uniform 
law, at least within the meaning of unification of law above. For one, the CISG establishes a 
common legal standard for governing international transactions worldwide, through a framework.  
Thus where it is adopted in Nigeria, it will subject traders in Nigeria and their foreign 
counterparts to a single set of rules and principles with the expectation that they will conform to 
these rules. Secondly, it will replace the domestic laws currently governing international trade 
where the parties opt for it. Consequently, it will supplant the domestic laws of traders in Nigeria 
and abroad in any international trade transaction, albeit choicely.   
Harmonisation on the other hand ‘implies a state of consonance or accord; the combination or 
adaptation of parts, elements or related things, so as to form a consistent and orderly whole.9 It 
is also ‘a process in which diverse elements are combined or adapted to each other so as to form 
a coherent whole while retaining their individuality’ 10 and further it is‘…effectuating an 
                                                          
4  D Sridhar Patnaik and Fabrizio Lala, ‘Issues of Harmonisation of Laws on International Trade from the 
Perspective of UNCITRAL: The Past and The Current Work’ http://works.bepress.com/sridhar/10/ 
5 Bogdan M, Comparative Law (1994) in Philip James Osborne, ‘Unification or Harmonisation: A Critical Analysis 
of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980’ 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/osborne.html     
6 W J Kamba, ‘Comparative Law’ (1974) 23 International and Comparative Law quarterly 485, p.501 in Philip James 
Osborne, ‘Unification or Harmonisation: A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods 1980’ http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/osborne.html     
7 A H Kastely, ‘Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations Sales Convention’ (1988) 
8 Northwestern Journal of International and Business Law 574. 
8 Philip James Osborne, ‘Unification or Harmonisation: A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980’ http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/osborne.html 
assessed 25/01/ 2012. 
9  J.A.H. Murray, H. Bradley, W.A. Craigie et al., eds., The Online Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/84303?redirectedFrom=harmony#eid accessed 25 January 2012. 





understanding about the significance of certain concepts, on certain modes of rule formulation, 
and on the recognition of authoritative sources’.11 
Goldring describes the process of harmonisation as one under which ‘… the effects of a type of 
transaction in one legal system are brought as close as possible to the effects of similar 
transactions under the laws of other countries’.12 Harmonisation is also a flexible concept which 
may in one context mean ‘that the relevant law of the jurisdictions involved is characterized by a 
high degree of similarity in basic principles but not detailed provisions.13 
From the above, harmonisation of law seems to be a less precise concept than unification of law. 
Distinguishing harmonisation from unification, Glenn states regarding harmonisation 
Uniformity of result is not its goal, since law is conceived in terms of process 
rather than result and variable results are entirely compatible with the process 
sought to be created. They may even be viewed as essential in demonstrating 
the lack of substantive bias of the system. The harmonisation, which takes 
place, is therefore of the intellectual cadre within which legal deliberation takes 
place – of broad concepts, of language and of structures. Given a broad and 
harmonious legal cadre the distinction between national and international 
cases becomes difficult. Sources are used within the cadre according to their 
merit, with no close regard for their formal and geographic point of origin or 
for the geographic locus of the dispute to be resolved. Authority within the 
cadre is largely persuasive, since communication is facilitated and no single 
solution is judged worthy of official consecration in definitive, formal fashion. 
Laws are thus not seen as conflicting; they simply co-exist as potential 
sources.14     
From the above, the CISG tends towards unification than harmonisation since it requires the 
adoption of a codified common legal standard by state parties, requiring uniform application and 
any individuation of its principles by interpreters defeats the purpose and aim sort to be achieved 
                                                          
11 René David, ‘The Methods of Unification’ (1968) 16 (1/2) American Journal of Comparative Law 13-27, 15 see 
also René David, ‘The International Unification of Private Law’ in (1971) International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
vol.2 (1971), 34-35, 29. 
12 John Goldring, ‘Unification and Harmonization of the Rules of Law” (1976-77). 9 Fed L.R 108.  
13. R.C.C. Cuming, “Harmonisation of Law in Canada: An Overview,” in the Report entitled “Perspectives on the 
Harmonization of Law in Canada” (1985). Martin Boodman, ‘The Myth of Harmonization of Law’ (1991) 39 (4) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 699-724, 702    
14 H. Patrick Glenn, “Unification of Law, Harmonization of Law and Private International Law”, in Liber Memorialis 




by the drafters. Harmonisation on the other hand, depending on the context, allows for more 
flexibility and tolerates the difference between individual laws and their processes, which is 
minimally tolerated in the interpretation of the CISG. However, one cannot categorically 
discountenance some of the qualities of the CISG, which draws from the core definition of 
harmonisation. For instance, since harmonisation as construed in the legal literature, arises 
exclusively in comparative law and particularly in conjunction with inter-jurisdictional, private 
transactions,15 the CISG for the fact that it applies solely to inter-jurisdictional contracts, can be 
seen as a harmonisation endeavour. 
Though differences exist in these two concepts and the CISG draws more from unification 
concepts, it must be recognised these concepts are still related and may be used interchangeably 
in reference to the CISG, since their distinction is really to the extent to which they 
accommodate variation. Thus, since all harmonisation efforts are characterised by a certain level 
of degree and scope, the degree to which all a harmonisation requirement continues to tolerate 
difference, known as the harmonisation ‘margin’,16 is the determinant of the classification of the 
CISG. The CISG may be considered a merger of both concepts since absolute uniformity among 
sovereign nations is an impossible goal and functional uniformity, which the Convention aims at, 
is what is more attainable. This is more the case since functional uniformity is really a 
compromise, which consequently results in harmonisation thus, one may find that in such cases 
the concept of unification becomes absorbed by harmonisation.17 This similarity in concepts of 
harmonisation and unification terminologies as it applies to the CISG is relevant in making a 
case for the adoption of the Convention in Nigeria since it may aid towards a better 
understanding of the perceived shortcomings of the Convention, i.e. inability to attain absolute 
uniformity. Thus, what may be construed as deterrent to the adoption of the Convention in 
Nigeria can really be employed as a measure for success, where the CISG can be considered a 
successful harmonisation endeavour and to that extent, a case can still be made for the CISG. 
This is even more the case if one considers that in most harmonisation instances margins of 
tolerance are implicitly or explicitly allowed and in the case of the Convention, since there are no 
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American Journal of Comparative Law 699-724, 702 
16  David W. Leebron, ‘Claims for Harmonisation: A Theoretical Framework’ 
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accessed 15/04/2014 at 72. He states that the unification of law or the adoption of uniform law is harmonisation 
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17 Philip James Osborne, ‘Unification or Harmonisation: A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Convention on 





harmonised institutions or any court with superior authority, it implicitly allows differences in 
implementation and effect, at least to a reasonable degree. Despite the meeting points between 
the two concepts, maintaining the distinction is a necessity as a tool for evaluating the success of 
the CISG, since unification remains an ideal to be striven for through the vehicle of 
harmonisation,18 and laws such as the CISG may be measured in terms of unification. 
2.2.1 Tracing the Harmonisation and Unification of Trade Law   
The international process of assimilating diverse legal systems goes back in history with two 
notable precedents, the common law and Roman law, which have become legal systems of a 
large of the world, either by conquest or settlement. Nigeria shares the common law legal 
traditions with other colonies conquered by the Great Britain. To that extent, Nigeria is no 
stranger to harmonious legal standards. With regards to international transactions, the existence 
of harmonious laws equally dates back. Trade existed in many merchant clans like the 
Phoenicians, Jews and Lombards in the West and they all had special rules that were effectively 
binding without the sanction of any specific nation state.19 These rules were both respected by 
the common law and continental courts as having some element of lex mercatoria or a derivative 
of natural law absorbed into local laws. Based on this, it may not necessarily be right to attribute 
most of the work on harmonisation and unification solely to lawyers and legislators but may be 
attributable to the result of private rule making, universally accepted through custom and 
contract which imperfectly finds its way into formal national and international law.20 This fact is 
supported when one considers the stages of development of international trade law which 
comprise firstly, the appearance of universally accepted rules in the form of medieval lex 
Mercatoria, then the incorporation of these rules into the municipal laws of various national states 
which succeeded the feudal stratification of mediaeval society and the more contemporary third 
stage, which consists of the development of widely accepted legal concepts.21 The stages of 
                                                          
18 Philip James Osborne, ‘Unification or Harmonisation: A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980’ http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/osborne.html  
accessed 27/01/2012. 
19
 Arthur Rossett, ‘Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial 
Law’ (1992) 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 683, 685. 
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Good examples are the Banker’s Rules dealing with documentary letters of credit. See Uniform Customs and 
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The culmination of the development in the second stage was the adoption in France of the Code de Commerce of 
1807 preceded by the Ordonnance sur le commerce of Louis XIV of 1673 and Colbert’s Ordonnance de le marine of 1681, in 




development are indicative of the fact that concepts found in the CISG are universally accepted 
concepts, which later diffused into domestic jurisdictions. This also shows that the similarities 
transcends the division of the world between countries of free enterprise and countries of 
centrally planned economies, legal families of civil and common law origins.22 This is indicative 
of the fact that international trade laws are concepts which are universally known and may 
possibly be well understood and easily adaptable in domestic jurisdictions, which means that the 
laws embodied in the CISG make for easier understanding by the interpreters whether in 
developed or developing countries. 
2.2.2 The CISG as a Harmonisation and Unification Endeavour in light of Art 
7(1) and (2) 
Art 7(1) states ‘in the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith in international trade’. Through this provision it is recognised that the international 
character of the Convention and the need to promote uniformity in its application are the basic 
criteria for the interpretation of the Convention. The observance of good faith is also recognised 
within the subsection. The recognition of the international character of the CISG is one of its 
most important element given the fact that it not only stresses the character of the Convention 
and its overarching goal of uniform application, but also describes the process by which those 
called upon to apply the Convention to a particular case ascertain the meaning and legal effect to 
be given to its individual articles. The principle of good faith under the CISG may be used when 
considering the facts of certain cases to persuade a court to depart from a settled interpretation 
of the Convention and thus run contrary to uniformity, if only because its meaning and scope are 
so unclear. 
Creating a uniform law such as the CISG is one step in achieving uniformity because the 
subsequent uniform application and interpretation is the true judgment of the unifying effort. 
When dealing with a piece of legislation such as the CISG, however, that has been prepared and 
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22 Clive M Schmitthoff, ‘The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and Operation’ in The Sources of 
the Law of International Trade with special reference to East-West Trade, edited by Clive M Schmitthoff (New York, Praeger, 
1964), p.3 in Progressive development of the law of international trade 
Official Records of the General Assembly - Meetings of the Sixth Committee A/6396 - Report to the Secretary 
General ("The Schmitthoff Study") (document ultimately was support for the creation of UNCITRAL) accessed 




agreed upon at international level and has been incorporated into many diverse national legal 
systems, interpretation becomes far more uncertain and problematic because there is no 
equivalent international legal infrastructure.  
The CISG was given an autonomous, self-supporting nature by its drafters. Undoubtedly, 
interpretive problems arise out of international laws such as the CISG especially because in the 
field of commercial law there is a proportional relationship that exists between issues of 
interpretation of the Convention. Principles of interpretation could be borrowed from the law of 
the forum or the law, which according to the rules of private international law would have been 
applicable in the absence of uniform law. Where any of these options are considered, they would 
result in different interpretations and implementation of the CISG, leading to dissonance in 
uniformity and promotion of forum shopping. Such a result would undermine the purpose of 
the uniform legislation and defeat the reasons for its existence.23  
Considering that article 7(1) declares that an autonomous approach to the interpretation of the 
CISG must be considered given its international character and purpose, interpreters must thus 
understand that although the Convention has been adopted in the national legal systems, its 
international nature must be borne in mind. 
The international character of the CISG also means that the terms and concepts of the CISG 
must be interpreted autonomously of meanings that might traditionally be attached to them 
within national legal systems. To have regard to the CISG's international character means that 
the interpreter should not apply domestic law to solve the interpretative problems raised in the 
CISG. The reading of the CISG in light of the concepts of the interpreter's domestic legal system 
would be a violation of the requirement that the CISG be interpreted with regard to its 
international character. In the CISG, the elements of internationality and uniformity are inter-
related thematically and structurally because of their position in the same Part and Article of the 
Convention, functionally because an autonomous approach to interpretation is necessary for the 
functioning of both, and inter-dependently because the existence of one is a necessary 
prerequisite for the existence of the other. The international, rather than national, interpretation 
is necessary in order for uniformity in the application of the CISG to be achieved, and 
uniformity of application is vital if the CISG is to maintain its international character.24  
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The ultimate aim of the CISG, and arguably the reason for its existence, is to achieve the 
broadest degree of uniformity in the law for international sales transactions.25 Its adoption by the 
Contracting States is a necessary but insufficient step towards this aim. What is also necessary is 
that the CISG, once incorporated into the various domestic legal systems, is read, interpreted, 
and understood in the same uniform way by all its users, in any of the Contracting States. 
The third element of article 7(1) promotes the observation of good faith in international trade. 
Some commentators have insisted on the literal meaning of the provision and conclude that the 
principle of good faith is nothing more than an additional criterion to be used by judges and 
arbitrators in the interpretation of the CISG. Thus, good faith is merely a tool of interpretation 
at the disposal of the judges to neutralise the danger of reaching inequitable results. Using the 
concept of good faith as interpretation as a mere instrument of interpretation, good faith can 
pose problems in achieving the ultimate goal of the CISG - uniformity in its application - 
because the concept of good faith has not only different meanings between different legal 
systems but also multiple connotations within legal systems.  
Another suggestion is that the duty to observe good faith in international trade is also applicable 
to the parties to each individual contract of sale.26 This however implies that interpreters of the 
CISG are not only judges or arbitrators but the contracting parties as well.27 
It has been suggested that the reference to good faith in international trade should be considered 
in light of the functional value of the qualification ‘in international trade.’ This is because the 
principle of good faith may not be applied according to the standards ordinarily adopted within 
the different national systems, and secondly the principle of good faith as expressed in the CISG 
must be construed in light of the special conditions and requirements of international trade.28 
The CISG attempts to provide a uniform body of law applicable to international sale 
transactions. It does not constitute an exhaustive body of rules, however, and thus does not 
provide solutions for all the problems that can originate from an international sale transaction. 
Given this, Article 7(2) states ‘Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which 
are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which 
it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of 
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the rules of private international law.’ This provision was drafted to deal with problems of 
incomplete body of rules. Gaps in the CISG, where not resolved, threaten the uniformity and 
autonomy of the CISG’s interpretation. These gaps must be resolved by interpretation of the 
CISG. Given that uniformity is the goal of the CISG, it is important that in resolving these gaps, 
the courts would refrain from resorting to the different domestic laws and try to find a solution 
within the Convention itself. The gap filling analysis does not apply to the matters excluded from 
the scope or application of the Convention (intra legem), they must be gaps praeter legem (matters 
governed by the Convention but not expressly resolved).29 
2.2.3 Evolution of the CISG 
The process of unification of international trade law dates back to the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century in Europe with efforts intensified after the First World War. This began to 
take place under the auspices of the League of Nations and intergovernmental bodies; The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, the International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law, and the Sixth International Conference of American States, held at Havana in 
1928.30 Ernst Rabel submitted a preliminary report on the possibilities of sales law unification on 
the February 21 1929 and on April 29 1930, a committee with representatives from different 
legal systems was constituted. Although the first draft of the uniform sales law was presented by 
Rabel in 1936, the World War II halted any further work on the unification. The diplomatic 
conference held by the Dutch government on the unification of sales law at The Hague 
established a singular commission tasked with ensuring progressive development of the 
unification effort. Following subsequent meetings in the 1950s, a draft substantive law was 
produced in 1956, which engineered efforts by the UNIDROIT to create a uniform international 
sales law. In 1958, a draft was presented and subsequently distributed amongst governments and 
inputs and suggestions were considered in the revised draft of 1963.31  
2.2.3  The Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (ULF) and the Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods 
(ULIS)  
Based on the work done before and after the Second World War, the ULF and the ULIS were 
birthed at The Hague on 1 July 1964 where they opened for signature and entered into force on 
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30 UNGA Twentieth Session ‘Unification of the Law of International Trade: A Note by the Secretariat’ Document 
A/C.6/L.572 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1968-70-e/vol1-p13-17-e.pdf accessed 21 March 
2014. 
31 Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, ‘The CISG - Successes and Pitfalls’ Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal 




18th August 1972. 32  The two Conventions, precursors to the CISG, served as underlying 
documents for the elaboration of the CISG. They however did not fulfil the expectations of the 
drafters since they garnered only nine ratifications, with just two States being non-European, 
despite the attendance of twenty-eight at the conference.33 This was because they reflected too 
exclusively the practices and concerns of Europe. Thus, developing countries and socialist bloc 
countries were sceptical about Conventions drafted by mainly industrialised nations.34 Secondly, 
there were a number of deficiencies in the material stipulations of the Conventions for instance; 
there were insufficient provisions on the transport of goods by sea and on the particular 
questions and problems connected with that mode of transport.35 Furthermore, the ULIS used 
abstract concepts, which could easily result in ambiguity and error that could not be understood 
by businessmen and the scope of application was considered too broad, as it was to apply 
regardless of conflict of rules.36 
The ‘failure’ of the ULIS and the ULF served as significant lessons on the importance of equal 
participation by all countries in the drafting of laws such as this. Interviews carried out amongst 
legal practitioners and Ministerial bodies’ reveal developing countries such as Nigeria are wary of 
laws, which have been drafted to their exclusion. However, it is suggested that this fear need not 
affect the decision on the ratification of the CISG in Nigeria since the history of the drafting of 
the Convention reveals that this factor was taken into account thus, ensuring equal participation 
and decision by countries from different legal families and development status.  
Despite the fate of The Hague Conventions, they played central roles in the drafting and 




                                                          
32 Belgium, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, The Netherlands, San Marino and the United 
Kingdom. Muna Ndulo, ‘The Vienna Sales Convention 1980 and the Hague Uniform Laws on International Sale of 
Goods 1964: A Comparative Analysis’ (1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
33 ibid; Sieg Eiselen, ‘Adoption of the Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods (the CISG) in South 
Africa’(1999) 116 South African Law Journal, Part II 323,334.  
34 Paul Lansing, 'The Change in American Attitude to the International Unification of Sales Law Movement and 
UNCITRAL' (1980) 18 American Business Law Journal 274; Peter Winship 'International Sales Contracts under the 
1980 Vienna Convention' (1984) 17 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 58.   
35   Mr Suy, ‘Speech by Temporary President’ United Nations Conference on Contracts For The International Sale 
Of Goods Vienna, 10 March-II April 1980 (Official Records) Documents of the Conference and Summary Records 
of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Main Committees 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-ocred-e.pdf 227 accessed 9 April 2014. 




2.2.4 The CISG  
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established by 
the General Assembly in 1966,37 with its main aim being the promotion of the progressive 
harmonisation and unification of the law of international trade. The request for the survey 
establishing the problems of the ULIS and ULF was recommended by the UNCITRAL at the 
first session in 1968. The replies submitted in 1969 revealed the flaws of The Hague 
Conventions. Based on the analysis of the replies, a working group consisting of 14 member 
States was set up to ascertain ‘which modifications of the existing terms might render them 
capable of wider acceptance by countries of different legal, social and economic systems or 
whether it will be necessary to elaborate a new text for that purpose’.38 The working group 
suggested the adoption of new texts.39  
A significant observation is regarding the constituency of the UNCITRAL at the time, consisting 
of seven seats from Africa, five from Asia, four from eastern European States, five from Latin 
American States and Eight from Western European States, was representative of the diverse 
legal families and their different levels of development. Amongst the African representatives 
included Nigeria.40 The above is evident that the CISG, which is a product of the UNCITRAL, is 
representative of the interests of both developed and developing countries. In recognition of the 
consideration for developing countries, several representatives pointed out the extreme 
importance for developing countries of devoting attention to, and participating in efforts 
towards the progressive development of the law of international trade, particularly, as stated in 
the document.   
Since developing countries were not able, by force of circumstance, to participate in numerous 
international institutions active in this field, their participation in such a United Nations organ, as 
had been proposed was particularly important to them…the Commission could be instrumental 
in improving trade practices that had evolved in the past which benefitted developed countries at 
the expense of developing countries.41 
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From the above, there is no doubt that the UNCITRAL took the failure of The Hague 
Conventions into account and in seeking to avoid its fate, reconstituted a more diverse body as 
members, and began the process of drafting of a new Convention which however was based on 
the texts of the Hague Convention. Commentators have suggested that a crucial factor to the 
success of the UNCITRAL is its varied composition. Not only were representatives experienced 
and versed in international trade law, some of them had participated in the drafting of the ULIS 
and ULF which provided continuity and experience in the unification process. The effect of the 
members from different backgrounds is reflected not only in the text of the CISG but also in the 
level of acceptance of the Convention.  
A first draft of the Convention on Sales was produced in January 1976 and subsequently ratified 
with some changes at the tenth conference of the UNCITRAL held in Vienna in May and June 
1977. Following this, the Draft Convention on Formation was deliberated on at the eleventh 
session of the UNCITRAL in 1978, and incorporated into the substantive sales law. The draft 
Convention was circulated amongst the governments of the UN members for opinions and 
comments, and this formed the basis for the work of the Vienna Conference. The circulation of 
the Draft among the members of the UN signifies consultation was sought from them and the 
input of every member was considered during the drafting of the CISG. This means that 
members were given the chance to voice any reservations or dissatisfactions, which they 
perceived to be detrimental to the State’s interests. This further emphasises the neutrality of the 
process of drafting the CISG and is also one of the advantages of the Convention for Nigeria. A 
fear for Nigeria in terms of ratifying the Convention may be the unfamiliarity with the 
terminology of the Convention. However, considering that Nigeria participated in the drafting 
process and consented to the draft presented is an advantage, because this involvement in the 
drafting process results in more familiarity with the wordings, and consequently more trust 
towards the representation of the CISG. Secondly, the words adopted in the drafting of the 
CISG reveal a purposeful elimination of domestic law ‘connotations in favour of non-legal 
earthy words’ which refer to physical acts. For instance, instead of connecting risk of loss with 
domestic concepts such as "property" or "title", risk passes when the goods are "handed over to 
the first carrier"; if the buyer is to come for the goods, risk passes when the buyer "takes over" 
the goods.42  
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During the drafting of the CISG, a fundamental measure of control was provided by the 
repeated review of multi-lingual drafts in UNCITRAL. Thus, delegations from other legal and 
linguistic systems voiced their concerns whenever it was perceived that a draft lacked clarity. 
Accordingly, ‘drafting in this setting imposed demanding standards for imagination, intellectual 
rigour and patience’.43 The linguistic thoroughness is advantageous for Nigerian traders because 
there is a need for the same level of understanding of concepts and terms for traders worldwide, 
whether trade is between Nigerians and Chinese or between Nigerians and the French.  
The integrity of the process of drafting the Convention is evident in its legislative history and this 
is particularly important for Nigeria because one of the criteria for acceptance of international 
Conventions is its neutrality and benefits to the Contracting State. Evidently, the CISG seems to 
accomplish this.  
2.3 Measuring the Success of the CISG  
Success can be defined as ‘the accomplishment of an aim or purpose’.44 From this definition, it 
may reasonably be inferred that for the term success to be conferred on any international 
uniform law, that law, must, have achieved, to an appreciable extent, its defined purpose(s). 
Accomplishment, in the context of the definition which means ‘an act or instance of carrying 
into effect; fulfilment’ is employed to examine the success of the Convention. The use of the 
word ‘carrying’ here, in defining accomplishment, suggests a continuous process.  
The CISG has set purposes and goals; however, their accomplishment can only be through 
actors ‘carrying’ out the mandates, in designated ways. As a continuous process, one must look at 
the definition in terms of process, not only as an achievement. That is, if and what is ‘constantly, 
continuously being done’ to achieve the goals of the CISG. As such, it may be limited to measure 
success only as an end in itself i.e. what has been accomplished. Thus, what is being done to 
accomplish the goals of the CISG, defines success. 
The Convention will be measured against the purposes it set out to accomplish, how it is 
accomplishing those goals and how the solutions for accomplishing those goals are. There is no 
singular accepted parameter for the measure of success of the CISG. Instead, it must be 
measured by various aims and standards holistically, to determine its success. Success therefore is 
a collective evaluation of the CISG against ‘accepted’ parameters and goals. And an examination 
of what is being done, the process and how effective they are in accomplishing the goals. 
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2.3.1 Measures of Success 
The section below measures the Convention against; the number of ratifications, the level of 
influence on law reform projects and the level uniformity. 
2.3.1.1 Number of Ratifications 
International treaties embody an agreement of a commonality between states, whilst their 
ratification shows the approval of the terms and willingness by States to bind themselves to such 
agreed provisions. Therefore, where a significant number of countries participate in the process 
of birthing an international agreement, subsequent ratification by a few or none of the 
participants is symptomatic of underlying problems, which may result in the treaty being classed 
a ‘failure.’  
Whilst one country’s lack of ratification of a Convention does not spell doom for instance, the 
lack of ratification of the CISG by the United Kingdom, a key player in world trade, has not 
resulted in its demise, lack of ratification by a good number of States may result in breakdowns 
or near breakdowns of international cooperation and in some cases, the outright death, of any 
particular international endeavour. 45  The ULIS and ULF, preceding the CISG, are clear 
attestations, though somewhat similar in scope and content to the CISG, they were considered 
failures for their abysmal number of ratifications. As ratification is indicative of acceptance of the 
terms contained in a document, the poor number of ratifications of these Conventions bared a 
disagreement by most States with the contents. 
Ratification by majority of countries was from the outset, a goal of the drafters of the CISG, 
especially considering the failure of the ULIS and ULF. With that in mind, the Convention was 
carefully drafted to accommodate and reflect practices universal to all countries. The acceptance 
of the CISG by a great number of countries signifies legislative success making it ‘the greatest 
legislative achievement in the field of uniform law in history’.46 It is also successful in terms of 
practical application. 47  The adoption also demonstrates agreement with the text of the 
Convention and the accommodation of the needs of countries from different legal backgrounds 
and varying levels of development. 
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The traditional benchmarks for defining successful uniform law instruments have been the 
achievement of consensus on binding legalistic rules, and subsequent ratification by States. For 
the UN, apart from the achievement on legal rules, ratification is a mark of a successful treaty. 
The CISG has been ratified by 83 states out of about 197 states worldwide. 78 of these are UN 
member states whilst 2, Macedonia and Moldova, non-UN member states have also ratified it. 
The ratification by non-member States of the UN is indicative of acceptance of the Convention’s 
neutral yet efficacious provisions and an awareness of the Convention’s representation of their 
interests. This is important considering that participation in the drafting process of any 
international convention is crucial in determining whether or not the Convention is ratified by a 
State.  
The ratio of non-ratification of the Convention to ratification by UN member states, about 2 to 
1, is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is suggestive that ratification of the CISG is 
not necessarily based on affiliations with the UN, but on a reasoned and logical acceptance of its 
usefulness for member States in encouraging seamless international trade transactions. Secondly, 
the CISG can be considered successful in the area of commercial law when measured against the 
number of ratification of other uniform commercial law conventions. The CISG is the second 
most ratified uniform convention in commercial law, after the New York Convention,48 which 
has 149 contracting states.49  
The graph below showing the irregular rates and times of ratification shows that the adoption of 
the CISG in states does not follow any pattern, and therefore cannot be attributed to the novelty 
of the Convention or pressure by the U.N to ratify it, but rather that it is a purposeful decision. 
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Figure 2.1  
As the graph above indicates, there is no particular order or trend of ratification. The year 1991 
records the highest number of ratifications and there are no particular reasons for this. Although 
this may be attributed to the recency of the CISG, the year which the CISG came into force, and 
the subsequent years 1989 and 1990, before 1991 were not as high. The graph also shows that no 
adoption was recorded in 2004 and 2008.50 There is no particular reason for the times and pace 
of ratification. This is indicative of independent decisions by States, not influenced by the 
novelty of the Convention to ratify it or pressure from the UN, saddled with other priorities.51  
The absence of influence by the UN to ratify the Convention is important because Nigeria 
should adopt the CISG based on the need for efficient trade. If the CISG is adopted in Nigeria 
because of pressure or incentives, but not usefulness, it may largely defeat the Convention’s 
purpose. Such adoption may result in superfluity of laws, convolutedness and cumbersomeness 
in a legal system, and more importantly confusion for users of the law. It is also likely that the 
law will be left to putrefy. There is also no need to ratify the Convention without cogent reasons 
if traders will invariably, opt of it. Thus, despite the success in terms of ratification of the CISG, 
it fails if traders regularly excluded it from their trade transactions.52 Furthermore, where laws are 
adopted because of pressure and influence without careful examination to determine the 
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compatibility of the law with the legal system, it results in contradiction with the local law. The 
fate of international laws adopted as a result of influence or pressure in Nigeria is fatal. 
Currently, there are over 200 international conventions and treaties, which Nigeria has signed on 
to but less than 15 have been properly ratified, putting the rest in legal limbo.53 These laws have 
no legitimacy and are not recognised in the court of law.54 This is a practice prevalent in Nigeria 
and must be avoided in the case of the CISG. Based on the above trend and reasons for 
ratification of the CISG in other countries, it is suggested that this will not be the case with the 
CISG in Nigeria, since there is no pressure of ratification and its recommendation is based on 
improving trade in Nigeria. 
Recent empirical evidence has shown that the rewards expected by states that ratify conventions 
because of other states or influence do not actually materialise.55 The absence of pressure means 
Nigeria can neutrally assess the usefulness of the Convention for international trade. This is also 
important because the adoption of the CISG would require that some measure of sovereignty be 
given up, for Nigeria, a compromise in this regard would be that the Convention will have 
‘greater vigour and strength’ than domestic sales law.56  
The prestige of countries that have ratified the CISG is also evidential of success. The top 
trading nations and powerful economies have ratified it, including China, the U.S, Germany, 
Japan, France, Netherland, Russia, Italy and South Korea, all except the U.K. This conveys 
acceptance and validation of its purposes and aims, consequently boosting the credibility of the 
treaty. This may act as a stimulus for developing countries such as Nigeria to ratify the CISG.  
The number of ratification is important for Nigeria, since an important criterion for the adoption 
of any law, is its usefulness. Where a particular international law meets the needs of a country, it 
is more likely for that country to adopt it and even more likely for other states to follow suit. 
States will not ratify a treaty ‘just because’. Therefore, the more countries have ratified the 
Convention, the more successful the Convention is perceived to be for Nigeria. Thus, the 
number of ratifications anecdotally may be an indicator of success.  
The adoption of the CISG by the major trading nations indicates success, because most of the 
export/import transactions concerning goods, carried out worldwide, are subject to the same set 
                                                          
53  Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, ‘Bilateral Ties: House Calls for Domestication/Ratification’ 
http://www.placng.org/new/main_story.php?sn=46 (PLAC) accessed 26 May 2014. 
54 Abacha v Fawehinmi (2000) 4 S.C (Pt II). 
55  The research is within the scope of human rights. Richard A Nielsen and Beth A Simmons, ‘Rewards for 
Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?’ 
http://www.mit.edu/~rnielsen/Rewards%20for%20Ratification_18jan2014.pdf accessed 02 May 2014. 




of rules. The Convention applies to two thirds of international trade,57 and the countries whose 
trade are regulated by the CISG are some of Nigeria’s important trading partners.58 Given the 
above, the Convention can be considered a success in terms of ratification. 
2.3.1.2 The CISG: A Successful Model for Law Reform  
The CISG is considered successful because it has been, and still is a paradigm for other 
international law projects and domestic law reforms, in commercial and general contract law in 
different continents, from the Asia to Africa and Europe. This confirms the Convention’s 
legislative success, since it represents neutrally and sufficiently, the distinctive characteristics of 
different legal families and variance in development. If the texts of the CISG were biased or 
carelessly drafted, it is suggested that it will not exert such influence.  
i. A Model for Domestic Law Reform  
a. The Scandinavian Reform 
For some countries, the Convention is both an instrument for cross border transactions and for 
domestic sales transactions. The Scandinavian States, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, except 
Denmark all reformed their domestic sales laws based on the CISG. Preparation for the CISG 
came at the time when the proposal for a new legislation was made in Sweden. It seemed 
practical to carry out a reform founded on the CISG, especially since the domestic laws were 
based on principles different to those of the CISG and would inevitably create confusion.59 In 
order to avoid setting up separate legal regimes all the Scandinavian States except Denmark 
opted for a revision of the national Sale of Goods Acts, bringing them in line with the system 
and most of the contents of the CISG. A new Sales of Goods Act came into force in Finland in 
1988, Norway in 1989, and Sweden in 1991, whilst Iceland adopted a new SGA similar to the 
Norwegian one in 2000.60 It seems that the conditions upon which Sweden adopted the CISG, at 
the epoch of revising their domestic sales law, is similar to the conditions and time of Nigeria 
currently. The motion for the reform of the 1893 SGA has been moved at the legislature; yet, 
nothing has been done towards reforming the Act. The need for reform of the 1893 SGA in 
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Nigeria makes this the right time to adopt the CISG because it would spur the efforts towards 
the reform of the Act whilst still functioning as the primary instrument for international trade 
transactions.   
In Sweden and Finland, the CISG was introduced alongside the domestic sales law, based on the 
CISG. Norway however went further by transforming the authentic CISG text into Norwegian 
and integrating both the domestic and international sales law into a single statutory instrument.61 
The adoption of the CISG in these countries was made subject to the effect, which exempts 
them as Contracting States with respect to Part II of the Convention on formation.62 Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark agreed to this apart from Iceland. This reservation was made because 
formation of contract was considered a matter of general contract law and should not require 
any particular rules for contract of sales.63 Thus they feared that the implementation of part II 
may create uncertainty as to whether a valid sales contract had been made.64 Further, it was 
perceived that the provisions of the CISG on contract formation are based on the 19th century 
contract conceptions. For instance, with regards to the issue of whether or when an offer may be 
revoked, the CISG adopts a position influenced chiefly by the common law. The right to revoke 
an offer seemed to be alien to the Scandinavian law, since virtually all promises and contracts are 
binding.65 
Although it is recognised that the promise in Scandinavian countries is binding in itself regardless 
of reliance of an undertaking to keep an offer open, the arguments above are hardly convincing 
because, the exceptions in paragraph (2) of Article 16 bridges the gap between the common law 
and Scandinavian law.66 The Scandinavian rules on contract formation are clearly distinguishable 
from the contract validity located in chapter III. Thus, the replacements of the domestic rules on 
contract validity in chapter I, with the international law (CISG part II) ‘hardly represent a greater 
threat to certainty than the Scandinavian ratifications of CISG Part III. 67  As suggested by 
Ramberg, the rules in Chapter 1 of the Contracts Act are not any more appropriate than articles 
14-24 of the CISG because Art. 3 of the CA, by providing for a reasonable time for acceptance 
when the parties have not determined a specific time for acceptance of an offer in writing, hardly 
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assists a merchant. There is hardly any way for the merchant to know with sufficient certainty 
whether there is still time to accept.68 Additionally, it is hardly appropriate for the Scandinavian 
States to rely on choice of law principles in order to determine whether there is a binding 
declaration or not. In cases where these States enter into contracts with other States that are 
parties to the CISG, where it is the seller situated in the non-Scandinavian State, the law will still 
apply despite the Article 92 declaration.69  
Nigeria need not make the reservations as it would result in the same dissonant situation. 
Particularly since rules of private international law will refer to the seller’s law and considering 
that Nigeria is an import driven economy, most of her cross border transactions will have the 
Nigerian trader as the buyer, potentially resulting in the situation where the Nigerian trader will 
be subjected to the laws of the seller, defeating the purpose of adoption of the CISG, balancing 
trade inequalities and bargaining strength. Another situation which emphasises the redundant 
nature of the reservation is where the other country, as the seller has ratified the CISG. Where 
the reservation is made and the seller’s law is applicable, the CISG becomes the applicable law 
regardless of the reservation. 
To the extent that the CISG adopts the common law approach to revocability with two 
exceptions,70 the Nigerian contract formation law is to a large extent compatible with the CISG.71  
To show that the perceived differences in the contract formation rules are not very significant 
and that they bring discordance, Denmark has recently abolished the Article 92 declaration 
stating that it had caused confusion regarding the applicable law for Danish companies as well as 
their business relationships abroad when drafting agreements.72 Norway and Sweden has also 
completed the process to become a party to the Part II of the CISG.73 
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There is also the neighbour state declaration, which excludes the application of the Convention 
in inter-Scandinavian sales.74 This was done in order to maintain the traditional status of the 
Scandinavian Sales Law. However, a requirement of the Article 94 declaration is that it is applied 
when rules of the reservation States are closely related. Considering this, it has been suggested 
that Denmark withdraw their reservation so that other Scandinavian States do not find 
themselves in situations leading to breach of their international obligations.75 Furthermore, the 
new sales statutes in Finland, Norway and Sweden have also moved in different directions and 
are no longer a homogenous group of jurisdictions which have closely related domestic sales law 
rules as otherwise required by CISG Article 94’.76 This provision will not be applicable in Nigeria 
since there are no regional trade laws subscribed to. Where Nigeria joins the OHADA in the 
future, the CISG still recognises the fact that regional laws are similar and parties have the right 
to contract out of the CISG.77 
Considering the above, the CISG may be used as a model for the reform of the Nigerian 1893 
SGA currently recommended for reform in the parliament. What is needful is that Nigerian 
domestic laws are brought in line with a modern trade framework, that operative laws are suited 
for international trade transactions and cater to the needs of the Nigerian trader.  
With respect to contract formation principles, the CISG provides principles better suited to the 
Nigerian trade environment than the common law principles. The flexibility offered by the 
Convention through Articles 18(3) and 8(3), which gives effect to the understanding that is 
derived from all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations and practices, 
which the parties have established within themselves, ensures that there is no compulsory 
‘stretching or amputation of a living understanding to fit the Procrustean bed of “offer” and 
“acceptance”.78  
Whilst the other Scandinavian countries chose to implement the CISG treaty obligation by 
incorporation of the authentic treaty text, meaning that the domestic and international sales law 
of these States are now located in separate statutes, Norway elected to transform the authentic 
Convention text thus creating a distinct Norwegian version of the CISG and contemporaneously 
places the transformed CISG rules together with the domestic law in a single statute.79 The 
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decision by the Norwegian legislators have been criticised and termed a ‘major mistake’ because 
the Act has become a ‘highly complex and difficult to understand’. 80   
Amongst the different methods of reforms adopted above, the better suggestion would be the 
method adopted by the other Scandinavian countries apart from Norway. There is no need to 
rewrite the CISG and merge it with the local sales law into one document. This may result in 
confusion regarding what is obtainable.81 Though it is suggested that the CISG serve as a model 
for law reform, enabling the local sales law to be drafted according to international standards, it 
is also important to create a favourable and sturdy framework, taking cognisance of, and 
reflecting the local situation and needs. Keeping them enshrined in distinct documents, no 
matter the level of similarity, ensures parties have a choice regarding the applicable law. More so, 
the CISG is not a perfect law and has compromised on certain standards which may not be as 
suited to local conditions as such, and may not contain ‘better rules, but better international 
rules’.82 Given the above, what is suggested is a reform of the SGA, drawing from the concepts 
of the CISG, which are necessary, but still retaining an independent domestic framework with 
distinctive concepts to reflect local needs.    
b. The German Reform 
The German Schuldrechtsreform (reform of the law of obligations), which begun in the 1980s,83 was 
strongly influenced by the ULIS and ULFIS, and later influenced by the CISG. Although the 
Hague Conventions were received sceptically, because they were different to the national sales 
law, 84  the CISG, gradually, met with more acceptance because it had received worldwide 
acceptance, through its adoption by a number of Germany’s trading partners, as opposed to the 
Hague Conventions. However, reform in line with the CISG did not come immediately after its 
adoption, the implementation of the Consumer Goods Directive strengthened the CISG-
influenced features of the new law.85 With the implementation of the EU Consumer Sales law on 
member States, the German legislators decided to modernise the German sales law completely. 
Apart from the need for uniformity in contract laws there were also economic benefits. The 
reform of the German laws was regarding conformity of goods. Under the German law, the 
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seller barely had any liability for non-conforming goods except in cases of fraud and 
noncompliance with qualities expressly guaranteed. However, with the CISG and the EU 
Consumer Sales law making the seller more liable, the need for an adjustment became evident. 
Following consultations regarding the modernisation of the whole system of remedies, a system 
similar, but not an exact duplicate of the CISG emerged. 86  Thus, the German Sales law 
eradicated the abnormality of the former sales law, which exempted the seller from liability from 
non-conformity apart from a few situations.87 
i. Contribution of the CISG to the Reform of the Civil Law System 
Apart from specifically contributing to the German law reform, the CISG is generally considered 
to have liberated civil law systems from the anachronistic survival of the distinction between 
non-performance and defective performance. In civil law countries, it is common to distinguish 
between damages for various kinds of default. French law distinguishes between ‘moratory’ and 
‘compensatory’ damages available for delay in performance and for other kinds of default. 
Moratory damages are assessed on the same principles as compensatory damages, and they are 
often sought for delay in performing some other obligation. The French Civil Code art. 1147 
distinguishes between delay in performance, giving rise to moratory damages and non-
performance, giving rise to compensatory damages.88  
The German Civil Code also distinguishes between two kinds of default. The Verzug or delay, 
giving rise to damages for delay requires notice putting the debtor in default. And a further 
requirement of the Nachfrist notice is a general rule imposed if the creditor wishes to rely on the 
delay in order to put an end to the contract or to claim damages for non-performance as 
opposed to damages for delay.  A claim for damages for delay may be accompanied with one for 
performance, or for damages for non-performance where the creditor exercises his right to 
refuse to accept performance because of the delay. This emphasises the distinction between the 
‘delay interest’ and the performance interest. Delay interest includes gains lost or expenses 
incurred in consequence of the delay as well as decline in value of the subject matter during the 
period of delay. In principle, these distinctions in the damages do not differ from those allowed 
in cases of impossibility.  
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Another type of default is the impossibility for which the debtor is responsible. This gives rise to 
a claim for damages for non-performance. This claim cannot accompany the one for 
performance.  
The third kind of default widely recognised by writers but not embedded in the Civil Code refers 
to cases in which performance is rendered in due time but defectively. As there are no provisions 
of this in the Civil Code, it suggests that it is not recognised as a separate concept. The damages 
offered here are in principle on the same basis as damages for impossibility. 
There is no distinction in common law countries, as a matter of legal principle between damages 
for delay and non-performance, or between damages for delay, impossibility and defective 
performance. The statutes relating to sale of goods in England and the U.S (except Louisiana) do 
contain certain special provisions as to the time of performance. But they do not contain any 
separate provisions, which deal with damages for delay. Although they deal separately with 
damages for total failure to perform such as non-delivery, and defective performance, such as 
delivery of defective goods, they are not based on any distinction in legal principle between the 
two kinds of breach. They only reflect the differences in result of each type of breach.89  
From a factual perspective, the delivery of an aluid (delivery of the wrong goods) may be 
distinguished from the delivery of a peius (delivery of non-conforming goods). This distinction 
gives rise to the question of whether the aliud-delivery can be qualified as non-delivery. The 
CISG adopts a wide notion, using the word conformity in order to characterise the obligation of 
the seller and considering her liable whenever a lack of conformity is found. The very fact that 
the relevant CISG provisions dealing with seller's obligations do not differentiate between the 
delivery of an aliud or peius allows the conclusion that both have to be treated equally. 
Consequently, scholars take the view that the delivery of an aliud cannot be qualified as non-
delivery but as delivery of defective goods.90 A plethora of case laws supports this position.91  
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Schwenzer recognises the particular benefit of the CISG in this respect. The inadequacy of the 
Swiss domestic law to international sales law is with regards to core aspects such as the 
distinction between the peius and aluid. She states  
In case of the former, the buyer must give prompt notice to the seller 
(according to Article 201 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO)) to 
preserve any remedies for breach of contract with a one year limitation 
period (Art. 210 CO); in case of the latter, the buyer can demand 
performance for ten years after the conclusion of the contract regardless 
whether it gave notice of nonperformance or not. And it can be 
extremely difficult to predict where the line between peius and aliud will 
be drawn in a particular case. The second example is the compensation 
for consequential losses. According to Art. 208(2) CO upon unwinding 
the contract the seller is liable for damages directly incurred by the buyer 
due to the defective goods. In this respect, fault is not required. 
However, whether "direct loss" also encompasses consequential loss is 
made dependent on the number of links in the chain of causation. 
Extremely short periods for giving notice of defects as well as a 
limitation period of one year in case of a peius also militate against 
choosing domestic Swiss law for the international context92 
Accordingly it is believed that all these shortcomings may be avoided by the application of the 
CISG. Within this context, the CISG attempts to reach all situations where conformity or non-
conformity could be used. The adoption of this unique concept is a direct influence of the 
common law system in which the idea of a defective performance is closer to the idea of a 
breach of contract in common law countries. The fact that the CISG draws from the common 
law concept in this regard shows compatibility of the Convention with the principles of common 
law to which Nigeria adopts.   
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c. The Chinese Law Reform 
The New Code of Obligations of China, Contract Law of the PRC,93 reveals many legal concepts 
and institutions resembling that of the CISG, and the similarities are confirmed by a comparative 
analysis of Chinese law and the CISG. These similarities are a result of concerted effort by the 
drafters to achieve such unison. As stated by the main drafter of the Convention, drafters of the 
new Chinese law ‘have consulted and absorbed rules of the CISG on offer and acceptance, 
avoidance (termination) with Nachfrist liabilities for breach of contract, interpretation of a 
contract and sales contract’.94 Thus, the CISG was a source of inspiration for the Chinese law 
both for sales specific and non-sale specific issues. 
Specifically, with regards to conclusion of contracts, Articles 9-43 of the CL (PRC) draws 
significantly from article 14-24 of the CISG. For instance with respect to bindingness and 
revocation of an offer, traditionally, the Chinese law follows the Germanic legal systems in terms 
of acknowledging the irrevocability of an offer.95 However, the more recent CL follows Art. 16 
CISG.96 The CL also follows the CISG by adopting a unitary approach, the integration of liability 
for non-conformity with remedies for breach of contract in general.97 With the exception of 
Article 148, the provisions on passing of risk (142-149) follow the model of the CISG.98   
China initially subscribed to the Article 96 declaration, which rejects domestic requirements to 
form. More recently however, this declaration has been withdrawn.99 
 It is advised, that Nigeria refrains from subscribing to this reservation, apart from the fact that it 
brings discordance but also because, as a developing country, it is important that contracts in 
Nigeria allow for flexibility since oral contracts are traditionally valid under the Nigerian 
domestic law and the international traders may sometimes enter into oral contracts based on 
trust with the other party and based on the fact that they may not execute the contract in writing. 
d. Reform by other Countries  
The CISG model was one of those considered, compared, and weighed, in countries that had 
implemented it already -- or were to implement it -- as their international sales law. A classic 
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example is the Estonian Law of Obligations Act (LOA). The Tokelau Islands, so far a trust 
territory of New Zealand in the South Pacific, enacted the CISG in 2004 as a sales law both for 
international and for domestic sales, along with some supplementation to make it a basic set of 
rules for contracts in general. It replaced the 19th-century SGA (Sales of Goods Act) of English 
provenance.100  
ii. A Model for Uniform Law Reform 
As a landmark in the international unification process, the CISG has influenced subsequent 
uniform commercial laws, both soft and hard law instruments, in Africa, Europe and Asia 
(PACL). Its prerequisites for the application in Article 1-7 have been used as a model whilst its 
substantive law provisions on the contractual relations of the parties to an exchange contract in 
general and its provisions concerning sales contracts can be seen in the provisions of these 
instruments.101  
a.  The CISG and the EU Laws  
In the EU, there is scarcely any debate on the level of influence, which the CISG has had. This 
has been attributed to the fact that 24 out of the 28 EU Member States have ratified the CISG 
thus, it ‘represents a common pillar of European contract law’ and though not officially, is 
considered as a set of common rules within the EU.102 Moreover, the CISG is considered the 
most successful drafting attempt with a sustainable compromise, to merge together 
terminologies and concepts of both civil and common law legal families, thus, making it a 
worldwide success in this regard.103 It has also been impactful on the national laws of the EU 
member states that have adopted it, in that their national laws have been renewed. 104 This of 
course means that even where the direct influence of the CISG on EU law is denied, it is 
impossible to deny its indirect effect, since the laws may be vertically transplanted resulting in 
trans-echelon borrowing, EU member State laws which often influence EU treaties, will 
eventually be disseminated to other EU member States. As such, where a good number of EU 
States have adopted the CISG and it influences their local laws, such laws will potentially 
influence the EU uniform laws since those laws will be generally obtainable and accepted across 
the States.  
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i. The EU Consumer Sales Directive  
In Europe, the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of May 25 1999 on 
Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees,105 was modelled 
after the CISG.106 This is significant because it is the first time in a while, that an international 
convention plays such a significant role in the drafting of an EU Act, and because the Directive 
is acclaimed the most important European provision in the field of the law of contract. 107 
Generally the Directive borrows the CISG’s general standard of judgment and conduct. For 
instance the standard of reasonableness, referred to about 37 times in the CISG, occurs about 5 
times in the Directive, with regards to the matters closely related to those envisaged by the CISG. 
This implies that a general standard of reasonableness is now adopted amongst EU member 
States in spite of different legal traditions.108 This is evidence of a successful Convention, the 
distribution of an acceptable standard between States across different geographic locations.  
Further, regarding the criterion for breach, the Directive draws on the unitary approach of the 
Convention by treating all breaches alike. This is true in particular, with regard to the basic 
concept of "conformity with the contract" of the goods to be delivered and to three of the four 
requirements thereof as set forth in Article 2 -- which almost literally corresponds to Article 35 
of the CISG. It is also true for the remedies for lack of conformity as provided in Article 3 -- 
whose counterparts in the CISG can be found in Articles 36, 46, 49, and 50. 109 This is key 
because for most EU countries, the concept of ‘conformity’ was vague, despite the proviso in 
Recital 7 of the Directive, that it is common to the different national legal traditions. Thus, by 
drawing from the CISG, the Directive transforms ‘this vague convergence in a truly common 
rule of decision’.110 The obligation of the seller to deliver goods in conformity with the contract 
of sale, as enshrined in the Directive, exactly as the CISG, traces the liability of the defective 
goods back to the general rules on the debtor’s liability for non-performance of an obligation. 
This, a more modern and uniform approach is preferred to the approach differentiating non-
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performance and guarantee. 111  In spite of these similarities, there are significant differences 
between the Consumer Sales Directive and the CISG.112 
The large reliance of the Directive on the CISG also plays an essential role in its interpretation.113 
According to the interpretive criteria of the EU, specifically, the historical and the objective-
teleological criteria, the CISG’s role as a model law cannot be ignored. This is reinforced by the 
rule recognised in the EU, which provides that all national provisions, which implement a 
Directive must be interpreted by national courts in light of the rationale informing the Directive. 
The interpretive role of the CISG is vital in ensuring that the similarities between the two laws 
are maintained while softening their differences.114  
The influence of the CISG on the Directive is not without criticism. For one, the unitary 
approach of treating all breaches alike constitutes a huge change for the member states whose 
old sales law are based on the Roman law tradition.115 Similarly, countries whose legal traditions 
date back to centuries and millenniums may not really appreciate the colonisation by a more 
modern law.    
1. Influence on other EU Directives 
The CISG has also influenced other EU Directives though in a less obvious manner. For 
instance, the Package Tour Directive of 1990116 whose underlying structure can be traced back to 
the CISG.117 This is seen in its systems of obligations and liability, particularly Article 5(2) which 
provides for the supplier’s liability in damage for non-performance or improper performance of 
the travel services and permits the supplier to be relieved if the fault of the consumer or of a 
third party or if force majeure or an unforeseeable and unavoidable event has caused the damage, 
is similar to that of the CISG.118 The definition of force majeure is also similarly worded as that 
of Article 79(1) of the CISG.119 
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Echoes of the CISG can be found in the Directive on Cross-Border Credit Transfers of 1997.120 
Based on the definition of force majeure in the Act, it is concluded that the act draws from the 
Convention.121 
Connections have been made between the CISG and the Directive on late payments of 29 June 
2000 (35/2000/EC), which concerns relationships between businesses.122 The commonality of 
certain topics such as issue of interests in case of delay has led to the conclusion.123 
2. Influence on other Initiatives 
The CISG’s use of simple prerequisites for its application inspired a couple of the conditions for 
applications of other conventions. In order to apply to cross-border contracts, all that is required 
in the CISG is that the parties have their place of business in different contracting states.124 The 
Convention also allows application if the conflict of laws rules of the forum determine the law of 
a contracting state to be applicable law. 125  This has since remained the prerequisite of 
internationality in most uniform law conventions. For instance, the UN Convention on the 
Limitation Period for the International Sale of Goods (1974) as amended by Protocol of 11 April 
1980 provides the same in Art.3, Article 1(1) of the 2001 Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade. Art 3 in the drafts for an instrument on the carriage of goods 
and 2 place of receipt for carriage and place of delivery in different states; Article 1(3)(a) of the 
Model law on International Commercial Arbitration.126 
Article 7 of the CISG which provides measures to protect against domestic interpretation of the 
CISG, through directives for interpretation and gap filling have becomes paradigms for the 
clauses in other international law instruments. For instance, Article 7 of the Limitation 
Convention, Art.6 (1) of the 1983 Geneva Draft Convention on Agency in International Sale of 
Goods, Art 4(1) of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing of 1988 
(Ottawa), Article 7(1) of the 2001 ON Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade and Article 5 of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment (Cape Town Convention of 2001).    
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The CISG is also a major influence on some of the Uniform Acts of the Organization for the 
Harmonization of African Business Law (OHADA). The OHADA Uniform Act on General 
Commercial Law contains provisions on sale contracts, which follow closely to those of the 
CISG,127 albeit with certain divergences.128 An analysis of the Draft OHADA Act on Contract 
law, reveals it was inspired by the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
which draws largely from the CISG. This shows the indirect link between the CISG and the 
Draft OHADA Act and any difference are with respect to specific African features.129 The fact 
that the OHADA Uniform Act draws considerably from the CISG is significant because, in the 
event that Nigeria adopts the CISG and subsequently becomes part of the OHADA, though 
there might be certain instances where both instruments will be applicable, under Article 10 of 
the OHADA Treaty, the Uniform Act overrides previous or subsequent enactments of internal 
law. Since the CISG will be a part of the Nigerian law, the OHADA Uniform Act will override it.  
3. The CISG’s Influence on Soft Laws  
The influence of the CISG on soft laws and principles are significant because although they are 
non-legislative codifications, and drafted outside the political sphere of states, making them non 
mandatory, they are useful for parties and serve as an important guide for interpreters who may 
have to resolve contracts unfamiliar to them.130 
With regards to the academic endeavours in the EU, the European Commission favours the 
CISG as a model for the texts and more generally as a ‘model for a future comprehensive set of 
European rules in the field of commercial law.’ 131  To further emphasise this support, the 
European Commission included the CISG and other UN uniform law Conventions-in the broad 
definition of ‘acquis communautaire’. Thus, stressing the fundamental role of the CISG as a 
model for the future unification of European Contract law.132    
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i. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Law 
The CISG was a direct influence and obligatory point of reference for the UNIDROIT 
Principles, which provides general rules for international commercial contracts. The Principles 
were drafted in recognition of the gaps, vague and ambiguous provisions of the CISG, a result of 
the compromise necessary, in light of the differences in legal traditions and times. The Principles 
were thus drafted on the merits and shortcomings of the Convention. But for the worldwide 
adoption of the CISG, any attempt at rules such as the Principles would have been unlikely.133 
The Principles took a different route since the CISG had achieved legislative success as a binding 
instrument, by restating the existing international contract law, which had the most persuasive 
value and appeared to be more suited to cross border transactions.  
With regards to issues common to both instruments, the provisions of the Principles were taken 
either literally or at least in substance from the corresponding provisions of the CISG and the 
influence of the CISG on the Principles is so much, so that it is only in rare cases that the 
Principles depart from the CISG’.134 Although the Principles were not meant specifically for the 
purpose of harmonising or unifying European contract law, they influence debates in this field. 
Thus, the influence of the Principles on this debate is a further channel for the CISG to have an 
indirect impact in this process.135   
ii. The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) 
In drafting the PECL, the importance of the CISG for the unification efforts was clearly stated, 
consequently resulting in its adoption as a model for the Principles.136 The provisions of the 
CISG resonate through the articles of the PECL.137 
Though the PECL draws from the CISG, because of its academic nature, its primary purpose is 
possibly ‘to stoke or enrich the debate on the future of the European private law’, as such, the 
impact of the CISG may to a certain extent be disregarded. The author argues that the influence 
of the CISG in this regard, albeit indirect, must not be undermined because whether or not the 
PECL is used in drafting future EU laws, a vital fact is that its contents have been recognised in 
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the EU and have proven popular because of its ability to accomplish a synthesis of all European 
contract law and its simple language.138 And, there is no denying that the more it is read, the 
more people in the region (EU) familiarise themselves with its contents, and the more 
conversant EU members become with the principles of the CISG. These users will invariably 
have a say in the drafting of any future law, with the likely outcome that their opinions will 
reflect concepts familiar to them. Thus, enabling drafters to provide laws familiar to users.  
The CISG will thus have an indirect influence on the EU laws. Furthermore the PECL has 
become a basis and framework for further attempts on the European level, particularly, on the 
work of the study group on a European Civil Code, founded and chaired by Christian von Bar 
and now entrusted by the EC Commission to draft a Common Frame of Reference for a 
European Contract Law.  
iii. The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
The DCFR is an academic endeavour by the study group on a European Civil Code (the ‘Study 
Group’) and the Research Group on Existing EC Private Law (the ‘Acquis Group’).139 One of 
the purposes of the text is to serve as a draft for drawing up a ‘political’ Common Frame of 
Reference (CFR).140 This framework draws both directly and indirectly from the provisions of 
the CISG. Indirectly, through the provisions of the PECL, the UPICC and the Consumer Sales 
Directive and directly, the influence of the CISG is noticeable in Book IV.A on Sales. This is 
unsurprising if one considers that the members of the CISG Advisory Council were a core part 
of the group and thus, the solutions proffered by the CISG were always an option.141 
The CISG has also been influential in the works of the Gandolfi Group, the Academy of 
European Private lawyers, directed by the Giuseppe Gandolfi which started in 1995 with the 
drafting of a European Contract Code’. 142  The Draft of the Code was published in 2001. 
Although its influence is not as obvious as the PECL’s influences of the CISG is still spread 
across it. The CISG influenced not only the sales section of the Code, but more the parts 
specifically devoted to the general law of contracts.  
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The influence of the CISG is also in the Principles of European Law (PEL), which was drafted 
by the working team within the framework of the Study Group on a European Civil Code. A 
major aim of the Study Group was to draft a codified set of Principles of European Law for the 
law of obligations. The CISG served as a starting point for drafting specific rules on sales in the 
PEL. This was because of the Convention’s wide acceptance and the influence it already had on 
national laws of the EU countries and the Consumer Sales Directive.143  
Questions concerning the continued effectiveness of the CISG in light of the existence of these 
instruments have been raised, to the effect that the Convention may fade into obscurity and that 
these instruments, in most cases present more comprehensive instruments than the CISG. It 
seems logical that laws built on a model should be more comprehensive since they can avoid the 
deficiencies of the antecedent. In fact, the outright intention of the Principles was to address 
issues, which are either completely excluded or not sufficiently regulated by the CISG. However, 
these instruments do not pose any threat to the Convention rather, they complement the CISG, 
in that it is more useful for businesses with thousands of small contracts coming under many 
different systems ‘having an optional instrument which, if opted into, would replace all the 
national laws and which, therefore, would have to have adequate protective rules in it. The CISG 
could not fulfill this function.144  
As a model for domestic and uniform laws, the success of the CISG is unquestionable. It sets a 
standard as a model law, by providing a framework on which these laws are built and for which 
they can be interpreted. Thus, making the drafters work easier and promoting harmonisation of 
laws, which encourages seamless cross border trade transactions. More than a model framework, 
it serves as an interpretive tool for these laws, which draw inspiration from it.    
2.3.1.3 Uniformity as a Measure of Success  
An important criterion for measuring the success of the CISG is the degree of uniformity 
achieved in its application. 145  This is particularly important within the context of Nigeria’s 
adoption of the CISG, since a key requirement for international traders in developing countries 
is predictability of laws and equal bargaining powers in trade transactions with counterparts in 
developed countries.  
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Recognising this, it has been suggested that the measure of the CISG against the above 
mentioned parameters, and the subsequent conclusion of the Convention as successful may be 
misleading, since one may be ‘led to believe that the CISG is a comprehensive code governing 
international sale of goods, addressing contracting generally and therefore governs all 
international sales transactions and exhaustively deals with all problems.’146 This is misleading 
because the CISG does not govern all international sales transactions, neither does it deal with all 
issues that may arise in connection with these transactions. Most uniform laws possibly provide 
only verbal uniformity, and their application and interpretation may amount to lip service, when 
in reality domestic laws are applicable.147 
Further, since the central goal of the CISG as a uniform Convention is some standard of 
harmonisation, to ignore it as a measure of success will be to present an incomplete picture. 148 
There is a need for a functional level of uniformity in order to achieve this goal. This is an 
essential goal given that the main objective for Nigeria’s adoption of the CISG is primarily the 
predictability of the applicable law to controversies linked to a plurality of countries.  
It must be reiterated that uniformity as a yardstick for measuring the success of the CISG is only 
complete to the extent that uniformity is considered in totality, not necessarily as an end, but also, 
the processes and what is being done to achieve this benchmark.  
The challenges of uniformity of the CISG and the ways that they have been overcome are the 
best ways of measuring the level of success attained in terms of uniformity.  
i. Interpretive Challenges  
As a result of the Convention’s vague provisions and its applicability to transactionally diverse 
range of deals, any lack of interpretive consensus undercuts its overarching goals. Interpretation 
is important as a process of ascertaining the meaning of the CISG and adapting meaning of the 
legal text to changed circumstances.149 
The possibility of political interpretations of the CISG, meaning that courts or tribunals may 
systematically favour their citizens, through unfair procedural means could have potentially been 
a problem of the CISG. However, case laws over the years reveals that there is no such tendency 
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systematically pursued in any of the CISG member States.150 The CISG is considered successful, 
because courts demonstrate an understanding of the overarching aim of the Convention. 
The gaps inherent in the CISG, due to the fact of complexity of the subject matter, different 
economic systems, varying legal structures or even political backgrounds, 151 means there are 
limitations to solutions for problems in international sales. There are the external gaps, referring 
to issues not dealt with by the Convention, and internal gaps, issues dealt with within the scope 
of the Convention, which are problematic. Despite the provision of Article 7(2) to fill the gaps, 
difficulties such as its interplay with the interpretations Art 7(1) and the distinction between the 
matters that are governed by the Convention and those, which are not, are a real problem.152 
However there are numerous solutions such as the true code approach,153 where the interpreter 
confines himself to the Convention itself, considering the CISG as a comprehensive document, 
the Meta code approach, where external legal principles are used to fill gaps found in the CISG, 
unless it expressly disallows it,154 and a combination of both approaches. The drafters of the 
Convention compromised after some debate regarding the above-mentioned methods, choosing 
both methodologies. 
The gaps in the Convention can also be solved by parties through party autonomy principle of 
the CISG. This option eliminates the divergence of interpretation and allows for parties to make 
their decisions. 
The ability to resolve the interpretative challenges of the Convention through the above 
solutions is indicative of a degree of success. 
The goals of the CISG to achieve uniformity have been hampered by the political and cultural 
differences, which exist amongst nations. Frustrating the efforts of the CISG in achieving 
uniformity, its main purpose, is a practice by interpreters, termed the ‘Homeward Trend,’ ‘the 
temptation to project the familiar rules of one’s own national legal system onto the Convention’s 
                                                          
150 For empirical evidence on this based on the CLOUT cases relating to the CISG. ibid 36. 
151 André Janssen and Sórren Claas Kiene, ‘The CISG and Its General Principles’ in André Janssen and Olaf Meyer 
CISG Methodology (Sellier European Law Publisher, 2009) 261, 262.  
152 Bruno Zeller, ‘The Challenge of a Uniform Application of the CISG-Common Problems and their Solutions’ 
(2006) Macquerie Journal of Business Law 309.   
153
 Grant Gilmore, ‘Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure’ (1961) 70 Yale Law Journal 1037, 1043. 
154
 John B Felemegas, ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Article 7 




provisions’.155 It is also the failure of courts to consider foreign decisions while deciding cases 
under the CISG. 
CISG jurisprudence reveals pervasive practice of the homeward trend. Two forms of homeward 
trend exist, ‘variation which consists of the tendency by interpreters to turn to their familiar, and 
non-uniform, norms of domestic law in the interpretation of international standards’…and the 
legis fori variation’.156 Amongst the two, more courts tend to apply the variation that turns to their 
familiar domestic laws.  
To emphasise this, cases such as Italdecor SAS v Yiu Industries157 come to mind where although the 
court applied the CISG, it failed to seek guidance from existing cases on the CISG when making 
the decision on fundamental breach, the court applied Art 49(1) without analysing the related 
Article 25. 
A plethora of cases employing homeward trend in the interpretation of the CISG exist, 158 
however, this pattern, comes from the novelty of the Convention in the jurisdictions. This 
novelty generates uncertainty because transactors will generally avoid applying a law where they 
lack information upon which to base reliable estimates about prospective outcomes under the 
law.159 However, the CISG is no longer a novel code and has surmounted novel interpretation 
effects, thus, resulting in more consistent case laws. More recent cases indicate that interpreters 
have familiarised themselves with the Convention and thus have been following the interpretive 
methodology resulting in a noticeable decline in the trend. 160  Moreover, the practice of the 
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homeward trend is not done wittingly. Judges seem to do this more as a defense to the 
provisions, which they consider ambiguous within the Convention. This fact is supported by 
evidence showing that with regards to clear provisions of the CISG, ‘misunderstandings and 
incorrect applications…are a rare exception.’161 
The decline in homeward trend practice is evidence of success of the Convention bearing in 
mind that the likelihood of perfect uniformity is hardly possible. The impressive build-up of the 
jurisprudence and the ease of accessibility of the CISG is indicative of substantial uniformity. 
ii. Textual Non Uniformity of the CISG 
The text of the CISG was drafted and approved in a single copy in the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish languages, with each text considered equally authentic. However, 
this is a source of non-uniformity because of the disambiguation in translations. Although 
significant, this is not a problem for Nigeria because the Nigerian lingua franca, English, 
corresponds with the original language. 
Reservations, which mean that different versions of the Convention are applied throughout the 
CISG states, are also a source of non-uniformity. By having varying versions of the same text 
apply in a seemingly uniform framework, businesses can be misled to think the same law applies 
where that is not the case. This presents a somewhat deceptively uniform façade. The effect of 
the reservation, resulting in non-uniformity means that states transacting with these countries 
had to depend on private international law rules to sort out the applicable law. Nigeria need not 
worry about making these reservations since, as earlier explained, part II of the CISG is 
compatible with the common law applicable in Nigeria. Understanding that these reservations 
were likely to cause non-uniformity, the drafters of the CISG provided in article 98 that only 
reservations expressly authorised by the Convention are permitted. Today, there is hardly any 
need for the reservations in Articles 92-96, which have a detrimental effect upon the 
Convention's practical application. More recently, the realisation that the reservations are 
obstacles to the uniformity goals of the CISG has led to their subsequent removal. This shows 
the level of effort invested into ensuring the uniformity goals of the CISG are met in order to 
encourage and promote trade. This is clearly evidence of success. 
 
                                                          




2.4 Overcoming Uniformity Issues: Tools and Methods and Suggestions for Nigeria 
 
2.4.1 Autonomous Interpretation  
It is suggested that the aims of the Convention should be kept in mind by the interpreters in 
Nigeria, when seeking to conform to the uniformity requirements. From the outset, the drafters 
of the Convention anticipated divergent interpretations and thus, included tools to guard against, 
and where impossible ameliorate it. This is found in Article 7, which states that regards for the 
Convention’s international character and for the settlement of questions not governed by the 
Convention should be in conformity with the general principles. This means that for any 
interpretive issues on the CISG arising in Nigeria, resolutions must be made on the basis of the 
CISG itself. This is in accord with fulfilling the mandate of and contributing towards the 
uniform application of the CISG. Thus, interpreters should look to foreign decisions for 
guidance, whether as voluntary binding precedent or as persuasive precedent. And where there 
are conflicting decisions on a particular issue, they carefully select and reconcile those decisions 
through use of the CISG’s interpretive methodology.  
As stated earlier, the international character of the Convention must be kept in mind in order to 
achieve uniformity, making the purpose of the Convention crucial. Keeping in mind article 7(2), 
the general principles of the CISG, Nigerian interpreters are able to exclude the homeward trend 
and rules of private international law that seek solution outside the Convention. In light of the 
above, one can see that Article 7(2) prescribes the policy for Nigerian interpreters to fill gaps and 
thus describes the boundaries between the CISG and domestic law. 
The admonition not to resort to domestic law is not to be considered a Procrustean bed, it is 
recognised that there are cases where recourse must be made, but this must be in situations 
where the CISG has expressly stated so or as a last resort where no other principles within the 
CISG may be referred to. It may also be used where the CISG has evidently borrowed from 
certain national law concepts such as the Nachfrist. Guidance may be sought from the national 
laws for concepts such as these, which are alien to the Nigerian interpreters. All these however 
must be done with the recognition that the single-minded pursuit of uniformity may produce a 
distorted reading of the Convention.162  
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2.4.2 Other Instruments as Aides to achieving the Uniformity Goals of the CISG 
 
 Other solution for filling the gaps in the CISG is through the use of the UNIDROIT Principles 
and the PECL. It must be remembered that these are soft laws, which were influenced by the 
CISG and thus can be used in the interpretation and gap filling of the CISG. Using these 
instruments have become much more popular especially in commercial arbitration, albeit with 
controversies.163 Since the UPIC and the PECL have a wider scope of application and they share 
a common goal, with the CISG of ‘de nationalisation of rules and principles’ they are also 
useful.164 The UPIC is particularly useful for Nigeria in the sense that since they do not have a 
binding application, and thus do not require ratification, they are more likely to have been heard 
of by traders and if the provisions are substantially similar, they will make easier for the users of 
the CISG. The Preamble of the UPIC in support of this, states ‘that they may be used to 
interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments.’165 Although the UPIC is not a 
legally binding text, it has been successful in practice since some courts and arbitral tribunals 
consider the statement in the preamble binding.166 The UPIC has been used for instance to solve 
one of the most troublesome issues of the CISG, the type of interest to be applied under Art. 78. 
As a gap, the rate of interest has been filled by applying the UPIC as it has been considered the 
general principles on which the CISG is based.167 
The use of the UPIC as a gap filler, is indicative of the success of the CISG in this regard. One 
can see the interplay of the success of the CISG as a role model working with the instrument to 
which it influences to successfully achieve its uniformity goal.  
It is warned however, that in using UPIC in Nigeria as tools for uniform interpretation, 
interpreters must be careful to look at the contractual clauses, applicable law and forum or 
arbitration clauses if any – the Convention and its method of interpretation and gap filling as 
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well as the lex arbitri applied, so that the Principles ‘do not come as a unforeseeable element to 
the parties’.168  
2.4.3 Using the Global Jurisconsultorium of the CISG 
 
Nigerian interpreters can gain from the juriosconsultorium of the CISG, which is ‘a process of 
consultation which takes place across borders and legal systems with the aim of producing 
autonomous and uniform interpretations and applications of a given rule of law’.169 Most CISG 
scholars would agree that Art. 7(1) CISG provides the legal basis for a duty to aim for a uniform, 
transnational interpretation. Thus, the terms of Article 7 ground the use of the Jurisconsoltorium 
which institutes that duty in the Convention itself. This is a logical conclusion based on the 
wording of Article 7(1) CISG and its requirement of 'regard' toward internationality and 
uniformity.170 Through this means, Nigerian interpreters can consult with and refer to other texts 
and decisions of the CISG. In undertaking to share a uniform legal text like the CISG, 
contracting States are also undertaking to pursue the goal of uniformity in unison. The legal basis 
for this duty to share sources of a uniform law when sharing the law itself is derived from comity, 
and from an understanding that shared international laws are unique, and that their interpretive 
sources are as diverse as the legal systems which share them. This brings to the fore, the 
argument of comity.171 
 The provision of the website dedicated to the CISG, and the continued improvement on 
translation of cases, refute the argument that a major substance is lost in the process of 
translation. Moreover, the English language is the lingua franca of Nigeria and was one of the 
original language texts of the CISG and so there shouldn’t be interpretational problems. 
A fundamental argument in terms of the development of the website is that this was not factored 
in, when drafting the CISG and as such, one must question the dependence on it as a uniform 
mechanism, especially since the drafters of the Convention did not envisage it. This argument 
further raises the issue as to whether there was any other means intended for promoting the 
uniformity of the CISG. Admittedly this is the case, although a critical examination of this view 
lends itself to the argument that what was expected from the outset when drafting the CISG was 
substantial uniformity not perfection.  
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Moreover, drawing from the examples of the Common law, which uses precedent as a 
mechanism for ensuring uniformity in decision, this most likely would have been the case of the 
CISG. The common laws, which are applicable in Nigeria, were transposed into the country 
upon colonisation and the precedents were equally transplanted, successfully. Thus records of 
the CISG decisions in foreign jurisdictions would have been physically transported to countries 
to ensure harmonious interpretation. Though, the Internet makes for speedy application.   
Another issue in this regard is the issue of translation of CISG cases on the website. There may 
be issues of translations in that when Nigerian interpreters want to access the cases from the 
other jurisdictions they may be faced with poor translations of the decisions. But more than poor 
translations is the fact of language barrier of interpreters in other countries. It is suggested that 
this may not necessarily be an issue. Where the courts have a problem with the meaning of any 
word in their local language or the fact that there may be double meanings, the suggested 
practice is for the courts to refer to the travaux preparatoires of the CISG to resolve the issue, and 
this is the same suggestion for Nigerian interpreters. Where there are discrepancies between the 
decisions of foreign courts, they can look at the prevailing or dominant and accepted position to 
resolve the issue. 
Despite the lack of a central court competent for CISG matters, Nigerian interpreters can adopt 
the prevailing view followed generally by a vast majority of the courts. 
2.4.4 Travaux Préparatoires 
 
Article 32 of the Treaties Convention recognises the use of the Travaux Préparatoires as a means 
of interpretation, albeit restrictively. The provision of the Treaty allows ‘recourse to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion however, only in order to confirm a result reached under the 
general rule of interpretation or if this result remains unclear or manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.’172 Although preparatory work is not defined in the Treaty, Magnus suggests it 
includes the usual conference materials such as drafts at prior stages and records of the 
conference at which the treaty was concluded. 
 The ULIS and the ULF, which predate the CISG, can also be used by Nigerian interpreters as 
secondary sources of interpretation principally because they are the basis on which the CISG was 
birthed and because they are similar in content and scope to the Convention. However it is 
                                                          




suggested that in using these Conventions, care must be taken in order to avoid conflicting 
results in certain cases where the CISG departs from these Conventions.173 
Based on the above provision, it is advised that where the CISG has been adopted, Nigerian 
interpreters will first have to resort to the general rules of interpretation of the CISG to reach a 
conclusion. And where the interpreter is not sure of the decision reached, he can consult with 
the materials only as a supplementary means of interpretation. The validity given to these 
documents as a solution to interpretive problems, mean that it will be difficult for interpreters to 
deviate from the true purpose of the Convention.   
2.5 Conclusion  
The history of the Convention shows that much thought was given into the process of drafting 
of the Convention. The historical timeline of the CISG, which spanned a period of 30 years 
reveals that drafters not only focused on the text of the Convention but ensured that the text 
was politically acceptable to States from different legal families and levels of development in the 
world, consequently ensuring an equal level of representation which is an important factor for 
Nigeria, who as a developed country shies away from uniform laws usually perceived to favour 
developed countries. 
The history of the legislative drafting process of the Convention, carried out with rigour and 
thoroughness is a telling indicator of the integrity of the Convention. This proves that the CISG 
should be an appealing framework for Nigeria.  
The CISG can also be considered successful at least within the context of the needs of Nigeria, 
based on the criteria examined above. Particularly, the provision of and efficiency of solutions 
proffered to encourage uniformity, shows continuous improvement, making the CISG a success. 
The chapter also emphasises the fact that in measuring the success of the Convention, one must 
not look only to success as an end, but equally as a process i.e. the effort made towards and the 
continuous provision of solutions to extant problems. This is what is crucial for Nigeria, 
understanding that potential problems of uniformity can be resolved through the lively academic 
debates and write ups of the international community, specific to the CISG. Therefore, regarding 
both the achievement of set goals, and the process towards achieving it, there is no doubt the 
Convention is commendable. 
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UNDERSTANDING THE NON-ADOPTION OF THE CISG IN 
NIGERIA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical research gleaned from interviews and surveys 
of stakeholders in Nigeria, on the reasons why the CISG has not been adopted in Nigeria. The 
chapter is important in the context of the thesis, if it is understood that expansion of markets 
from the domestic to the international sphere promotes long run economic prosperity, and that 
international trade as an important source of economic growth derives from the fact that as 
global trade increases, its contribution to long term prosperity will continue to rise.  
A necessary factor in ensuring the continued contribution of international trade to economic 
growth lies in the strength and functionality of the institutions in place.1 When institutions are 
not functional, the costs of transacting increase, consequently preventing economies from 
realising wellbeing. Thus, the recognition and enforcement of property rights and contracts, and 
the capacity of states to mobilise sources for rule of law fundamentals such as due process and 
judicial and legal infrastructure are an instrumental part of promoting the rule of law.2 This 
emphasises the clear nexus between economic and social development and trade law reform.3 
Given the importance of international trade in promoting long term economic growth, and the 
necessity of functional institutions in maximising the advantages of trade, the chapter seeks to 
understand why a law such as the CISG has not been yet been adopted in Nigeria. The reason 
for questioning the non-ratification of the CISG, is premised on the fact that the Convention is a 
desirable framework, because it unifies common law and civil law concepts, eliminates the costs 
of dealing with distinctive legal systems, consequently allowing for a seamless flow of trade. 
Considering that the Convention presents a framework, which helps to overcome the 
                                                          
1 Institutions here mean rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour. Constitutions, statutes 
and common laws and contracts specify in formal terms the rules of the game, from the most general constitutional 
ones to the specific terms of a particular exchange. Douglass C North, ‘Institutions and Economic Growth: An 
Historical Introduction’ World Development (1989) 17 (9) 1319-1332, 1321.  
2 In Focus Article, ‘Expanding the UN Rule of Law Agenda: Rule of Law Activities that Promote Economic 
Development’ (United Nations Rule of Law) www.unrol.org accessed 30 November 2013. 
3 K Pistor, D Berkowitz, J Monenius, ‘Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows’ (2005) 10 University of 
Michigan International Law Review 163-198 in Luca Castelleni, ‘International Trade Law Reform in Africa’ (2008) 




contradiction between the character of contracts on the international sale of goods and the 
regulation of these contracts by the individual states, it may be complementary to the 1893 SGA 
applicable in Nigeria.  
The chapter specifically presents and analyses the opinions of legal practitioners in the 
commercial law sector, lecturers, personnel in the relevant government ministries and private 
agencies. The analysis is undertaken in order to understand if, and to what extent the reasons 
suggested have affected and continue to affect the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria.  
3.2 Reasons for the Non Adoption of the CISG in Nigeria 
From 2007 to 2011, Nigeria’s exports increased on average by 23.5% each year and amounted to 
125.6 billion US$. During the same period, imports increased on an average by 18.6 % each year 
to 64.0bln US$.4 More recently, the Nigerian economy has grown significantly; with the GDP 
doubling to more than $500bn from $307bn.5 Nigeria is also seeing more investments being 
made in the economy.  
Although economic growth is significant, it is important to sustain this growth. Empirical 
research shows that factors such as the respective roles of democratic, economic activities 
regulation and property rights protection institutions are important for economic growth 
sustainability, 6  and only the regulation institutions positively and significantly affect the 
probability of growth sustainability.7 These regulatory institutions constitute functional laws to 
regulate investment and trade relationships. Thus, although Nigeria can ignite economic growth, 
there is a need to sustain the growth. One way of sustaining growth is by encouraging and 
building the strength of the private sector, through functional laws such as the CISG, aimed at 
regulating trade. Laws drafted to meet the specific character of international economic relations. 
Since the CISG is capable of promoting economic growth by enhancing efficient trade for 
transactors in Nigeria, one would assume that it should have been adopted. 
In addition, some of Nigeria’s major export trading partners, the United States, the European 
Union, Brazil and Equatorial Guinea, and import partners, the European Union, the United 
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http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economist-explains-2 accessed 9 July 2014. 
6 Abdoul’ Ganiou Mijiyawa, ‘Economic Growth Sustainability: Do Institutions Matter, and Which One Prevails?’ 
http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE06/Papers06/05.2%20(no%20discussant)/Mijiyawa.pdf accessed 9 July 2014, 1-2. 




States, China, Antigua and Barbuda have ratified the Convention.8 Given this, it seems desirable 
that Nigeria ratifies the Convention in order to facilitate and enhance trade transactions. In light 
of the above, the chapter presents and analyses the answers provided by the stakeholders 
interviewed in Nigeria, regarding the non-adoption of the CISG.  
3.2.1 Lack of Awareness of the CISG in Nigeria  
For any international convention to be ratified there must be some level of awareness of its 
existence in the country. Particularly, there is a burden on the relevant government ministry to be 
aware of its existence in order to assess its relevance. 
 The findings in Nigeria however reveal a fundamental lack of awareness of the existence of the 
CISG. Although the Convention came into force in 1988, it is hardly known within the 
professional legal practice, the academia and the government parastatals.  
 
Figure 3.1: Interview Response 
The diagram above shows that 73% of the respondents had never heard of the CISG, 22% of 
the 27% heard of the Convention during their studies in the UK, whilst 6% heard about it at 
conferences.9  The percentage of respondents unaware of the CISG is almost four times that of 
respondents aware of the Convention. This shows a disproportionate level of awareness of the 
                                                          
8  World Trade Organisation Statistics on Nigeria (WTO, September 2014) 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=NG accessed 26 March 
2015. 
9
 Although a total of 34 people were interviewed, 33 are affiliated to Nigeria, consequently their responses are the 
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Convention. Given that a significant number of the interviewees are legal practitioners, in the 
commercial law firms in Nigeria, it is interesting that there is hardly any awareness of the 
Convention amongst them. 
 
Figure 3.2: Survey Response 
The questionnaire, specifically distributed amongst lawyers in the commercial sector, revealed a 
general lack of awareness of the CISG.10 64% of the lawyers had never heard of the CISG. 17% 
of the 36% who were aware, heard about it whilst pursuing their degrees in the UK. 4% of the 
respondents did not provide any answers when asked where they had come across the CISG. A 
further 4% came across the Convention in the course of practice, 3% came across the 
Convention in the course of personal research and the other 3% came across it online. 2% of the 
participants heard about it from seminars, another 2% came across it in a textbook and the 
remaining 2% heard about it in Nigeria but did not specify where. 
Given the above, it is clear that lack of awareness of the CISG may be a major factor inhibiting 
its ratification in Nigeria. The dismal levels of awareness amongst legal practitioners, supposedly 
primary users of the law diminish the likelihood of adoption. Without knowledge of the 
Convention, it is hardly possible to evaluate and discuss the Convention.  
In order to consider the reasons for the prevailing lack of awareness of the Convention in 
Nigeria, six key sectors have been identified. Their distinctive responsibilities and roles in 
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promoting awareness of the Convention makes them suitable to be examined. The sectors 
identified are the department of international and comparative law (Ministry of Justice), the 
department of trade, (federal ministry of trade), commercial legal practitioners, legal academia, 
trade groups and the United Nations. 
a. The Legal Practitioners  
75% of the interviewees were legal practitioners in the area of commercial law, and 64%11 of 
them were unaware of the existence of the Convention. The lack of awareness of the CISG by 
the legal practitioners is not particular to Nigeria. In some of the jurisdictions where the 
Convention has been ratified, there is hardly any familiarity of it. Based on an empirical study 
carried out in 2009, about 21 years after the CISG had been ratified in the U.S, 34% of the 
practitioners were still not familiar with the Convention.12 
Despite acknowledging that lawyers have an a role to play especially in staying updated with 
current international law and to push for changes in law, a majority of them felt that more of the 
obligation of creating awareness of international treaties rests on the government agencies. They 
believed that the government ought to be in the ‘driving seat’.13 One of the respondents stated  
As the department in charge of treaty ratification, ‘you ought to come 
back and sensitise your people on the existence of such convention and 
their benefits, and then maybe circulate a communique from the 
conferences, and maybe get some of the experts, organise conferences 
where local lawyers that are knowledgeable on the area covered by the 
Convention can now exchange ideas.’14  
This echoes the expectations of legal practitioners in Nigeria regarding the obligation of the 
government agencies of staying updated on, and spreading awareness of international uniform 
laws. This expectation is valid given that lawyers have no responsibility to ratify laws, and cannot 
                                                          
11 Out of 33 interviewees, 25 were legal practitioners involved in practice and 16, a majority were unaware of the 
Convention.  
12 Peter L Fitzgerald, ‘The International Contracting Practices Survey Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and 
Utility of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale Of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts to practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United States’ 
http://jlc.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jlc/article/view/15/15 accessed 22 July 2014; see also M W Gordon, ‘Some 
Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contracts Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected in One 
State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) 
Judges’, (198) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 361 (Gordon’s paper also shows that 10 years before 
Fitzgerald’s survey there was still low levels of the CISG in the U.S. 
13 Interview with Mr Okorie Kalu, Legal Practitioner, Punuka Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, June 2013).  




on their own undertake responsibilities of participation and ratification of international treaties 
on behalf of the government. Emphasising that it was beyond the scope of the legal practitioners 
duties it was stated   
That is not our job, I mean it would be a good thing to do, but if we 
have all kinds of government agencies in Abuja whose job it is to push 
the government that there are some contractual provisions in this 
Convention that may help local parties, that we need to look at, put it in 
local jurisdiction or even make it mandatory... But it’s not my job as a 
legal practitioner, unless I am doing it as CSR or pro bono.15   
This further emphasises the government’s responsibility in initiating and being proactive with 
relevant international laws. This belief is substantiated considering that knowledge of the 
Convention by legal practitioners is dependent on their scope of practice. Thus, it is unlikely that 
there would be awareness of the CISG amongst the legal practitioners since it may be difficult to 
come within the scope of transactions or practice, especially since Nigeria has not adopted it.  
Accordingly, the attitude of the government ministries reflects the ‘general deficiency in the 
country in relation to awareness of what is happening globally in terms of international 
instruments of global governance.’16    
Despite recognising the responsibility of the government agencies and their apathetic attitude 
towards ratification of relevant laws, some of the legal practitioners suggested that for any treaty 
to become ratified, a group of people with vested interest should push for it.17 Accordingly, the 
ratification of the CISG could be initiated by private parties especially, since most reforms in 
Nigeria are currently being driven by private initiatives.18  
As a result of the lack of expertise within the government agencies in specialised areas of 
commercial law, and the fact that the private initiatives currently play an active role setting the 
scene for reforms in Nigeria, these private initiatives are capable of playing more active and 
functional roles in providing awareness of the CISG, by drawing the attention of the relevant 
government agencies to the existence of the Convention.   
                                                          
15 Interview with Oghogho Makinde, Aluko and Oyebode Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, June 2013). 
16 Ekwueme (n 15), This reason is discussed further in the section examining the government agencies and their 
responsibilities with regards to international laws.  
17 Kalu (n 14); Interview with Olufemi Lijadu, Partner, Ajumogobia & Okeke (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013); Interview 
with Adewale Olawoyin, Managing Partner, Olawoyin & Olawoyin Law Firm, Lecturer, Commercial Law University 
of Lagos Law School (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013). 




Supporting the fact that lawyers play a significant role in creating awareness of international 
conventions, one of the legal practitioners stated that the simple answer for the non-ratification 
of the CISG ‘is that nobody has really argued strongly and forcefully that the Convention is an 
important one, that the country should domesticate.’19 
Although government agencies ought to assess and galvanise into action, laws relevant to Nigeria 
on an international level, lawyers could also play a more active role in staying aware of global 
laws. Thus, ‘more has to be done by the legal practitioners towards gaining knowledge of 
international conventions’.20 This will enable more informed decisions regarding laws, which may 
be useful to clients. This is more so since global business transactions are ‘potential catalysts for 
legal evolution and practicing lawyers and businessmen are the contemporary carriers of 
transnational laws, and there is a tremendous amount of globalisation in businesses and the 
economy and the law follows along.’21 They have an obligation to keep themselves informed 
about potentially useful laws for their clients on the international scene. This is best practice 
especially for their clients, and it is also a part of continuous legal education. Moreover, as a 
result of client contact and the varied nature of commercial practice they may be better exposed 
to international laws,’’ which aid legal transactions. Their exposure is important given the general 
lack of expertise in commercial law in the government agencies, in developing countries. 
Through their expertise and exposure, they can draw the attention of the government agencies to 
conventions such as the CISG. Their role then can be catalytic towards the ratification of the 
Convention. 
b. The Department of International and Comparative law  
The department of international and comparative law, under the Federal Ministry of Justice 
Nigeria, is charged with the responsibility, amongst others, of vetting international agreements 
between Nigeria and various countries, rendering advice to extra-ministerial departments, and 
government agencies. They also oversee the ratification of international agreements, preparation 
of council memoranda in international meetings, provide periodic reports on treaties, ensure that 
all treaties entered into by Nigeria are deposited and registered in the Ministry, ensure the 
observance of Nigeria’s treaty obligations by preparing and collating Nigeria’s periodic reports 
                                                          
19 Olawoyin (n 18). 
20 ibid. 
21 David Trubek and others, ‘Global Restructuring and the Law: The Internationalisation of Legal Fields and the 




and monitoring Nigeria’s obligations in respect of certain international organisations, mostly 
those legal in nature.22 
The functions of the department indicate that their central responsibility is keeping Nigeria 
updated with laws on the international scene, and recommending such laws, where relevant, for 
adoption. Given their duties, there is an expectation of awareness of global laws by the 
department.23  
The Assistant Director General, who was interviewed as a representative of the department 
although aware, had limited knowledge of the Convention and its purpose. When asked why the 
CISG had not yet been ratified, he suggested a number of reasons, particularly the administrative 
problems. 24  It is interesting to note that UN documents listed a Nigerian emissary as a 
participant in the negotiation. 25  However, there is no document to corroborate this in the 
department.26  
The respondent suggested there was no documentary evidence of participation by Nigeria, and 
therefore hardly any awareness because the officer allocated that particular file may have been 
inundated with work at the time, thus relegating the report for later, intending to deal with it at 
an opportune time and so in time, the report is forgotten. He further suggested that the 
nonchalance with which reports are dealt with in the ministry could be the cause. That the 
officer responsible may have dealt carelessly with the documentations of the meetings leading to 
the loss of the document. This would result in the obscurity of the Convention amongst 
members of the department. It is plausible that the above reasons are responsible for lack of 
awareness of the CISG, considering that Nigeria participated in the drafting of the CISG. 
The respondent further suggested that funding may have been a problem because in certain 
cases, officers though aware of possibly useful treaties, lack the funding to attend negotiation 
                                                          
22 This is in accordance with Section 4 sand 5 of the Treaties (Making Procedure) Act 1993, 
http://www.justice.gov.ng/The_Ministry/Departments/International_and_Comparative_Law/ accessed 19 
November 2013. 
23 Interview with Oni, Assistant Director Department of International and Comparative Law, Ministry of Justice. 
(Abuja, Nigeria, August 2013).  
24  Other reasons given, though extraneous to the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG as it relates to 
awareness include; incompatibility with domestic laws, existence of other laws and section 12 of the Convention as a 
burden. They are examined in the following subsections.     
25  Christopher Akporode OSAR Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, New York. See Travaux 
préparatoires United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) 
A/CONF.97/INF.2/REV.3 - List of Participants 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-Inf.2-Rev.3.pdf  accessed 26 August 2014. 
26 A search was carried out with Mrs Ekanem, Legal Counsel at the Department of International and Comparative 
Law Department, Ministry of Justice, Nigeria (Abuja, Nigeria, 7 June 2011). The search revealed no evidence or 




sessions thus, excluding their participation or whilst they may have participated at the initial 
stages, they may not be funded for participation in the subsequent stages. There is no evidence 
to show that Nigeria stayed or did not stay the duration of the drafting process of the CISG. 
Possibly, if Nigeria was absent, through a substantial part of the process, it may generate some 
scepticism about the Convention, since it may be felt that provisions favouring Nigeria were not 
sponsored. This will stifle any interest in the Convention and hinder any possibility of ratification. 
However, there is no evidence to either confirm or disprove this. 
Although the above reasons are correlative to the lack of awareness of the Convention in the 
department, further reasons were suggested. Sometimes, officers sent to represent Nigeria lack 
the expertise and may be insufficiently educated in the particular area of law. This means the 
officer is unable to understand and participate significantly in discussions on that area of law. 
Therefore, he is also unable to produce a comprehensive report on the benefits of the treaty in 
question. This may have been the case of the CISG, if the representative lacked expertise in the 
area of uniform laws, particularly uniform commercial laws. He may not have been able to 
provide a comprehensive report on the Convention thus, denying the opportunity of an 
objective evaluation. It may also be that the emissary did not find the Convention useful. 
However given that there is no record of this, it is highly unlikely. The absence of any report on 
Nigeria’s participation during the drafting stages of the CISG may then be one of the reasons 
why there is hardly any awareness of the Convention in the department. 
The opinions of legal practitioners in the commercial law sector confirm the above as one the 
reasons why the Convention has not been ratified. At least, 50% of the interviewed respondents 
felt the DICL was responsible for the low levels of awareness of the CISG. They suggested that 
the onus was on the department to disseminate information about international Conventions.27 
As Dr Elias states ‘there is inertia in the system, a fundamental problem with putting things in 
place, with ratifying treaties locally, we tend not to take it very seriously.’28 This is attributable to 
lack of expertise in relevant areas of laws, lack of provision to participate on a global scene and 
the fact that the ratification of treaties in the area of commercial law is lacking.29 
                                                          
27 See Interview schedule attached. 
28 Interview with Gbolahon Elias, Partner G. Elias Law Firm, Lecturer Babcock University Nigeria (Lagos Nigeria, 
June 2013 August 2013).   
29 For instance, the Hamburg Rules of 1978 became effective in 1992 and Nigeria ratified it 1992 however the Rules 
were finally domesticated and included recently in the LFN 2010. The Convention on the Elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination against Women- CEDAW was ratified by Nigeria on the 13 of June 1985, as of 2013 and as of the 
writing of the paper, the Convention has not yet been domesticated. The United Nations Treaty Collections Website 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en  accessed 23 




In terms of awareness of and evaluating treaties for ratification, the department acts on 
suggestions or calls by other Nigerian ministries specialised in, and responsible for particular 
topics. Thus, with regards to uniform commercial laws, the respondent suggested that the 
ministry of trade was also responsible. However, since there had been no request by them, there 
was hardly any way for the comparative law department to avert their mind to such laws. The 
respondent suggested the responsibility was on the ministry of trade to draw their attention to 
the Convention before they could advise on ratification.30  
Given the ministry of trade’s specialisation in trade and commercial matters, there is indeed an 
obligation on them to keep abreast of laws on the global scene, which may be useful in Nigeria 
and make recommendations to the DICL. Both ministries ought to work together in this regard 
to ensure evaluation and awareness of global laws.  
It is interesting to note that since 2005, the DCIL has represented the Ministry at the Session of 
Working Group III (Transport Law) of the UNCITRAL, which was entrusted with the 
responsibility to renew current laws and practices in the area of the international carriage of 
goods by sea with a view to establishing uniform rules. Given this, it is a wonder that there is still 
no awareness of the CISG. 
c. The Department of Trade, Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment  
As suggested by the Director of the DICL, there is an obligation on the Federal Ministry of 
Trade and Investment31 to bring to their attention the CISG. Since they are the ‘focal ministry,’ 
they ought to play the leading role, by attending meetings and making suggestions to the DICL 
based on thorough evaluation of the law. Drawing the attention of the DICL to the relevant law 
is imperative towards staying aware of global international laws.32 
A visit to the departments of Trade and Investment,33 and Commercial Law under the MITI 
revealed little awareness of the CISG. The Principal Assistant Registrar of the Commercial law 
department was interviewed and although he had heard of the CISG, he did not hear of it at the 
ministry of trade, but whilst he was undertaking a Masters degree program abroad.34 The Acting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
September 2013) http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/nigeria-is-notorious-for-abandoning-international-
treaties-oby-nwankwo/   accessed 23 November 2013. 
30 Oni (n 24).  
31 Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment (FMTI). 
32 Oni (n 24). 
33 DTI. 
34 Interview with Shafiu Adamu Yauri, Principal Assistant Registry, Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment 




Director of the DTI, who is also the head of the UNCTAD unit, stated that in his 30 years in the 
civil service he had never heard of the CISG.35 The third interviewee, a commercial officer in the 
Bilateral Trade Division also stated that he was unaware of the Convention.36 
The officers interviewed stated that they were unaware of the Convention because Nigeria had 
not ratified it.37 This suggestion is problematic, given that the ministry in question is charged with 
trade matters in Nigeria and therefore is responsible for staying abreast with local and 
international laws governing trade.  
Other reasons suggested by one of the respondents were the incompetency of the 
representatives in specialised areas,38 and the inability of the UN agencies to interact effectively 
with certain countries.39 This incompetency means the representative’s unfamiliarity will hinder 
him from evaluating the Convention properly and therefore will not be able to make 
recommendations. Further, lack of staff educated in such areas means that the Convention may 
not receive the relevant attention, consequently resulting in stifled awareness. 
The suggestion of insufficient interactions between the UNCITRAL and the relevant agencies in 
Nigeria, raises questions regarding the burden of responsibility between the government agencies 
particularly FMTI and the UNCITRAL.  
The role of the FMTI as a representative of the Nigerian government suggests there is an 
obligation on the ministry to act in the interest of Nigeria in all trade matters. As agencies of 
Nigeria whose responsibility lie in ensuring the economic needs of the citizen are met, they are 
directly responsible for searching out trade laws both domestic and international laws that will 
potentially meet the needs and spread awareness of relevant laws to Nigerian citizens. This duty 
is underpinned in the state’s economic responsibility to the citizens. Ideally, the Nigerian state as 
an economic actor should provide a neutral and functional framework for law and order and the 
maintenance of contractual relationships between its citizens and foreign traders.  
The UNCITRAL owes no such responsibility to the citizens of any state. Furthermore, given the 
state’s role as a regulator, setting the framework of contract and exchange, the FMTI has more 
responsibility to determine the laws that should regulate the affairs of the Nigerian citizens. This 
                                                          
35 Interview with I K Mohammed, Acting Director, Bilateral Trade Division, Department of Trade, FMTI (Abuja, 
Nigeria, December 2013).  
36 Interview with Sunday Oguchie, Commercial Officer, Bilateral Trade Division, Department of Trade, FMTI 
(Abuja, Nigeria, December 2013). 
37 ibid. 





responsibility is particularly important given the unstructured way that trade is carried out in 
Nigeria and especially the fact that in most international trade transactions, Nigerian traders find 
themselves as the weaker bargaining parties.40 The FMTI by assuming more responsibility in 
obtaining information on laws such as the CISG and spreading awareness, serves in providing a 
platform for the Nigerian trader to have equal bargaining strengths as his foreign counterpart. 
This in turn would lead to a structured market and a better economic environment. 
The duty of the FMTI, which is the diversification of the resource base of Nigeria’s economy, 
with a focus on increased production and export of non-oil and gas products, 41  further 
emphasises that it has greater responsibility in promoting awareness of the CISG than the 
UNCITRAL. In the diversification of resource base, the department ought to seek out and 
evaluate the best frameworks to regulate international transactions between SMEs since they can 
be the backbone of the economy, by providing an alternative source of income particularly, if 
there is a potential for such laws to promote a robust international trade environment. Thus, the 
major responsibility of investigating into the CISG and, subsequently disseminating information 
on the Convention falls on the FMTI. 
The distinctive status of the UN also suggests that more responsibility of promoting awareness 
of the CISG falls on the FMTI than on the UNCITRAL. As an international organisation it is 
established by ‘formal political agreements between members that have the status of 
international treaties.’42 This implies that its legitimacy is derived from the states and as such, it 
can only be as useful as its members needs. Hence, laws such as the CISG have gained legitimacy 
because states have agreed to them. Further, whilst the UN has allegiance to a collective but no 
particular state, Nigeria owes allegiance singularly to its citizens. This means that whilst the UN 
represents the interests of all the states, it does not represent the interest of any particular state 
(at least in theory). Consequently, states such as Nigeria, which give legitimacy to the UN, albeit 
with other states, cannot expect the UN to take greater responsibility for promoting laws 
intended for the Nigeria’s citizens’ welfare.  
Additionally, the UN is funded by states and therefore, states are able, and should provide the 
resources for working conjointly, if they choose to, with the UNCITRAL, towards spreading 
awareness of the CISG in Nigeria. Where there is no consensus, it may be infelicitous for 
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41 Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment (FMTI), http://www.fmti.gov.ng/ accessed 31 August 2014. 





resources pooled together by states to be designated to favour one state. Furthermore, Nigeria 
has the resource to fund and promote awareness of the CISG together with the UNCITRAL.  
As central actors and subjects of international law, States participate in the drafting of, and 
subject themselves to such international laws. 43  Given that international laws represent the 
interests of the states, and states commit themselves to this consensual process, their 
participation suggests acquiescence to these laws. Such acquiescence suggests acceptance of the 
benefits of such laws to the states. As beneficiaries involved in the process of drafting ‘UN laws’ 
States should have more responsibility than the UNCITRAL in creating awareness of such laws. 
This is particularly so, given that states aim to undoubtedly represent the interests of their 
citizens. Nigeria’s participation in the drafting further emphasises their subjection and acceptance 
of standardised practices.  
Nigeria also understands the distinctive legal requirements of her people, and is better equipped 
to assess laws such as the CISG. The FMTI is responsible for collating information on trade in 
Nigeria and liaises with bodies that represent SMEs and sole traders. Therefore, they understand 
the needs of these sectors. They also work directly with, and have greater access to the 
UNCITRAL. The FMTI thus is a conduit between both domestic and foreign bodies, treaties 
and conventions, with respect to trade. Their position in this regard places more responsibility 
on the FMTI than the UNCITRAL in terms of obtaining and dispersing information on the 
CISG.  
That more obligation lies on Nigeria does not absolve the UNCITRAL of its obligation because 
the FMTI can only create awareness of the CISG in Nigeria with the help of the UNCITRAL. 
However, this understanding may help in investing on staff training in commercial law. This will 
encourage informed participation at the international level. Understanding this, the FMTI should 
aim to liaise more closely with the MAN44 to ensure effective dissemination of information on 
the CISG. 
d. Legal Academia 
The data obtained with respect to legal academics shows that 86% of them were aware of the 
CISG.45 However, this data is not representative, given that the institutions were on strike when 
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the data was obtained.46 However, the author believes that there is hardly any awareness of the 
CISG within the academic circle. This position is supported by anecdotal evidence and the 
reasons presented below.  
Firstly, considering that the Convention has not yet been ratified in Nigeria and therefore, is not 
a part of the domestic laws, the National Universities Commissions,47 even if there was a chance 
that they are aware of the Convention, would see no reason to include it in the academic syllabus 
because international trade law is not taught at the undergraduate level. Further, the scope of the 
commercial law module at the undergraduate level does not cover any international law and thus, 
international laws are not discussed as part of the module.’48 At the undergraduate level, the 
Nigerian law i.e. the sale of goods is strictly taught. This is because the NUC dictates the 
structure of the module.49  
Given the module structure and the mandate of the NUC, there is no avenue for conventions 
such as the CISG to be discussed.50 Therefore, even if lecturers were aware of the Convention 
there is no platform to discuss it. This limitation supports the fact that the CISG is not known in 
the academic circle. And, even if they are aware of the CISG, there is hardly any avenue for them 
to promote awareness of the Convention. 
Given the ubiquity of globalisation, it is suggested that a syllabus which reflects more 
international laws on trade should be considered. In order to promote awareness of the 
Convention it is also suggested that the CISG and other such international Conventions should 
be included introductorily in the syllabus as part of the commercial law module. This would keep 
budding lawyers informed on global laws. It also provides the relevant exposure to international 
laws and sets the stage for timely assessments of foreign legislations that may be relevant in 
Nigeria.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the author had mentioned that this was the area of her research prior to the interview session and he chose to 
familiarise himself with the Convention before the interview. 
46 6 people in the legal academia in Nigeria were interviewed, because of the on-going University strike which was 
called off subsequently in December 2013. 
47 The National Universities Commission (NUC), http://www.nuc.edu.ng/pages/pages.asp?id=27 accessed 21 July 
2014.  
48 Phone Interview with Nkem Itanyi, Lecturer, Commercial law University of Nigeria Nsukka (UNN) Enugu 
campus (Durham, England September 2013). 
49  This is possibly a result of the NUC mandate Phone Interview Nduka Ekeyi, Lecturer, UNN and Legal 
Practitioner in Enugu; Mrs Itanyi (n 52); Interview with Professor Nnona, Commercial law lecturer UNEC (Abuja, 
Nigeria, January 2014); Olawoyin (n 18); Interview with Nat Ofo, Lecturer, Igbinedion University Okada (Lagos, 
Nigeria ; Elias (n 30). 




One of the respondents stated that he had considered introducing the Convention to the 
students, since he was familiar with it. However, this was not possible because the international 
trade law module, at the postgraduate level was handled by the Department of Philosophy and 
International Law,51 who did not see the need for the CISG.  
Another respondent felt that there was no need for the CISG to be taught at the undergraduate 
level but that it may be offered as an optional module for postgraduate.52 Although this is a 
plausible suggestion, it is the author’s opinion that the syllables should in the least reflect current 
global trends and laws. This is to ensure that lawyers are equipped with the relevant knowledge 
to deal with the ever-burgeoning complex global transactions.    
A perusal of the Nigerian textbooks on commercial law also reveals that the CISG is not 
discussed.53 This may be because the NUC provides a strict syllabus and therefore authors would 
naturally seek to cater to the relevant needs. However, this is not necessarily sufficient reason not 
to deal with the CISG in the textbooks, at least, for informational purposes. In comparison, 
most of the textbooks on trade and commercial law in the UK, a country which has not ratified 
the CISG, discuss the Convention and in some cases to a significant extent. 54  Given the 
approach adopted by the academics in the UK, it is suggested that the CISG should be discussed 
more in the textbooks as this will serve to educate the Nigerian legal populace.  
Further supporting the proposition that the CISG is not widely known within the academic circle 
in Nigeria is the fact that the academics that were aware of the CISG, became aware of it outside 
the country.55 If awareness of the CISG amongst the academia comes from undertaking foreign 
studies abroad, it may be surmised that the majority of the academia, who have not undertaken 
any studies abroad will most likely be unfamiliar with the Convention.   
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Calculation of the mean year of post call qualification of the survey participants provides 
evidence to support the unpopularity of the CISG within the Nigerian academic circle. The fact 
that the average year of post call qualification amongst the survey participants is 3.5 years shows 
that a majority of the participants had been called to the bar within the last three and half years. 
Since they had never heard of the CISG, it is probable that it is not included in the Nigerian 
educational syllabus, and a majority of the lecturers did not discuss it.  
Despite the possibility of the lack of awareness amongst the legal academia, they are a significant 
group with respect to dispersing knowledge of the Convention in Nigeria. This is reinforced by 
the fact that some of the legal practitioners felt, that they not only had a significant role to play in 
this regard, but that any ignorance of the Convention is traceable to the academic institutions. 
Accordingly, one of the respondents stated; 
There is a general deficiency in this country in relation to the awareness 
of what is happening globally in terms of international instruments of 
global governance because if you go to the Nigerian universities, you 
will see that some of the things that are being taught abroad are not 
being taught to the students here. I do not want to deride our lecturers. 
Yes, they are qualified but we don’t devote enough funds for education 
so our curricula are not as elaborate as they are in the western world. 
Our professors and lecturers are not as encouraged as they are abroad. 
Our research institutions are not receiving adequate funding that will 
make them stay abreast of cutting edge research around the world.56 
Inherent in the statement above is the suggestion that the lack of awareness of international laws 
such as the CISG is a result of the social problems in Nigeria, which invariably affects 
educational institutions. There is the problem of funding for the implementation of government 
policies on education and for carrying out curriculum innovations in various disciplines and at 
various levels of education.57 Research institutions are also poorly funded, and this affects the 
educational staff. Academics at the federal universities are hardly funded to attend international 
conferences that discuss global trends and laws. They also lack the facilities to undertake 
extensive research. The federal and state governments hardly provide funding for these 
universities. Additionally, lecturers have to personally pay for articles required. These setbacks 
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are disincentives to gaining access to writing, thereby creating a general lack of awareness of 
global laws in academia. 
Despite recognising the above, some of the academics perceived the ignorance of the CISG as a 
result of the Convention’s nature. Ofo suggested that his lack of awareness of the CISG raises 
questions regarding the Convention’s usefulness. This is especially since traders still carry on 
with their transactions in spite of this ignorance.58 Supporting him Nnona states; 
[T]hat in the grand scale, the Convention is not a radical piece of 
legislation and cannot be considered revolutionary; at least it is not on 
the same level as the WTO and its endeavours. It is not that if you do 
not have it you will suffer too much. The rules of common law provide 
good enough base for international transactions.59 
These views are understandable if one considers that even in jurisdictions that have adopted the 
CISG, it is frequently opted out of. This means that the CISG may not govern as much 
international trade transactions as imagined. This is because of the perennial problem of its 
unfamiliarity, which covers both lack of sufficient knowledge of the CISG and lack of awareness 
of its existence.60 However, the radicality of the CISG is not the vital issue, neither is it the fact 
that traders are able to continue trading without the CISG. The crux of the argument is that 
although the CISG is not radical, it presents an option for Nigerian traders who would otherwise 
be the weaker bargainers in international trade transactions, because of choice of law issues, and 
ignorance of the existence of the CISG. Thus, the CISG provides a neutral choice in transaction, 
which the Nigerian traders stand to benefit more from, given their disadvantaged position. 
Therefore, although the Convention is not radical, it can improve the structure of trade in 
Nigeria and improve the transactional position of the traders.   
It is also inapposite to compare the CISG with the WTO legislation and treaties because they 
serve distinctive functions. Whilst the WTO treaties are frameworks for the conduct of trade 
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relations amongst members in matters related to trade agreements,61 the CISG governs private 
international transactions between parties from different states.   
Comparatively, it is interesting to note the situation of the CISG at UK Universities. A survey 
carried out in 2010 in the UK shows that more than three quarters of the courses that 
incorporated the CISG were optional (77.3%) whereas only 22.7% were mandatory. Although 
both Nigeria and the UK have not ratified the CISG, the disparity in their approach is clear. This 
provides students with more knowledge of what is happening globally in United Kingdom.  
The research also showed that the majority of the courses in which the CISG was taught, were 
for postgraduates, with only 31.8% being for undergraduates.62 This suggests that knowledge of 
the CISG amongst legal practitioners in Nigeria may come from studying the optional module of 
international trade law in the UK because three quarters of the courses on which the CISG is 
taught is optional.63  
Although the UK has not ratified the CISG, the level of awareness amongst the legal academia is 
indicative of good knowledge of the Convention. The survey showed that the majority of 
lecturers (42.1%) had either ‘good’ or ‘very good’ knowledge of the CISG, whereas 15.8% had 
‘excellent’ familiarity of the CISG including publishing in the field. 64  Given this, the non-
ratification of the Convention in any jurisdiction seems to be no excuse for its lack of awareness. 
There is a need for proactive participation by academics in Nigeria in the discussion of global 
matters by attending international conferences, and organising local conferences in order to 
engage in discourses on treaties and conferences on possibly relevant issues within the Nigerian 
context.  
e. The Traders    
The traders (SMEs and sole traders) and multinationals involved in international trade are likely 
to be most affected by the ratification of the CISG. However, there is a general lack of awareness 
of the CISG amongst them. As stated by a legal practitioner ‘although there is some awareness 
of the issues addressed by the Convention, there is no awareness that there is something there 
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that could help address the problems’.65 This statement is valid given the unstructured nature of 
trade in Nigeria, and the disadvantaged position of Nigerian traders in international trade 
transactions. As a result, it is unlikely that Nigerian traders are unaware of their transactional 
position, but plausible that they have no information on accessing laws that could assist in 
creating parity in international transactions.  
On the other hand, it may be that there is no awareness of the CISG amongst the traders 
because of its perceived sophistication. However, this suggestion within the Nigerian context is 
flawed. In order for any law to be categorised as sophisticated, there has to be awareness of that 
law.  Considering this, the CISG cannot be considered sophisticated amongst Nigerian traders 
who are unaware of its existence.  
Two departments that represent businesses in Nigeria were visited to determine if there was any 
awareness of the CISG. The MAN,66 which is the collective voice for manufacturers in Nigeria 
and the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture67 the 
umbrella organisation for all the state and Bilateral Chambers of Commerce within Nigeria.68  
The MAN is a private initiative that seeks to create an investment friendly environment in 
Nigeria through formulating, making known and influencing general policy with regard to 
industrial labour, social, legal, training, and technical matters. It is also a forum for manufacturers 
in the private sector to formulate and articulate policy suggestions that would be complementary 
to government’s efforts at policy formulation.69 Given these functions, laws such as the CISG 
should be of interest to them. However, the Acting Director was not aware of the Convention.70 
He cited the following reasons; firstly, the status of the organisation, as a private initiative, meant 
they were not obligated to carry out certain duties, and this limited the scope of their powers.71 
This suggests it is solely the function of the government agencies to create awareness about 
international conventions. However, it also suggests a certain level of complacency. Being that 
the purpose of such associations is to pursue joint interests and objectives of actors from 
different backgrounds, in this case an inclusive function is keeping abreast with current 
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international laws that have the potential to promote the interest of members, it seems that this 
in the least should not fall outside the scope of their powers.  
There is a need for the MAN to be more proactive in staying updated with global laws. This is 
further buttressed by the fact that reforms in Nigeria are currently being driven by the private 
sector.72 There is no doubt that the MAN, given its nature, has information on the needs of its 
members, the potential users of the law. Through more proactivity, relevant needs can be 
communicated to government agencies, which will result in more awareness of potentially useful 
uniform trade laws.  
Secondly, the voluntary nature of membership means there would normally be a slowed pace in 
dealing with issues not considered priority. He added that the association did not interfere with 
the affairs of members, especially since companies each had their style of conducting legal 
transactions and contractual obligations.73 Understandably, MAN should not interfere with the 
legal affairs of its members. However, there is a need to frequently assess the adequacy of the 
frameworks governing trade, and the satisfaction levels of members.  
Although the MAN receives complaints and settles disputes amongst members, it was stated that 
this was usually sparse.74 This creates a gap between the traders and the MAN especially in terms 
of understanding their needs. One way of obtaining information on trade problems experienced 
by members without intruding into their business and legal affairs is by encouraging submission 
of complaints. This may be done through surveys and consultation documents, which specifically 
address issues with respect to international trade transactions. They should also carry out 
independent assessments to gauge the level of satisfaction of members in terms of policies that 
affect them. This will enable the body to draw out issues, which have not been brought to the 
fore by members, such as the overbearing nature of governing laws on the manufacturers and 
the bargaining strength of the Nigerian parties when they enter into transactions with foreign 
parties. 
By gathering information on issues affecting international traders in Nigeria, MAN can work as a 
pressure group responsible for recommending international laws such as the CISG to the 
department of trade and investment, FMTI. This is more so, since the FMTI has direct access to 
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the UNCITRAL, they also have facilities to disperse information on uniform commercial laws 
and are obligated to ensure the existence of a favourable trade environment in Nigeria.  
f. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Although the government agencies have the main responsibility of drawing attention to 
international Conventions, there is responsibility on the UNCITRAL to ensure awareness of the 
CISG by member states. Supporting this, one of the respondents at the FMTI suggested that the 
reason there was no awareness of the CISG in Nigeria was the ‘inability of the UN agencies to 
interact effectively with certain countries.’ 75 Another respondent stated that ‘although 
international trade is not my primary area, there is no reason why I should not have heard of the 
Convention, if it is popular.’76 Additionally, out of the respondents who were aware of the CISG, 
only one participant remembers hearing it mentioned vaguely at a conference organised by the 
UN.77 This is indicative of a gap with respect to the dissemination of information on the CISG 
generally, and in Nigeria.  
The UNCITRAL is the core legal body in the UN system in the field of international trade law,78 
and ‘plays an important role in developing that framework in pursuance of its mandate to further 
the progressive harmonization and modernization of the law of international trade, by preparing 
and promoting the use and adoption of legislative and non-legislative instruments in a number of 
key areas of commercial law.’ 79  It also seeks to promote wider participation in existing 
international conventions and wider acceptance of existing model and uniform law.80 Given this 
mandate, the UNCITRAL has a duty to spread awareness of the CISG in Nigeria particularly as 
she is a member state.81 However, the extent to which this duty is carried out and the sufficiency 
of the methods employed in promoting wider participation raises questions. 
The general lack of awareness of uniform commercial Conventions such as the CISG is not 
atypical and the UN is not unfamiliar with the reservations regarding uniform commercial laws. 
Conservative routine, prejudice and inertia are considered the general obstacles to their 
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adoption.82 This is because of the ‘diversity of nations, with their different economic, social and 
political structures and divergent ideas of justice coupled with the diversity of methods used by 
lawyers of the various countries in the elaboration and development of the law.’83  
The UNCITRAL has several initiatives designed to promote awareness. There are the technical 
cooperation and assistance activities which include organising briefing missions and participating 
in seminars and conferences, organised both at national and regional levels, assisting countries in 
assessing their trade law reform needs, assisting with the drafting of national legislation to 
implement UNCITRAL texts and organising training activities to facilitate the implementation 
and interpretation of legislation based on UNCITRAL texts by judges and legal practitioners.84 
The intentions behind the initiatives are commendable considering the lack of expertise in 
certain areas of commercial law in Nigeria. However, these initiatives fall short of expectations 
particularly in Nigeria. For instance, conferences held in Africa regarding the CISG are minimal. 
The ‘First African Conference on International Commercial Law’ took place in Cameroon where 
a couple of papers discussed the CISG and the case for accession in Africa.85 Since then, it seems 
from a search on the Internet that there have been no such conferences held in Africa. This 
seems counter intuitive, considering that conferences provide the right platform to disperse 
information on the CISG and to discuss its potential benefits for Nigerian traders.  
In the past five years, conferences on the CISG have been held in countries where the 
Convention has either been ratified, or countries where there is sufficient awareness of its 
existence.86 This limits the focus on countries where there is little awareness of the CISG. The 
UNCITRAL should endeavour to hold conferences on the CISG in Africa, since commercial 
laws in countries such as Nigeria are in need of reform and the CISG may be beneficial in 
reforming them, whilst encouraging seamless trade. 
Another way in which the UNCITRAL promotes wider participation is through the provision of 
the PACE University Website, dedicated solely to the CISG and the CLOUT system 87  for 
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UNCITRAL texts including the CISG. These websites have a digest of cases, which aid in the 
application and interpretation of the CISG. Although these websites are comprehensive and 
commendable because they provide a surfeit of articles, commentary and cases on the CISG, 
they are more useful for countries that have ratified the CISG. There is hardly any reason for a 
lawyer in Nigeria to look for information on the CISG, given that Nigeria has not ratified it. 
Thus, their usefulness is limited to countries that have ratified the Convention and as such, the 
website is a limited way of promoting awareness of the CISG. This further shows that the 
UNCITRAL’s efforts in promoting wider acceptance of the CISG may be insufficient. 
The PACE website, states that their ultimate goal is to have a CISG website for every country.88 
Although this is a laudable aspiration, it falls short of expectations. Nine out of the eighty 
countries that have adopted the CISG are African countries however, there is just one website 
catering to them- (University of South Africa) UNISA website, dedicated to the CISG which was 
last updated on 2011/11/24.89 This is unsatisfactory especially when compared to how active the 
websites of the other four continents; the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Oceanea, and the 
Americas,90 and it also demonstrates laxity in promoting awareness of the CISG in Africa.  
The UN suggests that the lack of awareness of some uniform commercial law texts is because 
commercial laws are not considered legislative priority in some developing countries. Given this, 
there is insufficient number of people in the government with expertise in commercial law 
reforms with whom UNCITRAL would be able to establish sustainable dialogue.91 Consequently, 
steps proposed towards drawing awareness of international commercial laws are aimed at 
achieving sustainable capacity of interested countries to implement commercial law reforms 
themselves with assistance from the international community where necessary.92 Although this is 
a plausible reason for the minimal spread of awareness of the CISG by the UNCITRAL in 
Africa, it defeats the purpose of the uniform laws. This is because if the aim of uniform laws is 
to achieve coherent and seamless trade transactions and eliminate barriers to trade, focusing 
disproportionately on countries that show interest because they can afford to, skews the essence 
of the law.   
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL suggests that because of the growth in demand for its technical 
assistance, and given that the regular budget does not include funds for such activities, such 
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activities can then only be conducted if funds can be obtained from other sources.93 However, 
the lack of funding is also a result of the discordant relationships between the UN Systems, 
which is fragmented, rife with competition and ‘certainly not a harmonious cooperative whole in 
which the parts work towards a common purpose.’94 The functionally decentralised UN system is 
not solely an organisational problem but also a result of a deeply divisive political issue hinging 
on the views of member states about the organisation’s priorities. 95  This has led to a 
disproportionate allocation of funds to what is considered priority by core funders of the UN i.e. 
social agenda taking precedence over economic needs. The international agenda is also reflected 
in the millennium development goals, which are more social oriented and very little economic 
oriented.96  
Prioritising social development over economic development means that commercial laws such as 
the CISG will hardly have funding allocated for activities, which promote awareness of the CISG 
in Nigeria. This means that until there is a shift from social development to economic 
development, the international agenda will hardly be more interested in encouraging, through 
funding the wider participation of uniform commercial law, texts such as the CISG.  
There should be a structure by the UNCITRAL to follow up on states that have expressed 
interest in a treaty but have not ratified it or have ratified it, but not domesticated it. Although 
letters from the UNCITRAL have been sent to countries such as the UK,97 asking about the 
ratification of the CISG, it is doubtful that any letters have been sent to Nigeria. This could be a 
way of promoting awareness of the CISG in the government sector without expending the 
meagre funds.   
Working with bodies such as the MAN is also one way the UNCITRAL can disseminate 
information on the CISG, ensuring that traders become exposed to it. This can be done via 
technological means such as emails and Internet calls, which is less expensive, although contact 
may have to be initiated by the UNCITRAL. Spreading awareness of the CISG through bodies 
such as the MAN before it is ratified will decrease the possibility of the CISG being viewed as 
sophisticated by the traders. Ultimately, the benefits of the CISG may be recognised, leading to a 
possible demand for the law by potential users. 
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The UNCITRAL should also consider programs involving the legal academia, working with 
them towards incorporating UN laws into the law curriculum would bring about awareness on a 
broad-spectrum. 
The next section identifies, the reasons suggested by the respondents for the lack of awareness 
of the CISG in Nigeria.  
3.2.2 Familiarity with the Status Quo and Preference for the English Law  
One of the reasons why there is no awareness of the CISG in Nigeria is the comfort with the 
extant laws. Legal practitioners and traders familiar with existent laws are not naturally disposed 
to seeking new laws, despite their utility. Supporting this, one of the practitioners stated,  
I don’t see Nigeria signing up to that Convention because things we do 
not know much about, especially in this part of the world is usually a 
problem to accept. So human proclivity is that you gravitate around 
people you like, people you are used to and things you are used to. We 
are used to our laws and for the Nigerian practitioner, we don’t believe 
that we have problems as such but we believe that we don’t enforce our 
laws. And therefore where one is advocating for a holistic change of our 
contract laws, I’m not sure it will resonate with the legal community 
because we do not think that we have problem with our laws98  
The statement reflects the natural human reaction to the unknown. Fear of laws different from 
what people are familiar with may require a change in existing patterns, and unpredictable results, 
to which they would be liable. This fear though understandable, is not sufficient to deter 
consideration of the best options for international trade in Nigeria. The belief that the extant 
commercial laws, which are out-dated and in some cases unfit for modern transactions- the SGA 
1893, are still very functional, may be incorrect. The problem however is not necessarily the 
adequacy of the existent laws, but the gap, which the CISG seeks to fill. That is, ensuring that the 
Nigerian trader has equal bargaining strength with his foreign counterpart.  
The suggestion that the adoption of the CISG implicates an overhaul of the current laws 
governing trade, or that it is fundamentally different is misleading because the Convention acts 
complementarily with, and can exist alongside domestic laws, because of its non-mandatory 
                                                          




nature. As such, parties are allowed to "opt out" of the Convention in its entirety, derogate from 
or vary the effect of any of its principles.99  
Respondents seemed to be more familiar with, and preferred English laws to govern their 
transactions, making English laws more dominant. 
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Figure 3.4: Interview Responses to Preference for English Laws 
The above figures show the dominance of and preference for English laws in commercial 
transactions amongst legal practitioners in Nigeria. The first chart shows that for 55% of the 
respondents, English law was most frequently used in their transactions. 33% of the respondents 
did not provide answers on the law, which featured most in their transactions and 6% stated that 
arbitration was the preferred form of dispute resolution as opposed to answering questions on 
governing law. The other 6% stated that other laws dominated their transactions. 
58% of the interviewees on the second chart agreed that English laws dominated their 
transactions and that they would opt for it. 24% of the interviewees were not asked about their 
preferred governing law because they are not legal practitioners, and thus have no experience in 
this regard. 15% of the respondents were not asked the question. Whilst 3% stated that German 
laws dominated their transactions and the other 3% stated other laws governed their transactions.  
The dominance and preference for English laws in cross border transactions is not limited to 
Nigeria.100 However, there are several reasons why this is the case in Nigeria. Firstly, foreign 
traders are wary of the Nigerian legal system. As one of the respondents stated ‘there is not 
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much confidence in the legal framework in this part, and U.K laws seem to be the usual 
governing law requested. It is usually not a problem because of the cultural background and the 
ties between the Nigerian legal system and the common law of the UK’.101 It was further stated 
that ‘foreign laws are mostly asked for in international transactions because they believe the 
judicial system is likely to be compromised….’102 These fears are founded, given that inadequate 
legal processes and widespread corruption is rife in developing countries. However, these fears 
emphasise the need for the CISG, which offers a neutral solution. 
Secondly, familiarity with English laws amongst legal practitioners and judges in Nigeria makes it 
preferable and so any novel law may be discomforting. Confirming this, one of the respondents 
stated that she usually advised her clients of foreign nationality to choose English law because of 
its neutrality and familiarity in Nigeria,103 particularly since legal bodies are familiar with English 
laws.  
English law is also preferred for reasons regarding choice of law and choice of jurisdiction 
clauses. The purpose of a governing law clause is to express the parties' choice as to what the law 
interpreting and terms of the contract and its effects should be. By inserting a governing law 
clause, parties achieve certainty: they know what law is likely to be applied to determine 
questions regarding their rights and obligations under the contract. This in turn, allows them to 
analyse their legal position with confidence. On the other hand, a jurisdiction clause allows 
parties to submit all the disputes arising under their agreement to be determined by a particular 
national court or courts. 
Despite the distinction between the choice of law clause and the choice of jurisdiction clause, in 
the drafting of contract terms, there is usually an interplay between the both clauses. Parties will 
usually want consistency between their governing law clause and jurisdiction clause. So, for 
example, if disputes are to be resolved in the English courts, it makes sense to choose English 
law. This is the motivation for choosing English laws over the CISG.  
Thus, whereas the CISG offers just the governing law of a transaction, the SGA may continue to 
be chosen in transactions because where the jurisdiction for the resolution of conflict by the 
seller is England, the applicable laws would most likely be the CISG. Where the governing law 
clause and the jurisdiction clause are not consistent, parties would have to adduce expert 
evidence as to the foreign law before the English courts. 
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In the above instances, the CISG may be helpful in that where it is adopted by both parties, 
although the jurisdiction may be England, the CISG rules which are familiar for both parties can 
still be applicable in the courts. This helps to balance the bargaining strength of both parties 
especially in light of the applicability of the sellers laws in international trade transactions by 
virtue of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. 
The comfort of status quo resulting in routine inertia and prejudice has always been one of the 
obstacles to uniform law.104 As stated by Sono  
lawyers and businessmen are attached to the status quo, to the order of 
the things which they know, and to which their behaviour and their 
ways of doing things have been adapted. They view all form of reform 
with suspicion, seeing primarily the trouble it will cause rather than the 
beneficial effects and the progress, which it is intended to produce…105  
Commenting on the probable functionality of the CISG in Nigeria, one of the respondents 
stated  
It is like asking people to choose out of three cinemas in a city and then 
asking why they go to a particular cinema. Naturally, they would 
gravitate to the one they are more familiar with. So, for the known laws, 
that is, the legal systems, which are usually chosen these are laws that 
have been tested, and people are familiar with them. If English law is 
chosen and a dispute arises, you know that the English courts and 
judges are naturally familiar with it as opposed to a new body of laws 
such as the CISG that you know there is gonna be a lot of voyage of 
discovery…people may not want to resort to the CISG until such a time 
as the body of jurisprudence has been built or developed around it.’106  
When asked what laws clients asked for a respondent stated ‘well its not the clients normally; it is 
I myself who would normally request for English law…advising them that it is in their interest to 
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use English law…English law is fairly developed, more certain, and there is a perception that 
they are fairer and more consistent.’107  
There is also the demand by both foreign and local clients for English laws as the governing law 
of their transactions. This is because of the neutrality of the English law,108 its fewer formalities, 
and the flexibility it allows in transaction structures. For the Nigerian party, the English law is 
preferred because in certain cases, one of the parties may have a link to the English jurisdiction, 
or in some cases, the subsidiary of the Nigerian company is based in England.109  
Additionally, the traders who these firms represent are generally satisfied with the English laws. 
Thus, in some cases as stated by a practitioner   
Although clients may start off with other laws, people are generally 
happier with the English laws, and to the extent that people are 
comfortable, there is no need to lose the English law and their trust in 
the law because of a uniform law…there is no need to lose things we are 
familiar with or things that work in our legal system because of political 
reasons…110  
The dominance of English laws in Nigerian transactions contributes to the lack of awareness of 
the CISG in Nigeria because stakeholders may not see the need for other laws. This is further 
reinforced by the fact that respondents felt that topics addressed by the CISG, were already 
covered by the English laws, thus questioning the Convention’s significance.’111  
The arguments above are insufficient reasons for the lack of awareness of the CISG. The 
dominance and preference for English laws should not inhibit the search for useful international 
laws. Besides, this dominance is detrimental to the Nigerian lawyer, given the potential loss of 
pecuniary benefits resulting from the settlements of disputes arising from transactions, by 
English lawyers in English courts. This depletes economic benefits ordinarily intended for 
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Nigeria. Where any provisions require interpretations, the English lawyer is consulted. The 
English legal sector thus reaps large rewards because of their legal dominance. This is confirmed 
by statistics showing that almost two thirds of litigants in English commercial courts are 
foreign.112  
The loss of pecuniary benefit has become an issue of concern for the Nigerian legal practitioners 
who have gradually seen a trend of preference for English laws in the transactions by local 
businessmen.113 The result is that Nigerian lawyers are becoming increasingly disadvantaged. 
The CISG presents a solution because it provides a neutral framework for the lawyers, 
irrespective of their legal background. Its provisions do not require the expertise of lawyers 
versed with the laws of any particular jurisdiction, since it is central to the countries that have 
adopted it. Legal practitioners in Nigeria therefore have an equal opportunity of sharing in the 
pecuniary benefits from contractual disputes.  
There is hardly any doubt that the settled English laws may be easier to continue using, and to 
the extent that it will not be easy to understand and interpret a new law especially in the Nigerian 
context, one can commiserate. However, the CISG boasts of extensive websites on decided 
cases and scholarly writings especially dedicated to help lawyers and interpreters in reaching 
decisions.   
The discomforting possibilities of a new law should not be a deterrent to legal practitioners and 
judges in Nigeria responsible for interpreting laws, especially since this is an ethical issue. Law is 
organic, commercial trading methods keep evolving and for any legal system, keeping up to date 
with internationally accepted legal practices is key to ensuring the smooth functioning of 
globalised commercial transactions. 
3.2.3 Legislative Lethargy, Legislative Priority and Legislative Process 
The CISG is not considered legislative priority in Nigeria because of the inertia and complacency 
of the legislature towards international laws. Answers garnered from the respondents reveal the 
interplay between the legislative lethargy on certain legal issues, which results in their being 
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considered lesser priority, and the unhurried process of ratifying international Conventions in 
Nigeria, which is an obstacle.  
 
Figure 3.5: Interview Response on Legislative Priority, Lethargy and Process as a reason for the non-ratification of the 
CISG  
From the table above, 71.4% of the respondents suggested that the reason for the non-
ratification of the CISG was either legislative lethargy, lack of prioritisation or cumbersome 
legislative process, whilst 29% of the respondents gave other reasons apart from this.114   
For law-making to be effective, the law has to be passed timeously and according to the needs of 
the society. However, this is a problem in Nigeria. Accordingly, one of the legal practitioners 
stated, ‘the legislative process can be quite tedious, cumbersome, and long-winded…it is also 
predicated on the legislators having an interest in the Convention. So the question becomes, is 
this something that the legislature is interested in?’115  
Supporting this, another legal practitioner stated 
Perhaps, because of the level of development of the legal practice and 
level of development of specialisation and the state of laws, Nigeria does 
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not have so much integration in the mainstream of international laws. 
There are still even constitutional limitations, in the sense that as it 
stands right now, Nigeria cannot participate fully in international 
transactions no matter what amount of uniform laws that are out there, 
and the goodwill of their government there is a process that leads to 
domestication of those laws and if that is followed, they do not form 
part of those of laws and to that extent, one cannot say that the issue is 
so much of cause of burden but not that of adequacy or otherwise of 
the framework in terms of the modern realities we still have a lot.116   
The unwieldy process of law making, which entails a bill passing four stages, receiving three 
readings and being subjected to assent by the president, before it can be passed into law, means 
that international laws may stall at any of those stages, and advocates of such international laws 
may ultimately be put off.117 Furthermore, the unclear distinction between laws to be legislated 
on by the federal government and the ones to be legislated on by the state is problematic because 
where any of them purportedly legislate on matters not within their scope it becomes 
unconstitutional.118 The reality of these issues is that an inordinate amount of attention will be 
paid to laws held in this process, which may take away from time allocated to research in other 
areas. 
Furthermore, there is no ‘well established process’ whereby a Convention is signed and 
subsequently sent to the National Assembly…there should be a process, however, that process is 
broken.’119 This broken process is evidenced by the gap in communication between the FMTI 
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and the DCIL with regards to whom the burden lies on regarding acquisition and dispersal of 
information on international conventions such as the CISG.120    
The leisurely pace with which the legislature takes interest in laws affects proactive efforts of 
knowledge of the CISG, therefore stifling any possibility of adoption. This lethargy is obvious in 
the manner which the government agencies handle their international obligations.121 Thus, ‘we 
have a fundamental problem as Nigerians with putting things in place, with ratifying treaties 
locally. We tend not to take very seriously, and if you look at the rest of the commercial law for 
e.g. in many parts of shipping you find that there are many conventions we have not 
ratified…we took a very long time to ratify the Hamburg Rules, so that inertia is there.’122 ‘There 
is a huge time line to ratifying, it is laziness on the part of the national assembly, laziness also in 
the foreign ministry, I guess no attention is being paid to cerebral work because there is no 
money in it’.123  
It was also stated that ‘the Nigerian country issues also play a role in the reasons why we have 
not ratified the Convention that we have subscribed…on a daily basis Nigerian laws that we all 
know exist, continuously get breached.’124 Another lawyer stated that the Nigerian Government 
has the responsibility of doing all the ratification. However, they are currently, and have not been 
for a long time, concerned with these kinds of things.’125 Another asked  
If you go to the Ministry of Justice, how many people there are actually 
aware of the Convention? It is only what you are aware of that you can 
only be talking about…but because nobody in the Ministry of Justice 
will go and sit in the UN waiting to hear news about the Conventions 
which are necessary. So there is a peculiar difficulty where the channels 
of communication are not open and flowing.126  
These issues make it unsurprising that the CISG is not considered legislative priority, particularly 
since there is no awareness of the CISG and therefore, no pressure from potential users. One of 
the respondents stated that ‘if it’s a political issue, they will look into it … and give it speedy 
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attention, it is very unfortunate that this is a transaction based Convention.’127 This statement 
suggests that laws regulating private transactions as opposed to political issues are not necessarily 
considered priority in Nigeria.  
The lack of recognition of the CISG as legislative priority is a general problem of uniform 
commercial laws. Twenty years of the UNCITRAL experience in providing technical assistance 
to states with their local commercial law reforms reveals that under pressure of tackling other 
priorities, local needs in commercial law reforms are steadily overlooked with the result that 
resources are apportioned to other areas and local capacity of countries to commercial law 
reforms are weakened. 128 In Nigeria, whilst security, insolvency and property laws are discussed 
for reform, commercial laws are generally overlooked.129 This is partly because there are hardly 
expert personnel in Nigeria to engage in this aspect of law reform. Furthermore, the continued 
operation of the 1893 SGA irrespective of its out datedness shows that commercial laws are not 
priority in Nigeria.  
The current focus of the Nigerian legislature on more pressing laws, which it considers priority 
right now, is also a major deterrent to the adoption of the CISG.130 This is also one of the 
reasons why the UK has not adopted the CISG.131 More recently, authors have suggested that 
the idea that the UK would eventually ratify the CISG, when there is legislative time, should be 
dispensed with.132  
Based on the UK experience, it is surmised that with priority being given to other laws, the 
CISG may not become popular in Nigeria. Considering the focus on other laws,133 interests in 
commercial laws such as the CISG may continue to dwindle.  
Supporting the above is the UN’s recognition that in many states policymaking and legislative 
work related to international legal standards have not kept pace with international developments 
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in finance and commerce.134  The inadequacy and insufficiency of staff with expertise in the area 
of commercial law has been recognised as the reason why commercial law reform on a domestic 
level is slow.135 
3.2.4 The Disposition of African Countries Towards International Uniform 
Laws  
The disposition of African countries towards international laws is one of the problems, which 
hinders awareness of, and generates disinterest in laws such as the CISG. Developing countries 
are chary of international laws because they have little or no input into international norms and 
institutions. This means that developed countries are disproportionately represented at the draft 
stages of these international conventions and the end products are ultimately dictates of, and 
favour the influential, usually, developed countries. 136  Given this, developing countries may 
consider themselves receivers of such norms, which have questionable legitimacy and ‘may be 
inappropriate policy choices in countries at a different stage of economic development than 
more developed western countries.’137  
It is no surprise that lawyers in Nigeria view international uniform laws with suspicion. 75% of 
the respondents were concerned about these international laws especially for developing 
countries,138 whilst 25% of the respondents felt, that they were, for the most part, preferable to 
local laws. The respondents were concerned that uniform laws have no consideration for the 
heterogeneity of the domestic legal systems. Therefore, ‘where these laws are adopted and 
subsequently ratified, they were not usually adapted to the local circumstances, but copied 
verbatim’.139  And upon closer scrutiny, discrepancies between these laws and the local laws 
manifest.140  
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These concerns are valid considering that each country is different. Thus, for ‘any law reform to 
be meaningful, it must be sensitive to the concept of law as an organic entity…this sensitivity 
must apply on practical and theoretical levels.’141 Particularly for ‘“third world” countries, where 
there is an assemblage of a diverse set of countries, extremely varied in their cultural heritages, 
with very different historical experiences and marked differences in the patterns of their 
economies…’, 142  uniform laws must be able to recognise and find a way to balance their 
distinctiveness.  
Advocates of harmonisation, suggesting that international businesses are supported by the 
harmonisation of laws, point to a different vehicle of harmonisation as a method to ameliorate 
these fears. One of such methods is international agreement, which is either incorporated into 
the municipal laws of states or forms a model for municipal legislation.143 Supporting the latter 
suggestion, one of the respondents stated; 
 Uniform laws are good as a sort of guide or model when the national 
assembly is looking to pass its own local laws because, quite frankly the 
national assembly could do with the help. But beyond being a guide, it is 
very important that solutions are developed for the particular 
circumstances. Uniform laws are good as a guide for laws being 
developed in your own country, but I think it’s important they stop it at 
being model laws and allow particular countries to adjust it to whatever 
circumstances for whatever issues are of particular concern to them and 
for whatever their peculiar circumstances are…I would rather we passed 
our own laws taking into consideration our own circumstances. This 
would enable us place our emphasis on the areas we have particular 
problems and not necessarily restrict parties in places that we don’t have 
problems with.144    
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The fact that adopted laws are copied verbatim, without first undergoing scrutiny to determine 
compatibility with the domestic legal system is indicative of a problem with the legislature and 
not necessarily the uniform laws. International laws adopted in Nigeria are usually copied 
literatim. This is because of legislative languor, which means that lawyers are left to deal with the 
resultant discrepancies and conflict between the international treaties and local laws. It is no 
surprise then that legal practitioners are sceptical about these laws.  
Furthermore, because of the principle of sovereignty, states are allowed to choose whether or 
not to ratify international laws. Where the choice is made, the responsibility then lies on the 
legislature to ensure that before signing or domesticating a treaty, it undergoes careful evaluation 
to determine its compatibility with the Nigerian law. The fact that Nigeria is a dualistic system 
also provides the opportunity for closer scrutiny of any convention before domestication.  
The fears expressed by the respondents regarding the contents of international uniform laws and 
their suitability to Nigeria’s local circumstance is unfounded with respect to the CISG. The CISG 
is a product of participation by both developed and developing countries. In fact, Nigeria 
participated at some of the meetings leading to the birth of the CISG. The failure of the ULIS 
and the ULF, because states felt they reflected too exclusively, the practices and concerns of 
Europe,145  made the UNCITRAL adopt an inclusive approach in the drafting stages of the 
CISG.146 Thus, the UNCITRAL ensured equal participation and representation by countries on 
broad spectrums of development at the drafting stages of the CISG.  
Even if the CISG is considered a product of developed countries, the party autonomy principles 
which allows parties to derogate or vary provisions of the CISG that they want,147 the freedom to 
draft contracts according to their needs, priority given to local usages and customs in CISG 
related transactions, and the fact that where discrepancies between Nigerian laws and the 
Convention exist, parties can always opt out, suggests otherwise.  
Although the CISG gives these freedoms, structuring changes in the Convention to meet local 
needs in Nigeria, if the Convention is eventually ratified, must be done cautiously in order not to 
defeat the overarching purpose of the CISG as a uniform law. If the singular focus is adapting 
international Conventions to local circumstances or interpreting them according to local needs, it 
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takes away from the uniformity goals to which the Convention aspires. This is because a self-
evident purpose of uniform instruments is to achieve, to certain degree, uniformity in the 
application and interpretation of the unified rules across borders thus, easing transaction 
problems. Therefore, where rules are adapted to the local circumstances, it may lead to the 
“renationalisation” of a law drafted to achieve the opposite effect.148    
If the CISG can improve trade transactions and structure in Nigeria, this should be a priority 
rather than a general focus on the fact that the interests of developing countries were not 
represented, which the UNCITRAL records refute. Moreover, such fears should be assuaged by 
the knowledge that the Convention can exist separately from the domestic sales law. This means 
that parties can choose a different local law for domestic transactions and the CISG for 
international transactions. Further, as the Convention only applies to international trade 
transactions where parties have opted for it, the ability of parties to choose, means that the 
Convention is not imposed on them even where the parties feel that the laws are at variance with 
the domestic laws.   
Another reservation towards international uniform laws in third world countries is the fear that it 
represents neo-colonialism, or in some sense re-colonisation.149 Although international laws that 
come in the form of uniform laws have noble aspirations and goals, which are justifiable, lawyers 
in Nigeria view them with scepticism.150 This fear is justified by authors who claim that the 
process of globalisation has had deleterious effects on the welfare of the third world people, with 
international law playing a crucial role towards aiding the legitimisation and sustenance of 
unequal structures and processes between the developed and developing countries.151 What has 
come to be imagined by the third world as the post-colonial ideal has been interpreted as 
allowing the major organising principles of Western Culture, the idea of infinite development as 
a possibility, value and cultural goal to be implanted in the poor world.152 International laws 
prescribe rules which deliberately ignore the phenomena of uneven development in favour of 
prescribing uniform global standards and has essentially ignored the principle of special and 
differential treatment.153 Accordingly, a disproportionate attention has been paid to the numbers, 
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variations and differences in the presence of structures and processes of global capitalism which 
is aimed towards binding and uniting heterogeneous developing countries and these structures 
and processes are the reasons for colonialism and propagate neo colonialism.154 
Despite the creditability of these arguments, international law instruments are continually being 
signed into. This shows that these laws cannot be discountenanced and implies that some of 
them are more useful practically.  
Apart from the fact that these arguments do not explain the reason for the lack of awareness of 
the CISG, even if these problems are deterrents to the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria, 
solutions, which have been proffered, may allay fears. One such solution from the standpoint of 
the development of international law is analysing it from a people’s perspective and consciously 
including the developing countries in the drafting of laws.155 An analysis of the CISG reveals a 
conscious compromise between the Civil and Common law legal systems. This compromise is 
particularly important because these legal systems are the dominant families in the world and a 
Convention which amalgamates both principles is relevant in light of globalisation. Furthermore, 
the provisions of the Convention were extensively debated and deliberated upon, resulting in 
compromise and recognition of the distinctiveness of developing countries.   
3.2.5 Comprehensively Drafted Contracts  
One of the factors recognised by the respondents as contributing to the lack of awareness of the 
CISG in Nigeria is the fact that parties usually have extensively drafted contractual agreements at 
the very outset. 156 In this context, counsels typically seek to cover most of the substantive legal 
issues in their contracts in an effort to cover all eventualities, thereby limiting their reliance on 
governing laws.  
At least, 41% of the respondents, who were asked about the CISG, felt that because their 
contractual agreements are drafted comprehensively, to include most of all the issues they 
envisage, it decreases the relevance of the governing laws.157 This suggests the likelihood that 
other potentially useful laws may not be sought after. Regarding this one of the respondents 
stated that ‘if the lawyers do their jobs well, almost all the things that are relevant are dealt with 
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in the contract based on the agreement of the two parties…but in most of the normal 
circumstances whatever you are relying on the general law for, typically does not come up.’158 
This submission is buttressed by a 2012 survey which revealed that some 53% of the 
respondents in question believed that the impact of the governing law was limited to some 
extent, by an extensively drafted contract, whilst 29% believed it was limited to a great extent. 159 
Furthermore, it was stated regarding the CISG 
It is not popular because the guys doing business in Nigeria have other 
ways of handling their relationships. These people look at their 
contractual documents, and that basically is what they depend on and 
then of course…I still think it is because of the freewill to enter into a 
contract that is why the Convention is not so pronounced. So people 
believe that what they discussed and agree that is what binds them.160 
In the Nigerian context, it appears that the CISG has a limited impact on contracts entered into 
because parties typically prefer relying on extensively drafted contracts which they are both 
familiar with, and have greater control over. Considering this, it is at least arguable that parties 
merely give rhetorical force to the governing laws in their contractual undertakings, but do not, as a 
matter of practice, ascribe any normative significance to such governing laws. In short, it is submitted 
that this, viewed in light of the libertarian principle of freewill to enter contracts, arguably 
explains why there may be little awareness of the CISG in Nigeria.  
The nonchalance of transactors towards contractual details is a contributory factor in the 
unawareness of the CISG. 161 This was confirmed by 68% of the respondents who suggested that 
in certain cases, their clients may not find laws such as the CISG necessarily relevant, given their 
apathetic attitude to laws.162 Thus, parties will generally go ahead with the transaction, preferring 
not to be bogged down by the details and hassles of carefully drafted contracts.  
The fact that the thoroughness of the agreement does not impede on the contract means that the 
need for laws such as the CISG, offering that completeness, may scarcely be noticed by parties. 
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Thus, beyond the contract and issues of governing law, is the fact that contractors will go ahead 
with transactions. This further reduces the efficacy of the governing law clause. Confirming this, 
one of the respondents stated that ‘contractors will not necessarily go through the whole hassle 
of a contract,’163 and skepticism on the real impact of the Convention on the volume of trade 
was expressed since parties would normally reach whatever arrangement they are comfortable 
with, regardless of what governing law.164 In the end, ‘it all becomes an exercise in futility in 
ensuring that your interest are protected in the circumstances so no one except the most 
snobbish will walk away from a  transaction  simply because the CISG is not applicable.’165  
As a result of the limitation of human cognition, contracts cannot be perfectly drafted. This 
means that despite the decline in the importance of governing laws, there will always remain a 
need for governing laws. The CISG will also be most appreciated by parties who enter into 
contracts, irrespective of how well drafted it is. The Convention will cover details which the 
parties have ignored as a result of the costs and in the event of dispute, parties have provisions 
clearly defining their rights and obligations.       
3.2.6 The Scope of the CISG and the Nature of Transactions governed by the 
CISG/Narrowed and more Specialised Areas of Law 
One of the reasons for the lack of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria is its limited scope and the 
nature of transactions it deals with, sale of goods. This conclusion was reached, based on the 
statements by 53% of the respondents.166 It was suggested that since the Convention covered a 
particular area of law, legal practitioners may not have reason to come across it because of the 
nature of their practice. The CISG excludes consumer contracts, contracts involving the sale of 
securities, ships, vessels, hover craft or aircraft and electricity.167 Questions involving the validity 
of contracts are also outside the Convention, as is the effect which the contract may have on the 
property in the goods sold,168 and any liability of the seller for defective goods causing death or 
personal injury to any person.169 The exclusion of questions of validity of contract is significant 
because the Convention does not define ‘validity’. Furthermore, because limitations of liability 
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clauses are frequently encountered in sales contracts, excluding it severely ‘impairs the utility of 
the Convention.’170  
This problem is common amongst uniform laws because of the compromise of concepts and the 
need to ensure acceptability by differing legal systems. Thus, particular areas subject to 
conflicting interpretations are purposely omitted. At the drafting stages of the CISG certain 
matters were considered too controversial for inclusion, since the national laws differed too 
much to harmonise the various approaches.171 The drafters thus decided to exclude these issues 
from the Convention’s scope of application in order to garner wider acceptance, rather than end 
up with a complete but controversial text. 172  This compromise, despite accomplishing wide 
acceptance, resulted in limited knowledge and narrower application of the Convention, making it 
less likely to be known. This means that lawyers specialised in the areas of practice not covered 
by the CISG, will hardly be aware of the Convention.  
The chances of a Nigerian legal practitioner being aware of the CISG is further limited, given 
that practitioners in jurisdictions where the Convention has been adopted, and where there is 
awareness of its existence, usually opt out, because of its limitations and ambiguity. Thus, even 
where practitioners are aware of it, the ambiguity constitutes a hindrance to the Convention’s 
utility and consequent spread of awareness to countries that have not ratified it. Given its limited 
scope, the possibility of a Nigerian legal practitioner coming across the CISG, is unlikely.  
The limitation of the CISG raises questions of its relevance. As stated by one of the respondents, 
‘it may be because there is not a lot to gain from using it and it may also be that it is important to 
Nigerians who do business. If it was, more people would have suggested it.’173  
Additionally, the CISG deals with only substantive contract law and not the procedures and 
conflicts which are sometimes, necessarily what international traders worry about in transactions. 
Thus, ‘the commercial parties the CISG aims to serve are usually not only interested in a suitable 
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contract law regime (or private law regime in general), but also in other fields such as procedural 
law or tax law…The problem therefore is that the CISG regime is not exclusively applicable to 
the party relationship. Gaps will have to be filled by the domestic law that is applicable in 
accordance with the rules on conflict of laws. This has been suggested as one of the main 
reasons why parties exclude the CISG: they prefer the imperfectness of one whole national 
jurisdiction to the situation in which their rights and obligations are governed by fragments of 
different origin, no matter how high the quality of these fragments may be.’174   
The above statement substantiates the preference of clients and lawyers in choosing a holistic 
jurisdiction or law to govern their transaction. When respondents were asked about their 
preference for governing laws, English laws were chosen because they believed they were more 
holistic, offering not only substantive contract laws but procedural laws as well. Thus, where 
English law is chosen, it would also be included as the jurisdiction for the settlement of disputes.  
One of the respondents stated regarding the CISG, that the question is ‘whether the Convention 
will have terms that meet our needs as a nation.’175 Another respondent who was sceptical about 
the CISG stated that the CISG does not holistically address all the issues in a contractual 
relationship. He suggested that with the convention, there would be a law dealing with concepts, 
interpretations and definitions and another law dealing with procedures and process. As such,  
Those two laws are unlikely to be Nigerian laws because if the forum is 
foreign, it will be those laws that will apply to either or two of those 
matters that I have mentioned to you, distinct from the law that settles 
the disputes itself. It is another law that deals with the issue of contract 
and that is both the court forum as well as the arbitration forum.176   
Admittedly, the Convention’s scope is limited. However awareness of the Convention and its 
ensuing utility need not come from solely practicing in the areas covered by the CISG. Forums 
discussing international laws and global issues are ideal for drawing awareness to the CISG. 
Further, for foreign legal practitioners in jurisdictions where the Convention has been ratified, 
there is hardly any need to opt out, given the current number of cases and legal scholarship.177  
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Another hindrance to the awareness of the CISG is the fact that the area regulated by the 
Convention is the sale of goods. In Nigeria, the SGA is hardly utilised because parties choose to 
draft their own clauses and include their specifications and consequences of breach. Thus, it is an 
area hardly litigated on. This significantly impairs any awareness of the CISG, because, if parties 
hardly litigate on matters of sales of goods, they will hardly come across it. This suggests that 
laws such as the CISG being of similar nature will not be popular. Accordingly, one of the 
respondents stated regarding the interplay between the limitations of sale of goods transactions 
and the awareness of the CISG 
I believe part of it is also still because sale of goods as we knew it under 
common law is out-dated, in the sense that commercial law has evolved 
so much that the concept of chattels and goods have become a bit 
narrow, old approach. There is so much that has happened with the 
development of information technology and commercial transaction and 
so commercial law has completely exploded and evolved and it involves 
a lot of specialisation… The international aspect of trade in goods is 
even much more developed and does not have so much ramifications 
with the common law concept as we were being taught because it 
incorporates many aspects of commercial laws which takes you to the 
fact that even then some of those aspects there are a lot of 
specialisations a lot of uniform laws coming up in those areas. The 
general sale of goods act has become a bit too general. In Nigeria, we 
don’t see much happening in terms of litigation concerning common 
traditional concepts of SGA. The general contract principles are really 
what are applying…there is very little jurisprudence that you find that 
has been developed in Nigeria, not the common law cases, that talk 
about sections of the SGA because really in the truest sense of it the law 
of contract and commercial transactions are on-going and whatever 
special contracts you have. But you find out that little do you have cases 
that fall under SGA because they are just relics of a lost stage.178  
Part of the reason for this is because the Convention for instance does not govern the contract 
of carriage between the carrier and the shipper or receiver. As suggested by a legal practitioner, 
the type of disputes usually found in courts with respect to international trade is with regards to 
                                                          




the rights and responsibilities between shippers of cargo and ship-owners. This fragmentation in 
international trade impedes any awareness of the Convention. Furthermore, globalisation and its 
attendant consequences have resulted in a shift from legal practitioners dealing with broad areas 
to handling different areas of international commercial law. This further limits the possibility of 
lawyers in niche areas being exposed to this area of international trade law. 
The implication of the limited scope of the CISG in Nigeria is significant because the 1893 SGA, 
which has the same scope as the CISG, is not applied frequently, neither is it very popularly 
litigated on in Nigeria. Thus, the CISG may enjoy the same unpopular status as the SGA. 
Further exacerbating the effects of the unpopularity of the two laws is the fact that they share 
certain limitations, for instance, with respect to the sale of shares or the transfer of shares. Under 
the SGA, there is the question of whether shares can be categorised as goods and whether it 
conforms to the SGA definition. 179Article 2(d) of the CISG states categorically that it does not 
apply to the sale of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money. 
Matters such as this, excluded from the scope of both laws severely limit their popularity.  
The attitude and status of the Sales of Goods Law Lagos State,180 which is equivalent to the SGA 
1893, was reported in a consultation paper.181 The findings reflected a general lack of awareness 
of the existence and relevance of the SGLLS.182 When the respondents were asked why they felt 
the law was not known, they claimed that they had no cause to litigate in this area and that clients 
did not demand representation on issues within the scope of the SGLLS.183 One of the problems, 
which the respondents had with regards to litigating in the area of the sale of goods, amongst 
other problems, was that the SGLLS is its limited scope of application. This is one of the 
problems of the CISG, since both they have the same scope of application, the same reticence by 
practitioners towards the SGA possibly plagues the Convention. This attitude thus, contributes 
significantly towards the lack of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria.   
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3.2.7 The Nature and Environment of International Trade in Nigeria  
The system and structure of trade, and the attitude of the traders involved in the transactions 
contributes to the lack of awareness of the CISG. Although this question was not directly asked, 
it was gleaned from the answers of the respondents. Generally, foreign traders are wary of 
engaging in trade transactions in Nigeria because of the laws and systems in place. This caution is 
commonplace amongst developing countries across the world since a majority lack sturdy and 
established legal systems and consolidated policy systems. Foreign traders leverage on the 
unstable institutions and structure to insist on their way of contracting, hardly leaving any room 
for the Nigerian trader to negotiate his terms. They transact with the Nigerian traders on a ‘take 
it or leave it’ basis through mediums such as standard form contracts or proforma invoices. Since 
most transactions are carried out through letters of credit, it obviates the need for a regulatory 
law or at least the transactors then do not concern themselves with the laws. This nature of trade 
done on a quick basis does not necessarily require laws such as the CISG with sophisticated 
documentation.184  
Interestingly, the traders seem unperturbed about the disproportionate bargaining strength in 
transactions. As noted by one of the respondents, whilst most of the top firms will generally not 
agree to the Nigerian laws, because they consider it underdeveloped, the Nigerian party is not 
necessarily uneasy with the dispute resolution being regulated by other laws.185 ‘We are more 
generally complacent, we are more accepting to laws as long as whatever rule or law you are 
bringing is not immediately detrimental…we would generally go with the flow’. 186  This 
disposition towards trade transactions is deleterious to the traders. 
56% of the respondents suggested that the unstructured mode of international trade made no 
room for the CISG to be known.187 This suggestion is hardly applicable to the multinational 
companies who usually have a branch of their company in Nigeria and are headquartered in 
another location. Usually, the headquarters situate outside Nigeria deals with the legal issues and 
trade contracts and merely supplies the local branch of the company with the goods already 
acquired. Given this, it is most likely that most legal issues such as international trade 
transactions would be dealt with at the headquarters. In cases such as these, there is no need to 
examine the impact of the CISG since there would hardly be any contact locally. Even where the 
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multinationals decide to engage in trade, they would usually have the higher bargaining powers 
and invariably contract with smaller or individual traders on their own terms. In any case, trade 
with multinationals tend to be more structured. 
In the experience of the legal practitioners, the unstructured nature of trade was mostly 
applicable to the sole traders and the SMEs. The traders sign international trade contracts 
typically, without reading it. The importers constituting largely of sole businessmen, trade in a 
manner distinct to the multinationals. Within the private sector they have been identified as the 
actors for whom the CISG may be most useful for. Apart from exportation of crude oil, in terms 
of exchange of goods, Nigeria is more import oriented. Thus, an appreciable percentage of 
Nigerian traders buy already made goods and resell them to the population. The goods are 
usually bought and imported from foreign multinational companies. Although there is a high 
demand for the goods, because of the underdeveloped credit system in Nigeria, foreigners are 
sceptical to deal with Nigerian traders and thus would stipulate their terms of transactions. The 
Nigerian importers either buy the goods on the seller’s terms or leave it. In reality, most of the 
traders sign contracts with foreign traders, these contracts are drafted in such ways that the 
foreigner takes all his money before the goods are delivered. The subsequent realisation that the 
goods are not of merchantable quality or fit for purpose is of little consequence because the 
jurisdiction and governing laws stipulated is that preferred by the foreigner. As suggested by one 
of the respondents ‘this way of doing things has beclouded our vision to see that the instrument 
exists.’188 
Trading in this manner is a result of the underdeveloped system. Regarding the underdeveloped 
credit system and the effect on trade, it was stated:  
The credit system in Nigeria is not very well developed. So you would 
find that for the Ibo man who is bringing in containers from foreign 
countries, most times you would find that it’s a cash and carry 
transaction. Most foreign countries will not give goods to a Nigerian 
trader because then you have a situation where the man says I want to 
buy, the foreigner says how much it is and the Nigerian party transfers 
the money in full irrespective of the knowledge of the fact that wrong 
goods may be sent or contract may be breached.189 
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The Nigerian importer is invariably put in a disadvantaged position because he is on the 
receiving end of an already drafted standard form contract and therefore offered no choice.190 
Given this, ‘Most traders begin and conclude their transactions in china or internationally at the 
point of buying or selling and would not necessarily go through the hassle of a contract. As a 
result, there has been no push by these traders for a better law’.191  
The use of standard form contracts in international trade transactions further inhibits the 
awareness of the CISG in Nigeria. Accordingly it was stated ‘for people bringing goods for value 
into Nigeria, they have their own standard form contracts, and that is what you sign when you 
deal with them. Thus the provisions of the statute are usually not obtainable… any multinational 
will choose its own laws.’192 Although these forms fulfil an important efficiency role in the mass 
distribution of goods and services, they also have the ability to trick consumers because of the 
unequal bargaining power between the parties. This mode of transaction is usually unfavourable 
to the party with less bargaining strength since they do not allow them to alter the terms of the 
contracts.  
This leaves the Nigerian importer vulnerable to the whims of the multinational, already in a 
stronger position. In the event of dispute the Nigerian importer is most likely unable to afford 
the costs necessary to settle the dispute because he may have little or no knowledge of the 
governing law, neither will he be aware of the procedural rules of a court located in a country he 
is unfamiliar with. Having knowledge of the cost implication of litigating in an unfamiliar 
territory and being unaware of the laws thrust upon them, these parties are virtually helpless with 
regards to pursuing remedies if the goods arrive damaged.193   
The underdeveloped credit system which has resulted in cash and carry transactions between 
international traders has amounted in reduced litigation. 194  This is not an advantage, since 
majority of transactions end at the point of exchange of cash for goods. This seemingly 
advantageous result of a poor credit system must be measured against the consequences of 
having no option for remedy where goods supplied are substandard. The infrequency in 
litigation or lack thereof should also not be considered an indication of the satisfaction of traders 
or businessmen, in the way international trade transactions are carried out, it is not an indication 
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of a system that works, especially if the parties have no choice in the manner in which the 
transaction is carried out. As such, the infrequent litigation does not signify reduction in breach 
of contract terms, but more a case of hardly practicable litigation options for the Nigerian trader, 
given the unfamiliarity of laws, and the costs of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction. 
The effect of this mode of business transaction is deleterious to the traders and the economy. In 
the event of a breach of contract, traders have no remedy against the seller and are forced to 
alternative ways to mitigate losses. One way of doing this is through setting inordinate prices on 
subsequent goods. The exorbitant price tags on the subsequent goods in order to make up for 
the lost goods would seem justified since there is no regulation of the prices of goods and the 
way they are sold. The end consumer thus buys the goods, irrespective of the price set by the 
trader, because he has no other alternatives. It is then consumers of the products that bear the 
brunt of the forfeited claim for breach. The increased costs of goods will result in inflation in the 
economy.  
Since the parties using the CISG are mostly unsophisticated, their approach to trade transactions 
and governing laws issues are unfavourable because if some of the contractual provisions 
contradict mandatory rules of the governing laws, they will be unenforceable.195 The CISG may 
play a vital role in this aspect. Where it is adopted, spreading awareness of its provisions to 
sellers will ensure they are educated on structured trading especially, parties can agree on a 
neutral law. Since the law is mutual to the foreign seller and the Nigerian buyer, the contract can 
be structured to benefit them both. The CISG can also be made the choice law to govern the 
transaction, in the event that a law is not chosen, it will be automatically applicable. Although 
Cuniberti argues that pre-contractual costs for unsophisticated parties would be lower than post 
contractual costs, this argument only caters to a probability, that is, instances when the 
negotiated provisions prove unenforceable. However, parties do not have to wait for this 
situation to arise, the CISG is always a safe and neutral law to rely on.  
With respect to the standard form contracts, the CISG can provide protection to the buyer 
where it is adopted. Although the CISG does not expressly deal with the requirements for the 
inclusion of standard terms, courts can rely on the articles dealing with the formation and 
interpretation of the contract in general. This issue is mainly governed by Article 8(2) of the 
CISG. Through this provision the Nigerian buyer is protected because where he is not aware of 
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the intent of the foreign trader or the standard form contract, since the courts are enjoined to 
provide a reasonable man’s interpretation.  
Another factor that plays a role in the way trade is carried out in Nigeria is the literacy levels of 
these traders. The World Bank Report states that the literacy level of adults over the age of 15 in 
Nigeria is 60.1%. 196  Although the literacy levels are higher than average generally, they are 
insufficient for purposes of the contractual transactions or awareness of intricate terms of the 
contract and affects the way transactions are carried out. According to one of the respondents 
‘the literacy level of the bulk of the traders ‘not big companies’ i.e. individual traders is high. 
Thus, they deal with business transactions in a manner where they find out the price of the 
goods, they find out the way to pay for the goods and as such would not bother with putting 
things in writing.’ 197 The effect of this illiteracy is that the traders may not necessarily know the 
impact of their sales transactions and contracts or its contents.  
As a result of this, traders generally see no need for a law to govern their transactions because in 
the first place, there is no transaction requiring a regulation since it goes no further than the 
exchange. Thus, even in the breach of contract, there is no remedy because sometimes, a 
contractual relationship has not been entered into. Given the above nature of international trade 
transactions in Nigeria, there is hardly a platform for the traders to hear about the CISG or seek 
its application in their transactions.  
The sophistication of the CISG may also be a causal factor for its unawareness. This means that 
as a result of its status as an international law, advocates may see it as inaccessible to the potential 
users in Nigeria particularly because of the structure and nature of trade and traders in Nigeria. 
The discrepancy in number of cases adjudicated upon between developing and developed 
countries that have adopted the CISG, buttresses this fact. It is clear that developed countries 
have more adjudicated cases on the CISG than developing countries.198 For instance the highest 
number of cases on the CISG is found in Germany, China, Russia, Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Austria. The average literacy level amongst these countries is 98.3%. On the other hand, the 
following countries, Uganda, Liberia, Benin, Zambia, Gabon and Guinea, considered developing 
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countries have an average literacy level of 63.3% amongst them.199 This is indicative of more 
utility of the CISG in countries where trade is more structured.  
The developing countries above, which share a similar development index with Nigeria, show 
that the CISG is underutilised because of the nature of trade in developing countries. It may thus 
be inferred that since the CISG is not functional in countries where it has been ratified, in the 
countries where it has not been ratified, the nature of trade, which is a reflection of the level of 
development is a correlative factor contributing to its lack of awareness. The nature of trade 
coupled with the level of illiteracy means that the CISG may be considered too sophisticated in 
Nigeria resulting in disinterest. As suggested by one of the respondents, it is possible that we 
have not adopted the Convention because it is not something we need at this stage in our 
development.200  
The attitude of the traders towards legal information and seeking legal advice further exacerbates 
the issue. There is hesitancy about approaching lawyers for legal advice prior to signing contracts 
and in the event of a breach. Accordingly it was stated ‘for commercial transactions it’s not only 
because there is mistrust of the legal system but there is also this mind-set that I need to spend 
money or pay lawyers so there is also that cultural sense of it’.201 Accordingly, transactors would 
usually feel that when lawyers start to review contracts they end up being destroyers of 
bargains.202    
With respect to remedies, even where the Nigerian party is aware that they have been supplied 
the wrong goods, their attitude is not remedy oriented through recompense. Traders tend to be 
more complacent and would much rather solve this problem through inflated prices on goods 
than consulting with lawyers and engaging in complicated matters. A classic scenario given by a 
legal practitioner whose spouse engages in international trade of furniture is below 
Interestingly, my wife is in the furniture business, she brings a lot of 
goods from different parts of the world, she is not a multinational and 
most of the things she buys are on proforma basis. She contacts the 
seller who agrees and she pays in part. A lot of the times, she has to pay 
the seller, by the time the goods have gotten to Nigeria, there would be 
no risk on the seller but all the risk is on her. She finds out the goods are 
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not fit for purpose, or does not meet the expectations, she has a choice, 
there is a contract to the extent that emails have been exchanged, the 
seller has been paid, but the questions is ‘Is it worth pursuing? 
considering the amount of money I have spent on that transaction, is it 
worth fighting for?203  
To minimise risks, his wife buys goods in bits and in groupage, rather than one person taking the 
whole trailer load of goods, five of them share it. This reduces the value of the transaction. So 
the value of the transaction is too minimal that it does not equate with the money to be spent on 
legal action. He further suggested that his wife would not litigate because of the costs. Therefore, 
what she does where there is a breach of contract is to aim to recover it in the next batch of 
goods by selling higher to consumers.204  
This confirms the disadvantaged position and burden of risks on the Nigerian importer. The 
CISG can help draw attention to the effects of the unstructured trading system on the Nigerian 
economy. Firstly, since a major deterrent for the Nigerian importer is the inaccessibility of laws 
imposed by the foreign party, the CISG, by creating a common law for both buyer and seller 
ensures there is easier access to governing laws, eliminating the burden of learning a new law. 
The Nigerian trader is also in a better position to make choices regarding the pursuit of damages. 
If traders exercise their option to pursue compensation, the receipt of compensation will ensure 
that the goods are sold at a regulated price. Thus, eliminating the extortionist price imposed on 
the consumers because of lack of access to legal remedy. Additionally, where the CISG is 
adopted in Nigeria, it will help to draw attention to the hardly existent regulation on consumer 
goods.  
Despite the perceived advantages and relevance of the CISG, the environment of trade and the 
attitude of the Nigerian traders to the legal aspect of international trade transaction may suppress 
the functionality of the Convention, resulting in questions regarding its usefulness in Nigeria. As 
stated by one of the practitioners ‘although it may be useful to merchants, sole traders etc., the 
problem with the law is that these traders are not educated or literate enough to understand 
these things, they are focused on bring my ware in, container arrives on this day, I pay. 
Consequently, these traders are far removed from the process.’ 205  This can be resolved by 
creating awareness of the CISG and its ability to streamline trade transactions. 
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Where the CISG is adopted, there has to be a reorientation of the attitude of these traders 
towards contracts and reference of contracts to lawyers before signatures are appended. This is 
to ensure there is some awareness of the contractual provisions. As such, in the event of breach 
of contracts, parties are aware of the remedies available to them. Traders have to be educated on 
the need for structured transactions despite the demand for goods. A regulatory body is needed 
in order to deter traders from disproportionate price increase. This will ensure that customers do 
not bear the brunt of breached contracts and that traders will demand fairer deals from foreign 
parties and exercise the option of pursuing compensation for unfit goods. 
3.2.8 Nigerian Political History  
The respondents suggested that one of the reasons why there is no awareness of the CISG in 
Nigeria is traceable to the political history of instability in Nigeria.206 Political systems in African 
countries have been historically been marked with instability. Although at the time of 
decolonisation in Africa, there were favourable conditions for the effective unification of 
commercial law,207 there was no real political support, since the post-colonial African states 
staunchly guarded their sovereign prerogatives despite pan African sentiments. 208  Thus, 
burgeoning supranational institutions met with resistant and stilted power transfers. Following 
the Nigerian independence, 209 military regimes started from 1966 and witnessed eight 
successions. 210  At the epoch of the military, corruption and disregard for rule of law was 
prevalent. This era, marked with arrests of democratic opponents, closure of media houses, 
convictions and executions, shifted the focus of the country to these issues. As a result, there 
was hardly any awareness of international uniform laws. This meant there was hardly room for 
commercial laws in the legislative agenda. Even if there was knowledge of such laws, it seemed 
an inopportune time to make demands for such laws, particularly since the relationship between 
Nigeria and the international community was fraught. The sequential military administration after 
Nigeria’s independence led to a comatose civil society, resulting in a general lack of awareness of 
global laws.  
It is only recently that Nigeria has started to appreciate the importance of a robust commercial 
framework as a means of improving the economic and social conditions of post conflict societies.  
In this regard, one of the respondents stated 
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We are only just starting now to have a civil society where Nigeria has a 
voice. We have a right to demand the laws that we feel would help us. 
Under the military rule, you can’t say that because they will just throw 
you in prison. So it’s part of the reawakening that has to happen and it 
takes time. Even in developed countries these things took a lot of time 
to be developed and crystallised. So I think that civil society is just 
waking up and people are beginning to demand laws and they know they 
have a right to demand those laws.211 
The above reason plays a significant role in explaining why there is hardly any awareness of laws 
such as the CISG. However, this rebirthed interest should act as an impetus for private and 
public government agencies to proactively search out, evaluate and propose laws geared at 
promoting commerce and improving the economy. In light of the above, it may be surmised that 
given time, awareness of the Convention will spread.  
3.3 Conclusion  
From the above analysis of the empirical study, the foremost reason why the CISG has not been 
adopted in Nigeria is the general lack of awareness amongst the stakeholders. The legal 
practitioners, the legal academics, the relevant government agencies, the traders and the 
associations representing them are unaware of the CISG resulting in poor appreciation of 
benefits of the Convention.  
The lack of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria is triggered by certain factors not exclusive to 
Nigeria. These include; comfort of the status quo, legislative lethargy, lack of prioritisation or 
cumbersome legislative process, the fact that potential advocates of the CISG in developing 
countries are chary of international laws, the fact that parties usually have extensively drafted 
contractual agreements the nonchalance of transactors regarding details of contract, the limited 
scope and the nature of transactions which the Convention deals with, i.e. sale of goods and the 
structure of trade and the attitude of traders in Nigeria. All the above also draw from the 
historical political instability in Nigeria, which affected the civil society.   
However, these causes of lack of awareness are not insurmountable, given the roles and 
responsibilities of the actors identified and their designation. They can be overcome with the 
right attitude and approach by the government ministries and collaboration of all the actors 
identified. Whilst it is agreed that the government agencies have more responsibility in creating 
                                                          




awareness of the CISG in Nigeria, each of the other stakeholders have a vital role to play. 
Despite their distinctive roles, there is an interconnectedness, which should define the way 
awareness of the CISG should be created. The UNCITRAL should make more effort towards 
working together with the MAN and the FMTI to bring attention to the CISG. This is especially 
because there is a dearth of expertise in commercial law in Nigeria. The FMTI and the DICL are 
obligated to undertake research into potentially useful international laws that may encourage a 
favourable trade environment. They could consult more with the MAN and NACCIMA in order 
to assess areas of improvement and potentially useful laws. The legal practitioners and academics 
should also strive to educate themselves on what is happening globally so as to inform these 
agencies about the existence of useful laws. Where each actor recognises his role, awareness of 
the CISG can spread through conferences and seminars. Consultations can also be had in order 






LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
TRANSPLANTING THE CISG IN NIGERIA 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter uses the theories of legal transplant to draw up a framework for measuring the 
success of the CISG through the experience of the two countries that have adopted it. This is 
used to conceptualise the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria. The chapter first provides a brief 
overview of the theory and literature on legal transplants before drawing up a typology for 
measuring the success. A typology for determining successful or failed transplants is proposed in 
order to measure the level of success of the CISG in these jurisdictions, This enables an analysis 
of whether the CISG either contributed, or was detrimental to the legal systems where it was 
transplanted. 
The chapter then considers the experiences of two countries that have ratified the CISG. The 
goal of the CISG to negotiate between international and domestic laws suggests that ideally, it 
should function cohesively with any legal system, particularly, the two prominently recognised 
legal systems in the world - civil and common law legal systems. However, critics have 
condemned the plethoric adjudication of CISG cases in civil legal systems, which surpass those 
of the common law legal system. These assertions are questioned in light of the increasing 
awareness and applicability of the CISG in the common law jurisdictions. Some of the criticisms 
levelled against the CISG, which have resulted in a dearth of cases in common law jurisdictions, 
are based on divergences between the provisions of the CISG and recognised legal concepts 
under the common law.  
The chapter examines the application and experience of the CISG in Germany and the U.S, 
countries from civil and common-law jurisdictions, using them to assess the validity of the claims 
above. Germany and the U.S are selected because they represent the different legal families 
enabling a varied analysis and holistic view of the CISG in civil and common law jurisdictions 
and allowing for appreciation of the nuances in each legal system. They also have a high number 




As Germany is a civil law jurisdiction, different to Nigeria, a common law system, it enables a 
comparative analysis of the CISG’s interaction in a civil legal family distinctive to Nigeria. The 
CISG experience in Germany will highlight how the CISG interacts with the civil legal system. 
The process of adjustments and effects of application of the CISG on the key players and the 
system is considered, in order to draw out lessons, which may be useful to Nigeria.  
The United States is chosen for its common law background. The similarity of the US legal 
system to the Nigerian legal system, allows for evaluation of how concepts from the CISG, alien 
to common law jurisdictions are dealt with. It also allows for an analysis of how civil law 
concepts interact with the UCC common law concepts, how this interaction affects the actors in 
the society, and their reactions to the CISG. 
The Convention’s impact on key actors - judges, legal practitioners and traders- in the society 
and how it coexists with, and affects the extant laws, is measured in order to understand the 
experience, challenges and benefits faced by these countries. 
4.1 Brief Overview of the Theory of Legal Transplant  
It is not disputed that legal transplants, the movement of laws from one jurisdiction to the other, 
takes place. Watson defines legal transplants as ‘the moving of a rule or a system of law from one 
country to another...’1 Generally, it is the transfer of laws and institutional structures across 
geopolitical or cultural borders and also connotes the movement of legal ideas through diverse 
channels that only notionally recognise national and cultural boundaries. 2  This rudimentary 
definition of legal transplant applies to the CISG, because although international law does not 
emanate from a country, there is a movement of laws from the international sphere to the 
national sphere. More recently, legal transplants have been linked to international legal 
harmonisation projects sponsored by large trading nations, international donor agencies and 
transnational corporations.3  
4.1.1 Debates on Legal Transplants  
The argument on legal transplants was a reaction to the functionalist positivist views that laws 
are a result of norms produced by ruling powers according to the society’s needs. Watson 
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challenges this account through empirical evidence, arguing that much of law in the past has 
been borrowed or transplanted.4 These copious borrowings question the assertion of innovation 
on the basis of local conditions. 5 
If laws are bare propositional statements and not connected to the cultural and social moorings, 
then transplantation can be considered easy, making success easier. Academics who support 
lawmakers in copying foreign rules are known as Transferists. Such Transferists include 
academics such as Watson, Rafael La Porta and law development organisations such as World 
Bank, which are trying to manufacture and export effective legal systems.6 They believe that 
transplants are either all pervasive or non-existent. 7 Thus, compatibility between recipient and 
donor countries is irrelevant for successful legal borrowing. 
From the above, one may be tempted to argue that the CISG is a bare propositional statement, 
because there is no connection to any social or cultural anchorages of any jurisdiction, and 
neither does it represent any particular culture. However, the CISG fuses the culture of different 
legal families and embodies an international business culture. Therefore, adopting its principles 
and implementing it ought to be comparatively easy. It is recognised that the interpretation of 
concepts of the CISG may vary in different legal systems. However, a reciprocal effect of legal 
unification is the production of a unified legal culture.8 
The practical usefulness of laws introduces the social and cultural elements of legal transplants 
i.e., the interaction of imported laws with the local elements of the domestic jurisdiction. This 
process of interaction is supported by culturalists, who propose that law is culturally embedded 
with limited legal autonomy. That one cannot decouple law from a people because it is peculiar 
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to them, those for whom it is made.9 The term culturalists is adopted in contrast to transferists 
for academics such as Legrand who believe that legal transplants are impossible.10 
There are also limited autonomists who focus on the effects of careless transplantation. For 
them, the relationship between law and underlying social forces is important in analysing legal 
transplantation. Accordingly, if laws are socially embedded with limited autonomy, they cannot 
simply be decoupled from their social moorings and require careful adaptation to fit the 
underlying social structures. 11  These limited autonomists include scholars like Tuebner, who 
considers Pistor and Hantrias.12 On the extreme, they deny the possibility of transplantation 
based on the inherent differences between systems involved.13 The mobility of law is criticised 
on the basis of the assumption that law as a social construct, cannot remain the same. Legrand 
states that ‘a rule is necessarily an incorporative cultural form," its meaning to be found through 
essentially subjective interpretative processes, which are "a function of the interpreter's 
epistemological assumptions which are themselves historically and culturally conditioned." 
Therefore, transplants do not occur at all: the product of moving a rule elsewhere is always 
something else, "not the same rule."14 He rejects the view that law is only about the words that 
can be found in legal texts. Although Legrand concedes that legal rules transfer, he argues that 
legal cultures and epistemological assumptions do not travel. He argues that legal transfers, 
untenable, are not only ineffective or short lived but that they may also stimulate tensions which 
will destabilise the society and cause greater problems than they intended to rectify,15 because 
recipients of such laws interpret their texts using local mentalities that reconstruct the meaning 
of those texts.  
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It has been suggested that the disagreements between the two authors Watson and Legrand may 
be terminological, since both agree that lawmakers do, in the very least, copy texts from other 
countries.16   
The claims of the impossibility of legal transplants however fails to take into account the 
manifold successful transfer of institutions among western societies which have taken place 
rapidly and smoothly. Neither does it consider the ‘fragmentation, differentiation, separation, 
closure of discourses that is so typical for the modern and post-modern experience.’17  
The extremes of the two debates opened up the ground for more nuanced debates, with authors 
falling generally into the middle ground. This middle ground sought to show that transplants do 
happen and usually involve a degree of cultural adaptation ‘a domestication that is the necessary 
counterpart of the transplantation –whether it concerns the law, or other social or cultural 
artifacts that travel across space.’18 That law is a living social construct affected by cultural and 
political issues. And thus, that legal culture is a key determinant of the viability of 
transplantation.19 Accordingly, ‘complete isolationism and hermeneutical closeness were replaced 
by a vision of law as rooted in its cultural/social frameworks, but also amenable to various 
influences.’20 This is more evident in legal history, which shows that legal transplants take root in 
foreign legal terrain. Supporting this, Otto Kahn Freud, though recognising that most laws are 
deeply embedded in their social and institutional matrices, believes some laws are more 
autonomous than others and can transplant across socio political boundaries.21 He also argues 
that distinctive environmental conditions in each country-particularly the political environment 
in the form of constitutional structure and interest group coalitions make successful transplants 
rare.22 For Freud, there are different degrees of transferability, which results in the embeddedness 
of certain transplants. Laws intended to allot power, rulemaking, decision-making and policy 
making remain deeply embedded in social institutions, and are unlikely to easily transplant.23 
Essentially, Freud argues that all laws have to some extent decoupled from their socio-political 
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underpinnings, making legal transplants a theoretical possibility. Since there are varying degrees 
to which laws decouple, it is inevitable that some are more likely to survive the journey than 
others. Finally, the degree of coupling between law and society is determined by socio-political 
institutional factors; these include the ideological role of law, the distribution of state power and 
pressure from non-state interest groups.24     
 The social and cultural interaction of the CISG with domestic laws is plausible, considering that 
previously held beliefs and interpretations based on domestic knowledge may surface during the 
application of the CISG by domestic actors. Moreover, considering that the CISG has been a 
catalyst for reform of domestic laws, the effect of interaction with the legal system, there is no 
denying its ties and interaction with the legal systems and culture where it is transplanted.  
The Convention’s culture is not representative of any particular domestic culture because it 
represents the business community. The representation of international business laws drawn 
from different legal orders is not peculiar to one system. This means it is not incorporative of 
any cultural form. If rules are an outward manifestation of an implicit structure of attitude and 
reference, and a reflection of a given legal culture, the CISG represents a mix of legal cultures. 
Although it may be argued that the CISG is representative of a lex mecatoria culture, since the lex 
mercatoria is border reluctant, and irrespective of where it originated, is now an accepted part of 
business practice, a synthesis of different legal cultures and families, then it belongs to no 
particular culture. Thus, based on Legrand’s argument that a legal rule cannot survive the journey 
from one legal system to another unchanged, the fact that the law being transplanted is 
cultureless means that on its journey, it will not change. Therefore, the transplantation of 
international laws such as the CISG, essentially cultureless, are viable.   
The effect of legal transplants may be detrimental to the society. Teubner argues that legal 
transplants may cause some irritability in the receiving system. Legal transplants do not 
automatically displace pre-existing laws and the effect of what is transplanted may be a legal 
irritant.25 There is no repulsion or integration but rather ‘it works as a fundamental irritation 
which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events. It irritates, the minds and emotions 
of tradition bound lawyers, and more deeply, it irritates laws binding arrangements.26  
                                                          
24 ibid. 
25 Teubner (n 17) 12.  




The arguments above showing scepticisms towards legal transplants, and their consequent 
categorisation as legal irritants is fraught, given the fact that legal systems in today’s world, have 
incorporated ideas from various parts of the world. Therefore, it is doubtful that there are legal 
systems currently in the world, which are undiluted.27   
4.2 Typologies of Legal Transplants 
Various categories of transplants, for different conditions exist. There are categories which 
define the types of movement of laws, or the places it moves from and to, i.e. the line of 
borrowing; here, law moves between states and between international orders and states. In this 
case, laws such as the CISG feature i.e. from international to national legal order. The second 
categorisation is based on whether transplantation is voluntary or involuntary. A further 
breakdown of the typology of transplants is based on motives for receiving. 
4.2.1 Typology Based on Movement 
4.2.1.1 Horizontal or Transnational Borrowing/Transplantation 
Horizontal or transnational transplantation as the name implies is borrowing done across 
national legal systems.28 This is the more pervasive form of legal borrowing. Comparativists 
through empirical legal evolution have been inclined to see national laws as borrowing from 
other national laws and international treaty laws as borrowing from other international treaty 
laws. This is supported by the first definition of legal transplants offered by Watson, limited to 
countries ‘the moving of a rule or system from one country to another’,29 although he later 
admits that international uniform laws such as the CISG are considered legal transplants.30 In 
horizontal legal transplants, doctrines are borrowed from countries despite the geographical 
boundaries. Such borrowing with its desirability has burgeoned over the years amongst legal 
scholars and states.  
Comparative law school scholars have placed emphasis on horizontal borrowing, disregarding 
the reality of vertical borrowing. This skewed emphasis placed on horizontal borrowing by 
comparativists is a result of traditional focus of their domestic discipline on the comparison of 
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national legal systems and cultures. 31  There is hardly a want of scholarship in the area of 
horizontal legal borrowing, however for purposes of the thesis, it will not be explored.  
4.2.1.2 Vertical or Trans-Echelon Borrowing 
Vertical or Trans-echelon legal borrowing is defined as ‘borrowing between national and 
international law.’ 32  This concept is hardly recognised by legal scholars because most 
comparativists focus largely on the borrowing between national legal systems while 
internationalists tend to see international treaty law as borrowing from other international treaty 
laws. Thus, they consider international treaties endogenous, because they only draw from other 
international treaties. This belief fosters the thinking that there is no meeting point for the two 
categories of borrowing i.e. international and national.  
Understandably, there is a gulf between international and national law scholars. As a result of this 
gap, scholars seldom search for additions or solutions to the existing body of international laws 
in the analogous national laws. This is particularly for fear of costs, but there is also the pride of 
keeping international law untainted by other academic endeavours, since it is considered morally 
superior to laws of nation states.33 Actors involved in producing these international laws apply 
concepts, knowledge and designs previously used in drafting prior treaties, to new treaties, thus 
ensuring some continuing uniformity of treaties, but furthering distinctions with national laws. 
More importantly, since international laws are considered paradigmatic by national laws, 
international scholars believe then that there is a need to maintain a neutral façade, unfettered by 
national laws. As such, even where there is some appropriation of national law concepts or some 
form of interaction between national and international law with regards to borrowing, it is either 
neglected or treated discreetly,34 and in some cases, outrightly denied.  
However, national laws affect international law and in some cases unilateral national action often 
preceded, and in certain cases spurs international treaty negotiations.35 The incrementally global 
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consistency in national laws is also indicative of convergence and makes for a higher probability 
of recognition as customary international law. These examples do not in the real sense amount 
expressly to borrowing, as they are not conscious, since there is no organised international 
deliberation about the selection of a new international legal rule ex ante.36 Despite all these, 
vertical borrowing can still be glimpsed, particularly upwards from national into international 
laws.37 Although there is the rarity of discussion on this type of transplant, authors have argued 
that borrowing of this sort may occur more frequently than has been acknowledged.38  
Another variant of the trans-echelon typology of legal transplants, are processes originating at 
the international level, adopted within the nation state. This is known as ‘down-ward diffusion’.39 
This is where international laws/ideas and their effects are felt within the domestic legal order.40  
Another categorisation of legal transplants is voluntary and involuntary. These types of 
transplants are based on how, that is the choice of, the recipient country acquires the imported 
laws into their jurisdiction.   
4.2.2 Typology Based on Choice 
4.2.2.1 Voluntary Transplants  
Voluntary transplants occur when countries have made an informed decision to copy a foreign 
legal system. According to Watson, this is when either an entire legal system or a large portion of 
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it is moved to a new sphere. 41 Where transplantation is voluntary, it increases its own receptivity 
by making a significant adaptation of the foreign model to the pre-existing conditions and 
structures in the domestic setting.42 This increases the chances of success of the transplanting 
model in the local setting. Evident changes in the transplanted rules have been interpreted to 
mean positive acceptability and thus something good. This accordingly is an indication that the 
rules have been considered and modified as needed, taking into account the needs of the 
domestic circumstance.43  
4.2.2.2 Involuntary Transplants  
These types of transplants occur where a system is colonised and has a foreign legal system 
imposed on its indigenous culture.44 This is usually done by colonisation, and or war. Through 
colonisation the foreign rule is usually established for long periods of time leaving strong 
imprints on the institutions of the recipient country. A case in point is Nigeria, colonised by the 
British and having been forcefully thrust upon the English common law. Wars on the other hand 
may be short lived and in that case, the institutions established during the war may either be 
retained or abrogated. During the Napoleonic wars French codes were imposed on a large part 
of Europe however, after the war they were free to retain or abrogate and although a majority of 
them chose to retain it, many of the countries initiated their own national codifications.45 
Watson further breaks the transplants into other category; imposed reception, solicited 
imposition, penetration, infiltration, crypto reception, inoculation and so on. All these types of 
transplants though having different names may be categorised under voluntary or involuntary. 
4.2.3 Typology of Legal Transplants Based on Motivation 
Miller categorises transplants based on the different set of factors that can motivate a transplant. 
This typology proves useful because it focuses on motivations of the recipient country. 46 
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Moreover, the motivations within this category suggest they fall within voluntary transplants. 
The externally dictated transplants are included because although there are conditions and 
incentives attached to this transplant, it is still the choice of the government of the recipient 
county to adopt such laws.47      
4.2.3.1 The Cost-Saving Transplant  
According to Miller, cost-saving transplants are borne out of the simplest motivation and 
explanation for borrowing, which is that it saves time and costly experimentation. Here, the 
drafter faced with the need for legal reform will look for solutions outside in order to save him 
the stress and time of innovating.48 Thus, since the donor country already has the rules proposed 
to be borrowed, and it has already worked, it will save a lot of time and thinking by simply 
adopting the approach of the donor country.  
The arguments for cost saving transplants are founded largely on the same reasons as Watson’s 
theory-extreme practical utility. This is considered the basis for the reception of a law.49 Costs 
saving transplants are economically efficient for the state as a whole and even particularly for the 
lawmaker who is saved the awful labour of thought.50 Watson supports this by suggesting that a 
body set up to recommend law reforms begins normally not by trying to think its way through to 
its own solution based on local conditions and character, but by examining external solutions. 
This is because usually, there is a conscious attempt to achieve the best possible solution rules.  
Cost saving transplants may involve a process of Bricolage which means the reformers in the 
recipient country will simply paste together whatever it is they have at hand resulting in miniature 
resemblance to the product emanating from the donor country. This is a consequence of a 
shoddy job or lack of detailed analysis of the law to be transplanted because of the lack of 
expertise of draftsman. 51  At other times it may be resultant upon the chance meeting of a 
draftsperson and a foreign academic,52 and at other times it may involve functionalism which 
means that the borrowing is done upon prior consideration of the extent to which the foreign 
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approach deals with problems of similar nature.53 The cost saving transplant may also involve 
some element of functionalism, that is borrowing that first considers the extent to which the 
foreign approach deals with problems similar to one’s own. Here the transplanter examines how 
the same function may exist in two legal systems and the extent to which a foreign model can be 
sensibly adapted to fulfil the same functions in one’s own system.54 
Questions regarding the level of assistance which the cost saving transplant may offer a system’s 
development has been raised. Whilst some theorists argue that law is autonomous since they are 
bare propositional statements,55 others argue that laws are hinged on the social and political 
context of a particular society.56 However, as suggested by Miller, even where it is found that the 
law must fit the context of the particular society, it does not impede the allure of the cost saving 
transplant.57 Since cost saving transplants hardly guarantee success, it has been suggested that 
they should be sought where it is functional. Although, one must consider that the motivation of 
the cost saving transplant through bricolage and functionalism is to save resources, which would 
otherwise be spent in developing rules indigenously.58 Further, cost saving transplants are hardly 
ever to be found existing purely as that, they in most cases exist simultaneously with the 
legitimacy generating transplants.59   
Although cost saving transplants are a good motivation, one must also consider the costs of 
transplanting the new law, or of switching from one set of rules to another. 
4.2.3.2 The Externally Dictated Transplant  
This transplant seems more pervasive and particularly found commonly within developing 
countries. It could involve foreign individuals, entities or governments who dictate (suggest) to 
the recipient countries, the adoption of certain rules or model laws as the basis for carrying on 
business, or for allowing the dominated country a measure of autonomy.60 This typology of 
transplant may include transplants driven by the desire to please foreign states, individuals or 
entities. This can either be simply to acquiesce to their demands or to take advantage of the 
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benefits and enticements offered.61 Recently, externally dictated transplants have occurred more 
in the domestic incorporation of public international law because of opportunities and pressures 
in international law.62 
4.2.3.3 The Entrepreneurial Transplant  
The entrepreneurial type of transplant was first recognised by Dezelay and Garth who suggest 
that the success of a transplant is dependent upon the willingness of the exporter to provide the 
capital, and an importer interested in the import. 63  For these actors, they are led by their 
expectations of gain, domestically, by operating internationally.  International strategies as they 
call it ‘is the way foreign actors seek to use foreign capital such as resources, degrees, contacts, 
legitimacy and expertises, to build their power at home’.64 These actors responsible for this type 
of legal transplant have been categorised as ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ that is individuals and groups 
who leverage on these international norms to strengthen their position.65 A negative aspect of 
this typology of transplant is the possibility of abuse by particular individuals or law firms who 
encourage the domestic adoption of particular foreign laws so as to enjoy an advantage in 
marketing its own legal services. Although this should be warned against, the nature of the CISG 
seems to suggest that acquisition of expertise in that regard is available for anybody interested 
through the global jurisconsultorium and the availability of resources in that regard on the 
Internet, which is readily available.  
4.2.3.4 The Legitimacy-Generating Transplant 
According to Miller, the most commonly offered explanation for legal transplants and in some 
cases their successes, are based on the legitimacy generating transplant.66 Transplants within this 
category are alluring for recipient countries and takes place as a result of the desire to appropriate 
the works of others. For these countries, the law has a prestigious quality.67 This prestige can 
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either be of a particular legal institution or sometimes of an entire system.68Although authors 
agree that the meaning of prestige is elusive, may be tautological and faulty, it is nevertheless 
agreed that the prestige of a legal model is important in the consideration of legal transplant.69 
For the recipients, the law may be perceived as efficient and globally important, thus, informing 
the transplantation.70  
More specifically, Mattei has argued that what is termed prestige by comparative scholars is really 
the examination of the process where less developed economies opt for laws of developed 
economies based on the economically efficient rule, as opposed to the view that transplants 
based on prestige are largely empty ideas.71 Thus, that prestige comes from efficiency. As a result 
of the free flow of information and limited legal parochialism, there is the replacement of more 
efficient legal doctrines for inefficient ones.72  
Miller concurs with Mattei, that there is a link between prestige and efficiency though not 
supported by empirical evidence or an explanation of the process leading judges and the 
legislature to import a particular model.73 Consequently, there may be circumstances where the 
Judges and the legislature search for economically efficient models and this really exemplifies 
costs saving transplants, since they choose not to adopt a homegrown approach for fear of the 
cost and labour involved.74 Prestige he further argues is not ‘relevant where there is a true free 
flow of information and no barriers to the adoption of the most efficient practice possible, since 
presumably the legislators and the public will simply weigh all the technical alternatives open to 
them and select the most efficient.’75 It is the many barriers to an efficient market that make 
prestige relevant. Further, Miller adds that it is as likely that a model acquires prestige because of 
its perceived success as because of its true economic advantages.76 
Mattei’s argument that prestige based transplants are necessarily efficient does not consider the 
fact that countries seeking efficiency in adopting a model for transplant have a wide variety of 
foreign laws to choose from, and in most cases, all of the options are economically efficient. 
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However, they tend to choose particular laws i.e. the most prestigious out of all their options, 
and in fact, the laws of the particular jurisdiction opted for becomes a recurring choice 
influencing the choice of laws to transplant in other areas of law. This is the case with US laws, 
which have become popular transplant paradigms at least on the international scene. This is 
despite the existence of a plethora of other possibly similar laws on par or better than the US 
laws, which possibly serve the same function as the US laws. The model of the United States is 
also likely to be chosen, at least by developing countries even with the existence of variety of 
choices because it is considered more prestigious and popular.  
The choices made by developing countries with regards to transplants are indicative of the 
hegemony of the US laws, and consequently could be classified as being prestigious. This of 
course is in line with Watson’s argument for prestige as a source of authority and can be 
considered more of a determinant in choosing models for legal transplants than either the cost 
saving, entrepreneurial and externally dictated transplants.77 
Watson has argued, although without detailed explication that legitimacy generating transplant 
based on prestige takes priority over all the other categories of legal transplants. 78 Miller supports 
this assertion by building a case for prestige based on Weber’s sociology of law.79 Accordingly, 
three types of legitimate domination exist to explain that authority does not rest on force alone.80  
However, the one most commonly linked to the rule of law is the ‘rational’ grounds of legitimate 
domination. This is based on the ‘belief in the legality of enacted rules and the rights of those 
elevated to authority under those rules to issue commands’.81 A modern state founded on a 
strong rule of law invariably has a strong element of rational authority, which may derive from 
written legal norms. However, for these written legal norms to have any rational authority, the 
foundation of that society must be moored on the rule of law. This of course is an unrealistic 
expectation of a typically developing country that has little or no reason to place faith on the rule 
of law. Miller states that in a bid for the government officials to assert control, they desperately 
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source for foreign models to provide that missing authority. This need for a source of legitimacy 
from a foreign model ascribes to that model such a superior status that it may be seen as a 
talisman. In such situations the model may apply in the developing country even where there is 
little or no link to the local substantive needs.82 
Certain unique characteristics have been typically allotted to legitimacy generating transplants. 
However, these characteristics do not, and cannot apply to all legal transplants which may be 
included in this category because of the degree, nature and the particular subject to be 
transplanted. 
Firstly, it is expected that proponents of the legitimacy generating transplants in debates 
regarding the contents of the model to be transplanted and its suitability to the local laws would 
tend to skirt around the issue, focusing rather on the importance of the model.83  
Secondly, one would expect to find the acceptance of the model by persons with opposing 
political interests even where the model does not particularly support their substantive goals. 
This is done in the belief that there is a higher goal.84  
Finally, there is the willingness to surrender future autonomy to the model without any need for 
local adaptation since it is assumed that the model will produce good results. A corollary of this 
is the unacceptability or maybe inability of the local institutions to interpret the model for fear of 
corruption. Thus, incorporating the future interpretation of foreign institutions is appropriate 
since these domestic institutions can only enjoy adjunct authority.85  
4.3 The CISG – Vertical Transplant (Downward Diffusion) 
Traditionally, the terminology used for laws such as the CISG in any jurisdiction is adoption. 
Adoption is defined as the ‘formal act by which the form and content of a proposed treaty text 
are established’.86 However, adoption as a definition of what happens with the CISG in various 
jurisdictions is limited. This is because adopting the CISG merely explains the process of 
formally signing onto it and excludes the significance and implication of the law in practice, that 
is, its interaction with the legal culture in any particular jurisdiction. 
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 In the real sense the CISG entails more than a formal act of signing. Of course, the term 
adoption could be used if the CISG is solely to be adopted for mere formality i.e., without the 
formal legal order and the informal legal order undergoing any changes. However, this cannot 
strictly be the case since it may be particularly difficult to adopt a treaty without the treaty 
effectuating any changes in the laws of the country. At the least, the potential users of the law 
will have to be affected. This is because the mode and manner of doing things, in this context 
international trade transactions may possibly have to adjust, the laws which the actors, i.e. traders 
and lawyers have access to will be affected, the way business is done is altered. Unfamiliar 
concepts will have to be dealt with in the society, which may require some adjustments in the 
mode of thinking and for the judiciary, a reorientation of interpretive methodologies. 
In this sense, the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria may be considered a form of legal transplant. 
Scholars have recognised that the production of uniform or harmonised legal norms at the 
international level has become a major force stimulating legal transplant and these instruments 
are adopted in the form of international treaties and Conventions.87 Increasingly, legal transfers 
have been linked to international legal harmonisation projects sponsored by large trading nations, 
international donor agencies and transnational corporations. In addition, there is circularity 
between the domestic laws of national states and transnational laws.88 The diffusion of these laws 
into the legal systems of party States is considered a form of transplantation. This is further 
substantiated by Miller’s arguments that domestic incorporation of international laws by 
developing countries is considered externally dictated transplants because of the level of 
participation. This in fact supports the theory of the CISG as constituting a form of legal 
transplant especially with the fact that the level of participation of Nigeria in the process of 
drafting the CISG is not as significant.  
The choice to adopt the CISG into any jurisdiction is a voluntary one since there is no 
imposition through war or colonisation and since the UN makes adoption of the Convention a 
matter of choice. This makes it a voluntary transplant. Generally in the international society, 
there is no overarching sovereign, and international law has frequently been understood as 
involving a multitude of bilateral relationships between those entities which have international 
legal personality.  
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Based on this typology, the transplantation of the CISG into Nigeria can be considered a vertical 
or trans-echelon borrowing and more specifically, it is a type of downward diffusion. This is 
because its adoption means the diffusion of its principles into the legal system through 
application of its principles subject to the various influences. Ultimately, there is an interaction of 
the CISG with the domestic laws and the actors in the legal system.  
4.4 The Typology for Measuring the CISG as a Successful Legal 
Transplant 
Various measures for, and definitions of success of transplants have been suggested and 
employed by legal scholars. A successful transplant may mean a transplant operating exactly as in 
the origin country, it may refer to good enforcement of the law, it may also mean the level of fit 
with the societal needs of the transplant country.89 Further, it may be determined by the transfer 
of the legal idea into a host country’s legislation,90 or it may be the ability of the legal transfer to 
act as a catalyst that stimulates behavioural modifications in ways that may be unforeseen by 
lawmakers.91 
Questions based on criteria such as the above have prompted authors, to conclude that they can 
often not be clearly defined as successful or failed. Given that the success or failure of the 
transplant cannot be clearly ascertained, it becomes imperative that the choice and design of the 
transplant should be done meticulously.92  
One agreed measure of success is that it entails changing legal behaviour in the recipient 
country.93 There is also, the issue of determining from whose perspective the success must be 
defined since the legal imports may appear useful for one social group but useless for another. 
And, by challenging existing patterns, imported laws may create winners and losers.94 Based on 
extant literature, several criteria have been distilled and will be considered as definitions of 
success. They will be adopted as a baseline to define the success of the CISG in adopted 
jurisdictions. These criteria are not considered in isolation, but collectively, to the extent that 
they are all recognised as important factors in defining success.  
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Although it is not necessary that the CISG meet all of the criteria, it is imperative that it meets at 
least half of them. It must be noted that each criterion of success has relative values, which 
differs according to each jurisdiction. It is also recognised that state centred narratives are more 
likely to link success to state policy objectives than to non-state business narratives.95  
4.4.1 The Civil and Common Law Divide 
 
The typology adopted will be woven through the lens of the divide between the civil and 
common law, which is a constitutive element of legal culture and therefore important. It is 
important to assess the fit of the CISG as a combination of concepts of civil and common law 
systems. A successfully transplanted law should be able to function in any legal system 
irrespective of this divide.  
The CISG suggests a bridge of the gap between the common and civil legal system by providing 
principles familiar. Accomplishing the feat of unification of divergent principles and concepts of 
different legal families belittles the assertion of a wide chasm and disjunction between the 
common and civil law systems and emphasises the convergence of laws, indicative of more 
similarities and more superficial dissimilarities between the legal systems. This supports the 
argument for convergence, that all systems would eventually reach similar natural results. 
The concept of a lex mercatoria, which the CISG represents, has been described as a fallacy 
because of its broad conception which offers the possibility of including aspects of domestic law 
that may be acceptable to some trading partners but not to others.96 This argument however 
does not consider that inherent in a trading agreement is compromise. Parties normally suggest 
what is best for them in any contract expecting to receive counter suggestions by the other 
parties. This process of haggling continues until there is a compromise. Thus, the question is not 
whether one party has a concept familiar to him, but whether there is satisfactory compromise 
on concepts or laws irrespective of whether it is familiar to one or both parties.  
Therefore, that the CISG has concepts and laws familiar to one party is not problematic for 
trade, especially if one considers that there are concepts and laws familiar to the other party. 
What the CISG does is to provide a law that makes the process of compromising easier and 
quicker for the parties. But more importantly, for jurisdictions where parties in international 
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trade are usually the weaker bargaining parties, such as Nigeria, the CISG becomes more useful 
in providing a guide for a balanced compromise. The Convention also plays a vital role in that 
for countries where international trade is unstructured, it provides a balanced guide for traders 
not as knowledgeable about the international trade processes, especially in comparison with their 
foreign counterparts. The Convention as a guide puts them in a near equivalent stead with their 
counterparts, making sure that there is an opportunity for the party with minimal knowledge to 
contract on an equal basis. 
4.4.2 Actual Movement of the Law and Ease of Movement of the Law 
The first yardstick for measuring a successful Convention is whether or not it has been adopted, 
and the ease of adoption. Starting with this criterion does not imply the exclusion of, nor does it 
attribute less to other criteria, which show a deeper interaction of the transplanted law with the 
legal culture of the recipient jurisdiction. At this level, what has been accomplished is a formal 
transfer of rules. However, there are other processes of assimilation, which determine more how 
the law interacts with the society. In such situations, ‘the transfer is exposed to the differences of 
episode linkages that are at the root of different legal world constructions’.97  
This criterion is meaningful considering that legal transplant is the moving of a rule from one 
country to another...,’98 irrespective of whether what is intended is statutory rules or otherwise.99 
In the first instance, it is important that the statutory rules are adopted before the interaction 
with culture can take place.  
This is especially important if one considers that a key part of accepting any international treaty 
is the ratification, not just the signing of the treaty, and that a common issue with international 
treaties and conventions is the signing of treaties without actual domestication or ratification. 
Under contemporary treaty practice, signing a treaty typically does not make the nation a party to 
the treaty. Rather, nations become parties to treaties by an act of ratification or accession, either 
by depositing an instrument of ratification or accession with a depositary or exchanging 
instruments of ratification. The signing of treaties under this practice is at most an indication that 
the terms of the treaty are satisfactory to the executive institution in that nation charged with 
negotiating and signing treaties and does not constitute a promise that the nation will become a 
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party to the treaty.100 Where laws are just signed but not ratified they stay in limbo and nations are 
not obligated to them. Transplantation of the CISG occurs when interested countries adopt it. 
The adoption by 83 countries is indicative of success on this criterion. 
The second limb of this criterion is the ease with which the Convention is transplanted into any 
jurisdiction. Thus, whilst legal rules may obviously reflect a society’s desires, needs and 
aspirations, a startling characteristic of legal rules is the ease with which they transplanted from 
one system to another. 101  This conclusion is based on the history replete with borrowings. 
Accordingly, the ease of transplanting laws is evidence that it is autonomous, possessing a life 
and vitality of its own, devoid of any relationship with legal structures, institutions and rules.102 If 
law does not possess any such close relationship to legal rules, institutions and structures, it 
therefore makes it easy to borrow. If not, laws would transplant only with great difficulty and 
their power of survival would be severely limited.103  
The ease of legal transplants is attributed to the fact that human societies both past and present 
have a lot in common, that legal rules institutions and structures may suit several societies and 
continue to exist through centuries.104 Further where two legal rules are suited equally, one will 
be chosen in a rather arbitrary fashion because it already exists elsewhere and once accepted, 
there will be little reason for change.105 Legal rules in addition to being part of a social structure 
also operate on a level of ideas. Particularly because the foreign rule was known to those with 
control over law making and they observed the apparent benefits, which could be derived from 
it.106 This argument is plausible given that these borrowings occurred rather too frequently, and 
the similarities in laws, especially with respect to private international trade law show historically, 
that they have shared similarities, transcending state borders.  
The CISG demonstrates such similarity because it represents a common set of rules conversant 
to different legal systems and is representative of the agreed commonalities amongst the business 
society. The CISG is non-ideological and important to economic development, making it easier 
to borrow, and copy from the analogous laws of other nations. The ease of transplantation of 
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the CISG shows that the drafters recognised that trade and commercial laws are harmonisable 
because of the similarities across jurisdictions.107  
The ease of adopting the CISG is demonstrated in the number of ratifications. This ease is 
rooted to the history of the development of international trade law, particularly at the third and 
more contemporary stage of development,108 which marked the development of widely accepted 
legal concepts, bringing a measure of unification.109 The ease of transplanting the CISG was 
recognised by the UNCITRAL, before embarking on the drafting of the CISG that the rules of 
international trade exhibit remarkable similarity in all municipal jurisdictions. Thus, the CISG 
transcends the division of the world, between countries of free enterprise and countries of 
centrally planned economy and between the legal families of the civil law of roman inspiration 
and the common law of English tradition. This difference means that international trade law 
specialists of all countries have found without difficulty that they speak a common language.’110 
Such similarities exist because parties are free, subject to limitations imposed by national laws, to 
contract on whatever terms they agree to, and are bound by their contracts except in exceptional 
circumstances.  
Considering the above, the CISG can be considered a success because of the actual movement 
to the jurisdictions and the fact that the similarities in trade law across various jurisdictions make 
it easily transplantable.  
4.4.3 Transplant Operating in the Same Way as in the Origin Country 
(According to Its Purpose) 
The measurement of success in this regard is the use of the imported legal rule in the same way 
as it is used in the home country, subject to local adaptations.111 For purposes of the thesis, and 
the nature of the law being discussed, international law into domestic legal order, downward 
diffusion as opposed to transnational borrowing, the measure of success is not how it operates in 
the origin country, because international laws such as the CISG do not have any origin country. 
Therefore, the measure of the CISG on this criterion is based on the purpose for which it was 
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created, as intended by the drafters, and how it will function. This is the measure to assess the 
Convention as a transplanted law. 
According to the UNCITRAL, ‘the purpose of the CISG is to provide a modern, uniform and 
fair regime for trade transactions. The CISG seeks to introduce certainty in commercial 
exchanges and decreasing transaction costs’112 by ensuring uniform interpretation and application 
of its provisions amongst member states. This is mandated in article 7 of the Convention, that 
regard must be had to the international character and the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade. The second leg of the article 
states that questions concerning matters governed by the Convention are to be governed by its 
general principles and in the absence, regard is to be had to the rules of private international 
law.113    
Measuring the success of the Convention on this criterion suggests a functional operation and 
achievement of its purpose because the CISG is a harmonised law, and the expectation of 
harmonised legal instruments is functional uniformity as opposed to perfection. Thus, the 
measure of success of the CISG in this regard is an appreciable degree of functionality operating 
in light of its overarching purpose. 
The success of the CISG according to this criterion is the uniformity in its application. A filed 
transplant in this regard would be where an international law is not interpreted according to the 
general principles or in light of its purpose. This would be the interpretation and application of 
the CISG based on the subjective interpretative process, born of the interpreter’s epistemological 
function in accordance with the domestic belief. This would particularly constitute failure where 
the transplant is an international law aimed at harmonisation to the exclusion of domestic law. 
This interpretation would completely defeat the purpose of the CISG, making it unsuccessful. 
However, this is perennial problem with uniform laws such as the CISG, which defeats the 
neutrality and uniformity sought by the Convention in governing international trade transactions.   
Tuebner suggests that the question of success of a legal transplant is not whether there is 
repulsion or interaction with the host country, it is the fact that a legal transplant works as a 
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events.114 The minds 
and emotions of tradition bound lawyers become irritated but more importantly law’s binding 
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arrangements are irritated. Whatever is the product of the irritation cannot be domesticated, it 
does not morph from something alien into something familiar but meanings are reconstructed 
with the consequent result that internal context undergoes fundamental changes.115  
Although this form of reconstruction of the CISG by domestic actors does not necessarily imply 
success or failure, but simply an effect of the transplant, an extreme reconstruction of meaning 
of the CISG would defeat its purpose because it would deter from its harmonisation goal. If the 
Convention seeks to cater to international traders, any reconstruction will result in unfamiliarity 
with the concepts. Secondly because the principles of the Convention are a combination of those 
of countries from different legal families and levels of development, any reconstruction would 
most likely be a domestic interpretation, defeating the neutrality of the Convention and 
encouraging issues which the Convention sought to avoid, the dominance and cost of unfamiliar 
domestic laws. 
From the above, where it is established that there is a pattern of reconstruction of concepts of 
the CISG based on domestic legal principle in the two jurisdictions to be examined, the CISG 
will be considered a failed transplant.  
4.4.4 The Fit with the Societal Needs and Legal Infrastructure of the 
Transplant Country (Provides a Solution)  
The way the transplant meets with the needs of the recipient country is important in measuring 
its success. Unless a commercial code meets the needs of important parts of society, it may be 
difficult for that law to survive as a living working instrument. Despite the importance of any 
transplant, it must be congruent with societal values. Although oftentimes the need for the fit is 
greatly exaggerated because the existence of legal transplants undermines attempts to construct a 
sociology of law.116  
Fit here can be divided into three; fit with the societal need, macro fit and micro fit. Fitting with 
societal needs is where the transplanted law solves a problem and fills a gap in the recipient 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the process of legal reform and development becomes more important 
than the substance of transplanted rules. If the law triggers a reform process and contributes to 
the development of the country, it may be considered more successful than if the bare rules fit a 
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certain idea or the existing framework. Thus, simply focusing on the supply side as opposed to 
the demand side is not as important.117  
Where a society’s need is law reform in a particular sector, the transplanted law may be used to 
challenge the previous laws. It may trigger an overhaul or update of the domestic law. This 
would mean success. Fit in meeting societal needs does not require a fit with the culture and 
identity of the recipient jurisdiction, because the law is there to serve a particular purpose, which 
is its overarching aim, rather than fitting with the culture of the society. The assertion by 
culturalists that law cannot be grasped by outsiders, and that the best that can be achieved is a 
taste of otherness thus becomes inconsequential. Particularly, where there is a gap, and no 
culture for the transplanted law to conflict with.  
This is usually the case with international uniform projects in developing countries. In most cases, 
the law is not developed sufficiently, or there is a want of expertise in that area. Thus, the 
uniform laws provide a solution to the need, making secondary, the need for a fit with the 
culture.    
The CISG aims to introduce uncertainty in commercial exchanges and decrease transaction costs. 
It aims to fill gaps in legal systems, which domestic laws cannot, because they cannot meet the 
needs of international business men in any jurisdiction since they are not global laws. Parties are 
wary of using laws of other jurisdictions because of the costs associated. In this sense, there is 
hardly any need for the CISG to fit with the law of any domestic jurisdiction since domestic laws 
do not govern such transactions, and any domestic law would incur costs.  
Apart from the costs to the transaction, there are also economic costs on the jurisdiction. The 
domestic lawyers are deprived of monetary benefits which would ordinarily accrue were the laws 
of another domestic jurisdiction not chosen. The Convention thus fills the gap and needs of the 
society in this way by providing a law which is neutral, allows parties to save costs and allows 
benefits to accrue to the social actors.   
Based on these aspirations, an approximation of the demands of the countries that have, or aim 
to adopt the CISG would be to achieve certainty in their commercial transactions and reduce 
costs. Where the CISG does these for the countries, it would be considered a successful legal 
transplant.  
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Conversely, the Convention would be considered unsuccessful where despite adoption, the 
intended change does not occur and the system remains the same. This was evidenced in the 
more recent revival of the law and development program which began in Central America and 
spread to Latin America as well as Eastern Europe.118 These efforts did not lead to ‘any real 
successes…since neither the independence, nor the efficiency of the courts improved 
significantly.’119    
Macro fit is how well the transplanted law complements the pre-existing institutions of the 
political economy in the host country. Micro-fit on the other hand, is how well the imported 
rules complement the pre-existing legal infrastructure in the host country.120 In this case, the 
CISG would be considered a success where it complements the laws and legal system in the 
jurisdiction governing international trade before its advent. This would usually be the domestic 
sales law of the jurisdictions or foreign laws opted for most frequently by parties. With respect to 
legal systems, it would either be the civil or common legal system.  
In light of macro fit, the civil and common law divide becomes pertinent. Here, the nuances of 
legal traditions and how it affects the CISG in practice in these jurisdictions play a key role.   
4.4.4.1 Substantive Laws 
The way the CISG complements the domestic law in each jurisdiction and the extent of their 
differences matter. In terms of substantive laws, there is convergence of solutions in commercial 
law. Particularly, disputes of international trade often bear much resemblance and have 
converged overtime towards principles and concepts much generally accepted in the 
international business environment. In light of this convergence, if there is no way around the 
distinctive provisions of the CISG and the domestic law of the jurisdiction, leading the actors to 
reject the Convention, it may result in categorising the CISG as a failed transplant. 
4.4.4.2 Using Statutes or Case Law Precedent 
Whilst both civil and common law systems are politically legitimised sources of law, traditionally 
civil law countries are those in which this ideal has produced general codification of law. For 
common law systems, case laws are a key tenet of their legal tradition.121 Codes have burgeoned 
in the common law legal systems, and this is a result of the growth of welfare state legislation 
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through almost the first half of the twentieth century.122 The civil legal system also saw some 
growth in the use of case laws, which is a result of a need to adapt the rigid codes to new 
circumstances.123 Despite this convergence, the role of case law in civil legal systems is still 
severely limited and as such, the absence of case laws as interpretive materials will not be 
missed.124 For the common law jurisdictions, codes are considered the exceptions. 
A measure of success of the CISG would be if the absence of precedent affected its use or 
transplantation in civil law countries because of their unfamiliarity with precedents, whilst it did 
not affect common law countries because of their familiarity with precedents.  
Currently, the CISG has a collection of cases which are suggested can be used as precedent. As 
the precedents grew, there seemed to be a shift in trend in the use of the cases in the common 
law jurisdictions.    
4.4.4.3 Role of Judges 
The role of judges in the common law tradition is still much more important sociologically than 
its civil law counterpart. This implicates that in the interpretation of the CISG, one may find the 
likelihood of judges in the civil legal system adhering more to the CISG than in the common law 
jurisdictions, where judges’ roles are more important and suggests some discretion in performing 
their duties. 
The role of judges becomes more significant given that in interpreting uniform international laws, 
there is never a genuinely disinterested judiciary, as a judge cannot be independent of his legal 
paradigm. 125  Thus, a rule has a meaning, which cannot be divorced from an interpreter’s 
perspective. The ascription of a meaning is predisposed by the way the interpreter understands 
the context within which the rule arises. Accordingly, whatever meaning is given to a law is ‘a 
function of an interpreter’s epistemological assumptions which are themselves historically and 
culturally conditioned’. 126   
If interpretations of laws such as the CISG cannot be dissociated from culturally conditioned 
mentalities of the interpreters, it may be inferred that this is the reason for the suggestion that 
the CISG favours civil legal systems. However, this discountenances the fact that there are 
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concepts alien to the civil legal systems enshrined in the CISG and that common law concepts 
are being interpreted by civil law judges accordingly. 
4.4.4.4 The Role of Legal Doctrine  
Academics are influential in making of the civil law tradition. For the civil lawyer, scholarly 
commentary to enacted legislation and the case law is still part of the unavoidable component of 
everyday work.127 Whilst in common law traditions, academic commentary of the law plays an 
almost irrelevant practical and theoretical role. 
Findings suggest that there is a degree of convergence in this area in the common law system. 128 
As a result, there seems to be a bigger role for legal scholarship in the common law than there 
traditionally was.129  
Whilst there has been a surge in the role of academics in common law systems, there has been a 
decline in civil legal systems because of the enactment of general codification, a proliferation of 
academic institutions, borne out of democratization of academic institutions thus, resulting in the 
decline in quality and therefore, in prestige and influence of scholarly writings.130 This decline 
means that comparatively there is a convergence between the two legal systems.131 
4.4.5 The Reaction to and the Level of Interaction with the Social Actors 
towards the Transplanted Law 
One of the criteria for measuring the success of a legal transplant is the reaction of the key 
players towards the transplant. That is, how the users of the law, react to the law. These actors 
include lawyers, interpreters and businessmen. If an imported law is accepted by the actors in the 
recipient society, then it is considered successful. Acceptance here means familiarity with the law, 
usage of the law and willingness to use the law. Undeniably, there is an interplay between the 
reaction of some actors, commercial lawyers, to the correspondence of a transplanted 
commercial statute, with the needs of the society. Where a transplanted law is not perceived as 
relevant, lawyers will ignore it or meet business needs by drafting around it. Where there is a 
purposive and conscious effort by any of the legal actors not to engage with the law and 
therefore to avoid it, the transplant as in the above case would be considered a failed transplant. 
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For the CISG to be considered a success, it should meet most or all the criteria above. Whilst to 
define it as a failure, would be the contrary to the factors above. That is, blatant ignorance of the 
law, lack of usage of the law and lack of willingness to use the law. 132  
In measuring the reaction of the actors towards the imported law, the influence of their legal 
culture, with regards to their legal families is examined to see what influence the origin has on 
their interpretation or approach to the law. In this sense, whether the fact that they are of civil or 
common law origin affects their interaction with the law i.e., the source of law, the legal method, 
their styles and techniques, and institutions and procedure.  
According to culturalists, any attempt to transplant laws would result in a different interpretation 
by the actors because they are participating in a different legal episteme. This means that the way 
of doing things does not change, or that the expected change resulting in the transfer of the law 
does not happen. Thus, the CISG would be a failed transplant where the interpretation is not 
according to what it ought to be. That the mentalities of the social actors do not accord with the 
Convention’s essence because interpreters routinely adopt the homeward trend in interpreting it.  
According to the culturalists argument, given that meaning invested in rules are culture specific 
attempts at unification are bound to fail and even cause harm. With regards to the CISG, the 
issue would be how the interpreters can distance themselves from culture specific interpretation 
i.e., interpretations based on legal family orientation. A civil law interpreter handling a common 
law concept through civil law epistemology and vice versa, will invariably lead to what may be 
considered a failed transplant.  
4.4.6 The Duration of the Imported Law  
The last criterion for measuring a transplant’s success is the duration of the transplant. Thus, an 
unsuccessful transplant is one that is short-lived. Recognisably, there is no standard for 
measuring the length of time for a transplant to be considered successful in any jurisdiction. The 
simple measurement for success is if at a later time, when the transplant is examined, it is still 
being used in the jurisdiction. It would be considered a failed transplant if it is no longer being 
used. 
 An examination of transplants across history shows both successful and unsuccessful 
transplantation of law, 133  one may find that for laws that are considered successful it is 
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irrespective of whether it is voluntarily borrowed or imposed. For instance, in Indonesia, 134 
despite the imposition of Dutch law, riddled with detestation by the subject population, 
subsequent conflicts with, and modification of the law when it clashed with the culture, overtime 
the legal culture has adjusted to it and even embraced it.135  
The continued usage of the law despite imposition is evidence of success. This buttresses 
Watson’s argument that most transplants, startlingly, have the capacity for a long life. And 
although with the passage of time modification may occur, however the alterations have limited 
significance. 136  Thus, irrespective of numerous attacks on transplanted laws they manage to 
survive in the recipient jurisdiction.137  
There is also evidence of legal transplants becoming unstuck in the recipient jurisdictions. The 
law and development movement was proclaimed a failure within a short period of being 
transplanted.138 This failure was attributed to the cultural differences between the western donor 
countries and the developing recipient countries. 139  The recent revival of the law and 
development initiative inclusive of the World Bank, on building institutions to train the judiciary, 
akin to that recognised in the US cannot also be considered a success.140  
The case of the Anglo American trust in Russia through Edict 2296141 also shows that a law can 
still come unstuck directly after transplantation, albeit in its early stages. The Edict attempted a 
legal transplant of the Anglo-American trust in situation when the new Russian company law was 
at its initial stages. Right from its early stages, the introduction of the full Anglo American trust 
failed because of the strong opposition of both the Russian Parliament and legal scholars against 
the presidential edict.142    
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The CISG will be considered successful if it is still being applied at the time of writing. Where 
cases are still being reported and articles still written, it would be indicative of continued 
engagement with the law thus, making it a living instrument.  
4.5 The CISG in Germany and the United States 
This section considers the experience of Germany and the U.S with the CISG based on the 
typology of a successful legal transplant provided above. 
4.5.1 The CISG in the United States  
4.5.1.1  Actual Movement and Ease of Movement of the Law 
The CISG became effective in the US on the 1st of January 1988, although it was ratified 
officially in 1986. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the CISG, as a duly 
ratified treaty, is part of the "supreme law of the land."143 It has the rank and effect of a federal 
statute and directly applies to all cases covered by it, in both state and federal courts.144 The 
adoption of the CISG in the US makes it the default substantive law governing contracts for the 
sale of goods between a buyer and a seller from a different jurisdiction. The implication of 
signing and ratifying the CISG is that its provisions qualify as American federal law, thereby pre-
empting state law. This means that unless specifically excluded, the CISG—and not the UCC—is 
applicable to any contract that falls within its scope. Thus, buyers and sellers located in the 
United States are faced with two legal texts, one for the domestic, and the other for international 
contracts for the sale of goods.   
The adoption of the CISG in the US meets the first criterion of a successful transplantation. This 
is particularly important, given that the US has a pattern of signing onto treaties without ratifying 
them.145 The CISG was however signed and ratified by the US. 
The consent of the Senate without significant objections to the ratification of the CISG when 
requested by the president is indicative of easy transplantation.146 It was also recommended and 
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approved by the American Bar Association.147 The ease of adopting the CISG at the time was 
because of its perceived usefulness for trade transactions.  
4.5.1.2 Transplant Operating According to Its Purpose 
The purpose of the CISG is to provide a uniform and fair regime for contracts of international 
sale of goods. To ensure certainty, Article 7 provides that regard must be had to its international 
character and the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith 
in international trade. The above supports uniform interpretation and application of the CISG’s 
provisions.     
One effect of legal transplant is the likelihood of attaching old and familiar meanings to new 
rules and attaching new meanings to old institutions. The effect of this is a production of a 
different set of rules and institutions distinct from the original transplant. In order for the CISG 
to be considered successful, there is a need for autonomous interpretation by actors. The US 
courts however disregarded this notion in their interpretation of the CISG in the early stages.  
At the preliminary stages of the adoption of the Convention in the US, the courts, at loss 
regarding what to make of the Convention applied their domestic understanding to the 
interpretation of concepts of the CISG. This attitude is known as homeward trend, the ‘tendency 
of those interpreting the CISG to project the domestic law in which the interpreter was trained 
unto the international provisions of the Convention’.148  
Several cases demonstrate this. For instance, the way Raw Materials Inc v Manfred Forberich Gmbh149 
was decided showed the way in which national courts disturbingly misuse domestic sales law to 
interpret and apply a treaty with international reach. Here, the courts recognised the CISG as the 
applicable law but endorsed the plaintiff’s general assertion that case law on U.S domestic sales 
law, Article 2 of the UCC could be used for guidance in applying the CISG, where the relevant 
provisions track that of the UCC. The court particularly declared that the case law interpreting 
the UCCs excuse provision S 2-615, provides guidance for interpreting Article 79 of the CISG 
since it contains similar requirements as those set forth in the Convention. Based on the 
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defendant’s consent, the court went ahead to apply the UCC cases to the CISG and this marked 
the end of any mention of foreign case commentaries and cases on the CISG.   
The effect of any homeward trend interpretation of the CISG violates the mandate of Article 7 
of the Convention. Although this case has been criticised heavily, problems of this nature are 
attendant with transplanted laws and unless, and in situations where grave injustice is carried out 
and the purpose of the Convention is not achieved, it may not necessarily be considered a failed 
transplant.  
Thus, if justice is efficiently carried out to the detriment of the mandate of the CISG, it can be 
considered a process of adaptation. Given this, although the MCC-Marble case150 has been hailed 
by commentators as a standard to aspire to by courts, particularly courts in the US, in 
interpreting the CISG, Cross has criticised such accolades for the decision in adherence to 
Article 7(1) of the CISG. She argues that such decision emphasizes uniformity at the expense of 
other important considerations. Anyways, a main consequence of any unification project, which 
may be unavoidable, is the homeward trend. Consequently, the “categorical condemnation” of 
the concept by scholars may be unwarranted.151   
Cross suggests that the homeward trend should also enhance the CISG’s legitimacy and 
acceptability over the long term,152 because of the paucity of cases in the U.S. She suggests that 
while the dearth of cases may be due to factors such as the prevalence of arbitration or the 
possibility that the applicability of the CISG is unknown or ignored by U.S courts resolving 
transnational contractual disputes, another possible factor is that the U.S parties and their 
attorneys engaged in such disputes choose to opt of the CISG. This according to Walt is a 
problem resulting from the “novelty” of the Convention, which generates uncertainty because 
transactors will generally avoid applying a law where they lack information upon which to base 
reliable estimates about prospective outcomes under the law. This in turn hinders the success of 
the uniform law.153 He concludes that resort to domestic law principles, both with respect to 
filling gaps in the Convention and interpreting ambiguous language should limit the uncertainty 
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generated by novelty and therefore enhance the likelihood that parties ultimately will utilise the 
Convention.154 
As seen from the above, domestic actors may infer or suggest meanings different to what the 
Convention intended whilst interpreting the CISG. This essentially defeats the purpose of the 
Convention and creates unintended consequences, concurring with Teubner’s theory, that what 
is produced will be alien and unfamiliar and in most cases cannot be transplanted, especially if it 
is glaringly so. Although there is a probability it may not be transplanted, there is also the 
possibility of righting the unintended interpretation through subsequent judgements. Where one 
judge interprets the CISG, producing unintended consequences, another judge can correct the 
misnomer by creating the intended consequences. This is just a matter of time, and can be 
considered the adjusting period of the CISG.  
The transplantation of the CISG in the US evidences this. At first when the CISG was adopted, 
most of the US Federal Courts based their interpretation of the Convention’s concepts on the 
guidance of the UCC and the cases that apply to the US domestic sales and contract law, 
asserting that UCC case law can guide them in interpreting the Convention. 155 However, in 
subsequent cases the judges recognised the importance of interpreting the CISG autonomously. 
In St. Paul v Neuromed Medical Systems,156 for instance, it was stated that 'the CISG aims to bring 
uniformity to international business transactions, using simple, non-nation specific language', a 
statement incompatible with the homeward trend. In MCC-Marble,157 the need to refrain from 
reading domestic concepts into the CISG was addressed more directly, that 'courts applying the 
CISG cannot [...] substitut[e] familiar principles of domestic law when the Convention requires a 
different result.' This line of reasoning constitutes the basis for other US court decisions too, 
such as Geneva Pharmaceuticals Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc.,158 stating that 'UCC case law is not per se 
applicable to cases governed by the CISG'159 and Calzaturificio Claudia S.n.c. v Olivieri Footwear 
Ltd.,160 where it was expressly stated that 'although the CISG is similar to the UCC with respect 
to certain provisions, it differs from the UCC with respect to others, including the UCC's writing 
                                                          
154 ibid.   
155 See eg Macromex S.r.l. v. Globex Intern., Inc., U.S. Federal District Court, Southern District of New York, 16 April 
2008, 2008 WL 1752530 (S.D.N.Y.); Travelers Property Casualty Company of America et al. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics 
Canada Limited, U.S. Federal District Court, Minnesota, 31 January 2007. 
156 U.S. Federal District Court, Southern District of New York, 26 March 2002. 
157 MCC-Marble Case. 
158 U.S. Federal District Court, Southern District of New York, 10 May 2002. 
159 ibid; for the statement referred to in the text, see most recently Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v Republic of Iraq, U.S. Federal 
District Court, Southern District of New York, 20 August 2008, Orbisphere Corp. v United States, U.S. Court of 
International Trade, 24 October 1989. 





requirement for a transaction for the sale of goods and parole evidence rule. Where controlling 
provisions are inconsistent, it would be inappropriate to apply UCC case law in construing 
contracts under the CISG. 
4.5.1.3 The Fit with the Societal Needs and Legal Infrastructure of 
the Transplant 
 In order to understand how the CISG meets the societal needs and the legal infrastructure of 
the US, this section examines the domestic concepts of the UCC with those of the CISG to see 
the discrepancies and how the courts resolved them.  
a. The CISG and the UCC 
As a result of the influence which the UCC had on the drafting of the CISG, some authors have 
argued that their basic concepts such as the concept of good faith and trade usages are similar in 
approach and content and therefore, interpretational inspiration should be drawn from the UCC 
when faced with similar issues in the USA.161 It is true that a comparison of the provisions of the 
UCC and the CISG may have some similarities, however, it does not necessarily resemble Article 
2 of the UCC either in scope or substance.162 Thus, there is the danger of wrong interpretations 
using the UCC to interpret the CISG.163 The above arguments were adopted by the American 
businessmen and the judges in the application of the CISG, leading to a flawed analysis of 
cases.164 They essentially failed in holding up the objectives of the CISG, uniformity through 
autonomous interpretation and resorting to domestic law as the last option. 
The following section examines the compatibility of the CISG with the concepts fundamental to 
the common law UCC.  
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1. Parol Evidence Rule  
The Parol evidence rule states that oral evidence may not be adduced to, added to, contradict or 
controvert a written document. It means that where there is a written contract, a court may not 
admit any oral evidence to contradict the terms of the written contract. It has been suggested 
that Article 8(1) (2) and (3) eliminates the parol evidence rule,165 which opens the door for 
prolonged litigation, since there is a significant impact on the summary judgment rule.  
A combined reading of the provisions of Art 8(1) and Art 8(3) of the CISG shows that it 
promotes open ended reliance on parol evidence as well as parties’ behaviour in all circumstances 
of the contract. 166  On the other hand, the provisions of §2-202167  and §1-205 of the UCC 
implicate that any oral agreement made by parties prior to the conclusion of the agreement when 
introduced for evidence purposes is not valid.  
The rejection of the parol evidence rule by the CISG became a problem for the courts in 
America since scholars believe that the provision of article 8(3) of the Convention overrides any 
domestic parol evidence rule.168 This contention and reluctance to adopt the mechanisms of the 
CISG was evidenced in the case of Beijing Metals and Minerals v American Business Centre.169 The 
lower court excluded the testimony about oral agreements under the state's "parol evidence" rule. 
The appellate court declined to resolve the dispute about whether CISG or state law applies to 
the parties' contract because it concluded that to do so would be unnecessary to its decision. 
Nevertheless, the court states expressly that the parol evidence rule "applies regardless" of 
whether CISG applies or not.170 
This decision has been criticised because it carelessly dismisses the obvious application of the 
CISG and its rejection of the parol evidence rule. However, prior to this decision, the court in 
Filanto S.p.A v Chilewich International Corp171 addressed the differences between the UCC and the 
CISG on the issues of offer and acceptance and the battle of the forms.172 After engaging in a 
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thorough analysis of how the CISG applied to the dispute before it, the district court tangentially 
observed that article 8(3) "essentially rejects . . . the parol evidence rule." 
This statement evidences recognition of the CISG’s rejection of the rule. Thus, suggesting that 
courts are averse to the Convention because it does not support the principles, which they are 
familiar with, may not be very true since case show judges alluding to it in the first instance, 
recognising the Convention’s position. 
It is suggested that anybody looking for the principle of parol evidence should not look to the 
Beijing Metal case without considering the court’s decisions in MCC-Marble.173 Here, the issue 
before the court was whether the parol evidence rule of domestic law applies to the 
interpretation of a contract governed by CISG. The US Court of Appeal rejected the opinion in 
the Beijing Metals as being not particularly persuasive on this point and reversed the District 
Court’s judgment holding that article 8(3) displaces the parol evidence rule even though its role is 
not expressly stated in article 8.174 
The MCC-Marble decision came six years after the decision in Beijing Metals, which is indicative of 
more understanding and applicability of the CISG in the U.S. This case thus supports the 
argument against habits as an excuse for wrongful application of the CISG. Even if habits were a 
factor to be considered as affecting the CISG in the U.S, those habits eventually decline. 
Particularly with the understanding by judges that habit should not be a reason for the 
perversion of justice. 
Indeed, the American courts have in recent times, recognised the CISG’s rejection of the Parol 
Evidence Rule. In 1998, the Federal District Court in Mitchell Aircraft Spares v European Aircraft 
Service),175 confirmed the rejection of the parol evidence rule in the CISG. More recently, in the 
2011 case Cedar Petrochemicals inc. v Dongbu Hannong Chemical Ltd176 where the court, stated that ‘the 
CISG does not merely lack a parol-evidence rule, it commands courts to consider extrinsic 
evidence that illuminates the parties' intent’.177 While there is some scholarly debate as to whether 
Article 8(3) rejects the parol evidence rule or is confined to interpretation questions,178 there is no 
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doubt that CISG does not recognise the parol evidence rule as known.179 However, because that 
court viewed CISG through its domestic lens, it provides a distorted image,180 suggesting a failed 
transplant. 
There are still ways to ensure compatibility, through the insertion of “merger” or “integration 
clauses” in the written contract, which serves as evidence to provide express manifestation of the 
intention that writing constitutes the sole and exclusive statement of their agreement.181 This is 
supported by Article 6 of the Convention. The effect of the merger clause has also been 
recognised by the CISG Advisory Council stating that ‘the parties may wish to assure themselves 
that reliance will not be placed on representations made prior to the execution of the writing. 
The Merger or Entire Agreement Clause has been developed to achieve certainty in this 
regard’.182   
The above shows that parties can adopt the merger clause in their contracts, governed by the 
CISG, and still have the parol evidence rule apply. A better approach suggested by Murray, is by 
explicit reference to the parties’ intention to derogate from Article 8(3) through Article 6, since 
there is some doubt about the implied derogation of CISG terms under article 6 and it may then 
prove insufficient for the parties to just rely on article 6 without specifically mentioning article 
8(3).183  
The solutions above show that the CISG is clearly compatible with one of the core common law 
concept of the UCC, the parole evidence. To this extent, the CISG cannot be considered a failed 
transplant. 
2. The CISG and the Statute of Frauds (SOF) 
The American Statute of Frauds lays down rules that prescribe formalities for certain categories 
of contracts. Given its function to cure, or at least circumvent deficiencies of the law of evidence 
and common law, it is important for American businessmen.184 
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The implication of Article 11 of the CISG is that it eliminates any mandatory requirement for 
enforcement based on any domestic requirement of form.  
The counterpart to article 11 is found under §2-201 of the UCC which states that contracts ‘for 
the sale of goods for the price of $5,000 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless there is some record sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between 
the parties and signed by the party against which enforcement is sought or by the party's 
authorized agent or broker…’ 
A comparison of these two provisions reveals that the CISG embodies a more updated version 
of current legal practice because the SOF prescribes a method of contracting which is not in 
conformity with the way business and transactions of that sort are normally carried out in recent 
times. However this is only with respect to some provisions of the statute rather than all of 
them.185 Although the SOF was provided to ensure that parties write down their agreements and 
take them more seriously, ensuring matters are approached less hastily, it has been criticised for 
not extending its application to other categories of contracts. Another reason for the SOF was to 
deter fraud by preventing parties from lying in a court about a contract without it being written 
down. This function, while preventing one type of fraud makes it possible for another type, and 
causes some injustice by allowing defendants to get out of promises made which should in all 
fairness, be enforced by allowing them argue that the promise was not in writing.  
Regarding the SOF, there is really no way for parties of mitigating or excluding the provision of 
the CISG, which does not have any restriction on the formality of contracts. Although there are 
provisions of the CISG allowing a country to opt out of article 11 and apply its domestic 
legislation, which requires putting contracts in writing, such as Article 12, this option will not 
avail the US because that declaration has not been made. This implies that contracts between the 
US and foreign parties will not be subject to the SOF unless the non-U.S party has its place of 
business in a country that has opted out of article 11.186 Where the CISG applies, parties will 
have to keep in mind that there are no restrictions regarding any class of contract either written 
or oral.  
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At first, the courts misapplied Article 11 of the CISG. For instance in the majority opinion in 
GPL Treatment, Ltd. v Louisiana-Pacific Corp,187 where the courts overlooked the clear applicability 
of the of the CISG under 1(1)a, was based on seller having a place of business in Canada and 
buyer’s place of business in the U.S. They however applied Section 2-201(2) of the UCC. Whilst 
the court concluded that communication sent by the buyer to the seller after the alleged oral 
contract was entered into qualified as a confirmation of the oral contract which then became 
enforceable against the recipient who did not object to its content, the dissenting judge stated 
that the application of the CISG would enable the seller to enforce the oral agreement since 
Article 11 abolishes the SOF requirement.188 
The U.S courts in contrast to the above decision have recognised the excludability of the SOF. 
In Calzaturificio Claudia the courts recognised the applicability of CISG under the “places of 
business in different contracting states” rule. Applying Article 11 of the CISG, the court rejected 
Buyer’s argument that in the absence of a written contract or any purchase order setting forth 
the terms of the parties’ sales transaction no enforceable agreement existed between Buyer and 
Seller. The court concluded, “unlike the U.C.C., under the CISG a contract need not be 
evidenced by writing . . . and is not subject to any other requirement as to form.189 Also as stated 
by the Federal District Court in Fercus, S.r.l. v Mario Palazzo, et al. ‘Unlike the U.C.C., the Statute 
of Frauds does not apply to the CISG’ although the court went on to hold that the CISG did not 
apply since there was no binding contract between the parties.190 
The continued existence of the SOF in the UCC has been questioned, with abolition suggested 
for a number of reasons; for the CISG’s lack of recognition of it, that it should be repealed or 
revised.191 The only reason it exists in the UCC is simply because Karl Llewellyn ‘was enamoured 
of it.’192 The suggestion to abolish the SOF in the UCC is supported by the author, since the 
original reasons for the SOF no longer exist and there are no new reasons for the SOF in cases 
of contract.  
The CISG can be considered successful because it presents a more useful and version of current 
legal practice, than what is currently embodied in the UCC, and is accessible to domestic actors 
Thus it provides a way for international transactors not to be bound by the archaic provision of 
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the UCC. In light of the provision of a better and more updated law useful in modern business 
for American businessmen, the perceived incompatibility of the CISG with this provision of the 
UCC becomes irrelevant. 
3. The CISG and Firm Offers 
The common law position on offer is that they are generally revocable even where the offeror 
has made a promise to keep it open unless the offer is supported by consideration or is under 
seal. Article 16 of the CISG on the other hand provides that 
1. “Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the 
offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance. 
2. However, an offer cannot be revoked; 
a. If it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is 
irrevocable; or  
b. If it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the 
offeree has acted in reliance on the offer”.    
Article 16 of the CISG was drafted to bring a balance between the Civil and Common legal 
system principle on offer and so, it incorporates elements from both systems. The first 
paragraph of the CISG article 16 suggests that offers made under the Convention are freely 
revocable, provided acceptance has not been dispatched. This gives the offeror the freedom to 
revoke the offer and opportunity to take his business elsewhere until the offeree accepts or 
where the offeree has failed to make acceptance.193 Although this position seems to tilt towards 
the common law principle of revocation, there are no implications regarding the point in time 
when a contract is deemed concluded.194 Moreover, paragraph one is just the starting point and 
must be read in conjunction with the subsequent paragraphs which then bring the implications 
and results closer to the principle of revocability under the civil law systems, which principles are 
stringent.195 
Under the American UCC, the position is that a merchant can make an irrevocable or a firm 
offer without the need for consideration. However, this is qualified by certain criteria; the offeror 
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must be a merchant; the offer must be in signed writing; the offer must contain an assurance that 
it will be held open and the period of irrevocability must not be longer than three months.  
Unlike the UCC, the CISG does not require that the offeror be a merchant, neither does it make 
writing a criterion and there is no limit to the period of irrevocability. The Convention however 
allows the offeror to revoke by expressly stating it. So, where an offeror states that the offer is 
irrevocable, he cannot subsequently revoke it before the written time, even where he changes his 
mind. Under the UCC, precise and clear wordings are fundamental parts of irrevocability so 
much so that if an offeror states that “this offer will expire June 1” or if he states that ‘this offer 
will be open until June 1” it may not be considered clear enough. In the first case, it may be 
regarded as merely establishing an expiration date for the offer and in the second case, may 
either be interpreted as an assurance that the offer will remain available for acceptance until June 
1 or that it will not expire until June 1. However, under the CISG any of the two cases 
mentioned above will suffice.196     
The effect of a fixed time of acceptance under Article 16(2)a has generated arguments amongst 
scholars. These contentions are not limited to scholars now, but also existed at the time of 
drafting of article 16 of the CISG. Despite the disputes over the language, UNCITRAL 
approved the language that an offer cannot be revoked if it indicates, whether by stating that a 
fixed time for acceptance or otherwise that it is irrevocable.’197 While some delegates argued that 
the revision reflected the view that the ultimate test was the interpretation of the offer rather 
than the use of a specified expression, others argued that it represented an irrevocable offer. In 
light of the arguments made by delegates from different jurisdictions, Honnold suggests that in 
order to give effect to the two decisions one may conclude that the reference in an offer to a 
fixed time for acceptance creates a presumption of irrevocability until the stated date. But 
however, this presumption may be rebutted by showing that an offer in its full setting Art 8(3) 
would be understood to refer to the automatic expiration of the offer.198  
Schlechtriem on the other hand suggests that the offeror can also declare the offer to be 
irrevocable and does not need to do this expressly, but rather his intent to be bound can be 
deduced from the circumstances relevant to the interpretation of the offer and particularly from 
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his setting a fixed period during which the offer is open.199 Lookofsky suggests that there is no 
one correct interpretation since the offeror is recognised as the master of the offer under the 
CISG, thus his offer should be interpreted in his own terms.200 
In order to avoid any snag, since two interpretations may be made out of the issue of acceptance, 
it has been suggested that common law lawyers, when drafting provisions of contracts to be 
governed by the Convention should ensure that their meaning regarding the irrevocability of an 
offer is clear.201  
Another aspect of article 16 is the offeree’s action based on his reliance on the offer. The CISG 
recognises that an offer may be considered irrevocable if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely 
on the offer as being irrevocable.202 This principle applies even if there was no express indication 
of irrevocability under paragraph 2(a).  
This approach has support in domestic law because some civil law legal systems hold offers to be 
irrevocable for the period needed for the period until the response while other legal systems hold 
that reasonable reliance either bars revocation or makes the offeror liable in tort for damages.203 
There is some semblance between the principle of reliance on the offer and the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel under the American domestic law principle of promissory estoppel although 
there is no express foreseeability required from the offeror and no express requirement that the 
offeree’s reliance be detrimental. 
It has been asked whether section 2-205 permits the finding that an offer is irrevocable because 
of the offeree’s reliance or whether it displaces any case law applying promissory estoppel so that 
it cannot be introduced through section 1-103?204  
Initially, the courts were not very clear on the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel even 
though the Restatement (First) of Contracts contained a promissory estoppel doctrine stating 
that the promisee’s reliance on a promise could make the promise enforceable despite the lack of 
consideration. This was because section 35 provided that an offer could be terminated by the 
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offeror’s revocation except as provided in sections 45 through 47 but the promissory estoppel 
doctrine was contained in section 90.205 In later times, the courts in the landmark case Drennan v 
Star Paving Co.206 stated that even if there was no explicit promise not to revoke the foreseeability 
of the offerees reliance on an offer created an implied promise by the offeror not to revoke. 
Where the implied promise lacked consideration, it could be enforced under the promissory 
estoppel doctrine.207 
The last sentence of comment 2 to section 2-205 states that when oral offers are relied upon, 
they remain irrevocable under the article since a central part of the article is the necessity of 
writing. It has been asked if this is to be interpreted to mean that oral offers cannot be made 
irrevocable by S2-205 or if it means the only way to render an offer lacking consideration is 
through complete compliance with S2-205?208 Certain cases have been cited more recently to 
suggest that support can be found not to exclude the application of promissory estoppel. In 
these cases, although the court did not expressly hold that an offer not complying with S 2-205 
can be made irrevocable under promissory estoppel theory, they approved the use of promissory 
estoppel doctrine in the sale of goods transaction.209  
American authors are divided on the issue of estoppel. While some argue that where the 
requisites of S2-205 are not met, it should not be taken as preventing offerees from invoking 
promissory estoppel or restatement doctrine210 with support from others arguing that S2-205 
should not be read to preclude the application of promissory estoppel and that the section was 
not intended to deal with the revocability of offers from which consideration is given or that for 
which a substitute for consideration is present.211 Gibson argues to the contrary that courts have 
misused the promissory estoppel doctrine since the idea espoused by Karl Llewelyn, the primary 
drafter of the UCC Art 2 is not intended to include the promissory estoppel doctrine especially 
in light of his desire for a formal authentication of firm offers.212  
The CISG provides more support for an offer being irrevocable as a result of reliance by the 
offeree than the UCC, however a way of applying this irrevocability under the UCC is still 
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possible especially in light of the cases examined above, where the promissory estoppel principle 
was used in sales of goods cases.   
4. The CISG and the Doctrine of Consideration 
Article 29(1) of the CISG states that ‘a contract may be modified or terminated by the mere 
agreement of the parties’. This provision of the CISG eliminates the consideration requirement 
under the common law and the cause requirement under the civil law system. The position of 
the Convention departs from the common law doctrine of consideration where something of 
value, flowing from the promise, in the eye of the law must be given for a party to be entitled to 
bring an action.213 The drafting history of the CISG reveals that working parties were particularly 
adamant about including the doctrine of consideration, because consideration was considered a 
barrier to enforcing agreements. It was then agreed that it should be considered one of the 
general principles pursuant to Article 7(2).214 Although this was the position in the US, one of the 
changes in the common law of contracts effected by the UCC in the already existent duty rule 
was permitting the modifications of contracts made in good faith to be enforceable without 
consideration,215 this is provided in § 2-209(1) UCC. 
Considering that the Convention does not explicitly mention consideration, one may think that it 
favours the principle of the civil system to the disadvantage of the common law system. 
However, this is not the case as the Convention also eliminates the cause requirement under the 
civil legal system.  
The purposeful omission of the doctrine of consideration from the CISG has not been without 
consequences on its application by the courts. The provision of article 4(1), which excludes the 
application of the Convention to validity issues, has provided a means to find consideration in 
contracts, through national laws. This problematic issue of incorporating consideration can be 
seen in the interplay between the article 4(1) of the CISG and the resort to domestic law. As 
predicted by Winship who envisaged the likelihood that common law judges, unfamiliar with 
civil law methodology of drawing out gap filling, will be quick to find gaps in the Convention 
and fill it with domestic laws. More importantly, voicing his concern that ‘a judge so disposed 
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may find issues of validity much more readily than anticipated by the drafters and thereby turn to 
national solutions’.216 
 Despite the warning, the courts still found a way to fall into what has been termed a ‘black 
hole…’217 Certain domestic legal systems, for instance, the American state law system provides 
both delictual and contractual remedies for abuses like misrepresentation and also allows the 
coexistence and competition of claims grounded in tort to compete with contract-based claims. 
In other jurisdictions however, where a contractual remedy is applicable to a case, the competing 
claim in tort is trumped.218The implication of this is that within the international sales context is 
that an interpreter might allow a domestic theory of recovery to compete with a CISG-based 
claim or hold that the CISG has priority over the domestic remedial rules.219 
In Geneva Pharmaceuticals220 an American plaintiff brought a case against a Canadian defendant. In 
considering the Buyer’s various CISG and domestic law claims, the court distinguished between 
intentional and negligent torts and held that the plaintiff’s negligence based torts were not 
covered by the Convention while the business tort claims for tortuous interference with contract 
and business relations were not. More importantly, the court allowed the plaintiff to rely on the 
domestic law principle of promissory estoppel to support his equitable claim, that although the 
sales contract was not supported by any consideration, it was still valid and legally binding under 
the New Jersey domestic law. The court found legitimacy for this under Article 4(a) of the 
Convention, since consideration was a validity issue, domestic law and not the Convention will 
govern it. 
 The better position would have been for the judge to examine properly, the position of the 
CISG with regards to consideration. If this had been done, the court would have found that the 
Convention just like the domestic law, does not does not make consideration a criterion for the 
modification of contract under Article 29.221  
Despite the position of the Judge in the above case, does this serve as an obstacle for common 
law judges to embrace the CISG? It is the author’s opinion that the answer is an emphatic no. 
This case in the U.S should not be considered representative of the attitude of the courts 
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towards the elimination of the requirement for the doctrine of consideration by the CISG or 
even the general attitude of the common law courts towards the CISG. In fact, the courts in the 
civil law system have been guilty of the same thing. The German District Court (Amtsgeritcht) 
of Nordhorn,222 held in a case that based on article 4(a), the validity of the seller’s conditions was 
beyond the scope of the Convention and the contract had to be determined by the governing law, 
Italian law. A clause in the seller’s general conditions of contract provided the buyer could avoid 
a contract for the sale of shoes provided a notice of demand was sent to the seller and only after 
15 days of receipt of such notice by the seller. After the seller’s late delivery, the buyer declared 
the contract avoided and seller sued the buyer for full repayment.  
The court was criticised for ignoring the provisions of Article 47 of the Convention and the 
underlying general principles. 223  Had the provisions of Article 47, fixing additional time for 
performing contracts been considered, the courts would have seen no need for the recourse to 
domestic law.224 
In light of the above, it is obvious that this anomaly in the application of the Convention is a 
central problem of the Convention, not limited to common or civil law legal systems, it is 
however not without solution. It seems the courts have failed to see that the provision of article 
4(a) was meant to promote elasticity.225 Authors agree with Honnold’s suggestion that a general 
rule which must be borne in mind by interpreters is that where a domestic law provides legal 
solutions on the same operative facts that require the application of the Convention, the 
Convention displaces domestic law governing validity issues if its provisions and general 
principle address the issue.226 In order words, where it is found that under the domestic law, the 
case is one for validity, an interpreter must examine the provisions of the CISG to determine if 
that domestic validity rule is displaced by a rule under the CISG. This solution was drawn from 
the drafting history of the Convention and proves suitable because it furthers the uniformity 
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principle of the CISG while acknowledging the domestic law validity provisions and may be a 
draw for practitioners.227 
Despite the above, one still finds that there is to a large extent, great compatibility between the 
CISG Article 29 eliminating the consideration requirement and § 2-209(1) of the UCC that 
allows for the enforcement of a contract. As such, this has posed no problem to the American 
lawyers or judges and has been upheld in several cases, most notably in Shuttle Packaging systems 
LLC v Jacob Tsokanis228 where the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a complementary 
agreement between the parties was ineffective due to the lack of consideration. The court then 
held that under Article 29 of the Convention, a contract for the sale of goods may be modified 
without consideration for the modification.229 More recently in the case of Chateau des Charmes 
Wines Ltd v Sabaté USA Inc, Sabaté SA230 where a buyer from Canada and a seller from France 
entered into a contract for the sale of wine corks and the issues before the court were whether 
the parties orally concluded a contract; and whether the forum selection clause contained in the 
seller’s invoice modified the original terms of the contract or rather constituted a separate 
agreement between the parties. The court found that a contract was orally concluded and that 
the forum selection clause contained in the invoice was neither a modification of the original 
contract or a separate agreement, as the buyers silence did not constitute acceptance of the 
forum selection clause. In reaching this decision, the court acknowledged the provision of article 
29 of the CISG allowing for modification of a contract based on the mere agreement of the 
parties. However, the court also stated that the CISG did not provide that failure to object to a 
party’s unilateral attempt to alter materially the terms of an otherwise valid agreement is an 
agreement within the terms of article 29.231  
5. CISG and the Battle of Forms 
As a result of increased mass production and large-scale enterprise, there has been the exchange 
of standardised form contracts in the sale of goods. The idea of standardising repeated 
negotiations into forms ensures some efficiency in trade or contract agreements.232 The efficiency 
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of these forms however has brought situations where the seller and the buyer simply exchange 
forms with small print conditions on the reverse side and this depending on the jurisdiction will 
either constitute a counter offer or an acceptance. This exchange has in the event of a dispute, 
raised questions regarding the existence of a contract and the final constituted terms of the 
contract.233  
The position under the UCC is that a definite expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance 
even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered. These additional terms 
may become part of the contract if a party expressly accepts them or automatically, so long as 
the offer does not limit acceptance to the terms of the offer, the additional terms does not 
materially alter them and the offeror does not object to the additional terms.234 What constitutes 
the different terms not articulated in § 2-207(2) has brought division in the courts. While the 
majority of the courts believe that conflicting terms cancel each other out and are replaced by the 
UCC’s gap fillers, the other minority view argue that the different terms do not automatically 
become a part of the contract since § 2-207 does not recognise them.235  
The CISG does not clearly address the battle of forms issue, however, where it does in article 19, 
it adopts a different solution to that provided under the UCC. Under the common law mirror 
image rule, an acceptance that added to or changed the terms of the offer was deemed to be a 
rejection and a counter offer. This has produced what is called the ‘last shot doctrine’ which 
means that each form sent is a counter offer until the last one is accepted. The CISG adopts a 
similar approach to the mirror image rule. Article 19(1) states that the reply to an offer, which 
purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a 
rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter offer. However, Article 19(2) waters it down by 
stating that if the additional terms are not material or substantial and the offeror does not object 
to them, then the purported acceptance is an acceptance and the additional or different terms 
become part of the contract. Article 19(3) goes on to outline the meaning of different terms 
which comprises such a broad definition it becomes difficult to find any changes which are not 
material.236  
The problem caused by the different principles led to the misapplication of the CISG rules by 
the American courts in order to align the decision according to what they thought it might be 
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under the UCC. In Filanto,237 the court applied the CISG noting that Article 19 was different 
from the principles of the UCC. It further stated that the Convention does not allow any 
material alterations to an offer and interprets it as a counter offer, and the arbitration clause was 
a material alteration to the contract. The judge in the decision misapplied the CISG first, by 
holding that Filanto did not object to the terms of the contract, which thus meant acceptance. 
However, this is contrary to CISG Article 18(1) which provides that silence or inactivity does not 
amount to acceptance. The court hinged its argument on the past dealings of the parties, that 
Filanto had in the past, informed Chilewich of his objection to the arbitration clause within a 
month but in this instance had waited five months. 238  It has been suggested that a more 
reasonable interpretation would not have been that Filanto’s silence constituted acceptance but 
that he continued to object.  
The above case illustrates the court’s tendency towards continued usage of the principles of the 
UCC. The court found a way to manoeuvre through the CISG and apply the UCC. While 
Filanto’s case suggests a deviation from the application of the CISG for domestic principles 
another case on the other hand demonstrates the court’s strict adherence to the application of 
the mirror-image principle of the CISG. In Magellan International corporation v Salzgitter Handel 
GmBH239 unlike the court in Filanto, the court held according to the Convention, that based on 
19(1)a, a reply to an offer which contains any alterations is a rejection of the offer and constitutes 
a counter offer, reflecting the mirror image rule. Thus, Salzgitter’s February 17 response to the 
purchase orders did propose price changes and hence can be seen as a counter offer that justified 
Magellan’s belief that its acceptance of those new prices would form a contract.  
In a more recent case, Hanwha Corporation v Cedar Petrochemicals Inc240 the District Court of New 
York applied the correct principle of the mirror image rule as enunciated by the CISG. The court 
recognised this by stating the provisions of Article 19 and holding accordingly that Hanwha 
made, and Cedar accepted a sufficiently definite offer within the provisions of article 14 of the 
CISG. However, the parties never worked out the final terms of the contract because they never 
formed an agreement on the term they deemed material, a choice of governing law. Hanwha had 
on several occasions proposed a different choice of law and Cedar had accepted the proposal 
either implicitly or explicitly. The parties therefore performed under various contracts. After 
Hanwha’s modification of Cedar’s contract document and the proposition of a different choice 
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of law, Cedar rejected the change. These activities constituted a counter offer and a rejection of 
the counter offer within the meaning of article 19(1). Furthermore, he recognised that Hanwha’s 
modification of Cedar’s choice of law, and his insistence that the contract could only enter into 
force upon the countersigning of Hanwha’s version of the contract document, in addition to the 
subsequent immediate and insistent nomination of its own term by Cedar, who also stated that 
the change was material resulted in the non-formation of a final contract.   
The last shot doctrine, a solution to the battle of forms propagated by the CISG has been 
criticised for being arbitrary because it favours one of the parties, usually the seller, since he is 
the last person to send his form. It also leaves the buyer in a vulnerable position since if the seller 
does not send the goods, the contract will not be concluded but if the buyer accepts the goods 
he would have impliedly accepted the terms contained in the seller’s forms.241 Another criticism 
is that it encourages bad faith in a contract. Thus, in a volatile market situation, a party may play 
on the changing market situations through the alteration of material terms of the contract, which 
is a result of the application of the mirror image rule. Furthermore, because parties recognise that 
the last form is the final form, they will try to get their forms to be the last one by increasing the 
volume of paper work that flows between the parties. This shifts the focus from the business 
realities to the routines.242 
In determining if there is a binding contract, it must be noted that the CISG based on Art 19(1) 
invalidates a contract for lack of mutual assent and as stated earlier it ameliorates this harshness 
by allowing acceptance where alterations are only minor. However, since almost all the 
alterations listed are likely to be material, it implies that most acceptances will probably be 
constituted as counter offers thus upholding the mirror image rule as the main rule for contract 
for formation.243 To answer the question of bindingness of contracts, where the parties have not 
performed any obligations of the contract, the CISG holds that there is no contract. However, 
where the parties have met some core obligations of the contract, the CISG states that a contract 
has been formed due to the conduct of the parties. The formation of this contract as some 
scholars and courts have reasoned goes that the communication which first contained the 
standard terms are the offer, the second communication then constitutes a counter offer which 
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had been impliedly accepted by the performance of contractual obligation by the offeror. 244 
Others have found the existence of a contract on the assumption that parties waived the validity 
of their conflicting terms of business or they derogated form the application of article 19, instead 
opting for party autonomy provision under article 6.245  
From the above, it can be concluded that courts are willing to find a contract on the basis of the 
action of the parties under the mirror image rule even where the offer and acceptance are not in 
unison.  
Both the UCC and the CISG seek to enforce clauses in exchanged terms and conditions. To this 
extent, one sees compatibility of purpose between the two laws, which is a key factor in any legal 
transplant. However, there are material differences, while the UCC does not enforce any of the 
differences in the contract, the CISG will enforce either the offeror or the offeree’s terms. The 
UCC knocks out the buyer’s version and the seller’s version and a new version of the clause 
derived from the governing law is substituted from the applicable governing law.  
Although the knock out rule is considered a neutral approach, it has been criticised because it 
undermines the intention of the parties and the bargain it is intended to strike. For instance, with 
regards to the issue of notice of non-conformity, where parties have contradictory days for time 
to issue a notice of non-conformity, The UCC will displace their number of days and replace it 
with the one stipulated in the local governing law, even though this may be to the dissatisfaction 
of the parties.246 The principles of the CISG will in this case be preferable to that of the UCC 
because interpreters have opportunity and discretionary power to interpret reasonable time based 
on the number of days given for notice by the parties.247 Another example is with regards to 
arbitration. If parties opt for arbitration but have different arbitration clauses, the effect of the 
knock out rule will be the exclusion of both clauses and subsequent trial of the disputes in the 
national courts. Furthermore, in cases where prices lower than the normal prices are arrived at, 
with the consequence of a restricted warranty, the application of the knock out rule will invoke a 
statutory warranty which can change the character of the intended bargain.248 
Although both the UCC and the CISG have flaws in the modes in which they deal with the 
resolution of the Battle of Forms, it is suggested that the CISG presents a better approach than 
the UCC. Firstly because knocking out the parties agreement for the governing law undermines 
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the intention of the parties and may result in undesired results whereas, with the CISG parties 
are generally aware of who gets what in the last terms, seller, and the buyer can reject the seller’s 
terms and the goods. This is supported by the attitude of the courts towards the CISG and its 
principles. From the cases above, it is seen that in more recent times there has been a shift in the 
attitude of the courts, especially in recognition of and upholding the principles of the 
Convention on consideration. 
From the above, the CISG presents a fairer rule than the provisions of the UCC with regards to 
the battle of form. It respects the parties contractual agreement as opposed to imposing on them 
the governing law concept in this respect. This shows that the CISG can be considered a 
successful transplant to the extent that it presents parties with a better alternative than the extant 
law. Furthermore, despite the misapplication of the CISG, recent attitude shows that the courts 
recognise the distinction between the CISG and the UCC and apply it in cases in this regard.  
6. CISG and the Mailbox Rule 
Under common law, acceptances become effective upon dispatch even if they never reach the 
offeror. The CISG however adopts a receipt rule, which provides that acceptances become 
effective when they are received.249 This variance is important considering that the common law 
principle seeks to protect the offeree against a possibility of revocation once the acceptance is 
dispatched and still places the risk of lost communication on the offeror.250 
Albeit this distinction, Article 18(2) of the CISG must be read in conjunction with Article 16(1) 
which allows that an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree, before he has 
dispatched an acceptance. This provision thus softens the strictness of the Article 18(2) because 
the implication of conjunctive reading is that while the CISG and the UCC both protect the 
offeree against the possibility of a revocation once the acceptance is dispatched, the risk of lost 
communication is on the offeror under common law, however, under the CISG it falls on the 
offeree.251  
The CISG provides better protection by balancing out the interests for both the offeree and the 
offeror than the common law protection, since the offeree is protected from revocation but the 
offeror is protected from lost acceptances, this allows him to carry on business where he does 
not get any acceptance in the mailbox. More importantly, the risk of lost acceptance is better 
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placed on the offeree since he is in a better position to know whether the medium he chooses is 
subject to hazards or delays.252 
Since the CISG presents a better model than the UCC, and considering that one of the functions 
and reasons for a transplant is offering an enhanced model to the extant law, the CISG may be 
considered successful to that extent. Although the Convention has not triggered law reform as 
expected with transplants, it is sufficient that domestic actors have a more favourable option in 
pursuing their business transactions. 
4.5.1.4 The Reaction and Level of Interaction with the Social Actors 
Although the CISG had been in effect since 1988, in 2001 it was reported that there had still 
been relatively few reported decisions on the Convention by US parties. At the time, the first 
statistics gleaned from the PACE University Website showed that out of over 1800 decisions 
involving the CISG, a total of 87 or less than 5% were rendered in the US. Most of the cases 
were from courts of first instance, barely a dozen from appellate tribunal and not a single one 
from the US Supreme Court.253 Practically, it seemed the cases were fewer than 87. In actual 
terms, as at 2001 the real number of cases in which the CISG played an actual role was 40.254 
Concluding at the end of the evaluation of these statistics in 2001, in the United States, one of 
the authors stated that ‘the fact that a country with a population, economy, and court system 
approaching that of Western Europe produces at most a dozen of re-reported CISG cases per 
year strongly suggests that the Convention does not play a significant role there’.255 This suggests 
the inability of the court to transcend their particular traditions and pursue the development of 
the elusive CISG general principles.256 
The above is clearly indicative of lack of engagement by actors in the US with the CISG, a 
prevalent occurrence in common law countries. These trends have been attributed to U.S legal 
counsels who habitually advise their clients to opt out of the Convention and choose the UCC as 
the governing law in their sales transaction.257  
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At the height of the marginal number of cases dealt with under the CISG, authors provided 
various explanations for the behaviour of the legal counsels in the U.S. Firstly, because of 
fundamental ignorance of the Convention, parties simply overlooked its application.258 However, 
it has been suggested that ignorance plays a minor role in the above context,259 because though it 
seemed so at the initial phase of adoption, circa 10 years, it fails at least 20 years into the 
adoption. Considering this, at 20 years of adoption of the CISG in the U.S, awareness of the 
Convention had increased since lawyers who graduated from the law school would have 
invariably heard of the Convention, given that some contracts casebooks used in the U.S 
American law school discuss it, 260  and the courses dealing with international business 
transactions do as well. 261  Moreover, at the time, there were extensive literature on the 
Convention, particularly on the practitioner level, case digests were available so were at least 
more than a hundred law review articles.262 
It was further suggested that although it was plausible that the American businessmen and their 
lawyers may overlook the CISG when drafting contracts, it was unlikely that the litigators did 
because they are usually highly specialised and experienced, and therefore would be thorough in 
searching out the applicable law.263 Given the above, it was concluded, at the 21st anniversary of 
the CISG that ‘American lawyers are not ignorant of the Convention, but rather conscious of, 
and hostile to it.’264  
The illicit avoidance of the CISG by attorneys representing clients in courts also contributes to 
the paucity of cases. The failure to invoke the CISG provisions in cases where it may apply has 
been suggested to be as result of parochialism. However, this reason is insufficient because 
where the CISG applies, it will be advantageous to at least one of the parties. This suggests more 
reason for the party to raise it in court. Furthermore, intentionally failing to apply the CISG will 
amount to a betrayal of a lawyer’s clients’ interests and violation of their professional obligation. 
This will result in risking their reputation and exposing themselves to liability for malpractice.265 
Another reason for the avoidance of the CISG is that though the litigants invoked the 
Convention, courts may not address it either out of neglect, incomprehension or even hostility.266 
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This happens only in exceptional cases since judges have to deal with arguments and legal 
sources before them. The attitude of the US courts, through interpretation and methodology 
showed resistance and hostility towards the CISG. Contrary to suggestions that judges would 
neglect the CISG only in exceptional cases, empirical evidence of the application of the CISG in 
the US at its initial stages show outright neglect and disregard of the Convention. Confirming 
this is the fact the federal courts in the US did not truly begin to use the CISG until ten years 
after it had been ratified.267 This trend continued even after the 21th anniversary of the CISG, 
with a mere handful of cases being recorded in 2001.268  
One way the courts showed their neglect of the CISG is through the appropriation of foreign 
elements disguised by dressing them in familiar clothes, making the CISG alien. This however is 
one of the challenges of transplanting laws. Graziadei states ‘such strategies help to forestall 
adverse reactions to change and to facilitate its acceptance, yet they also betray the difficulty of 
understanding change in its own term’.269 The fear of application of new laws put in place 
especially where there is existing law means that the new law will be avoided at all costs. The Raw 
Materials Case 270  shows misinterpretation and avoidance of the CISG. The court did not 
distinguish the CISG from the domestic law but rather seemed eager to make an exit into a more 
comfortable and familiar realm. It treated the CISG as irrelevant, albeit finding it as the 
governing law- as if it were in some unexplained fashion superseded by US domestic law. As 
stated by one commentator  
Not one word of this discussion would have to be changed if UCC 
Article 2 had actually been the applicable law. A more flagrant and 
depressing example of a court ignoring its obligations under CISG 
article 7(1) and indulging – nay, wallowing in- the homeward trend is 
hard to imagine…the only good that could come of the Manfred Forberich 
decision, in this authors view, is if it became an example of what to 
avoid when interpreting the CISG271    
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Apart from neglecting the CISG principles and consulting with domestic laws, decisions from 
U.S courts have also not exhibited a great deal of enthusiasm for consulting foreign authority.’272 
This defeats the purpose of the Convention to promote uniformity. In terms of the impact of 
the CISG on the style adopted by the US courts, evidence showed that the courts did not engage 
with foreign material. They did not make reference to scholarly writing. There was no use of and 
any quotation from any foreign doctrinal writing in the body of an opinion. Although in 
uncommon instances the judges referred to academic material borrowed by the judges from a 
party’s brief.273 This may be because of the attitude of common law judges towards law making. 
Although judges in common law jurisdictions base their decisions on legal precedents, their 
attitude towards law making, enjoying the elevated status as lawmakers may be an impetus for 
their delay in applying the CISG and consulting with foreign authority on the CISG. 
Ideologically, common law judges may tend to see themselves as law makers; this may remotely 
encourage an unconscious egoistic adamance at continuing with familiar laws, thus affecting their 
disposition towards a legal transplant. Accordingly, one reason for the paucity of cases in the 
United States is that judges were not equipped to interpret the Convention in an international 
light, because of their domestic epistemology. This reaction affected the success of the CISG at 
the initial stages because it undermined the purpose of the Convention and the requirement for 
autonomous interpretation. Although Murray suggests that it is merely an aspiration for a court 
to adopt an international interpretation of the Convention and disregard their national law 
interpretation,274 he undercuts the ability and integrity of the judiciary, who can adopt purposive 
mind-set when interpreting the CISG. Moreover, judges serve as neutral arbiters in the 
interpretation of the law,275 despite unavoidable influence by other external factors such as role 
orientation, attitudes, partisanships and parochial values276 and habit. 277 Although this must not 
be used as a justification for dispensing flawed cases. In order to interpret the law effectively, the 
judge must take the pains to understand the law and the purpose for which it was drafted and he 
must be willing to adjust to the laws either through breaking ingrained habits in order to 
effectuate justice.  
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Kilian defending Murray suggests that the intention was not to denigrate the ability of the judges 
but simply that judges may see no pressing need for this paradigm shift. 278  This further 
undermines the position of judges and implies that judges may be somewhat lazy in undertaking 
the necessary steps towards interpretation of law. Frisch recognising the impact of habit more 
explicitly states ‘The intellectual stubbornness brought on by habit may lead judges to reject not 
only optional innovations that may present themselves but may provoke them to construe 
mandatory provisions as if no change had occurred.’279 However he concludes by stating that ‘the 
inertia of habit is not forever. Eventually, when supporting environment for performance shifts, 
new behaviours develop’.280  
Mapping a timeline of the CISG in the US shows an accurate fulfilment of Frisch’s statement. 
The ingrained habits of judges applying the UCC in place of the CISG were only an initial 
natural reaction to an unfamiliar law, and thus was only a temporary hurdle. At the time these 
arguments were made, the CISG was only a decade old and there were just a few cases.281 
Moreover, the judges recognised the need to consider the application of the CISG after it 
entered into force as was stated in Orbisphere v. U.S  
for international contracts for the sale of goods between U.S. parties and 
foreign parties -- which [the Customs Service] contends the present 
transactions are -- concluded on or after 1 January 1989282 the applicable 
commercial law is not the UCC, but rather, the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods . . . unless 
the parties expressly contracted out of the Convention's coverage 283 
Over the years, judges have recognised the need to use the CISG principles and have considered 
the CISG jurisprudence where necessary in deciding cases. 
The third reason for the shortage of cases on the CISG in the US is the fact that parties 
effectively opt out of the Convention under Art. 6.284 For practitioners and merchants, the CISG 
evokes a general sense of discomfort stemming from the unknown.285 The purposeful avoidance 
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of a legal transplant results in a failed transplant.286 As such, when a transnational commercial 
transplant is ignored or lawyers meet their business needs by drafting around it, it is no longer a 
living working instrument. Thus, the prevalent practice of opting out of the CISG at the drafting 
stages in the US may be suggestive of some failure. 
Although there is the intimation that the CISG is a failed transplant because of the prevalent opt 
outs. There has been a steady decline in the opt out practice by lawyers. Initial reports showed 
that 71 per cent of lawyers opted out of the CISG287 whilst subsequent reports showed a decline 
to 55 percent.288 The difference between the times of the survey show significant decline and it is 
likely that any recent survey would show a further decline.  
Based on the above, it would be infelicitous to consider the CISG a failed transplant, on the 
basis of avoidance, in the US. It must also be noted that despite the shortage of cases in the U.S., 
there is a glut of academic commentary on the CISG from U.S scholars. In that regard, the CISG 
is clearly a successful transplant.  
4.5.1.5 The Duration of the CISG in the U.S 
The continued existence, and use of the CISG in the US signifies a successful transplant. 
Although there seemed to be rejection initially, there has been a decline in the opt out and 
avoidance levels of the CISG. In fact there has been an upsurge and more acceptance of the 
CISG. There continues to be articles written and cases decide on the Convention. This is the 
characteristic of a successful legal transplant. This is because the Convention is in its 26th year 
and there is evidence of its continued application in transactions in the US up until 2014. In 2014, 
the US recorded the highest number of cases amongst all the jurisdictions.289 
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4.5.2 The CISG in Germany 
4.5.2.1 Actual Movement and Ease of Movement of the Law 
Although Germany was not amongst the first countries to ratify the CISG, they embraced it 
completely. The former German Democratic Republic (GDR) became a CISG Member State on 
March 1, 1990. However, GDR membership was short; on October 3, 1990, the GDR ceased to 
exist and its territorial units became parts of the FRG. This created problems as the CISG was 
applicable in the former GDR from March 1, 1990, until October 2, 1990.290 The CISG does not 
apply to a similar contract made at the same time if the seller was located in Köln (FRG), since 
the FRG did not become a CISG Member State until January 1, 1991. The CISG came into force 
in Germany on January 1 1991. The Convention was adopted without reservation albeit with 
declaration concerning Articles 1(1)(b) and 95.291  
From the above, there was actual movement of the CISG into Germany, despite the delay in 
ratification. This reluctance however was influenced by the fact that the acceptance of its 
predecessors the Hague Conventions of 1964, by the industry was very slow. First, the rules were 
different from the German national law, particularly as it favoured the seller, and only a few of 
the German trading partners had ratified it.292  
Despite this, and with the scepticism of the German industry, one sees the actual movement of 
the CISG into the German jurisdiction through its approval by ratification and subsequent 
reception by both the legislators and the trading industries. The industry gave up their resistance 
mainly because the CISG preserves the freedom of contract via Article 6.293 
The experience of Germany with the previous uniform laws and the initial difficulty with respect 
to GDR and its cessation though obstacles did not stop the ratification. This demonstrates 
successful transplantation of the Convention. 
4.5.2.2 Transplant Operating According to Its Purpose  
The interpretation of the CISG by the German courts showed consideration of its purpose. 
From 1988-1994 records showed that judges generally adhered to the CISG and applied it when 
the need arose. For instance with regards to Article 1(1)b, usually in the absence of a choice of 
law provision in the contract, the German rules on conflict of laws generally lead to the 
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application of the seller’s law.294 If the country had adopted the CISG before 1991 the German 
courts applied the Convention as part of the seller’s law. 
The zealousness of the interpreters in engaging with the CISG can be seen in the wrongly 
decided case of Veneer Cutting Machine,295  where the judge ignored the applicable law of the 
contract which ought to be the Indiana law and applied the CISG. This was done on the basis 
that the US was a signatory to the CISG. The judge however ignored the fact that the U.S had 
opted out of Article 1(1) b by the declaration under Article 95. The attitude of the court here is 
one of the effects of a transplant, resulting in irritability and wrongful use of the transplant. 
However, this is an isolated incident in the Courts’ interpretation, and the sum total of cases 
suggests a more correct interpretation. 
At the initial stages of adoption of the Convention in Germany, its application tilted towards the 
homeward trend. These trends could be observed in the lower courts, where concepts of 
German domestic law were incorporated into the interpretation of the CISG. 296  In the LG 
Stuttgart,297 although the court held that the CISG was the applicable law, and in effect found for 
the seller. The court stated with regard to the issue of examining goods within reasonable time ‘it 
may be left open whether one applies Article 39 of the CISG or German law.298 The result is the 
same in either case. The buyer must examine the goods immediately, as the circumstances so 
require.’ The court applied the very strict and short notice period of the German law.299  
The Court’s decision in such cases is not habitual practice. The courts have gradually recognised 
the autonomous and international application of the Convention. This position is confirmed by 
Magnus, who having collected and prepared the German decisions for UNCITRAL and its 
CLOUT system for a decade suggests he is of the impression that German courts ‘today do 
neither directly nor indirectly, on a subconscious follow a homeward trend’.300 In a more recent 
decision, the Federal Supreme Court reiterated the status of the Convention as an international 
and autonomous framework while stressing that the Convention does not allow any redress to 
concepts developed under national law.301 While there are some courts in Germany that have 
                                                          
294 See Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch [EGBGB] Articles. 27-28 in Martin Karollus, ‘Judicial 
Interpretation and Application of the CISG in Germany 1988-1994’ (1995) Cornell Review of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 51, 52. 
295 Germany 2 July 1993 Appellate Court Düsseldorf (Veneer cutting machine case). 
296 Ulrich Magnus, ‘CISG and its Impact in Germany’ in Ferrari (n 273)156. 
297 [LG = Landgericht = District Court], Case Number 19890831 dated (31 August 1989). 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/890831g1.html  accessed 16 May 2013. 
298 (Article 32, section 2, EGBGB; Section 377 HGB). 
299 See also LG Aachen 3 April 1990, RIW 1990 491; OLG Düsseldorf 8 January 1993, IPRax 1993, 412.  
300 Magnus (n 296) 156. 




simply referred to the need to interpret the CISG by having regard for its international character 
and to the need to promote its uniform application,302 other courts have gone further. In 1996, 
the German Supreme Court expressly stated that 'the CISG is different from German domestic 
law, whose provisions and special principles are, as a matter of principle, inapplicable for the 
interpretation of the CISG (Article 7 CISG).'303 It is this reasoning that has led the Court of 
Appeal of Karlsruhe to state that 'German legal concepts such as "Fehler" and "zugesicherte 
Eigenschafteri" are therefore not transferable to the CISG'.304  
The court at the initial stages also applied the very strict and short notice period under German 
law for the interpretation of Articles 38 and 39. The prevalent view was that in the absence of 
specific circumstances, the average period was about 2 weeks. However, the Federal Supreme 
Court in the Machine for Producing Hygenic Tissues Case,305 prolonged the period in the interest of an 
international acceptable solutions since other countries allow for a longer notice period or 
require no period at all. Thus, the rule of thumb for the examination of goods and giving notice 
of defects under Articles 38 and 39 is roughly one month, if no special circumstances like 
perishable goods require a shorter period.306  
In Germany, the application of Article 79 of the CISG opposes the homeward trend problem 
experienced by various jurisdictions. Art. 79 which developed out of the variants of similar 
domestic legal principles, stands alone as an autonomous international doctrine under the CISG. 
As has been suggested, ‘its development in Germany may ultimately evolve into an autonomous 
international norm. It further supports the notion that Article 79 is capable of creating relative 
uniformity within the context of the CISG’s goal for a sales law that is transnational in design’.307 
The German courts did not invoke the domestic legal concept such as the national equivalent to 
Article 79—the principle of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage308 German jurisprudence in support of 
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this proposition indicates that there has developed a generally cohesive body of case law 
exemplifying a functionally uniform and autonomous doctrine of excuses for non-performance. 
The German federal Supreme Court has also provided guidance on the issue of non-conformity 
of goods and excuses for non-performance. In the Vine-wax case, a case that has been considered 
a landmark in CISG jurisprudence, 309  the Supreme Court demonstrated an advanced and 
sophisticated understanding of the Convention’s interpretative methodology.310 In this case, the 
buyer claimed vine wax sold by the defendant (seller), which was obtained from a third party was 
defective. The buyer demanded damages but the seller claimed he was exempt from liability on 
the basis that the damages were from frost and he was only an intermediary agent. Thus, the 
reasons for damages were out of his control. The invocation of this article by the seller reflects 
the broader interpretation of excuses for non-performance, which is resonant in civil law 
jurisdictions. Under German law, this would mean a determination as to whether or not physical 
performance was still possible for the promisor. Where possible, a case for delay may be made 
and in such situations, specific performance may be awarded. This allows a greater scope for the 
aggrieved party to perform. Although scholars had argued that the intention of the drafters was 
not that Art 79 should apply to deliveries of non-conforming goods, this was not made clear in 
the provision. 
Given this, the court considered impediments which may excuse a party from damages and the 
court stated  
Because the seller has the risk of acquisition […] he can only be 
exempted under CISG Article 79(1) or (2) (even when the reasons for 
the defectiveness of the goods are—as here—within the control of his 
supplier or his sub-supplier) if the defectiveness is due to circumstances 
out of his own control or out of each of his suppliers’ control311 
The decision of the court in this case was hailed by Schlectriem with him stating  
The decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in the "vine-wax case" brought 
needed clarity in this respect and is furthermore, a "liberation," in that it 
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shows our Anglo-Saxon colleagues that in Germany an exemption for 
the seller in the case of non-conforming goods is not taken into 
consideration just because the seller obtained the goods or individual 
components from third parties. Suppliers, and in turn, their suppliers, 
are within the seller's sphere of influence. As the Bundesgerichtshof 
correctly pointed out, the seller's liability for them is the same as if he 
had manufactured the goods himself. In its treatment of the legal issue 
as well as in its reasoning, the decision is not only a welcome movement 
towards the point of view of other legal systems regarding seller's 
liability, which is extremely important for the preservation of a uniform 
interpretation of the Convention, but is also in two ways guiding for the 
future legal developments in internal German sales law and the 
Convention: Control, meaning foreseeability, avoidability, and ability to 
overcome impediments within the meaning of Art. 79(1) CISG, has 
always been understood as physical control. The decision demonstrates, 
however, that it is also a matter of economic risk control. In other 
words, as long as the risk is within his economic sphere, the seller is in a 
better position than the buyer to carry the risk of damages due to a 
delivery of defective goods312 
Despite the commendation of the decision, it has been argued that the vagueness of the Court’s 
position on leaving open the question that Article 79 might in some other circumstances exempt 
a seller for delivery of non-conforming goods suggests according to a dicta from the German 
Federal Supreme Court that a seller could escape liability for damages under Article 79 for 
supplying non-conforming goods. This would allow a fault based liability, a concept recognised 
under German law, to creep into Article 79. Given that article 79 is distinct to civil law, which 
hinges its solution to impediments on the doctrine of fault,  
Such a development should it occur would undermine the objective of 
the CISG to create an internationally uniform sales law. For this reason, 
while the Vinewax case is an admirable addition to CISG jurisprudence, 
theoretically, it does leave open the possibility of divergence in the case 
law on Article 79 in national courts313    
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The battle of forms under the CISG is considered controversial because the Convention does 
not specifically address it but offers general guidelines and principles. This is through exchange 
of forms between parties,314 by practices or previous negotiations between the parties315 and 
international trade norm or practices.316  
The controversy in the application of the battle of forms based on these provisions can be seen 
in the German court interpretation based on their domestic knock out rule. This demonstrates 
the courts’ approach using domestic interpretation. In the Knitwear Case,317 the parties concluded 
a contract on essential terms but each relied on their own standard terms, which contained a 
conflicting choice of law clause. Strictly under Article 19, no contract was formed. The Court 
however held that a contract was formed, as the parties had started performance, showing their 
intention to be bound by the terms already agreed upon as well as by any standard terms which 
were common in substance, with the exclusion of the conflicting terms such as the choice of law 
clauses (knock-out rule).  
The Powdered Milk Case, 318  provides a classic example of differences between the offer and 
acceptance which may arise where both parties insist on the use of their standard terms prior to 
the conclusion of the contract and it is unclear from the facts which set of standard terms should 
prevail where both the parties referred to their standard forms during the negotiations phase of 
the contract. It was clear that a contract had been formed, but it was not possible to determine 
which set of standard terms was actually agreed on. The court was faced with a dilemma that is 
difficult to resolve on the basis of general principles of the CISG.  
The German Supreme Court reaffirmed the knock-out rule approach to cases where there is 
performance. The Court did not consider the conflict between the last shot doctrine and knock-
out rule in determining contract formation, but stated the contract was valid contract due to the 
performance of the parties. Employing the good faith principle in deciding whether or not T&Cs 
are in conflict, the Court stated that a party who uses a "rejection clause" should be barred from 
picking only favourable terms of the other party's boilerplate. This ensured that the seller’s 
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"rejection clause" prevailed and completely excluded the buyer's terms. Thus, the knock-out rule 
then applied.319  
Although in the above cases, it is found that the German courts followed the domestic principle 
of knock out rule, this approach using the knock out rule is justified and has been recommended 
as the better approach, even favoured by the majority of commentators320and the case law.321 
Given this, one can say that although the knock out rule is the domestic approach of the 
German domestic law, it still is the best solution to the controversy of battle of forms under the 
CISG and has been suggested as furthering the purpose of the CISG and therefore it operated 
according to purpose.  
Moreover, even if one were to condemn the German courts’ resort to their domestic 
interpretation, the Courts’ have more recently, adhered to the principles of the CISG, following 
its purpose. In 2005, the German Supreme Court stated that  
insofar as the Court of Appeals refers to [various German] judgments [...] 
in analysing the question whether, at the time the risk passed, the 
delivered meat conformed to the contract within the meaning of Arts. 
35, 36 CISG, it ignored the fact that these decisions were issued before 
the CISG went into effect in Germany and refer to § 459 BGB [...]. The 
principles developed there cannot simply be applied to the case at hand, 
although the factual position -- suspicion of foodstuffs in trans border 
trade being hazardous to health -- is similar; that is so because, in 
interpreting the provisions of CISG, we must consider its international 
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character and the necessity to promote its uniform application and the 
protection of goodwill in international trade (Art. 7(1) CISG)'.322  
The interpretation given by the courts in the above cases show that the CISG accomplishes its 
purpose of uniformity interpretation and application of its concepts. It shows that the 
Convention can be considered a successful Convention in Germany since the interpretations and 
applications of the concepts are in line with the requirement of autonomous interpretation and 
uniform application as mandated by Article 7. Thus, the application of the CISG in Germany is 
according to its purpose and therefore successful. 
 
4.5.2.3 The Fit with the Societal Needs and Legal Infrastructure of 
the Transplant 
At the time when the CISG was adopted in Germany, there had been calls to reform the 
German law of obligations. Therefore, the convention came at an opportune time. One criterion 
for a successful legal transplant is the extent to which it meets the needs of the society. Thus, if a 
transplanted law meets the reform needs, triggering an update of the domestic law thus, 
contributing to the development of the country, it will be considered successful.  
Legislators sought to reform the German law of obligation to bring it in line with the law as 
applied by the courts. Since the courts had shaped the BGB by interpretation and invention of 
new legal institutions, such that the Civil Code was no longer fully representative of the law.323 
Legislators also sought to bring the German law in line with international conventions 
particularly the Uniform Sales Law.324 The initiative for the reform of the law of obligations was 
launched in 1978. Following the discussions leading to the reform, the CISG played a major role. 
These discussions based on the CISG, led to a proposal drafted by the Commission, which was 
to a great extent to the model of the Uniform Sales Law.325 The general concept of the CISG was 
convincing to the Commission who extended it with a few exceptions to the general law of 
obligations.326 The proposal based on the CISG was widely accepted especially amongst the 
German lawyers,327 although it did not bring immediate response from the legislators. 
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The development of the European private law and the need to implement the European 
Consumer Sales Directive catalysed the reform of the German ‘Schuldrechtsreform’. The CISG 
influenced the Directive. In adopting the Directive into German legal system, the legislators 
eventually followed the proposal of the Commission for the reform of the law of obligations. 
Some fundamental and basic concepts of the German law were changed and brought in 
alignment with the concepts of the CISG. The Convention not only constituted a major ground 
for the discussion of the German reform discussion, it had also a real impact on the final 
outcome of the ‘Schuldrechtsreform’, regarded as the most important revision of the BGB since 
1900. The reform was not limited to sale specific matters but changed the general law of 
obligations.328 In this regard, although one may find differences, the similarities are more.329 The 
‘Reisevertragsgesetz’ Travel Contract Act of 1979, which regulated the duties and liabilities of 
travel operators was also enacted based on the structure and basic concepts of the CISG.      
At the time the CISG was birthed, the German law of obligations was in need of a reform. The 
fact that the CISG served as a model for the law reform providing a solution for the domestic 
law makes it a successful legal transplant. That it served as a fertile soil for the reform of not only 
the Civil Code, but the Travel Contract Act, shows it met the needs Germany. The CISG served 
as a gap filler and trigger for law reform in Germany, making it successful. Accordingly, 
‘Although the Uniform Sales Law was not the main reason for reform, its existence added to the 
climate for reform and served as the major inspiring source for the revision of the law’.330  
The extent of fit between the CISG and the German law can be seen in the fact that the 
interpretation of the domestic law is in light of the CISG. Magnus observes that the 
interpretation of the BGB, which is modelled after the CISG takes the convention into account. 
Commentaries on the domestic law refer to the CISG as part of the legislative history of the 
respective provisions.331 Furthermore, the interpretation of the provisions which were introduced 
into the BGB via the Consumer Sales Directive frequently considers the Directive as a model to 
which the domestic provision must comply.  This is significant because the Directive draws 
inspiration from the CISG. Thus there is an indirect influence of the CISG on the interpretation 
of the BGB.  
In terms of fit with the legal infrastructure, the approach of the courts to discrepancies between 
the Convention and the German domestic principles is significant. Even in the face of conflict 
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with already accepted and practiced principles, the courts esteemed the Convention by 
interpreting it according to its overarching principles and purpose. Of particular interest is the 
German courts’ attitude towards Article 18 of the CISG. The principles of German law on 
confirmation notices are quite distinctive to most other legal systems. Under German law a party 
may send to the other party, a notice purportedly confirming the content of the contract that 
actually deviates from the contract. If the other party does not contest this confirmation, the 
contract is irrefutably regarded as having the content of the confirmation note. The other party 
cannot argue that the contract is different from the confirmation notice or that the contract had 
not been formed. With the CISG, it was suspected that German courts would try to incorporate 
these principles into their application of the CISG. 
However, the courts proved otherwise by stating in the Rare Hardwood case that the confirmation 
notice of the principles do not apply under the CISG.332 Failure to respond to a confirmation 
notice has no effect under the CISG. The notice can only be used as evidence. While the 
German principles on confirmation notices could be applicable as a usage under CISG Article 9, 
the decision of the OLG Köln shows that German courts are not prepared to accept such a 
usage, merely because one contracting party comes from Germany.333  
Two other German courts reiterated that trade usage must be international in order for it to be 
implied into a contract. In the Shoes Case, the court distinguished the use of letters of 
confirmation in a national context from the international context. Here, a French buyer and a 
German seller had concluded an oral contract regarding the price of chocolates. When the buyer 
was silent as to the different terms in the seller’s letter of confirmation, the court held that the 
terms of confirmation letter were not part of the contract as such letters could not be considered 
part of international trade usage as required by Article 9(2). The court concluded that although 
the practice was well recognised in Germany, it was not so recognised in France. Another court 
held in the Chocolate Produce Case that a buyer seeking to hold a seller to the modified price 
contained in a letter of confirmation did not establish that there was a usage known in 
international trade recognising silence as acceptance to a commercial letter of confirmation.334 
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A more recent decision by the courts emphasised the position of the CISG as opposed to the 
domestic German law.335 The court made recourse to Articles 14 and 18 of the CISG in order to 
determine whether general terms have been incorporated into a contract governed by the CISG. 
It stated that recourse must not be had to the domestic substantive law, which is applicable by 
virtue of international conflicts of laws rules,  
it would run contrary to the principle of good faith Art. 7(1) CISG if the 
recipient were under a full duty to investigate the content of any 
standard terms which the declaring party has not sufficiently 
communicated or, in other words, if the recipient was burdened with the 
risk of unfavourable standard terms which had never been made known 
to it…it cannot be invoked that it is sufficient under German 
substantive law that standard terms can already be incorporated into 
commercial contracts if the incorporating party grants the recipient a 
reasonable opportunity to recognise their content336  
The courts above show a purposeful recognition of the aim of the CISG and sought to promote 
uniformity in interpretation and application instead of succumbing to its bias or domestic law 
disposition. 
The attitude of the courts towards the distinction in the above cases flies in the face of Legrand’s 
proposition of impossibility of legal transplants where he suggests that the meaning of a rule is a 
function of the application of the rule by the interpreter, determined by who and where the 
interpreter is, and to an extent, by what he wants in advance unwittingly’.337 The courts show that 
they understand what is expected of them and have no problem dispensing their function 
according to the requirement of law. This is in line with the key function of the judiciary to sit as 
a neutral arbiter remaining unfettered by societal biases. The German courts have also shown 
that Murray’s claims regarding the dearth of cases in the common law jurisdictions, being a result 
of acquired habits from years of applying domestic law is flawed.338  
The role of the judges in this context becomes important especially in light of the distinction of 
roles of judges under civil and common legal systems. The more reserved roles of the judges in 
civil law may aid adherence and correct interpretation of the Convention. Since judges are not 
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considered lawmakers in the civil legal system, unlike in the common law legal systems they 
would have no problems with the CISG. The consistent practice of interpreting laws based solely 
on the statutes as it is, makes them also predisposed to interpreting the CISG within its rules and 
less likely to tilt towards the homewards trend. This is unlike the common legal system where the 
judges see themselves as lawmakers and are therefore more easily swayed by their legal 
epistemologies. 
It has been suggested that the CISG has not changed the way lawyers draft their claims, defend 
or plead in court. However, the civil law tradition of academic influence on legal practice 
manifests in practice. Thus, for a practitioner, scholarly commentary to enacted legislation and 
case law is an unavoidable component of the everyday work of the lawyer. This is clear in the 
practice of the CISG in Germany. Practitioners tend to quote the respective literature on the 
CISG where necessary whilst cases are less often cited. However, it is the German literature on 
the CISG, which is more often cited, clearly a result of the language barrier. German 
commentaries have been noted as being fully devoted to international uniform interpretation and 
application. Thus it has been suggested that citing the German commentaries, practitioners ‘rely 
indirectly but nonetheless effectively on a uniform interpretation of the CISG.’339  
From the above, German courts made and continue to make concerted efforts in applying the 
CISG according to its aims. The application of the CISG according to its purpose makes it a 
successful Convention in this regard.  
4.5.2.4 The Reaction and Level of Interaction with Social Actors 
It has been stated that ‘German lawyers take the CISG very seriously’. This is clear in the level of 
interaction and engagement of domestic actors with the Convention.340 In terms of acceptance of 
the CISG, surveys, though not representative show a general acceptance of the Convention. 
Almost 100% of lawyers who practice in the field of international sales law, although not all 
exclusively, know the CISG. 341 Awareness of the CISG in Germany came through various 
sources which are indicative of engagement with the Convention. At the early stages of the CISG 
in Germany, several introductory courses were offered by the lawyers’ associations, chambers of 
commerce, publishing houses and universities. Currently, the CISG is part of the curriculum of 
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students, though optional. Further, every standard commentary on the German Civil Code 
comments on the CISG and cases published on the Convention have a special law journal.342  
An expected reaction of social actors toward legal transplants as advocated by Legrand is the 
inevitable slowed pace of change in legal epistemologies of social actors. However Germany and 
their reception to the CISG evidences how quickly legal epistemologies change, thereby 
confuting his argument.  
Despite the impressive levels of awareness of the CISG in Germany, half the times, it is excluded 
from application in contracts.343 Reasons for excluding the CISG include; little awareness of the 
Convention, same reasons as the U.S-legal uncertainty especially in terms of unforeseen solutions, 
clients being unaware of the CISG and the notion that the German law comparatively is more 
advantageous. A further reason is the habits and traditions, especially practice of excluding the 
predecessors of the Convention within the business circle just carried through.344   
Reluctance towards the CISG in Germany is somewhat unfounded because it is dependent on 
the extent of specialisation of legal practitioners in international sales law. Particularly the extent 
to which they have to deal with the CISG in their daily work. Thus, the more specialised they are 
in their daily work, the more advantages of the CISG they see.345 However, despite knowledge of 
the CISG, the preponderant attitude is towards exclusion of the CISG, based on the fear of 
uncertainty and unforeseeable results.346   
Increasingly however, business associations recommend non-exclusion of the CISG. As noted by 
one practitioner;  
Whenever I talk to clients active in international trade and tell them 
about the CISG, or as the case maybe, the CISG supplemented by the 
UNIDROIT Principles (2004) to the extent that a subject is not covered in 
the CISG, they are usually convinced by this concept regardless of their 
nationality or their place of business. Sometimes clients ask for a 
comparison between the CISG and the provisions on sale in the 
German Civil Code. Yet, this is rare. As a result, I am using both the 
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CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles quite often when negotiating or 
drafting a contract.347  
This is significant if one considers that German practitioners almost regularly excluded the 
predecessors to the CISG, The Hague Uniform Sales Law of 1964. However, this practice 
changed considerably with the CISG. 
Scholarly interest in the CISG in Germany is particularly impressive showing acceptance of the 
Convention. Hundreds of dissertations focus exclusively or in part on the CISG. Extensive 
commentaries and handbooks on the CISG abound and there are countless articles on the 
subject. Almost every book on the law of contractual obligations mentions the CISG.348 To the 
extent that scholars engage to a high level with the Convention, it may be considered successful 
in Germany. This interest is traceable to the German history with the CISG, particularly the 
forerunner of the CISG set the pace and its protégés followed suit.349 The interest in the CISG 
grew particularly in light of the initiative by the German government to reform the law of 
obligations, which was at the same time when the CISG was adopted.  
The willingness of the courts to consider the application and use of the CISG in cases before it 
shows a positive reaction and therefore acceptance of the CISG.  
4.5.2.5 The Duration of the Imported Law 
The CISG has been in Germany for 24 years, since its adoption and is still currently being 
applied. This is evidence of a successful transplant. At the end of 2014, a case on the CISG was 
recorded by the German Federal Supreme Court, 350  whilst in 2013, 10 out of the 41 cases 
recorded were from Germany. This is indicative of its continued usage in international trade 
transactions and engagement with it by domestic actors. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Several things can be gleaned from the transplantation and experience of the CISG in the U.S 
and Germany. Firstly, one can see the polarised adaptational process of the CISG in the U.S and 
Germany. Generally, the process of adaptation of a legal transplant happens in different 
conditions and at different times. Thus, the process of adaptation of the CISG could be through 
integrating into a new legal system more or less successfully, by the CISG becoming an alien 
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body within the legal system or by representing the departure point of a new system. In the two 
jurisdictions, the CISG integrated itself into the legal systems successfully but at different times.  
At the initial stages of adoption of the CISG in both jurisdictions, one found there was the 
interference of habits, whereby the CISG was interpreted within the old habitual forms and 
frames of the domestic law, borne out of intrinsic thinking of the actors responsible for 
interpreting the CISG. The explicit avoidance of the CISG in contracts was also a common 
occurrence in the two countries at the initial stages of adoption. Lawyers avoided the CISG both 
in the US and in Germany, choosing to stay with more familiar domestic laws.  
Understandably, traditions and ideology are a ‘highly efficient means of constancy, contributing 
powerfully to asserting the existing law, to increasing legal knowledge, to applying the law quasi-
habitually and to curbing change with great intensity.’ 351  However what actors are used to 
traditionally should always work pendent on given circumstances and contents of the tradition or 
law. Thus where a new law is transplanted into a jurisdiction, and it provides a better alternative 
to the existing law, habits and traditions should not be in perpetuity.  
From the above, there is the expectation that the natural inclination of interpreters drawn from 
the domestic law will feature subconsciously in the interpretation of the CISG. It has been 
shown that this is an acceptable process of adaptation. This happened in both jurisdictions 
although the process of adaptation of the CISG took longer in the U.S. Whilst there were a few 
anomalies with the interpretation of the German courts, subsequent interpretations within three 
years showed an adjustment and settlement of the CISG in Germany. The differing times of 
adjustment are by no means indicative of failure of the Convention in Germany or the U.S, but a 
difference in adaptation times and process.  
Success can be dependent on the recipient jurisdiction, as evidenced in Germany. Although the 
courts struggled at the initial stages of adoption, as expected with novel laws, they were quick to 
change their approach. The judges in the U.S. on the other hand seemed to linger in their 
adjustment. Admittedly, the early adaptation of the German actors to the CISG may be 
attributed to factors such as prior affiliation and experience with precursors to the CISG, the 
Hague Conventions, and the habits normative to actors in the civil legal system. These may 
explain the keenness to interpret the CISG autonomously, in contrast to judges in the common 
law jurisdiction, who considering the practice of judicial precedent and applying case law to the 
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cases to be decided, may be more predisposed to applying already made and previous decisions 
to new laws, irrespective of their requirement for autonomous interpretation.  
Although these factors may be contributory, they cannot be disproportionately considered as 
uniquely responsible for the difference in attitude of actors in the different jurisdictions. There is 
an onus on the actors to play an active role in ensuring receptivity of the CISG, by recognising 
its purpose and aligning their attitudes to that purpose.   
This is particularly, considering the role of judges as justice effectors and impartial referees in 
courts, and the preponderant influence which legal doctrine and methodology have on the 
outcome of cases. It is suggested that what must take precedence in the interpretation of the 
CISG in any jurisdiction is a consideration of the appropriate law, as evidenced in Germany. 
Thus, the rational doctrinal model of judicial law making should take precedence over the role of 
discretion in the interpretation of the CISG.  
Based on the above, one can see from the timeline of the CISG, the different interactional 
experience of the different countries with the CISG. Initially, one would have a found a case of 
rejection of the Convention in most of these jurisdictions. However, as time progressed we see 
the CISG, slowly melding into the local jurisdiction. This is evident through the adaptation and 
acclimatization by the actors of CISG concepts, and an appreciation and distinction between the 
domestic or preconceived interpretation and the autonomous interpretation of the CISG 
concepts. One can surmise that there is a fertile and healthy interaction between the actors in the 
domestic legal order and the CISG.  
The analysis above shows that the CISG in these jurisdictions can be considered successful 
based on the definition that success means the law works according to the criteria set out above 
with the domestic legal order. This is more so since scholars and academics understand that what 









    CHAPTER 5 
 CONCEPTUAL TRANSPLANTATION OF THE CISG INTO NIGERIA 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter conceptualises the transplantation of the CISG in Nigeria. The chapter will consider 
the reasons why the CISG should be adopted, its effects and implications in Nigeria. The chapter 
will also examine the way the Convention will interact with the extant framework for 
international trade in Nigeria, the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Given the importance of international 
trade in promoting long term economic growth, and the necessity of functional institutions in 
maximising the advantages of trade, the chapter assesses the adequacy and continued usefulness 
of the 1893 SGA. Following this, the chapter will also consider the CISG as a possible 
complementary framework to the SGA. 
An examination of how the CISG will work in Nigeria will be undertaken. In considering this, 
the chapter will examine alternative legal frameworks available for international trade 
transactions in Nigeria, such as the OHADA. This is in order to determine the most suitable 
framework for international trade in Nigeria, and, whether the laws can coexist.  
Undertaking a conceptual analysis of the CISG in Nigeria enables an evaluation of the likelihood 
of success of the Convention in Nigeria. Although there is a strong case for the adoption of the 
Convention, there are inevitable costs of adopting the Convention. Recognising that such costs 
may exceed the benefits, this examination becomes important in order to make the necessary 
recommendations and suggestion of the pitfalls to be avoided by the legal actors.  
Using the empirical research data, the chapter measures the attitude of legal practitioners towards 
the Convention. This is in order to gauge the level of acceptability and willingness to embrace 
the Convention.    
5.2 Making a Case for the CISG in Nigeria 
The benefits of the CISG are stated in the aims and objectives. However, there are more and 
specific benefits for Nigeria in transplanting the CISG, particularly in lieu of international trade 




5.2.1 Justifications for Transplanting the CISG into Nigeria  
5.2.1.1 Facilitation and Development of International Trade in Nigeria 
The high dependence on import means a large number of traders on the international scene are 
sole-traders and SME’s that buy already manufactured products and resell it. It is suggested that 
these are the actors to whom the CISG would be most beneficial for. SME’s who tend to 
dispense with formalities such as governing law issues, as opposed to multinationals who trade 
on their own terms and especially not in cases of government contracts where the Nigerian 
government is usually the stronger party.  
The growing interdependence in the relation of states, the increase in global trade and global 
markets, global communication travel migration amongst others suggest an inevitable pull 
towards uniformity in laws. This interdependence has resulted in increased trade in Nigeria. The 
‘extensity, intensity and velocity of globalisation’ justify uniform laws such as the CISG to govern 
international trade.1 The extent to which global activities stretch across borders and distances, 
the intensity which is the magnitude of interconnectedness in the transactions, the way in which 
the transactions have gained speed and the impact, i.e. the enmeshment between the global and 
the local, 2 justify the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria for international trade transactions.  
Despite creating new market opportunities, globalisation creates challenges for international 
traders in Nigeria, who having the opportunity of a wider market and a broader range of goods, 
grapple with complexities of foreign laws of different jurisdictions, which hinders trade. 
Furthermore, national judges are increasingly being confronted with disputes of international 
nature, which have different interpretational issues. The overwhelming flurry of commercial 
activities is substantially and continuously hindered by national laws, suggesting the need for the 
CISG, a framework capable of minimising transaction costs in international trade, while 
encouraging globalisation.  
Globalisation also creates an expectation of countries towards other countries. A legal transplant 
can function as a signal, conveying a message to the world-at-large regarding a system's 
commitment to a certain set of values or its robustness as a viable participant in the international 
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discourse. 3 It also explains the adoption of various kinds of international and foreign norms. As 
trade transactions increase in Nigeria, her trading partners would expect her to be motivated to 
reform her laws to meet modern commercial transaction, thereby justifying the CISG. Given this, 
adopting the CISG in Nigeria can be a signal to other countries trading with her, of her interest 
in improving her trade regime,4 and a commitment to international businesspersons that she is 
committed to the promoting international trade transactions. This is a justification for Nigeria to 
adopt the Convention.  
The convergence of international trade concepts into the CISG makes its adoption in Nigeria 
justified.  
The upsurge of transnational laws, which represent a hybrid of international and domestic laws, 
play a significant role in convergence. The transnational legal process is a ‘transubstantive 
process whereby states and other transnational private actors use the blend of domestic and 
international legal process to internalise international legal norms into domestic law.’5 Countries 
agree on treaties and conventions that envisage the harmonisation of legal rules.6 These laws, 
agreed upon by different countries, through the international treaties emanate from the domestic 
laws. Thus, there is an undeniable relationship and interaction between the domestic laws and 
the international laws. Transnational laws, which emanate from domestic laws through repeated 
cycles of interaction-interpretation-internationalisation, interpretations of applicable global 
norms are eventually internalised into states’ domestic legal systems.7 Consequently, similarity of 
laws of legal systems stem from subscription to public international laws.  
Since transnational laws represent a hybrid of international and national laws, laws such as the 
CISG are clear examples of convergence and yet, equally acting as a force of convergence. This 
is particularly in light of the role of private international law on convergence. The absence of a 
global private international law emphasises the need for legal certainty which is a catalyst for the 
convergence of substantive laws. Private international law problems in cross border businesses 
are also a motivation for transnational law. In this area the lex mercatoria is an example. The 
                                                          
3 Assaf Likhovski, ‘Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal Transplants and Signaling’ (2009) 10 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law. 
4  David Nelken, ‘Signaling Conformity: Changing Norms in Japan and China’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 933 in ibid. 
5 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘The Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review; 
in Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters’ (2006) 24 Pennsylvania State International Law Review 
745-746. 
6 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (CUP, 2014) 224. 





similarity in the trade laws which are most often inadvertent, represent convergence, thus making 
the CISG desirable for international trade in Nigeria in order to solve private law problems. 
Since legal systems and laws are converging, it makes sense that in recognition of the growing 
similarity of laws, that Nigeria subscribe to embodiments of convergence in order work with, 
and access similar laws, continuing with the already existing trend of converging legal systems. 
The fact that other transnational and regional laws conveying convergence are already being used 
in Nigeria, is reason for, and makes the adoption of the CISG easier. Particularly, in the area of 
trade, laws such as the New York Convention,8 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services (1994)9 which have been subscribed to and are in use, show 
familiarity and acceptance of convergence in this area. 
Apart from these, the CISG can specifically do the following;  
i. Ensure Legal Certainty in Trade in Nigeria 
The adoption of the CISG in Nigeria is justified on the basis that it can facilitate trade is by 
ensuring legal certainty, that is, ensuring that laws are accessible operable, legible, intelligible and 
up to date.10 This means that the Convention can allow Nigerian actors to ascertain with clarity 
the applicable law governing their transactions, the availability of the law, and what the outcome 
of their transaction will be at any given time. For international traders judicial certainty, allowing 
legitimate expectations of how judges are likely to interpret and apply the law in court decisions 
is also vital because it enables them assess the risks involved in pursuing any foreign trade 
endeavour. 
In commercial contracts, governing law clauses express the parties' choice as to what that law 
should be. Where they omit to do so complex rules exist to determine what the governing law of 
the contract should be. Where parties are located, or obligations are to be performed, in different 
jurisdictions, determining the governing law of the contract may be difficult. This may lead not 
only to uncertainty but also to time and cost being spent arguing at the outset of any dispute 
over what law should be applied. The need for the CISG in Nigeria becomes clear considering 
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that empirical research11 shows that sole traders and SME’s do not usually include these clauses 
in their contracts and where they are included, they are usually the sellers preferred law. Thus, 
where the parties have not agreed on a choice of law, the courts will have to identify the 
applicable law objectively.  The main rule in Article 3 of the Hague Convention is that the law of 
the country where the seller has her business establishment or habitual residence at the time of 
receipt of the buyer's order will govern the contract of sale. Given that the Nigerian SME’s are 
the buyers in the contract, this suggests that the applicable law would be the foreign seller’s law. 
This means that the Nigerian buyer is already at a disadvantage because the sellers’ law would 
always vary depending on the type of goods and contract.  
The CISG may help to solve problems of this nature in Nigeria for SME’s, given that the bulk of 
the trade transactions are with countries that have adopted the CISG. Thus, the applicability of 
the seller’s law may because of private international law rules lead to the CISG, by virtue of 
ratification. Where Nigeria has adopted the CISG, the contracting parties would already be 
familiar with the Convention, thereby eliminating unfamiliarity of a foreign domestic law. Since 
even where Nigeria has not adopted the CISG, it may still apply by virtue of seller’s law, it is 
advisable that the CISG is adopted in any case because it would still apply to the Nigerian party. 
The CISG can act as a neutral law in this regard, ensuring familiarity of both parties with the 
governing law in this respect.  
The CISG can facilitate commerce in Nigeria by lifting barriers resulting from the complexities 
of different legal regimes because it creates a legal framework tailor made for international 
transactions, disregarding differences in the regulation of domestic transactions. This is 
particularly an important advantage for developing countries like Nigeria that have in the past 
two decades, doubled their share of global trade, and in spite of recession, ensured that their 
economies have remained fairly resilient.12 
In order to continue this growth, the World Bank has suggested that developing countries place 
more emphasis on internal productivity and enhancing policies13 since their growth especially the 
Sub-Saharan regions of Africa has remained robust.  
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An accommodative policy environment translates to legal certainty which is one of the aims of 
the CISG, whose adoption and application results in the reduction of legal risks, increase in the 
value of transactions and allows parties to make commitments with predictable consequences. 
This makes it easy for them to rely on each other and ensure more productive behaviour.14 
Through the adoption of the CISG, parties in Nigeria and their foreign counterparts have a 
default law which they can rely on for predictable consequences.  
It has been argued that certainty in transactions may result in an optimal level of risk greater than 
zero.15 Meaning that greater clarity in rules require the provision of more precise instructions to 
cover a greater number of contingencies which may lead to less desired outcomes such as 
avoidance. Thus, the CISG may become counterproductive for Nigerian parties who will most 
likely not want such details, particularly since in international trade, parties continually make 
trade-offs between flexibility and certainty, with business people seemingly preferring flexibility.16  
They eventually will avoid such excessively detailed requirements. 
This argument is flawed because there is a broad spectrum for defining precise rules and one end 
of that spectrum is infinite. This infinity exists because human cognition is limited and cannot 
allow a perfect foreseeability of all possible outcomes thus there would always be imprecise rules, 
no matter how precise a rule like the CISG is. Further, this point raises the question of balance. 
How, when or where exactly do we decide and measure the level of precision parties demand? 
How do we determine any, or which particular set of rules have attained that level of precision 
(that is if precise parameters have been set)? The argument seems nebulous since there are no 
tools to carry out such measurement for parties in Nigeria and thus no way of determining 
precision.  
Regarding the argument that parties do not generally prefer off the rack regimes, but only where 
they do not cramp the relationships they govern with excessively detailed requirements, since 
parties prefer flexibility to a large extent, it seems a particular strength, yet paradoxically, a 
weakness of the CISG is its flexibility. The Convention was drafted with the understanding that 
certain areas could not be compromised on and consequently was left for the determination of 
the national courts. But more importantly, the CISG respects party autonomy with provisions 
embodied in Articles 6 and 9, which can provide value and allows flexibility for Nigerian traders. 
These are appropriate tools for use in a commodity sales contract, especially when applied to 
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contracts that incorporate internationally recognised trade terms or standard usages into the 
contract.17 
Furthermore, the argument that parties may prefer flexibility is problematic because the level of 
flexibility is dependent on the jurisdiction and the level of development. The degree of flexibility 
for instance in the U.K or Germany, would not be the same degree of flexibility in Nigeria. This 
is for a number of reasons; from the disparity in quality of laws and institutions to the rule of law, 
in fact, the juridical system. Thus, it may not necessarily be the case, neither is it in the best 
interest for foreign traders seeking to trade in Nigeria to seek a high level of flexibility since they 
may prefer definition and rigidity in order to be able to predict the risks involved since the legal 
institutions are not strong enough. Conversely, it is not a particularly desirable option for the 
Nigerian businessman having unequal bargaining power with neither knowledge nor capacity, to 
pursue a breach of contracts in a foreign law or foreign jurisdiction, to seek flexibility. 
Other authors have questioned the reality of the effect the CISG has on legal certainty. Cuniberti 
suggests that the choice of law rules which applied prior to the advent of the CISG allowed for 
legal certainty in that parties could determine with precision the legal regime to govern their 
contract since all they needed to do was include the choice of law in their contract to that 
effect.18 As such, the fact that some of the interaction issues which the CISG claims to solve can 
be resolved by private ordering has led to the assertion that the abilities of such uniform laws are 
usually overstated.19 This overstatement is labelled the ‘globalisation of law’, which really means 
that since there are more international transactions, there is a greater need for uniformity. 20 
Leeman suggests that this does not follow as issues such as the economies of scale could decline 
with an increase in international transactions.21 
The arguments above assume that Nigerian sole traders and SME’s traders have equal bargaining 
power. Although this may be true in a few transactions, for most international trade agreements, 
the Nigerian trader is disadvantaged because of the unstructured credit system, out-dated laws 
and little or no existence of the rule of law, trends particular to most developing countries. This 
suggests they are in no position to demand laws favourable to both parties. Rather they accept 
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whatever law is thrust on them by the party with the stronger bargaining power. Foreign parties 
will not be willing to compromise on choice of law knowing the instabilities associated with trade 
in Nigeria. This is not the case for most developed countries, where parties agree on laws 
favourable to both of them because of the stability and sturdiness of the juridical system. And 
even the party with the stronger bargaining power is willing to compromise in order to advance 
the business.  
A further argument is that the legal certainty provided by the Convention, through default laws 
where parties have not chosen any laws is doubtful because the decision not to provide for a 
particular law by parties may be indication that parties are not sufficiently concerned with the 
issue of applicable law or legal certainty, making the CISG useless.22 There seems to be a broad 
generalisation which defeats this argument. It is assumed that parties normally choose to neglect 
the governing law clause because they do not sufficiently care about it. However, in Nigeria, the 
environment of trade and the calibre of traders, especially individual traders, are such that the 
majority of them are largely unaware of general contracting issues and procedures. And even 
where they are aware, because of the risk perceived by foreigners as being associated with the 
Nigerian trade environment, they are handicapped to negotiate on their own terms since their 
foreign counterparts demand that they buy goods on contracts signed on a ‘take it or leave it’ 
basis. Thus, Nigerian traders may care about the choice of law clause but circumstances handicap 
them from making a case for a particular law. 
A further issue is that the sole traders and SMEs in Nigeria tend to do away with legal formality 
and explicitness as they can be considered burdensome to contracts. For them, the trade 
transaction is more important and there is an eagerness to conclude the trade contract without 
conscientiousness. The CISG can serve as a safeguard in the event of breach and resultant 
dispute, where parties have hastily concluded their contracts. 
It has also been argued that since default conflict of law rules still exist, the same level of legal 
certainty provided by the CISG can still be achieved,23 thereby, obviating the need for CISG. It is 
not disputed that both forms of the unification, either of the private international law rules or of 
the substantive rules are valid. However, a more pertinent question is ‘which of the two 
approaches is to be preferred?’ 
                                                          





Despite the existence of these two choices for reducing divergences in trade with the choice of 
law rules, seeking to ‘establish rules regulating the conflict of laws, and the unification and 
harmonisation of laws which are more preventive provide a better option,24 it seems unification 
of laws which work to avert law conflicts25 and harmonisation of trade laws are more effective 
methods since they present a universally accepted regulation of a particular transaction. Whilst it 
is assured in the former that the same country’s rules will apply no matter the forum in which a 
dispute is brought, in the later it is assured that the same legal rules will be applicable no matter 
where the parties litigate.26  
Thus, the CISG is to be preferred in Nigeria as more superior and of a higher level, 27 because it 
is specific and its sphere of application is more limited, leading directly to a substantive solution. 
Whilst the private international law rules require the identification of the applicable law and the 
application itself.28  
For Nigerians, the CISG is to be preferred because whilst the unification of private international 
rules means that the laws of a particular country are applicable, thus providing an unfair 
advantage to lawyers from that jurisdiction, thereby depriving Nigerian lawyers of pecuniary 
benefits and participation in dispute resolution on a global level, the CISG by providing uniform 
substantive laws, applicable to all parties and in all jurisdictions where it has been adopted, 
ensures an equal distribution of the participation in cross border transactions and pecuniary 
benefits. Moreover, for the Nigerian trader, having the domestic laws of another country 
applicable to international trade transaction is still tantamount to the initial problematic situation 
where the unfamiliar domestic laws of another jurisdiction are imposed upon him.  
Despite the need for equal bargaining power, simplification of trade processes and rules for 
Nigerian traders, which the CISG may provide, its inability to provide a wider application to 
respond to special and local circumstances is an obstacle. This means that the CISG ought to 
cater to the needs of Nigeria as well as developed countries. The CISG garnered success because 
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it is based on the desire for unification by countries of their legal systems for political, racial, 
social or economic need.29  
The CISG however offers a wide application because although the countries involved in the 
drafting process of the CISG had different backgrounds, the level of participation during the 
drafting process is indicative of the desire to unify commercial law concepts. That Nigeria 
participated in this process is also suggestive that there is a desire for unification of commercial 
laws and secondly, the differences in the level of development by countries were significant in 
the drafting and outcome of the Convention.  
The rarity of harmonised conflict of laws could be because uniform laws are more useful. 
However, the CISG can also exist side by side and be complementary to harmonised conflict of 
laws.30 Thus, to the extent and limitation in scope of the application of the CISG, uniform PILs 
can supplement. 
ii. Reduce Transaction Costs 
The adoption of the CISG in Nigeria is justified because it employs a legal framework to set 
international standards, which supports economic transactions. For the Nigerian exporter, every 
transaction potentially raises the issues of a different legal regime, which means that transacting 
will especially be costly. The Convention can resolve interface problems of jurisdiction between 
the Nigerian party and his foreign counterpart. This is preferable to the option of having 
identical domestic rules. In Nigeria, there is a need to minimize contract drafting costs i.e. 
knowledge and problem solving costs.31 The CISG can reduce the costs of the Nigerian trader 
educating himself of the consequences of learning a new set of rules in a world of multiple legal 
systems and the transaction costs of bargaining over the applicable law, since the trader only has 
to familiarise himself with, the Nigerian 1893 SGA and the CISG. 
The costs of learning a new law are simply unaffordable in Nigeria because counsel must spend 
time acquainting himself with foreign laws on behalf of his client. The adoption of the CISG is 
justified because it would encourage fair competition.32 Fair competition here does not mean that 
lesser regulatory burden will give producers an unfair advantage in international trade, rather it 
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refers to the advantage gained by English lawyers over Nigerian lawyers because of the 
dominance of English laws in international trade transactions. Practically in Nigeria, as revealed 
by empirical evidence, English laws are dominant in contracts to be executed in Nigeria.33 This 
means that although the commercial legal practitioners in Nigeria draft the contracts, they have 
to consult the English lawyers to advise on certain issues. Providing this advice means that 
whatever the lawyer gets paid will be split with the English lawyer, if the client has a retainership 
with the firm. The client in this case will not pay for the extra legal services thus, amounting in 
reduction of profits. Secondly, in the event of dispute, resulting from the contract drafted by the 
Nigerian lawyer but governed by the English laws, the Nigerian lawyer is deprived of the 
experience of handling international trade cases, which widens his scope. The more important 
concern however is the deprivation of pecuniary benefits attached to the dispute resolution since 
English lawyers will have to be consulted.  
This unfair advantage over Nigerian lawyers’ distorts the conditions of competition. However, 
this may not solely be attributable to distortion but the fact that there is no existence of a level 
playing field and even where the Nigerian lawyer decides to learn the English law, a more ethical 
approach is the consultation of English counsel. The CISG can eliminate this cost by providing a 
neutral law, which does not favour any particular jurisdiction. Thus, lawyers across jurisdictions 
have a chance to compete fairly since they can acquaint themselves with, and have the same 
exposure to the CISG. Thus, the adoption of the Convention in Nigeria will ensure that lawyers 
both in Nigeria and the UK are on a level playing field.    
For these actors, the CISG a neutral and familiar law presents an effective solution. It produces a 
uniform legal language allowing parties to retrieve key information about any particular issue. 
The Nigerian businessman does not have to pay lawyers in different jurisdictions, the lawyer 
does not have to acquaint himself with new laws neither does he have to give up the opportunity 
at pecuniary benefits.   
To ensure continued economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, foreign investors will seek a 
standard legal language and method of categorising and interpreting legal rules which will result 
in reduction in legal knowledge costs. As an import-dependent economy, Nigeria’s trade is 
largely unbalanced.34 This one sided trade means that the Nigerian market is largely dependent 
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on foreign traders and their goods. With such high demand for foreign goods, foreign sellers 
may act opportunistically. A higher bargaining power demands favourable contract terms for at 
least one of the parties, which in most cases is not the Nigerian trader. This situation calls for a 
reassessment of the costs of business transactions for the Nigerian traders.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that SMEs and sole traders involved in the importation of goods in 
Nigeria are unsophisticated parties unaware of the implications of choice of governing law 
clauses and in cases where they are aware, it may not signify much. Parties also tend to 
undermine the importance of contractual provisions when conducting transaction and would 
exclude lawyers for fear of incurring costs. The CISG plays can play a vital role for Nigerian 
traders because its default rules will automatically apply where they neglect the governing law in 
their contracts. Furthermore, the CISG will save them the costs of going back and forth to 
lawyers, but they can simply rely on its provisions in repeated transactions.  
It has been argued that where the parties are unsophisticated, as may be the case in Nigeria, the 
lack of awareness and importance attributed to the governing law regime may lead to the 
assumption that its utility is purely regarding dispute resolution.35 Thus, Nigerian parties may not 
appreciate the default rules provided by the CISG which could void some other contractual 
provisions and also save the costs of negotiating contractual provisions to that effect. This may 
result in an incurrence of negotiation costs for already provided default rules contained in the 
CISG or in hasty negotiation of contracts. Thus any transaction costs will be ex post or the 
parties will end up applying a neutral law. The application of the CISG may end up voiding the 
negotiated clauses.  
Where the CISG is adopted in Nigeria, this situation can be remedied by spreading awareness of 
the Convention, its functions, utility and pitfalls to traders. Adequate knowledge and information 
of this potentiality and ways to avoid them is an imperative towards ensuring that the 
Convention enjoys a seamless application in Nigeria.  
In Nigeria, the sole traders and SMEs deal largely with manufactured goods. The CISG may help 
reduce ex post transaction costs in this regard. For instance, through the Convention’s 
provisions on examination of goods and giving notice of non-conformity, which provides that 
the buyer must examine the goods within as short a period as practicable in the circumstances 
and that the buyer has to give the seller notice of lack of conformity, specifying the nature of the 
non-conformity, within reasonable time after he discovers it, and in any event he must provide 
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the notice within a period of two years latest, otherwise, he loses his right to rely on the lack of 
conformity.36  
The provision of two years for the expiration of time to provide notice to the seller is particularly 
favourable to the Nigerian importer because it allows time for examination of the goods. This is 
significant considering the environmental, social and developmental factors which the trader has 
to contend with, such as corruption and bureaucracy at the custom’s port resulting in 
inefficiencies, delays, and theft, lack of steady electric power supply meaning that examination is 
not practicable where the ascertainment of conformity of goods is dependent on power supply 
and the scarcity of fuel hindering the timely transportation of the goods to their final destination.  
The drafting history of the CISG reveals that all these factors were put into consideration before 
designating two years.37Although leading drafters of the (ULIS), seemed to favour the stricter 
approach, because of the wider participation by other countries during the drafting of the CISG, 
modifications were made.38 The arguments and subsequent resolution of the section to reflect 
the case by case approach is indicative of the fact that the situation of developing countries was 
considered. 39 
Based on the drafting history of the CISG, it is clear that the Convention was drafted with 
consideration of the developing countries and may be especially favourable to the Nigerian 
trader, on whom the risk of non-conforming goods usually falls on. And because of the trade 
environment hampered by development issues, the flexibility of the Convention proves 
particularly helpful and safeguards the buyer from any opportunistic tendencies by the seller who 
may knowingly deliver non-conforming goods. 
5.2.1.2 Law Reform in Nigeria 
Transplantation of laws can be a tool for policymaking by governing powers or institutions to 
achieve legislative reforms through an examination of the best possible options. Increased 
communication and competition may sometimes lead towards uniformity—of culture, of policies, 
and of laws. Thus although Nigeria participates in this globalisation trend, through evolving 
culture and laws, Nigerian laws which ought to regulate newly opened borders are not global in 
nature. The CISG can provide a better alternative to the existing rules in Nigeria. This is one of 
the normative components of harmonisation, that the laws of one society should be conformed 
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to a better standard.40 Although in some countries this may not always be the case, for instance, 
where the local laws are constantly being updated to reflect modern trends in international trade, 
reflective of the global convergence of laws, the opening up of markets and globalisation. 
However, in Nigeria the process of law reform is slow which obstructs the rule of law and is 
deleterious to international trade. Given this, Nigeria stands to benefit from the CISG because it 
may improve the status quo through some social goal by enhancing economic welfare.41  
In Nigeria, investors are suspicious of the trade environment because of prevalent juridical and 
judicial instabilities, out-dated laws and the unsuitability of such laws to the needs of modern day 
economy. This constitutes major hindrances in economic development and growth. Given this, 
empirical studies show that there are correlations between development and institutional 
qualities.42 The current growth in Nigeria and the potential for continued growth rests on her 
seeking improvements in the overall policy environment through strengthening of the rule of law, 
reductions in corruptions and declines in regulatory obstructions to business activities.43  
Currently in Nigeria, the law governing international sale of the goods is the 1893 SGA, which is 
over a hundred years old. This is the law that Nigerian traders and foreign investors have to use 
in any dispute. Empirical research shows that the SGA is not frequently used by the traders, 
commercial lawyers and foreign investors. And where it is applied, it is more out of obligation 
than choice.44 English laws are more commonly applied by traders.45 
International investors and traders are wary of the trade system and framework in Nigeria, 
including the SGA and the untrusted credit system. Confirming this, one of the interviewees 
stated  
the credit system in Nigeria is not very well developed. So you would 
find that for the Ibo man who is bringing in containers from foreign 
countries, most times you would find that it’s a cash and carry 
transaction. Most foreign countries will not give goods to a Nigerian 
trader because then you have a situation where the man says I want to 
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buy, the foreigner says how much it is and the Nigerian party transfers 
the money in full irrespective of the knowledge of the fact that wrong 
goods may be sent or contract may be breached.46 
This is the typical situation for SMEs, considered the backbone of a modern and balanced 
economy. In Nigeria, there is the need to encourage SMEs with limited financial and human 
resources, who find themselves as the weaker bargaining parties in international trade agreements, 
by simplifying the issue of choice of law applicable. It is also important to reduce the 
dependency on English laws in trade, in order to ensure that Nigerian lawyers have a fair share 
of handling contractual disputes. This can be achieved with the CISG which reflects accepted 
global practices.  
The lack of updated laws and the trade environment puts the Nigerian buyer at a disadvantage. 
He is importing on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis and even where he has an option to negotiate, an 
out-dated domestic law is hardly desirable.  
Generally, law reform is measured because of the need for careful preparation, meticulous 
planning and effective execution. However, the pace of law reform in Nigeria is in certain cases 
non-existent.47 This lethargy is evident in Nigeria given that the bill for the reform of the SGA 
has been in the house of assembly for almost 2 years. 48  It is uncertain when this bill will 
eventually become law. Understandably, there are several constraints49 to law reform in Nigeria 
resulting in dormancy of Bills. This is not only a result of the military regime because post that 
era, there still remains a ‘deliberate indifference or absolute lack of commitment and political 
machinations on the part of the political class in the area of law reforms’.50 The CISG whilst 
capable of governing international trade transactions, can serve as a model law for the reform of 
the SGA, or the enactment of a new law in sales of goods. It can also serve as an interim law for 
international trade transactions especially where the Nigerian party is the stronger party and 
demands his local law. This in any event will not prejudice the foreign party since it is a neutral 
law.  
                                                          
46 Interview with Mr Uwa, Partner, Streamsowers & Kohn Law Firm (Lagos, Nigeria July 2013). 
47 For a paper on the reasons for the slow process of law reform in developing countries see Daniel and Trebilcock 
(n 42). 
48 Onwuka Nzeshi, ‘House Moves to Repeal 120-year-old Law’ (This Day Live, Abuja 9 May 2013) 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/house-moves-to-repeal-120-year-old-law/147089/ accessed 13 January 2015.  
49 Dahiru Musdapher, ‘Law Reform in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities’ (lecture at Federal University Dutse, 
Jigawa State, Nigeria 20th May 2014) http://fud.edu.ng/sites/default/files/media-





Calls have been made by legal practitioners and academics in Nigeria for the reform of the Act.51 
The status and attitude of legal practitioners towards the SGL Lagos State, which is equivalent to 
the SGA 1893, was reported in a consultation paper. The findings reflected a general lack of 
awareness of the relevance of the SGL.52 Only 16% of the respondents had litigated in this area 
whilst the remaining 84% had not.53 The respondents suggested that the comatose state of law 
played a significant role.54 
Concepts in the Act which have been suggested for reform include the Market Overt 
Exception, 55  the definition of goods, 56  the inconsistency in the provisions dealing with the 
examination and acceptance of goods,57 rejection for delivery of wrong quantity.58 The CISG can 
act as a guide for reforming the SGA to include provisions suitable for international trade thus, 
saving time and costly experimentation. 
The factors inhibiting law reform in developing countries such as Nigeria, were considered, albeit 
on a broader scale when drafting the CISG. It draws from an international pool of legal talent 
increasing the level of expertise and considerations in solving any issues. Additionally, the 
systematic study of the experience of different legal systems provide law reformers with more 
and better data for drawing conclusions about which rules work best.59 For Nigeria, there are 
principles which can be drawn from the CISG at least when considering reform of sale of goods 
and contract laws such as the Nachfrist Notice, a concept which allows for an extension of time 
for the parties to a commercial contract to fulfil their obligations. By providing additional 
latitude and protection to the debtor contracting party, it seeks to optimise the fulfilment of 
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contractual obligations. This provision is capable of improving the Nigerian business 
environment where it is adapted in the reform of the local sales law. 
Although the Nigerian reform agencies can easily access the wide pool of talents accessible to the 
CISG, it has particularities. There are disparities between the socialist and African countries that 
have to grapple with colonial laws and its effects, whilst their developed counterparts do not. In 
Nigeria, law reform is hindered by certain factors such as embezzlement of funds allocated to 
reform initiatives, corruption, minimal or barely existent rule of law, political instability and civil 
unrest. Furthermore, commercial law reforms in developing countries take the backburner in the 
agenda of bodies such as the UN, because of the lack of fund by both the UN and the 
developing countries.60 
Since the UNCITRAL cannot offer law reform initiatives to Nigeria at no cost, because of other 
priorities, it means that Nigeria must seek out and pay for whatever reform and expertise is 
needed in the commercial sector. This will hardly be possible where there are other priorities.  
If it were as easy to carry out reforms it should have already been done in countries like Nigeria. 
A substantial number of the laws transplanted into the institutions have been reported as 
unsuited or discredited transplants.61 It seems intuitive to test the suitability of the CISG, whose 
incongruity with local laws is known, and even if unknown, the effects can be avoided by 
reservations and outright exclusion of the law by parties, than to riskily invest in the search for a 
suitable transplant and reform of laws, whose effects and costs to local circumstances are 
unknown, and where they fail, will leave Nigeria poorer and without any immediate remedies. 
The above reasons are further strengthened by the fact that the CISG exemplifies rules of 
convenience and responds to rational rather than emotional desires and has more potential for 
success. This makes adoption of the CISG in Nigeria justified since the Convention represents 
commercial law which does not have any emotional ties to the Nigerian people but is based on 
reason and intellect of simplifying trade transactions which may eventually encourage economic 
growth. Emphasising the lack of emotion to trade laws in Nigeria is the fact that the applicable 
trade law is the 1893 SGA, which continues to apply to modern commercial transaction, despite 
not being tailored to Nigerian local market or situation. 
Trade law reform based on uniform global standards is important in order to promote 
sustainable economic and social development in Nigeria, making it needful to reform the 1893 
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SGA to reflect more current practices in trade. As a cost saving transplant, the CISG is an ideal 
model for law reform in Nigeria. This has been proved in different national and regional spheres. 
This is the ideal time for adopting the CISG because the SGA is presently with the legislature 
and has been proposed for law reform. The CISG can serve as one of the laws which will 
influence the reform of the SGA. This function of the CISG is evidenced in the reform of 
domestic laws in other states where it has been ratified. These developments and reform of 
domestic laws has been through various channels. 
5.3 Transplanting the CISG into Nigeria 
5.3.1 The CISG as a Legal Transplant in Nigeria  
 
The CISG will operate in different capacities as a legal transplant in Nigeria. As a ready-made 
model, it will function as a cost saving transplant because of Nigeria’s need to restructure and 
develop the international trade environment and legal framework in Nigeria, particularly given 
the current plans to reform the 1893 SGA. Thus, there is a motivation for Nigeria to adopt the 
CISG because it will save time and costly experimentation, which is a natural path for drafters,  
who should begin not by exerting energy in thinking through solutions but by examining external 
solutions, eliminating the time and stress of innovating.  
The CISG already works as a model for international trade, blending the civil and common law 
concepts and balancing the needs of developing and developed countries. Given this, the 
adoption of the CISG becomes a matter of practical utility in that it is economically efficient for 
Nigeria and the lawmakers. This invariably increases its chances of receptivity.  
The motivation by Nigeria to adopt the CISG as a cost saving transplant, is supported by the 
legal evolution theory. 62  Legal systems will over time choose the most efficient rules and 
institutions from a selection of solution found in different national systems. 63  Therefore, 
adopting the CISG in Nigeria is an efficient endeavour because it is a blend of the most efficient 
laws regulating international trade.  
The CISG as a cost saving transplant involves some element of functionalism, in that a 
consideration of the extent to which the CISG may be adapted to perform its functions, i.e. 
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achieve its stated objectives in Nigeria, and the extent of fit with the Nigerian system reveals that 
it can easily be adapted to Nigeria’s needs because of globalisation and convergence of legal 
systems resulting in fading state borders. This means that the CISG is the ideal model for law 
reform in Nigeria especially towards achieving a standardised international legal framework.   
The level of assistance that the cost saving transplant may offer a system’s development raises 
issues. There is a contest between the autonomous nature of law, making them propositional 
statements,64 and laws hinged on the social and political context of a particular society.65 The 
CISG is a common framework meant to govern trade on the international level and is suited to 
the international community as a neutral framework, preferable to any domestic law, which 
invariably leaves one party in the transaction weaker. Given this, it is better to adopt the CISG 
when functionalism indicates it appropriate for Nigeria. However, the motive of transplant 
which is a result of bricolage and functionalism saves the resources that otherwise would need to 
be spent developing rules autochthonously.66 This is representative of what adopting the CISG in 
Nigeria would be since it would not singularly be for cost saving reasons. In fact, the primary 
reason for the CISG in Nigeria is its functionalism that is, providing an improved regulatory 
framework for international trade transactions in Nigeria. The cost saving benefit of the CISG in 
Nigeria therefore becomes peripheral to regulating international trade transactions. This precedes 
the intention to reform the 1893 SGA, which is complementary. 
The functionalism of the CISG however does stop its allure as a cost saving transplant. 
Moreover, costs saving transplants do not exist as purely that,67 meaning that the CISG is not 
adoptable in Nigeria solely on the basis that it will save costs.   
The CISG can also function in Nigeria as an externally dictated transplant. Such transplants are 
more pervasive in developing countries because they involve foreign individuals, entities or 
governments who dictate (suggest) to recipient countries, the adoption of certain rules or model 
laws as the basis for carrying on business or for allowing the dominated country a measure of 
autonomy. Such transplants may be driven by the desire to please foreign states, individuals or 
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entities. This can either be simply to acquiesce to their demands or to take advantage of the 
benefits and enticements offered.68 
Although the CISG is an externally dictated transplant, the above motives are not applicable in 
Nigeria because adopting the Convention is not simply to acquiesce to the demand of the UN, 
Nigeria’s trading partners or any government. There is no pressure from the UN, and evidence 
from the empirical research both from the Nigerian Ministry of Trade –Department of Bilateral 
Trade and Investment, the Ministry of Justice-DICL, Legal Practitioners in Nigeria reveal a lack 
of awareness of the CISG. This is corroborated by the UNCITRAL representative who stated 
regarding the UNCITRAL’s priorities, ‘that there was nothing currently being done to promote 
awareness of the CISG in Nigeria’.69 Therefore, adopting the CISG is not to please the UN, 
neither is there any pressure by the foreign governments and Nigerian’s key trading partners such 
as China and the US, despite their own ratification of the CISG. The CISG is to be adopted on 
its merit and usefulness in Nigeria. Thus, although the CISG can be an externally dictated 
transplant because it emanates from the UN, an external entity, its beneficiaries are sole traders 
and SMESs in Nigeria with limited financial and human resources to negotiate contracts. The 
CISG is important given their weaker bargaining status and the Convention’s ability to promote 
seamless and fair trade. 
It has been suggested that commercial laws such as the CISG are essentially externally dictated 
transplants because of the limited participation of developing countries in the drafting process 
and their need to eliminate trade barriers and encourage investments.70 This argument is valid 
because an important criterion for the ratification of uniform laws by developing countries is 
their level of participation in drafting them.  
The failure of acceptance of the ULIS and the ULF, predecessors of the CISG, by countries 
demonstrates this. However, Nigeria participated in the drafting of the CISG, despite the sparse 
participation by African countries. The nature of the CISG as an amalgamation of civil and 
common law system concepts makes it a neutral law that does not cater expressly to any 
particular legal system. Given that Nigeria is a common law country, it is already familiar with at 
least half of the concepts and principles. Furthermore, the substantive aspects international 
commercial laws are a product of the lex mercatoria which is recognised by traders irrespective of 
their legal system or culture.  
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The CISG can also function as an entrepreneurial transplant in Nigeria because its success would 
be dependent upon the willingness of the exporter to provide the capital, and an importer 
interested in the import. Thus, actors are led by their expectations of gain domestically, by 
operating internationally.71 International strategies ‘is the way foreign actors seek to use foreign 
capital such as resources, degrees, contacts, legitimacy and expertises, to build their power at 
home’. 72  The actors responsible for this type of legal transplant are ‘norm entrepreneurs’, 
individuals and groups who leverage on international norms to strengthen their position.73 The 
advocacy of the CISG by law firms, traders or academics in Nigeria makes it an entrepreneurial 
transplant. This also happens where individuals who travel abroad to study a particular area of 
law come home with foreign degrees in the area, establish a law firm or an NGO in the relevant 
field, and then work with legislators to get a law passed, modelled on the statute that was the 
subject of the study abroad’.74 
It is suggested that the assessment of the benefits of the CISG in Nigeria, in this thesis is an 
example, because of the author’s belief that the Convention can be useful for trade in Nigeria.  
Further reasons for this form of transplant in Nigeria abound. For the commercial lawyers 
representing traders, the CISG will ensure more economic benefits by giving them a chance to 
compete on the same level playing field as English lawyers. Thus, they have a duty to advocate 
for the CISG, making them norm entrepreneurs. For the Nigerian traders the CISG can provide 
them with the opportunity for equal bargaining power. Thus, they can also act as impellers of the 
CISG. There are also incentives for the legal academia, who will benefit from an exposure to an 
international law and the participation with the international community on international 
commercial law matters, able to bestow knowledge upon budding lawyers. 
Admittedly, there is the potential for abuse by individuals or law firms who encourage the 
adoption of the CISG. Although this is warned against, the nature of the CISG suggests that 
acquisition of expertise in that regard is available for anybody interested, through the global 
jurisconsultorium and the readily available resources online.   
The CISG can also function as a legitimacy generating transplant in Nigeria. As the most 
commonly offered explanations for transplantation, they are usually alluring for recipient 
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countries and borne out of the desire to appropriate the works of others. For these countries, the 
laws are usually prestigious.75 Despite the elusiveness of a definition of prestige, it is an important 
consideration when transplanting laws.76 For the recipients, the law may be perceived as efficient 
and globally important thus, informing the transplantation. 77  The CISG as a prestigious 
framework is desirable for Nigeria.  
Prestige is really the examination of the process where less developed economies opt for laws of 
developed economies, based on the economically efficient rule, as opposed to the view that 
transplants based on prestige are largely empty ideas.78 Thus, that prestige comes from efficiency 
and as a result of the free flow of information and limited legal parochialism, there is the 
replacement of more efficient legal doctrines for inefficient ones.79 The CISG qualifies as a 
prestigious and consequently a legitimacy generating transplant because it will be economically 
efficient by saving transaction costs in international trade in Nigeria.   
While it is plausible that there is a link between prestige and efficiency, it is not supported by 
empirical evidence or an explanation of the process to the importation of a particular model.80 
Nigeria’s adoption of the CISG can be economically efficient, exemplifying a cost saving 
transplant since a home grown approach is not necessary because of the fear of costs and labour 
involved.  
Although prestige is not ‘relevant where there is a true free flow of information and no barriers 
to the adoption of the most efficient practice possible, since presumably the legislators and the 
public will simply weigh all the technical alternatives open to them and select the most 
efficient.’81 It is however, the many barriers to an efficient market that make prestige relevant. As 
Miller suggests, it is as likely that a model acquires prestige because of its perceived success as 
because of its true economic advantages.82 
Though it is possible that this might be the case, it is not only barriers that make prestige relevant. 
Countries seeking efficiency in adopting a model for transplant have a wide variety of foreign 
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laws to choose from. However, they may be willing to take the most prestigious of all their 
options, which in most cases will be a popular US law. This is in spite of a plethora of other laws 
on the same topic. Furthermore, whether or not there are barriers to an efficient market, prestige 
stands as an independent decision when developing countries make their decision. The model of 
the US is likely to be chosen, at least by developing countries, despite other options because of 
its popularity and prestige. This does not mean other laws are inefficient. The choices made by 
developing countries with regards to transplants may be indicative of the hegemony of the US 
laws, consequently making it prestigious. This resonates with Watson’s argument for prestige as a 
source of authority and therefore more of a determinant in choosing models for legal transplants 
than either the cost saving, entrepreneurial and externally dictated transplants.83 
Miller suggests three types of legitimate domination, which explain that authority does not rest 
on force alone. The one most commonly linked to the rule of law is the ‘rational’ ground of 
legitimate domination, based on the ‘belief in the legality of enacted rules and the rights of those 
elevated to authority under those rules to issue commands’.84 Amongst the three, a modern state 
founded on rule of law has a strong element of rational authority, which may derive from written 
legal norms. However, for these written legal norms to have any rational authority, the 
foundation of that society must be moored on the rule of law. This however is an unrealistic 
expectation of a typically developing country, with little or no reason to place faith on the rule of 
law. In a bid for the government officials to assert control, they desperately source for foreign 
models to provide that missing authority. This need for a source of legitimacy from a foreign 
model ascribes to that model such a superior status that it may be seen as a talisman. In such 
situations the model may apply in the developing country even where there is little or no link to 
the local substantive needs.85 
The above suggests that the CISG is more of a legitimacy generating transplant but with some 
caveats. Although Nigeria as a developing country may have issues with respect to the rule of law, 
Miller’s conclusion is not necessarily applicable in this context. There is the need for a rational 
authority when looking for the best international sales law model for Nigeria, the CISG provides 
such model. It provides the most efficient law in international trade because of its neutrality, 
eliminating the option of a party’s domestic law, and more importantly because it is the only 
unified substantive law governing international trade. Thus, faced with a broad scope of options 
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of foreign models for governing international trade in Nigeria, CISG is the most preferred 
option. Other options such as model laws like UNIDROIT Principles of INCOTERMS are soft 
laws and usually are complementary to the CISG. They were not designed to be part of the 
domestic laws but can only serve as model laws. 
Furthermore, since Nigeria is a developing country, the CISG provides rational grounds of 
legitimate domination because of the legality of the substantive rules which it provides and 
because the UN is viewed by most nations as intrinsically possessing the rights and authority to 
issue such command. Thus, where measured against Weber’s theory on rational grounds for 
legitimate domination, the CISG in Nigeria aligns itself accordingly, because its rules are efficient 
for international trade and unless where expressly excluded, the Convention will take precedence 
over any domestic law in any international trade transaction in Nigeria. 
The advantages of choosing the CISG as foreign model to govern international trade law in 
Nigeria abound. With the 1893 SGA governing international trade, and considering that it is 
hardly ever the applicable law because of its out datedness, what is needed is the CISG to govern 
international trade in Nigeria, whilst serving as a model for local law reform.  
The hegemonic nature of American laws is unattractive for developing countries such as Nigeria, 
intent on preserving their sovereignty. The CISG is also to be preferred to the English SGA 
1979, given that the current laws governing sales of goods in Nigeria and international trade 
transactions in the rarest cases, is really an outdated version of this Act and brought through 
colonialism. The CISG presents a better alternative because its provisions are drawn from two 
known legal systems, yet it maintains its neutrality making it appealing for Nigeria as a 
developing country.  
Moreover, adopting the CISG in Nigeria is not a forced or desperate measure by the Nigerian 
government since there is no need to prove any authority in the area of international trade, but 
simply because there is a need for a functional, modern, fair and efficient framework, an essential 
element of a business enabling environment, capable of contributing significantly to good 
governance and the rule of law. As a law from the UN, even if the institutions to administer it 
are weak, it is more likely to be respected and interpreted normatively in order to project a good 
image of Nigeria.  
Certain unique characteristics have been typically allotted to legitimacy generating transplants. 
However, these characteristics do not apply to all legal transplants in this category because of the 




the tendency for model critiques to skirt around where there are debates regarding the specific 
content of the model focusing rather on the importance of the model.86 However, because of the 
CISG’s ability to reduce transaction costs, there is no need to focus on importance rather than 
content. Moreover, this only arises where there are questions on the viability of the content, so 
this situation is not a given. It is however important that the CISG undergoes an examination of 
its contents to justify its efficiency in Nigeria.  
Another characteristic is the acceptance of the model by persons with opposing political interests 
even where the model does not particularly support their substantive goals, because there is a 
higher goal. There should hardly be any opposition to the CISG in Nigeria because of its subject 
matter commercial law.  
Finally, there is the willingness to surrender future autonomy to the model without any need for 
local adaptation since it is assumed that the model will produce good results. Flowing from this 
is the unacceptability or inability of the local institutions to interpret the model for fear of 
corruption. Thus, incorporating the future interpretation of foreign institutions is considered 
appropriate since these domestic institutions can only enjoy adjunct authority.87 Although the 
adoption of CISG into Nigeria requires some surrender of autonomy, this is not compulsory for 
the parties. Countries can fully or partially opt out of the CISG, but for parties wishing to use the 
Convention, they still have the autonomy to choose any laws to govern the transaction. The 
power of interpretation of the CISG falls to the Nigerian judiciary, as shown by other countries 
that have adopted it. There is the freedom to interpret the Convention in the local courts, albeit 
in a purposive manner.  
Transplanting the CISG into Nigeria is voluntary and a downward type of diffusion from the 
international sphere to the State. There is no doubt that the justifications for the types of 
transplants are embodied in the CISG and therefore makes its adoption worthwhile in Nigeria. It 
will save costs and time of the law reformers, it will promote trade because the legality of its 
substantive rules come from the prestige of the UN as possessing rights and authority to issue 
such laws. 






5.3.2 Legal Frameworks for International Trade Law in Nigeria 
5.3.2.1 Current Legal Framework Governing International Trade in 
Nigeria 
 
The legal framework governing international trade in Nigeria draws from a range of sources.  
Since the Nigerian legal system is largely based on the English common law and legal tradition, 
there is substantial similarity between Nigerian and English laws and in certain areas it is an exact 
replication of the English law. There are also Nigerian statutes and case laws, although a majority 
of the principles are based on the English laws and cases. For international trade and commercial 
law, the current sources are; 
a. English Law and Statute 
Before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, various acts of the British parliament were applicable in 
Nigeria. This was received through local legislation such as Section 45(1) of the Interpretation 
Act which enables the application of the English Common Law and Equity as well as the 
Statutes of General Application (SOGA) in force in England on 1st of January 1900, in Nigeria 
with the exception of the former Western States.88 Section 3 upholds the application of the 
Common law and Equity principles whilst section 4 states ‘subject to the provisions of this law, 
no imperial Act hitherto in force within the state shall have any force or effect therein. The effect 
of these provisions is that English Statutes dealing with matters which fall within the competency 
of the states will not be applicable. 
These provisions give legitimacy to the core statute governing international trade in Nigeria, the 
English SGA 1893. 89  Although Section 4 of the Application Law above stipulates that no 
imperial Act shall have any force within the designated States where the matters to be governed 
fall within the competence of the States, this is mere formality because although the States have 
enacted their own Sales of Goods Law, they are exact replications of the 1893 SGA. 
b. Nigerian Statutes/Legislation 
Nigerian legislation also governs international law. The validity of laws made by the National and 
State houses of Assembly is derived by the provision of Section 4 of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution which gives the legislature power to make laws on matters in the exclusive 
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legislative list and certain matters in the concurrent list. Thus they are empowered to enact laws 
in specific commercial law areas such as Banking, Taxation, Bills of Exchange, Currency 
Incorporation and Stamp Duties.90  
The Nigerian legislation renders any law from any other source null and void to the extent of its 
inconsistency with the provisions of the legislation. This is supported by section 1(3) of the 
Constitution, which establishes the supremacy of the Constitution.91 This implies that where the 
CISG is ratified, it must become part of the Nigerian law. Thus, laws inconsistent with the 
domesticated Convention will be rendered null and void. This provision gives legitimacy and 
validation to international laws which have gone through the proper process of ratification and 
become part of the Nigerian legislation. Consequently, where the CISG is ratified, it adopts such 
status. 
Within the Nigerian statutes, the primary law governing international trade in Nigeria is the 1893 
SGA, which became operational through the SOGA. 
c. Judicial Precedent/Case Laws  
Commercial law in Nigeria also derives from case laws and precedents. Precedents from English 
statutes and case laws applied to Nigerian cases have created a body of legal principles 
recognised as binding in the Nigerian commercial jurisprudence. However, precedent as a source 
of law for international trade in Nigeria is problematic because the cases on which the principles 
are drawn from are out-dated and based on out-dated laws, such as the 1893 SGA. However, 
case laws as binding precedent in commercial law in the Nigerian jurisprudence is significant 
because a vital part of achieving the uniformity goals of the CISG is by interpreters drawing 
upon the decisions of other courts in the application of the Convention to build harmony and 
consensus resulting in certainty in international trade. 
5.3.2.2 Alternative Framework for International Trade in Nigeria  
An alternative framework which may govern international trade in Nigeria is Book 5 of the 
Uniform Act Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA).92  
i. A General Overview of the OHADA 
The OHADA seeks to address the needs of the individual foreign traders and investors who 
otherwise will be subject to national laws which they are not familiar with, and which because of 
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their domestic nature are not tailored to deal with cross border transactions.93 The OHADA was 
birthed following a failed project, through the efforts of the French Ministry of Cooperation in 
the early 1990s.94 It was signed in Port Luis, Mauritius by fourteen states on the 19 October 1993, 
upon the presentation of the treaty by a working group. However, it came into force in July 
1995,95 with the aim of fostering economic development of its member states through up to date 
business laws. OHADA seeks to create a contemporary business law and reinforce legal certainty 
in order to facilitate business in the member states and within the region, improving business 
environment and attracting more foreign investment.96 In light of these aims, it seeks to provide 
a framework such as the CISG and may be considered suitable for international trade. 97 
Although the OHADA is a grouping of countries, it serves as a treaty concluded between them 
and an international organisation established by the treaty to perform specific tasks.98 
i. Compatibility with the Nigerian Legal System 
The dichotomy between common and civil legal systems raises issues regarding the OHADA as 
the best framework to govern international trade for Anglophone countries like Nigeria and 
Ghana. This has raised scepticism amongst common law practitioners regarding the ambitious 
aim of the OHADA’s Uniform Act. 
Despite occupying the same geographic region, the laws in each African country differ because 
of the legal stratification in the continent. Besides the colonial laws which heavily influence the 
current laws, the customary laws applied in Africa prior to colonisation still feature. Additionally, 
the era following independence brought about the importation of different systems.  
The OHADA laws ‘retain the strong French flavour of their predecessors.’99 This distinction 
matters, considering that the Nigerian legal tradition is distinct from the civil law tradition. Firstly, 
with regards to the civil law system characterised by codes and other statutes containing 
extensive legal provision, there is a tendency for civil lawyers to depend more on the codes and 
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statutes. This interpretational style of the OHADA users differs from that of the common legal 
systems, who will seek judge made precedent and the overall interpretation of the text.100 This 
will invariably create a distorted interpretation of the OHADA laws. Since the OHADA is a 
system with a set of laws preponderantly based on civil laws and tradition, the Nigerian 
interpreter will struggle much more significantly than the user from civil jurisdiction. In this 
regard, the CISG is a better alternative for Nigeria, because it incorporates both civil and 
common law concepts adopted by both civil and common law countries, thereby creating a 
substantial body of uniform interpretation that allows equality for users from both civil and 
common law countries. Moreover it deals with only one area of law and can be opted out of. 
There is also the question of which of the two legal regimes best promote economic growth and 
political liberalisation. Literature suggests that common law regimes outperform their civil 
counterparts. 101  In other words, legal families with investor friendlier laws have stronger 
enforcement regimes. The implication is that the French laws are less protective of property 
rights. This is because of the history of civil legal systems the Napoleonic codes were very 
detailed in their design, removing all discretion from the judges.102 For developed countries that 
do not protect property rights, this may be counteracted by a well-developed legal profession 
that could create space for a protection of property rights through contractual provisions, and 
protection against abuse of power by the executive through use of all remedial tools.103 However, 
these measures are not available for developing countries because of their legal infrastructure, 
developing legal profession that can hardly provide protection and the relatively weak judiciary 
inherited from the French legal system, who in all cannot challenge the executive’s interference 
in the market.104 On this basis, common law systems focused on protecting property, irrespective 
of the level of development are considered better suited to support capitalist impulses both in 
developed and developing countries. 105    
From the above, the OHADA which is based on the French system may be unsuitable for 
Nigeria based on its legal infrastructure as a developing country, since the already existent 
common law is more flexible and this flexibility is significant in the level of economic output of 
any country. Based on this, the CISG is a better alternative to the OHADA for Nigeria.   
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Another constraint of the OHADA is the principle set out in Article 10 of the Treaty and its 
confliction with sovereignty. State sovereignty means that states have ultimate and independent 
authority to govern themselves and those within their territory. The state has the authority to 
govern the supremacy of the governing authority, the independence of the governing authority 
and the territoriality of the governing authority. Article 10 of the OHADA Treaty106 implies that 
the OHADA Uniform Acts automatically and directly repeal all existing legislation and supersede 
any future legislation on the same subject matter. The OHADA structure also renders the 
supreme courts in the ratifying countries inutile, causing member states to renounce their 
legislative and judicial sovereignty.107  
Undoubtedly restriction of sovereignty is one of the attendant problems of uniform laws. Any 
effective international law necessarily impinges on the state sovereignty.108 This is because in 
order to enjoy the protection and rights which international or uniform laws offer, states must be 
willing to relinquish sovereignty through domestic legislation. However, there are still concerns 
where international law infringes on domestic sovereign authority.109 These concerns stem from 
the premise that a state ought to have unrestricted authority to make the laws which govern its 
citizen. Considering this, Article 10 of the OHADA removes all State rights to legislate on their 
own laws by subsuming them into laws already legislated on by OHADA. As a result of 
compromise, member States are mandated to apply the Uniform Acts.  
Article 10 presents interpretational problems because the extent to which the national laws are 
abrogated by virtue of the Uniform Acts is not stated. This may mean that only national laws, or 
the individual provisions of these national laws contrary to the Uniform Act, should be 
considered abrogated.110 However, Mator suggests this is a complicated approach because it 
‘requires an analysis of which provisions of the national law are contrary to a Uniform Act and 
which are not.’111 Furthermore, it suggests interpreting Article 10 as meaning that a Uniform Act 
abrogates any national law having the same subject matter. This would obviate the need to carry 
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out a detailed inspection of national laws since the national law would automatically disappear 
upon the entry into force of the Uniform Act.112 
Although the latter interpretation allows efficiency and simplicity in the application of Uniform 
Acts in each Member State and to achieve full harmonisation,113 however, the wordings of the 
Treaty suggest the first interpretation.114 
Irrespective of the interpretation taken, that individual provisions of the national laws having the 
same subject matter should be considered abrogated, the effect of joining the OHADA, it is an 
unnecessary loss of sovereignty. Opting for the OHADA means that Nigeria would forgo all her 
rights to legislate on her business laws. Further, issues dealt with by the Uniform Acts, in most 
cases would have been covered by Nigerian legislation. Regarding commercial and international 
laws, there is the SGA, the Hire Purchase Act and the Companies and Allied Matters Act115. 
These laws are already familiar to Nigerians. Particularly, CAMA was drafted to suit the business 
needs of Nigeria. Joining the OHADA nullifies the provisions of the domestic laws. The CISG 
provides a better alternative because it deals specifically with international trade law, and can 
coexist alongside with the SGA.  
The fact that the OHADA Uniform Acts deals with a broad spectrum of laws may also 
encourage legislative lethargy in Nigeria, since the legislature would become dependent on the 
OHADA for legislating laws affecting Nigeria. Thus, minimum efforts would be devoted 
towards ensuring careful consideration of the provisions of future OHADA Acts at the drafting 
forums. Furthermore, there will be reduced exposure to, and knowledge of global trends by 
Nigeria, a particular problem for African countries, already struggling to meet up with global 
legal standards and generally known for indifference towards law reform.  
Although the OHADA may be of help to member countries that may not have contemplated 
reform in the nearest future,116 it is not the best for Nigeria because it abrogates local laws 
contrary to its provisions. And, law reforms on a national level should aim to reflect the best 
possible laws for Nigeria, suited to modern business. Where international business laws are to be 
adopted, they should work complementarily with the domestic laws not to render any domestic 
provisions void.  
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The Uniform Act becomes a part of OHADA only after examination by the Council of 
Ministers of Justice and Finance and recommendation of the CCJA, which is upon agreement 
where at least two-thirds of the member states are represented, and by a unanimous vote. This 
implies that member states have the power to veto any proposed legislation by having their 
ministers present at the meeting and casting a negative vote in Council. This raises questions 
about the position of the minority member states who disagree with a particular law.117 If Nigeria 
subscribes to the OHADA, she may be the part of the minority during the draft stages of laws 
incongruent with her socio economic realities.118 As part of the minority, Nigeria’s choice for 
certain concepts suited to her local circumstances may be rejected, putting her in a disadvantaged 
position. In this regard, the CISG is a better alternative because it presents an option to opt out. 
Another issue with the OHADA is language problems. The first draft of Article 42 of the 
OHADA Treaty provided that French was the working language of the organisation, this was 
one of the biggest obstacles especially because of its economic integration objective, which is not 
limited to the francophone countries, and French is not the only language of Africa. This was a 
deterrent to non-French speaking countries.  
However, the OHADA Treaty was revised in 2008 incorporating French, English, Spanish and 
Portuguese as the working language.119 This is however still problematic for a number of reasons. 
Practically all the Uniform Acts and the treaty already drafted in French and the ones yet to be, 
must be drafted and redrafted, or translated into each of the recognised languages of the member 
states to promote the principle of linguistic equality. Since the OHADA laws oust the current 
national and future laws contrary to it, citizens of member states must be able to comprehend it 
in their own language. However, in promoting this linguistic equality principle, there are many 
complex and costly problems of legal translation.120 Firstly, the mandatory process of translating 
the existent instrument in French into the other languages creates mistakes. This means that the 
final official versions will most likely not have the same meaning with the other texts. Another 
problem is translating texts of legal instruments already in existence to other languages. This may 
lead to different meanings from the original being given to translated texts. Consequently, the 
interpretation rendered by Courts or arbitrators may be different to the meaning intended by the 
law making body of the OHADA, leading to a miscarriage of justice.  
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Legal translation is peculiar and different from ordinary linguistic translation because it is full of 
hidden traps. It is not an ‘approximate process which focuses only on linguistic side, since it 
implies the transposition of legal concepts from a system to another, with the consequent 
employment of comparative law and its methodology.’121 It requires that the translator not only 
complies with the rules of the foreign language, but also with the rules of the foreign legal 
system.122 The translator must also find equivalent legal terms in the target language or terms that 
have an equivalent legal function. In some cases, the translators may not find equivalent legal 
terms in the target language or terms that have the same function.123 Where the Uniform Acts are 
drafted to cater to both civil and common law legal traditions drafters must be careful, especially 
when translating civil law terms into common law terms and vice versa, since the words belong 
to different legal systems whose meanings derive from the history, social context and the cultural 
changing of the legal tradition concerned.124 This is more so in Africa, where the different legal 
systems are not purely civil or common law systems but influenced by the customary laws 
religious laws.  
The linguistic problems of the OHADA especially considering the scope of laws which it deals 
with, makes it problematic for Nigeria whose lingua franca is English. The discordance in 
interpretation, consequent of translation makes it challenging for Nigeria. Moreover, since it is 
being translated to English from French, it means that Nigeria will deal with it as secondary 
language recipients, subjecting them to provisions with inferior meaning.  
Although the OHADA is commendable for its achievements, its requirements of yielding judicial 
and legislative sovereignty and allowing compulsory legislation on other aspects of law not 
envisioned by Nigeria, must be carefully considered. It is needless to relinquish that level of 
sovereignty, in order to improve international trade laws especially with the CISG as a more 
viable option. 
In any event, the CISG can coexist with the OHADA because its scope and sphere of 
application ensures other instruments can be accommodated. First, the CISG is flexible in 
accommodating parties’ needs and respects parties contractual freedom. Parties are free to opt 
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out of any or all of its provisions.125 Article 92 provides for a declaration made by contracting 
states which allows them not to be bound to either Part II or III of the Convention. This gives 
Nigeria the right to allow OHADA prevail over CISG, where both of them are adopted. 
However, parties are subject to the CISG in spite of the provisions of Article 92 which excludes 
the application of the CISG by Article 1(1) a. However, the CISG can still apply through Article 
1(1) b. This is possible through private international law rules, which makes the CISG applicable 
where one of the parties to a contract is not a member, but the other party is for instance a seller 
leading to the application of the seller’s rules.126  
Nigeria may however still exclude the application of Article 1(1)b through the Article 95 
declaration, which allows parties to opt out of Article 1(b), this would allow the OHADA to 
govern the contract.  
Article 94 of the CISG also emphasises the independence of parties and Contracting States to 
use unified regional laws. This would mean that if Nigeria joins the OHADA after ratifying the 
CISG, and enters into a sale of goods contract with another country such as Gabon, also a 
member of the OHADA and the CISG, because of their memberships to OHADA, and closely 
related legal rules through the OHADA, provided their businesses are located in the contracting 
states, they can declare that the CISG will not apply. Through this provision, the CISG allows 
exclusion of contracts under regional treaties or regional uniform laws.  
The CISG’s limited sphere of application is also indicative of its ability to coexist with the 
OHADA. The Convention does not cover all contracts for the sale of goods.127 As a result, the 
Convention allows for derogation and resort to domestic laws. Consequently, OHADA can 
coexist with the CISG, particularly to complement it in such areas, without conflict. 
Specific provisions of the CISG, for instance, Art 6 also provide for exclusions of any or all 
provisions of the CISG from contracts. This means that the OHADA Uniform Act can directly 
apply where the CISG is excluded. 
The CISG also respects other international instruments through Article 90, which states that in 
any conflict with regional laws, the regional law will prevail. 
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Article 9(2) also supports coexistence of the CISG and OHADA. This means that where a 
binding usage exists in a specific region, the regional usage will prevail over the CISG provided 
the requirements of Article 9(2) are met. Where the parties agree that they will be bound by the 
regional usage such as the OHADA, the terms of that usage will prevail against the application 
of the CISG by the provision of Article 9(1).128 
An analysis of the draft OHADA Act on Contract Law and the CISG demonstrates practically, 
how universal and regional uniform trade law texts can complement each other. Commentators 
in the preparation of the Draft OHADA Act stated that the CISG deals effectively with the same 
issues.129 This indicates the CISG’s ability to regulate international trade. Thus, member states of 
OHADA may be able to strengthen their process of economic integration by adopting the CISG. 
Where the Convention is adopted, they ‘will benefit from its application to contracts for the sale 
of goods concluded with commercial partners located in non-OHADA African States, and in 
other parts of the world.’130 
A measure of the CISG’s complementarity with the OHADA is regarding similarity in 
substantive issues of law, and similarity in outcome. The draft OHADA Act on contract law was 
inspired by the UNIDROIT Principles, which draws inspiration from the CISG.131 This indicates 
some link between the two laws, which suggests some consistency between the texts, thus 
promoting uniformity among the legislature. Considering this, interpreters will be able to refer to 
cases and materials already decided under the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles in the 
interpretation of the Draft OHADA Act. This is particularly useful for the interpreters if they are 
to accelerate justice especially in the areas where the OHADA Act shifts significantly from the 
existing principles, known to domestic laws.132  
Some of the issues raised at the conference in preparation of the Draft OHADA Act have 
already been addressed by the CISG. Thus, where these principles are incorporated into the 
OHADA Act, these similarities will help coexistence, and prevent conflicts. They will also help 
to promote principles which the CISG promotes.133 
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The principle of good faith in contract has a significant place in Africa and this same principle is 
a leading one under Article 7(1) CISG. Thus, it impacts the Draft OHADA Act in a positive way 
especially since it assists in addressing abuses from informal transactions.134 Any reference to 
cause and consideration which have their essence in the different legal systems are avoided by 
the CISG and instead replaced with provisions acting as functional equivalents. This solution is 
effective because it ensures effective regulation of contract while rejecting the misleading 
references to domestic notions.135  
5.3.3  Determinants of Successful Transplantation of the CISG in 
Nigeria 
Several factors are important in determining the workings, and to what extent the CISG will be 
successful in Nigeria, these factors will be considered.  
5.3.3.1 Transplantation as a Common Phenomenon 
That ‘most of the private law of all modern legal systems of the Western world (and also of some 
non-Western countries) apart from the Scandinavian, derives more or less directly from either 
Roman Civil Law or English Common Law’,136 and the fact that the history of a system of law is 
largely a history of borrowings of legal materials from other legal systems and of assimilation of 
materials from outside of the law,’137 suggests the pervasiveness of legal transplants. This also 
suggests striking similarities and formulations of laws in different jurisdictions.138 Particularly, in 
commercial law there are many examples of legal concepts, legislation and legal institutions being 
transplanted from one society to another.139  
The commonality of transplants suggests the ability of a system to easily assimilate laws from 
other jurisdictions irrespective of differences. Even where there are variances between the 
domestic law and the transplanted law, the system is able to adapt in its own ways, such as by 
either formulating laws or borrowing from other systems, thus, overriding the differences. The 
successful transplantation of English laws into Nigeria during the colonial era, albeit by 
imposition, and its continued use, demonstrates its successful reception despite variation. This is 
illustrative of Nigeria’s ability to successfully receive legal transplants, and therefore is indicative 
of the potential success of the CISG in Nigeria.  
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The number of adoptions of the CISG worldwide, 83 to date, shows that its transplantation is 
common amongst countries. This shows that the CISG will be easily transplanted to Nigeria.   
5.3.3.2 Transplantation as a Source for Development 
The fact that legal transplants are a major source of development, ‘the most fertile source of 
development’, 140  makes them appealing to recipient jurisdictions, contributing greatly to the 
likelihood of success. Since most changes in most legal systems are a result of borrowing,141 
recipient legal systems ‘do not require any real knowledge of the social, economic, geographical 
and political context of the origin and growth of the original rule.’142 Adopting the CISG into 
Nigeria is alluring because it can promote development by facilitating trade and catalyse the 
reform of trade laws and structure. 
There is a strong association between economic development and legality, meaning that good 
legal institutions are a precondition for long-term economic growth.143 Good legal institutions 
have been transplanted to developing countries in order to actuate reform. For these laws to 
work effectively, they ought to be meaningful in the applicable context, so that actors have an 
incentive to use the law, and to request institutions that work to enforce and develop the law.144 
Granted, some of these laws have not worked because of the undetailed examination of their fit 
with the local system, where it is undertaken in context, there is a high likelihood that the 
transplanted law would be successful. Given that the provisions of the CISG are compatible with 
common law concepts, and would aid in developing trade in Nigeria, while serving as a model 
for law reform, the CISG is considered a source of development and therefore necessary in 
Nigeria. The benefits of the Convention suggests actors would be motivated to engage with it. 
Seeing the CISG as a potential for economic development therefore increases the probability of 
success.  
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5.3.3.3 The Legality of the Jurisdiction from which the law Emanates 
and the Receptivity of the Recipient Country   
Nationalism plays an important role in determining which system will be the source of 
borrowing.145 Thus, the origin of law is a determinant factor on whether or not the law will be 
accepted, and the likelihood of success. The donor jurisdiction or organisation plays a key role 
for the donee jurisdiction in deciding whether or not it would be transplanted.  
For Nigeria, the UN may be seen as an organisation that caters to the needs of various nations 
through neutral laws. The UNCITRAL with membership of over 60 countries, including Nigeria 
is a fundamental legal body of the UN system in the field of international trade law, focused on 
modernisation and harmonisation of rules of international business. It formulates fair rules on 
commercial transactions through Conventions such as the CISG, which are acceptable 
worldwide, legal and legislative guides and recommendations of great practical value, updated 
information on case law and enactments of uniform commercial law, technical assistance in law 
reform projects regional and national seminars on law reform projects.146  
The UN on its own is a well-respected body concluding multilateral agreements and 
recommending laws to nations both developed and developing. Most countries model their laws 
after the UN Laws, since they are considered models to aspire to in terms of political and 
development decisions. This is because the UN does not represent any particular country, but 
seeks to protect the interests of all nations and assist in upgrading their laws. Since the UN aims 
to provide laws not influenced by any particular jurisdiction and purposed to serve the interests 
of all nations, irrespective of their level of development, understanding the source and legality of 
its laws become imperative in order to determine its neutrality and level of representation which 
the CISG can offer Nigeria, which can be a direct influence on the Convention’s level of success.  
Borrowing can be from domestic laws to international laws i.e. ‘vertical or Trans-echelon 
borrowing.’ 147 Advocates of legal borrowing in international laws suggest that, borrowing 
originates from prior international treaties and from works on public international law and as 
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such, each treaty is an effort to build on, and extend an assemblage of principles of international 
law.148  
Considering this, the CISG draws from the ULIS and ULF, and ‘some provisions of the CISG 
are substantially the same as provisions of…the 1964 Conventions’.149 Based on the document 
evidencing the conception of the UNCITRAL, its origin and mandate state that one of the legal 
techniques used to reduce conflicts and divergences in international trade law is the 
harmonisation and unification of substantive rules. The development of the law of international 
trade has gone through three stages; in the first stage, it appeared in the form of the medieval lex 
mercatoria, a body of universally accepted rules.150 In the second stage, the rules were incorporated 
into the municipal law of the various national states and the third stage is the development of 
widely accepted legal concepts. In the third stage, three distinctive characteristics are identified, 
that the rules of international trade exhibit similarities with rules of commerce in municipal 
jurisdictions, the application is provided for by authority of the national sovereigns and thirdly, 
their formulation is brought about by international agencies created by Governments or by non-
governmental bodies. Based on the above, it is concluded that the CISG does not draw 
singularly from any particular domestic law but draws from commercial laws generally accepted 
in various jurisdictions, which have become universalised and internationalised. Consequently, 
the CISG is a neutral law fit to be adopted by Nigeria.  
One of the methods recognised by the UNCITRAL for unification is the introduction of 
normative regulations devised and elaborated within the framework of international treaties and 
agreements concluded by two or more States. 151 A second method is formulation, normally 
under the auspices of an international agency, of commercial customs and practices, which are 
founded upon the usages of the international commercial community. 
A transplant can be successful irrespective of the level of development of the country. This is 
based on Watson’s deduction that the length of time during which Roman law has exercised its 
influence on Scotland indicates that something can always be successfully borrowed and adapted 
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from a highly developed system to a country at a different stage of development.152 This is true 
even where the parent system is not fully understood and even if the result is a simplification.  
The above can be considered true regarding the transplantation of the CISG in Nigeria. 
Although the CISG is a more developed law – because of its recency when compared to 1893 
SGA- and the international legal order on which it is founded, it can be successfully adapted to 
the Nigerian legal system. This is notwithstanding that the provisions of the CISG may be 
simplified. Where the CISG is transplanted into the Nigerian system, there will be no need to 
simplify the contents because of the dichotomy between the CISG as a developed system and 
Nigeria as a developing system. The CISG can still be applied harmoniously because of the 
availability and accessibility of its materials, which are useful for understanding and applying the 
CISG uniformly. 
A foreign rule can be successfully integrated into a different system, and even into a branch of 
law, which is constructed on very different principles from that of the donor.153 The reception of 
Roman property law by the Scottish, despite their differences is illustrative. That these disparate 
systems are able to transplant successfully shows the likelihood of successful transplantation of 
the CISG in Nigeria. This is because the principles on which the CISG was constructed are even 
marginally dissimilar to the common law principles of Nigeria.154 The Nigerian Legal system is 
based on the common law legal system, both in concept and practice whilst the CISG is an 
adaptation of both civil and common law concepts. Thus, the CISG embodies some familiar 
concepts.  
Furthermore, commercial laws of various jurisdictions share the same heritage and are based on 
principles that have evolved overtime from customs and practice amongst traders. 155 
Consequently, there is a common source for all commercial laws whether applicable in the 
common or civil law system. The accepted international trade and customs which developed 
through the lex mercatoria diffused into both civil and common law jurisdictions irrespective of 
their backgrounds.156  
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Nigeria’s laws are based on UK laws, drawn from the Lex Mercatoria. This suggests that despite 
slight differences in the principles and concepts governing international trade, they are fashioned 
out of the same principles and with the same goals in mind. Secondly, although the CISG reflects 
concepts and principles of two prominent legal systems, civil and common law, this does not 
affect its functionality ability to serve these countries efficiently. 
Despite the mixed nature of the CISG, it is suggested that it will be successful for the following 
reasons. Firstly, there are marginal distinctions between civil and common-law legal systems. 
Modern laws are ‘practical, technical and problem solving’, and do not differ greatly from 
country to country.157  Friedman states that a ‘French lawyer and an English lawyer would have 
an easier time comparing notes on say urban planning… than they would discussing legal 
problems with a lawyer from the days of Henry VII or Louis XIV respectively.’ 158  These 
similarities increase the potential for successful transplantation of the CISG in Nigeria. 
The dearth of cases in common law jurisdictions at the first stages of the Convention’s adoption 
refutes Watson’s argument, that a law can be successfully transplanted irrespective of the 
difference in principle. The disparity in the number of cases in the Civil and Common law 
jurisdictions was attributed to the fact that the CISG may be more based on the civil legal system 
and interpretational hindrance by judges in the common law. 159  This thus may hinder the 
successful adaptation of the CISG in Nigeria. 
These arguments are flawed because the CISG seeks to bridge the gap between the civil and 
common law legal systems and does not favour one system to the detriment of the other. In fact, 
the CISG in a bid to represent both systems, compromises on certain aspects, by regulating 
certain issues and excluding others. As Ferrari suggests common law courts have a broader, more 
civil-law oriented approach to interpretation, and the rigidity of the literal rule has been eased not 
only in England but in other common law jurisdictions. 160  Considering this evolution in 
interpretation in common law jurisdictions, courts in Nigeria may adopt this approach towards 
the CISG. This indicates a potential for the successful application of the CISG in Nigeria. 
The literature on transplants received widespread attention among comparativists because it 
showed that legal systems can accommodate a plurality of models, despite transplantation 
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occurring across legal systems that already have much in common. Though only some legal 
systems are currently classified as mixed, many more exhibit features revealing that borrowing or 
transplantation are regular occurrences, even across boundaries that seemed to be impermeable. 
This finding casts serious doubts on the utility of the established approach to comparative law 
with its heavy reliance on the classification of legal systems into legal families. The ability of 
countries to accept a plurality of models disproves the suggestion that unfamiliarity to common 
law practitioners and the judiciary is the reason for the infrequent application of the CISG in 
common law jurisdictions. Moreover, the increased application of the CISG in common law 
jurisdictions in recent years further invalidates the argument. Given the above, it is likely that the 
CISG would be successful in Nigeria.  
5.3.3.4 Area of law: The Ease of Transplanting Commercial and 
Business Laws  
Scholars believe that mechanical transplants i.e. those concerning technical legal rules occur 
easily while organic transplants, those involving institutional structures and processes, require 
careful selection and adaptation of the relevant norms.161 Emerging global norms in business, the 
environment, and trade,162 implies a synchronisation of laws governing business and trade. This 
suggests an easier ability of business laws to transplant successfully. 
This means that because of the commercial nature of the CISG, it would easily and successfully 
be transplanted to Nigeria. Business, commercial and economic laws are less affected by political, 
social and cultural factors which are important in determining the patterns of legal migration for 
constitutional and human rights laws, ideas and institutions.163 The CISG is considered as non-
ideological yet, instrumental to economic development. As stated by Watson,  
If the rules of contract law of two countries are similar (as they already 
are), it should be no obstacle to their unification or harmonisation that 
the legal principles involved come ultimately from different sources, or 
that the habits of thoughts of the commission teams are rather different. 
It is scholarly law reformers who are deeply troubled by historical 
factors and habits of thought. Commercial lawyers and business men in 
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Scotland and England do not in general perceive difference in habits of 
thought but only and – and often with irritation – differences in rules.164  
Thus, for businessmen, there is a similitude in how business is done across borders, which 
suggests an understanding of the underpinnings of commerce. Consequently, it will be easier for 
these businessmen to transplant the CISG to Nigeria.   
This is supported by Freud’s suggestion that most laws are deeply embedded in their social and 
institutional matrices and therefore it cannot be taken for granted that rules or institutions are 
transplantable. He however agrees that some laws are more autonomous than others and can be 
transplanted across social political boundaries.165  
The polarity in attitude of nations with respect to varied areas of laws transplanted is 
demonstrated by the Estonian law reform. While having the American bankruptcy law in Estonia 
seemed to most Estonians not much different from drinking French wine and owing German or 
Japanese cars, 166  having an American constitution was something else. It meant giving up 
sovereignty, a loss of control and what is constitutive of a nation.167 This is further buttressed by 
the suggestion that constitutions are especially immune from the effect on legal migration, being 
of the same member family. Thus, despite the fact that common law countries follow models 
from other common law countries, the same as civil law countries, French colonies and Spanish 
colonies, this is not typically so for constitutions.  
Nigeria is a typical case in this respect because although a majority of her laws are based on 
common law system, and are in some cases are exact replications of the English law, the current 
1999 Constitution is not adopted from the British system.168   
This implies that laws within the commercial category like the CISG, being non-ideological and 
important to economic development are capable of being borrowed from the analogous laws of 
other nations because trade laws are similar in most jurisdictions. Thus, the transplantation of the 
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CISG into Nigeria will most likely be successful because commercial laws are not indigenous to 
Nigeria. Moreover, Nigeria can apply certain reservations; parties can exclude it from the scope 
of application of their contract, and derogate from its provisions, allowing for cultural 
acceptations.  
5.3.3.5 Motivation and Voluntariness of Transplant 
Motivation must be analysed from the perspective of the law reformers initially responsible for 
the transplant, and the legal actors, the potential users of the law. From the reformer’s 
perspective, the more predominant the practical utility of a law is, the more likely it is that the 
transplant will be successful. If only because motivation is likely to affect the law reformers 
attention to micro fit other motives such as politics or symbolism, which are far less conducive 
to success. Yet the initial motivation for the transplant (whether conducive to success or not) can 
be overcome by those with the authority to apply or enforce the law subsequent to its 
codification in the local regime. 
If a country has a genuine motivation to transplant a law, their attitude is likely to be positive 
towards that law, therefore increasing the likelihood of success. For instance, Germany seemed 
more willing to use the CISG and quickly adapt to interpretations based on the aims of the CISG 
because the prominent German legal scholar Rabel was involved in drafting the Convention.  
There are several motivations for Nigeria to adopt the CISG; the desire to improve international 
trade by employing a better legal framework, the aspiration to use the CISG as a model for law 
reform and the desire to be respected by her trading partners and the UNCITRAL. According to 
Schaeur, the desire of a country to be esteemed by a particular group of nations bears a causal 
relationship to the degree to which that country will attempt to harmonise its laws with that of 
the group or community of nations, and also bears a causal relationship to the extent to which 
the country’s laws will eventually resemble the laws of that community of nations.169 Therefore, 
the motivations for Nigeria to adopt the CISG stated above increases the chances of its success. 
Voluntariness is another determinant of a successful transplant. Where transplantation is 
voluntary, it increases its own receptivity by making a significant adaptation of the foreign model 
to the pre-existing conditions and structures in the domestic setting.170 This increases the chances 
of success of the transplanting model in the local setting. Considering that there is no pressure 
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from any authority regarding the adoption of the Convention in Nigeria, it suggests voluntariness, 
therefore increasing the likelihood that actors will engage with it, making it successful.  
5.3.3.6 The Availability of Substitutes  
The fewer the available substitutes for the transplanted laws, within or outside the legal system, 
the more likely the transplanted rule or institution will be adapted to the local conditions and 
used by actors in the host country.171 This is because of limited choices, which increase the 
appreciation for the transplanted law. Further, where the existing laws are not considered 
standardised, they will not be considered an alternative.  
For Nigeria, there are hardly any viable substitutes, neither the 1893 SGA, the incompatible 
OHADA, nor the current structure of international trade, which are unfavourable to the 
Nigerian trader are suitable. Given the limited options, actors will be forced to engage with the 
CISG where it is adopted thus, increasing the likelihood of successful reception. 
5.3.3.7 Attitude of Actors Towards the CISG  
An important determinant in predicting the success of the CISG is the attitude of actors i.e., 
their willingness to engage with the Convention and how helpful they perceive that the 
Convention would be. In order to determine the likelihood and the degree of likelihood, the 
willingness and the degree of willingness of Nigerian actors towards the Convention, were it to 
be adopted, a survey was carried out amongst legal practitioners in Nigeria, the actors who will 
engage most with the CISG. This survey and response is particularly significant considering that 
one of the reasons for the CISG’s obscurity in some countries such as the U.S, Australia and 
surprisingly Germany, where it is considered most engaged with, is that legal practitioners were 
not willing to offer it to businessmen as an alternative.   
i. Likelihood of learning a New Convention  
The purpose of this question was to determine if the legal practitioners were likely to learn a new 
Convention, considering exogenous factors, independent of their own willingness or 
contribution.  
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The responses from the above diagram show that 75% of the legal practitioners are willing to 
learn a new Convention. This is three times the number of legal practitioners who did not 
answer the question, 20%, and about eighteen times the number of practitioners who said no, 
which is 4%.  
This indicates a positive attitude not only towards the possibility of a new convention such as the 
CISG but to other Conventions.  
ii. Degree of Likelihood of Learning a New Convention  
This question was asked to measure the degree of the likelihood of the legal practitioners to learn 
a new Convention. The question helps to show the extent to which Nigerian practitioners are 
likely to learn a new Convention, that is, how probable it is. This is employed to assess the 
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Figure 5.2  
The diagram above shows the extent to which the practitioners are likely to learn about the 
Convention. Whilst 44% stated it was Likely, 31% stated it was Very Likely, 19% did not 
answer and 6% said Not Likely. The degree of probability of learning about the Convention 
which in total is 71% shows positivity towards the convention, therefore increasing the potential 
of the Convention being successful in Nigeria.   
iii. Are you willing to learn a new Convention?  
This question deals with the personal disposition and readiness of practitioners to engage with 
the Convention where it is adopted. The question sought to determine their willingness based on 
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Figure 5.3  
The figures show that 75% of the practitioners are willing to learn a new convention. This is 
three times the percentage of the practitioners that did not answer the question, and the number 
of practitioners unwilling to learn a new Convention. This shows that a majority of the legal 
practitioners of their own volition are willing to engage with the Convention where it is adopted.  
iv. The Degree of Willingness to Learn a New Convention 
This question tries to establish the extent to which the legal practitioners are willing to learn a 
new Convention. It is recognised that although they may be willing, the degree of willingness is 
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Figure 5.4  
The chart shows that there is a high level of willingness of legal practitioners to learn a new 
Convention. Whilst 49% were willing, 28% were very willing, 19% did not answer the question 
and 4% stated that they could not be bothered. This suggests a more positive attitude towards 
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v. Would you be willing to offer the CISG as an Option to 
Businessmen? 
 
Figure 5.5  
The chart above shows that 68% of the respondents would be willing to offer the CISG as an 
option to businessmen even without knowing it personally. Another 28% did not answer the 
question. It is suggested that the percentage of respondents willing to offer the CISG as an 
option to clients would be more, had the respondents answered the survey questions carefully.172 
This willingness is particularly significant in determining the success of the Convention because 
one of the reasons why the CISG is minimally used in other jurisdictions is because lawyers are 
reluctant offer to it to their clients as an option, in fact, they purposely exclude it.  
The questions above show that the disposition of legal practitioners towards the Convention is 
very positive. This increases the likelihood of success the CISG in Nigeria. 
Additionally, as globalisation broadens Nigeria’s trade borders, it also provides an easy platform 
for movement of laws, through norm entrepreneurs; students and business men, familiarising 
themselves with foreign laws through education and international transactions. These can then 
be transported to domestic jurisdictions, which transcend borders, resulting in the production of 
uniform laws. Exposure and familiarity of laws makes the soil fertile for transplantation, not only 
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with regards to choice, but in receptivity and adaptation. Globalisation has enabled familiarity 
with foreign laws such as the CISG. Therefore, Nigerian students who studied abroad and 
migrated back are already familiar with the Convention, making it easier for the CISG to adapt 
successfully.  
5.4 The CISG and the 1893 SGA in Nigeria: Compatibility with Common 
Law Concepts  
The adoption of the Convention in Nigeria means that there will be two regimes governing 
international trade transactions. On one hand the 1893 SGA, able to govern both domestic sales 
transactions and international trade, and on the other hand the CISG, designed for international 
trade. This may be problematic because it will introduce variations in the interpretation and 
application of both the SGA and the CISG, leading to unanticipated inconsistencies in practice. 
Another concern is the relegation and consequent obscurity of the 1893 SGA. 
These fears are unfounded firstly because the CISG governs international sales transaction not 
domestic contracts, leaving ample room for the application of the domestic law. Secondly, 
empirical research in Nigeria shows that the SGA is hardly the choice of law in international 
trade transactions.173 Most of these transactions are governed by English laws, hence, the SGA 
will hardly be missed. Furthermore, because the SGA is not an indigenous law, being part of the 
laws transplanted from England, it will not be offensive to substitute it with the CISG.  
Although concerns about varied interpretation are valid, they can be overcome as demonstrated 
in Germany and the U.S, previously examined. Where the CISG is adopted in Nigeria, 
interpreters are urged to keep in mind the Convention’s purpose and requirement for 
autonomous interpretation. Moreover these tendencies can be avoided given availability and 
accessibility of resources on the CISG. The Convention also allows parties to opt out via Article 
6 meaning that the SGA can always be chosen.  
Given that where the CISG is adopted in Nigeria, it will exist alongside the SGA, the concerns of 
the complementarity of the CISG with Nigerian law necessitate an examination of the common 
law concepts, which may cause divergences, with the CISG.        
                                                          




5.4.1 CISG And the Statute of Fraud in Nigeria  
The law Reform (Contracts) Act No. 64 1961 is the foundational law for contracts in Nigeria.174 
Prior to the law of 1961, apart from common law, equity and Nigerian case law, statutory 
provision applicable to contracts in Nigeria were S4 of the Statute of Fraud 1677, and S24 of the 
SOGA 1893. These two provisions supplemented the common law on the enforcement of 
contracts for the sale of goods.175 Currently, the statute of fraud is enshrined in the various laws.  
Under the Amendment Act 1828, a contract for the Sale of Goods of 10 pounds value or in 
excess of 10 pounds is not enforceable unless; first, the buyer accepts part of the goods sold and 
actually receives the goods or gives something in earnest to bind the contract or in part payment 
or second, some note or memorandum in writing of the contract is signed by the party to be 
charged or an agent on behalf of the party. 
The effect of the U.K Statute of Fraud 1677 and the Amendment Act 1828 on the Nigerian 
contract law is that enforceability must be evidenced by a memorandum or note in writing signed 
by the party to be charged or some person authorised by the individual. The classes of contract 
listed to be governed by the statute of fraud are unsurprisingly similar to the ones found in the 
UCC. 
Cases upholding the SOF principle, albeit majorly in land abound. In Ali Safe v Northern States 
Marketing Boards176 the appellants amongst other issues asserted on appeal that the trial court was 
in error in finding that Exhibit 4, the receipt issued to the plaintiff on behalf of the vendor for 
the sale of a property, did not comply with the requirements of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds. 
The court applying the Law of Property Act 1925 and stating that this law is equivalent to 
section 4 SOF held that the receipt was sufficient memorandum in itself to conclude the 
matter.177 More recently the case of Nweledim v Uduma 178 where the court dismissed the case of 
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the plaintiff/appellant holding that based on Section 4 of the SOF that the receipt used for the 
transfer of land was not sufficient to constitute a memorandum as provided by the Statute.179  
With the recognition of section 4 of the SOF in Nigeria, it is admitted that like the parol 
evidence rule, courts and business men may struggle to understand and apply the provisions of 
the CISG if they are not familiar with it. However, the CISG recognises that some jurisdictions 
may be keen on the application of the writing as a form requirement and thus, it makes the 
provision for opting out under article 96.180  
In order to avoid any contradiction with the law and to avoid any misapplication or 
misinterpretation of the CISG, it is suggested that where the CISG is ratified in Nigeria, the 
option of making a declaration under Article 96, is a way of overcoming the obstacle of habit. 
The reservation clause enables states preferring a formal writing to decide, by application of the 
domestic law invoked by conflict rules, the form issue for contracts concluded by parties with a 
place of business in one of these states. The effect of this provision is that since the Nigerian 
contract laws and the courts still recognise and apply section 4 SOF, there will not be any 
conflict between the CISG and the Nigerian contract law.  
Even where the declaration is not made, that businessmen still have the option of including in 
their contracts, clauses agreeing to a writing requirement and this will be valid because it follows 
from the basic principle of party autonomy, which is recognised in article 29(2), sentence 1.181 
5.4.2 The CISG and Firm Offers in Nigeria  
The principle of revocation of offer under the Nigerian contract law is a replication of the 
English law, which is that the revocation of an offer before an acceptance involves no liability on 
the part of the offeror, even if he promises to keep it open. This has been recognised in Nigerian 
Amana Suits Hotels Ltd. v P.D.P.182 
Considering this, applying the CISG may be challenging for lawyers and judges’ since the fixing 
of a time for acceptance of an offer could be interpreted as meaning that the offer is irrevocable 
at the time, or could simply refer to the expiration of the offer.183 This principle draws from the 
civil law principles of revocability of offer.  
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However, this is not insurmountable. Since two interpretations can be given to acceptance, it has 
been suggested that when lawyers from the common law system are drafting provisions of 
contracts to be governed by the Convention, they should ensure that their meanings regarding 
the irrevocability of an offer is clear.184  
Another aspect of article 16 is the offeree’s action based on his reliance on the offer. The CISG 
recognises that an offer may be considered irrevocable if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely 
on the offer as being irrevocable.185 This principle applies even if there was no express indication 
of irrevocability under paragraph 2(a).  
This approach which finds support in the domestic law of some civil law systems, hold offers to 
be irrevocable for the period needed until the response, while other legal systems hold that 
reasonable reliance either bars revocation or makes the offeror liable in tort for damages. 186 
There is some semblance between the principle of reliance on the offer, and the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel under the American domestic law, although there is no express 
foreseeability required from the offeror and no express requirement that the offeree’s reliance be 
detrimental. 
The Nigerian principle on promissory estoppel is the same as the English doctrine. The initial 
position under estoppel was that there had to be some detriment to the offeree, by reliance on 
the offer. Detriment as an essential part of the application of promissory estoppel in Nigeria was 
recognised in the case of Ajayi v RT Briscoe.187 The High Court and the Supreme Court held in the 
company’s favour and a further appeal to the Privy Council resulted in the dismissal of the case 
with the court stating that Ajayi had not altered his position by reliance on the promise. The 
court held that Ajayi did not worsen his position by not putting forward counter proposals after 
the receipt of the company’s proposal that payment should be suspended during repairs. There 
was also no evidence that he had altered his position by reorganising his business on the basis of 
the promise. The implication of this being that he had suffered no detriment and detriment was 
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an important constituent in a plea of promissory estoppel.188 This initial position is at variance 
from the Convention’s requirement that the offeree’s reliance need not be detrimental.189 
However, the decision and views expressed in this case has been criticised because of its 
inconsistency with a majority of cases dealing with promissory estoppel. After a review of the 
cases where promissory estoppel was successfully pleaded, Lord Denning stated in WJ Alan & 
Co. Ltd. v El Nasr Export & Import Co.190 that ‘in none of these cases does a party who acts on the 
belief, act to his detriment. It is not a detriment but a benefit to him. Nevertheless he has 
conducted his affairs on the basis that he has that benefit, and it would not be equitable now to 
deprive him of it.’191 
Based on this, the requirement of alteration of position means ‘he must have been led to act 
differently from what he would have otherwise done. The cases show that all that is required is 
that one should have acted on the belief induced by the other.’192 Decisions in cases after that 
echo Lord Denning’s view that to establish promissory estoppel, there is no need to show 
detriment. It is merely sufficient for a party to conduct his affairs on the basis of a representation 
made by the other party.193 From the above, detriment is not an essential element in a plea of 
promissory estoppel in the Nigerian contract law.  
The current view is more in alignment with the provisions of the CISG, which does not make 
detriment a necessity under Article 16(2)b. This shows that firm offers in Nigeria is compatible 
with the CISG, thus eliminates one of the obstacles to the interpretation of the CISG. 
Considering this, courts may not find it too distinct when applying the provisions of the 
Convention. 
5.4.3 The CISG and the Doctrine of Consideration in Nigeria  
At common law, when an agreement to modify a contract merely increases or reduces the 
obligations of one of the parties, the agreement may be unenforceable since it is not supported 
by "consideration" -- i.e., by an act or promise given in exchange for the new promise. By virtue 
of the application of principles of common law in Nigeria, the doctrine of consideration has 
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been and is still well recognised under the Nigerian contract law. In Alfotrin Ltd v A.G Federation 
Justice Iguh stated the principles of a binding contract, 
 To constitute a binding contract, there must be an agreement in that the 
parties must be in consensus ad idem regarding the essential terms and 
conditions thereof; the parties must intend to create legal relations and 
the promise of each party, in a simple contract, not under seal, must be 
supported by consideration. There must be a concluded bargain which 
has settled all essential conditions that are necessary to be settled and 
leaves no vital term or condition unsettled.194 
The same principle was reiterated in Yaro v Arewa Construction Ltd where it was stated that the 
ingredients of a contract constitute amongst other elements, consideration.195 
With the recognition of the doctrine of consideration as a core of contract law in Nigeria, the 
application of the CISG, which does not require consideration as a criterion for modification of 
contract may create disharmony with the local laws.  
It has been suggested that the omission of the doctrine of consideration is without any 
significance because ‘a sale is an onerous transaction, where "consideration" is supplied by the 
exchange of promises to deliver and to pay; and a challenge to the enforceability of a promise for 
lack of consideration as an issue of "validity" dehors the scope of application of the Convention, 
hence remitted under conflict rules, to the applicable national law’.196 Since this is an issue of 
validity, it is outside the scope of application of the CISG and thus, would not come within the 
interpretation of the courts. 
Moreover, the elimination of the doctrine of consideration was not objected to by common law 
delegates during the drafting stages of the Convention because common law restrictions on the 
parties' ability to adapt their transaction to new circumstances had already generated pressure for 
modifications of the traditional common law rule.197 The above indicates the Convention is not 
at odds with the doctrine of consideration in Nigeria. 
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5.4.4 CISG and the Battle of Form in Nigeria  
In Nigeria, there is no known express law dealing with the battle of forms. However the 
principle of offer and acceptance which may be applied to disputes on battle of forms is the 
same as the common law mirror image principle, which is that any modification or amendment 
of the offer will constitute a counter offer, cancelling the original offer. The purported 
acceptance thus becomes a fresh offer. This was clearly recognised in Amana Suits198 where the 
court stated ‘that acceptance is ineffective unless there is complete agreement on all material 
terms.’199 This case also reflects the mitigation by common law courts of the mirror image rule 
which imposes the additional question of whether the new terms are material. 
Art. 19(1) of the CISG is the same as the above provision where it states that a reply to an offer 
which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications, is 
a rejection of the offer, and constitutes a counter-offer.  
Despite this advantage, the rules of Article 19(1), which reflects the mirror image rule of the 
CISG, is considered rigid. However, this rigidity is eased by 19(2) of the CISG which states that 
the only time an acceptance will conclude a contract is when the acceptance varies from the 
terms of the offer is when it contains additional or different terms "which do not materially alter 
the terms of the offer" and the offeror does not promptly object to the alteration. Therefore, 
even if the additional or different terms do not alter the offer materially, if the offeror objects to 
those terms, no contract will be formed. 
The impact of subsection 2 is however diminished by the overinlusiveness of materiality 
contained in subsection 3, which suggests that nearly all alteration will be material. Thus, the 
CISG whilst retaining the spirit of the mirror image rule provides that where alterations to an 
original offer are not material, they will not defeat the contract, and instead will become part of 
the contract unless an objection is made.200 
The Nigerian principles on the constitution of an offer, counter offer and acceptance are parallel 
to those of the CISG. Both rules favour the last party to submit its terms. This makes for an easy 
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interpretation and application of the CISG in that regard. This is because there will be not be 
substantial change from the principles recognised under the domestic law.  
Under the CISG, it has been suggested that the issue of battle of forms should be considered a 
gap that must be resolved by applying the general principles upon which the Convention is based. 
Following this approach, some authors believe that the principle of good faith should apply. 
They conclude that the parties are in agreement on the main terms and that all standard terms 
which are not in conflict, will form part of the agreement. Conflicting terms are excluded and 
replaced by the dispositive or residual law applicable. That is, they adopt a solution such as that 
followed in certain legal systems, the "knock-out rule.201 Some authors have favoured the opinion 
leading to the application of the "last-shot rule" - the last person to send his form is considered 
to control the terms of the contract and therefore the one who wins the battle.202 
It would seem that the knock-out rule is favoured by the majority of commentators and the case 
law, although there is also support for the last shot rule. Where the knock out rule is favoured, it 
would be contradictory to the Nigerian common law, which favours the last shot doctrine. 
Despite this conflict, the knock-out rule has the advantage that it is in conformity with the 
intention of typical parties in international commercial relations and leads to acceptable results in 
cross-border trade situations. Considering this, the battle of forms resolution through knock out 
rules as preferred by commentators of the CISG can be considered an advantage in facilitating 
international trade transactions.    
5.4.5 The CISG and the Mailbox Rule  
The mailbox rule under common law is applicable in Nigeria. Here, acceptance takes place the 
moment it is posted. This is different to Art 18(2) of the CISG, which states that acceptance 
takes place upon receipt. Based on these differences, it is cautioned that lawyers and interpreters 
of the CISG pay particular attention not to misapply Art 18(2) by tilting towards domestic law 
interpretation.  
While it is cautioned that care be taken in the application of this section of the CISG, there are 
suggested ways around it. First, Article 18(2) must be read in conjunction with Article 16 of the 
CISG.203 Where this is done, the result for interpreters will be the same with the common law, 
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that the offeree has protection from revocation because the offeror cannot revoke once the 
offeree has dispatched acceptance.204 However, the change will be with regards to whom the 
burden of lost communication falls on. As the CISG has proven to be better law in this regard 
than the Common law rule, it will bring some fairness for international businessmen who have 
opted to use it. Since the offeree already bears the burden of mailing the acceptance, it will 
ensure that he practices effective and reliable business communication by providing the best 
possible postal service for relaying his message. 
Professor Uche suggests regarding the acceptance on posting rule in Nigeria that the position 
ought to be contrary to the principle in Adams v Lindsell i.e. acceptance being immediate on 
dispatch. He argues that based on Section 3 of the Post Office Act, a postal article is deemed to 
be in the course of transmission by post until delivered to the addressee, and delivery takes place 
if the article is delivered at the house, or office of the addressee or to the addressee himself or his 
authorised agent. The effect is that in Nigeria, an acceptance by post does not take effect until 
the letter is delivered to the offeror or his agent.205 
Assuming the argument is valid by virtue of the peculiar circumstance of post in Nigeria, 
acceptance in Nigeria with regards to post would be the same as that under the CISG, it would 
take effect upon delivery. This suggests an alignment with the CISG and there would be no 
discord in interpretation.  
However, Sagay argues that this position does not have the effect suggested by Uche, since that 
provision is meant to define the liability of the post office for the loss or damage to postal 
articles, and what is being stated in the section is that the liability of the post office does not arise 
until the article is in the course of transmission and ends with delivery. Therefore, it cannot and 
does not, purport to lay down any rules governing the formation of a contract between private 
individuals who happen to use the post office as a carrier.206   
Despite the above arguments, there is consonance between the provision of the CISG in this 
respect and the exceptions of the mailbox rule under common law. The exception is that the 
rules do not apply where the terms of the offer either expressly or implicitly indicate that 
acceptance must reach the offeror. This exception was recognised in Afolabi v Polymera 
Industries,207 where the plaintiff had applied to be appointed an agent of the defendants. He was 
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offered the position in a letter with the following words ‘will you please read, study carefully and 
sign duplicate copy attached, signifying your agreement to all points as listed above and return at 
your earliest convenience for records. There was no evidence that he ever returned the signed 
duplicate copy. It was held that the defendants’ letter had set out the manner in which the offer 
it contained should be accepted, in order to become a binding contract and in the absence of 
acceptable evidence that he signed and returned the duplicate copy, there was no valid 
acceptance of the offer.  
Based on this, lawyers can advise their clients to state categorically if they want the acceptance to 
take effect upon receipt by the offeror since the CISG honours the terms of the contracts of 
parties first before its rules. Additionally, judges interpreting this section of the CISG will not 
find themselves in unfamiliar territory since it also falls under one of the exceptions of the 
common law rule, which they are already conversant with.   
5.5 A Comparative analysis of the CISG and the SGA- Remedies of specific 
Performance, Price reduction and Additional Time 
Where the CISG is adopted in Nigeria, contracting parties may choose the remedial scheme 
under the CISG or SGA. While the SGA recognises the same general concept, the scope of the 
equivalent provision in the SGA is somewhat narrower. 208  The fact that the CISG offers a 
framework that caters to varied legal systems means that certain provisions were drafted to suit 
international traders from different spheres.  Thus, considering that the CISG is to work and 
exist with the SGA, a comparative analysis of certain provisions in both regimes would show 
their complementarity. 
5.5.1 Specific / Enforced Performance 
Specific performance is a key aspect of international trade because in most cases, buyers would 
rather continue with the same seller than spend time finding another seller, causing delay and 
frustration in the maximisation of profit. Normally, businessmen are more concerned with 
actually doing the business as opposed to focusing on the formalities of a contract and the 
comprehensiveness of the contract.209 Particularly in Nigeria where empirical evidence suggests 
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that the traders are more focused on transactions, which are ‘cash and carry’,210 what is readily 
available by the seller in the event of breach, becomes priority. Recognising this, where Nigerian 
traders go through with formalising their contracts, there is a high likelihood that rather than 
going through with instituting an action for breach for contract they would prefer that the seller 
remedies the contract and saves time and cost of re-contracting. Furthermore, giving the 
opportunity for the seller to remedy the contract saves the contractual relationship and avoids 
the time and process of finding another seller.   
i. SGA 
S52 of the SGA states ‘In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained 
goods the court may, if it thinks fit, on the plaintiff's application, by its judgment or decree direct 
that the contract shall be performed specifically, without giving the defendant the option of 
retaining the goods on payment of damages’ 
A number of issues arise here; firstly the section limits specific performance to those 
circumstances involving ‘specific’ or ‘ascertained’ goods. This suggests that the section ought 
only to apply in limited circumstances involving limited types of goods. The inclusion of specific 
or unascertained goods however is not a guarantee that the court will exercise its discretion and 
order specific performance. This discretion causes uncertainty.  Thus, a plaintiff seeking specific 
performance has no means of knowing whether the remedy will be granted even if successful on 
the merits of the case. 
There is also further uncertainty arising from a lack of consensus regarding the nature of the 
SGA itself. The nature of the SGA as a codification of common law and equity regarding sales 
law suggests that the only remedies available are those codified by common law. With respect to 
specific performance, it is relevant in considering whether the remedy can be granted for 
unascertained goods. This view has been adopted in a number of cases, 211 and criticised.212  
The court however granted specific performance in other cases, taking a different route. 213 
Although they refrained from discussing whether in fact it had the power to grant such a remedy 
under those circumstances or how the remedy fit into section 52, the decision of Re Wait or 
even the general remedial structure of the SGA. 
                                                          
210 See chapter 3 for an elaboration of the reasons why the CISG has not been adopted in Nigeria.  
211 This view was taken in the leading case of Re Wait, [1927] Ch 606. This view of codification has been criticised by 
some commentators [50] and has not been consistently applied in all cases.  
212 See e.g GH Treitel, ‘Specific Performance in the Sale of Goods’ (1966) Journal of Business Law 211, 223-224. 




The conflict of the courts in this area, demonstrates uncertainty because the precise scope of 
when a court might have the power or discretion to grant specific performance is therefore 
unclear. 
The language in S 52 also causes uncertainty in that it adopts the term ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’ 
without any reference to buyer or seller. Yet S 52 falls within buyer’s remedies. This suggests that 
it may be argued that the seller can theoretically sue for specific performance,214 or simply that 
only the buyer has a right to ask for specific performance.215 Although certain circumstances 
have been identified as grounds for the seller to ask for specific performance, the position of the 
seller is unclear under the SGA. 
ii. The CISG  
Article 46 of the CISG which allows that a ‘buyer may require performance of the seller of his 
obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement’ 
is the equivalent of S.52 SGA. Unlike the SGA, the CISG contains a provision in favour of the 
seller in Article 62 to require the buyer to ‘pay the price, take delivery or perform his other 
obligations’. Although this area is clearer under the CISG, it has been suggested that the 
provision allowing specific performance in favour of the seller is unlikely to have a significant 
practical effect except in exceptional circumstances.216 
The CISG in Art 46 and 62 does not require that goods for which the specific performance is 
sought should be specific, ascertained or otherwise identified under the contract. The 
Convention thus proves superior to the SGA in this regard because it eliminates uncertainty.  
The only exception regarding the buyer's ability to demand specific performance is resorting to a 
remedy, which is inconsistent with specific performance. Like the SGA, the buyer can claim 
damages in addition to specific performance. 
A distinction between the CISG and the SGA is with regards to the person entitled to pursue the 
remedy. Whilst the SGA designates the remedy of specific performance to be granted by the 
court, discretionarily, the CISG makes it the buyer’s option to request specific performance from 
the seller without recourse to the court. This requirement shows the inclusive nature of the 
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Convention in considering the preference for many legal systems that an international text 
should focus on the rights and obligations of parties rather than reference to tribunals.217 The 
effect of the wordings of the CISG distinct to the SGA is considered uncertain. However, 
practically, the wordings seem more useful in Nigeria since a typical buyer would prefer the seller 
to make good on his obligations before resorting to court. This is ultimately similar to the SGA 
because in any event, a court would most likely award specific performance where the buyer has 
asked for it specifically. 
The CISG proves superior to the SGA in this regard because it does not mention the 
discretionary power of the court whilst the SGA does so. This suggests that specific performance 
would be granted more under the CISG. This is useful for SME’s and sole traders in Nigeria, 
buyers, who may prefer delivery of goods as opposed to the hassle of finding another buyer. 
However, this advantage is watered down by the provision of Article 28 of the CISG, which 
limits the ability of a party to obtain specific performance in certain circumstances. The article 
states  
If, in accordance with this Convention, one party is entitled to require 
performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound 
to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do 
so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed 
by this Convention 
This suggests that any determination by an English court regarding the granting of specific 
performance would require consultation with S 52 SGA. This to a large extent, defeats the 
uniformity goal of the CISG.  
Despite the above, one must recognise that this would only be defeated where the jurisdiction of 
the contract is possibly a common law jurisdiction. Given that the CISG is just applicable in 
terms of governing law clause and not jurisdiction clause, where it is in another jurisdiction the 
reference to domestic law may result in the grant of specific performance without reservations. 
It has also been suggested that there is still some scope for English judges to use the CISG to 
expand the doctrine of specific performance based on the wording of Article 28. It states that 
the court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless it would do so under 
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domestic law. However, it does not expressly limit specific performance to those circumstances 
allowed under English law. Since article 28 is discretionary, common law courts in different 
jurisdictions may choose to apply Article 46(1) to grant specific performance where it might not 
be clearly available under the SGA. 
Given the advantages of the CISG, with the ability to provide clarity through its provisions in an 
unclear area such as with the issue of the ambit of the court’s discretion in granting the remedy 
of specific performance, it is advisable that Nigerian traders consider the remedial scheme under 
the Convention as opposed to the SGA. 
5.5.2 Granting Additional Time to Defaulting Party 
The remedy which allows a party to grant additional time to the other party is not really a stand-
alone remedy. It usually goes with other remedies especially the ones, which repudiate the 
contract. This remedy gives the opportunity for a defaulting party to cure its performance by 
making delivery or paying purchase price. 
i. The CISG  
Article 47 of the CISG states  
(1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the 
seller of his obligations. 
(2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not perform within the 
period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of 
contract. However, the buyer is not deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages 
for delay in performance 
This remedy, borrowed from the German concept of Nachfrist has the same effect. Article 47 
accompanies Article 46. There is also some bearing with Article 33, which fixes time for the 
seller to deliver goods and Article 63, which is associated to the time obligations of a buyer in 
Article 38(1) and Article 59. 
Article 47 is inextricably linked to the concept of fundamental breach under the CISG. It has the 
principal purpose of protecting the buyer waiting for delayed delivery. The buyer in such 
circumstance may determine at what point the seller’s delay becomes a fundamental breach, thus 
entitling him to avoid or repudiate. The seller uses the additional time concept where the buyer 




reasonable is not defined by the CISG. Article 49 1(b) allows the buyer to declare the contract 
avoided if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time fixed by the 
buyer in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 47, or declares that he will not deliver within the 
period so fixed. 
Article 47 and 49(1)b raises uncertainty regarding the full effect of Art 47 as a remedy. 218 
Although Article 47 states that additional time may be granted to allow the seller to perform its 
‘obligations’, while Article 49(1)(b) speaks only avoidance in regard of the delivery obligation, the 
opportunity of the buyer to avoid the contract where the seller has breached an obligation other 
than a delivery obligation is limited to cases where there is in fact a fundamental breach. This 
means that if a buyer gives a Nachfrist notice in such circumstances, the effect of the notice will 
be that the buyer will be prohibited from resorting to any other remedy for breach of contract 
during the period of such notice. 
Although the seller has the opportunity to cure the breach, at the time, the buyer would be 
precluded from taking any remedial action. This provision is considered to be more useful for 
the seller who is trying to cure the defect. However, with respect to the buyer, it seems unclear 
what purpose a Nachfrist notice would serve in those circumstances. Instead of offering a 
remedy to the buyer, it imposes a burden.219 Despite this, the buyer after the expiration of the 
time is still entitled to other remedies allowed by the CISG. 
It has been suggested that the CISG by granting additional time to defaulting parties may tend to 
favour the seller more than the buyer. Thus, the provision of the CISG in this regard may be 
unfavourable to the Nigerian SME and sole trader, who in international trade bargain imports 
goods, thus, making him the disadvantaged buyer. It is suggested however that this assumption 
must be examined in light of the preference of the buyer i.e. whether he prefers the seller to cure 
his wrong or resort to the courts for resolution and possibly break the contractual relationship 
and go through the hassle of finding another seller. 
Furthermore, the essence of the Nachfrist notice must be appreciated.  
Where a remedial scheme does not have a clear distinction between 
obligations that allow for repudiation and those that do not (such as 
conditions and warranties), some remedy is required in the cases where 
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the delay is "borderline". Even within such a scheme, there are instances 
where an innocent party can be uncertain as to the remedies available to 
it. In these circumstances, the Nachfrist concept introduced from 
German law seems to be a useful tool220 
ii. The SGA 
The SGA does not have specific provisions resembling the Nachfrist notice. 221  However a 
similarity can be found within the rules relating to breach of timing obligations and whether it 
allows avoidance. Under the SGA, avoidance of a contract is based on the importance of the 
term being breached, either a warranty or a condition. 222  Thus, where a time stipulation is 
breached, an innocent party is not obligated to deliver any notice before seeking repudiation. 
Section 10(2) of the SGA provides that whether any other stipulation as to time is, or is not of 
the essence of the contract, depends on the terms of the contract. This provision suggests that 
the seller does not have the right to repudiate and any other time obligation does not allow for 
repudiation since it is dependent on the construction of contract.  
Several authors and English cases demonstrate that breach of time obligation is of the essence.223 
This shows that there is no need for the Nachfrist notice before a contract can be repudiated.  
Irrespective of the strictness of breach of timing obligations, the innocent party is still free to 
give the defaulting party additional time to perform its obligations. However, this is considered a 
waiver by the party rather than the equivalent of the Nachfrist notice. This process requires two 
steps first a waiver of the time obligation and second a new notice making time of the essence. 
The effect of the first step is that time is no longer considered of the essence. However, equity 
has intervened to propose that breach of the time specified after the waiver, which constitutes a 
notice requiring performance entitles the innocent party to avoid or rescind.224  
As a result of the above, a similar result would probably be reached in most cases by the 
common law as by the CISG.  
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Under both regimes, the innocent party can deliver a notice, the validity 
of which is dependent on the reasonableness of the innocent party's 
position and of the time period required. Both structures give the 
defaulting party the protection of a reasonable time, at the expense of 
the innocent party's certainty of when a time period would be 
considered reasonable225 
The above shows that although English law does not have the exact equivalent of the Nachfrist 
notice, where an innocent party waives a time obligation, the same results would invariably be 
reached. This suggests that there would be minimal difficulty in the application of the CISG in 
Nigeria with common law provisions. 
5.5.3 Reduction of Price 
The remedy which allows reduction of price gives a buyer the opportunity to keep non-
conforming goods delivered by the seller in which case the contract is adjusted to reflect the new 
situation. Here, the price of the goods is reduced just as if the subject matter of the contract had 
initially been the value of the reduced price. In this regard, the CISG drew upon the principles of 
the European legal systems. This principle has no real counterpart in common law, where it is 
replaced by the right to claim damages.226 Although the English law and the CISG do not fully 
embrace the traditional Roman law position, one may still find resemblances in them.227 
i. The CISG 
Article 50 of the CISG reads: 
If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not the 
price has already been paid, the buyer may reduce the price in the same 
proportion as the value that the goods actually delivered had at the time 
of the delivery bears to the value that conforming goods would have had 
at that time. However, if the seller remedies any failure to perform his 
obligations in accordance with article 37 or article 48 or if the buyer 
refuses to accept performance by the seller in accordance with those 
articles, the buyer may not reduce the price. 
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The non-conformity of goods availing the buyer of this remedy is on the basis of Article 35, and 
there is no distinction between the different types of non-conformity i.e. quality, quantity and 
description. Thus, the remedy applies irrespective of the reason for non-conformity. This 
provision is particularly beneficial to the buyer from a developing country, and was drafted, 
bearing the perspective of the buyer. 
This is evidenced by the fact that price reduction is an autonomous right of the buyer, which he 
exercises by declaration without any formal requirement.228 He also has the power to solely 
determine the difference in value between the contract price and the actual value. This means 
that the buyer does not need a court or tribunal to decide this.229 For buyers in developing 
countries such as Nigeria, this right is particularly useful, given the likelihood of their preference 
to carry on with business and make profits from the damaged goods, rather than waiting for new 
goods, thus encouraging delay. This is particularly detrimental where the goods sold are seasonal.  
The power of the buyer may be reduced where he has already paid the purchase price because he 
would be seeking a refund from the seller for a portion of the purchase price. This puts him in 
the position of the claimant, burdening him with litigation proceedings. It has been shown in 
most cases under this Article, that buyers did not use Article 50 offensively but rather as a 
counter claim or a defence to an action by the seller. 230 A problem with this remedy is how to 
calculate the price to be reduced in terms of quality. This may lead to litigation, which means the 
buyer would in most cases seek full damages for breach rather than just price reduction. It has 
been suggested that for the buyer to maximise his recovery, he should seek damages alone 
because it is calculated on the basis of the buyer’s loss, whilst price reduction alone is calculated 
without reference to the loss suffered by the buyer, and so therefore would not include common 
costs.231 Article 45(2) however allows the buyer to combine price reduction with damages under 
Article 45(1) b. Thus, the buyer may therefore base his claim for price reduction on Article 50 
and claim additional losses under Article 45(1)(b).232  
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There are certain cases where the buyer would prefer to seek price reduction as opposed to 
damages because he has difficulty proving his loss. In such instances the CISG protects the 
buyer. A particular problem with price reduction is where it is in conjunction with Article 79. A 
seller may be exempted from damages where failure to perform was due to force majeure. However, 
Article 79(5) states that this is only applicable to claims for damages and parties can exercise their 
rights to other remedies. Thus, a buyer may still claim price reduction. In certain circumstances 
where a buyer is precluded from claiming damages, his only remedy would be price reduction. 
Article 50 can in such circumstances be seen as an additional form of risk allocation between the 
buyer and seller in these circumstances.233 
The remedy of price reduction is more beneficial to the buyer than claiming for damages 
particularly in situations where the market price of the (conforming) goods has changed 
substantially between the time of contracting and the time of delivery. The calculation method 
for price reduction has been referred to as "proportionate", versus "linear" or "absolute" 
calculations for damages.234 The price reduction remedy favours the buyer in that he can reject 
the goods if there has been a reduction in price and obtain conforming replacement goods on 
the open market at less than the contract price. However the CISG balances this out with the 
seller’s rights by providing that Article 50 is subject to the seller's right to cure any defect under 
Article 48. This article is favourable because it does protect the buyer from certain inequitable 
situations that would otherwise not be properly remedied by damages alone. 
ii. The SGA 
The SGA does not explicitly provide for price reduction. However, some of the remedies 
provided by the SGA can be considered equivalent to the remedy of price reduction such as 
sections 30 and 53. Section 30 though referring only to delivery of the wrong quantity, follows 
the same general principle by stating that a buyer must pay for goods less than the contracted 
quantity, delivered by seller, ‘at the contract rate’. This ‘contract rate’ is comparable to the 
‘proportional’ calculations made under Article 50 of the CISG. Given this, the practical 
application of S 30 would have the same effect as Article 50. 
S 53 despite its applicability to only breaches of warranty and phrased in terms of setting off the 
breach against the price due, has a similar effect. Like the CISG, it allows the price reduction 
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remedy for the buyer in lieu of a claim to damages. While the CISG allows the buyer a general 
right to reduce the price, S 53 of the SGA allows price reduction only as a defence to the seller’s 
action for price. This section is further distinct from the CISG in that its calculation is linear or 
absolute like the calculation of damages as opposed to the proportional method of Article 50. 
Accordingly, where there has been a market price change (either a rise or fall) from the contract 
price, the difference in value test could reach a different result than the proportionality test, but 
not in all circumstances.235 
Even without a specific remedy comparable to Article 50, English law probably reaches the same 
result as the CISG in most cases where there is a breach of a warranty.236 
From the above comparison one can see similarities between the CISG price reduction remedy 
and the remedies offered by the SGA. This shows that the CISG complements the SGA, and 
interpreters would have no difficulty understanding the purpose of the Convention and 
interpreting it in that light. It also shows that as a legal transplant, the CISG has the potential to 
be successful in Nigeria. This is particularly in light of the fact that remedies such as pride 
reduction are more favourable to the Nigerian buyer who may feel out of his depth by the 
application of the sellers’ foreign laws.  
5.6 Potential Effects/Implications of the CISG in Nigeria  
The initial interaction of the CISG with the domestic laws, the reactions to it by the actors in the 
jurisdictions where it is transplanted invalidates Watson’s argument that legal transplants are 
socially easy because it is just words being transplanted. Experience of other jurisdictions show 
that at the initial stages of adoption of the CISG, there were mixed interpretations with the 
domestic law, avoidance of the CISG, and instances of homeward trend.237 All these illustrate the 
difficulties of transplanting a law. 
However, the suggestion of the impossibility of legal transplant by Legrand fails because with 
time, users of the CISG became more familiar with it and applied it appropriately, according to 
its purpose. Thus, although adaptation of the CISG did not occur immediately, apart from the 
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actual adoption of words, subsequently, legal actors became familiar with it and applied it 
accordingly, avoiding subjective interpretations.  
This confirms literature suggesting that there is usually a middle ground between success and 
failure when a law is transplanted. Thus, whilst the eager assertion that transplants are ever 
flourishing, and the opposing argument that they are impossible, may be somewhat far-fetched, 
there is indeed a strong case for the eventual adaptation of the transplant given time.    
Following this, an examination of the effects of the CISG on the various actors and domestic 
law are examined bearing in mind that there are degrees in adaptation of the Convention in each 
jurisdiction.   
5.6.1 Effects on Actors  
5.6.1.1 Judges/Arbitrators 
i. Wrongful Interpretation of the CISG 
One effect of transplant is the likelihood of attaching familiar meanings drawn from existing 
institutions to new institutions, and vice versa, resulting in the production of rules and 
institutions distinct from the original transplant. The CISG was not exempt from this 
consequence, particularly because Article 7 requires an autonomous interpretation. Thus, it is not 
possible to directly resort to national methodology. Since the Convention is silent on how to 
attain autonomous interpretation, there may be issues for Nigerian interpreters in following a 
uniform approach.  
At the preliminary stages of its adoption in the U.S, Courts, at loss regarding what to make of the 
Convention applied the domestic understanding to the interpretation. Cases such as Raw 
Materials Inc v Manfred Forberich Gmbh,238 where the courts despite recognising the CISG as the 
applicable law, endorsed the plaintiff’s general assertion that case law on U.S domestic sales law, 
Article 2 of the UCC, could be used for guidance in applying the CISG, where the relevant 
provisions track that of the UCC, demonstrate this. The court particularly declared that the case 
law interpreting the UCCs excuse provision S 2-615 provides guidance for interpreting Article 79 
of the CISG since it contains similar requirements as those set forth in the Convention. Based 
on the defendant’s consent, the court applied UCC cases to the CISG. This marked the end of 
any mention of foreign case commentaries and cases on the CISG.  
                                                          




This was also the case in Germany, in Veneer cutting machine case,239 where the seller came from 
Indiana, and the law applicable to the contract was therefore the law of Indiana.240 However, The 
OLG Düsseldorf decided the CISG was applicable, because the United States had been a CISG 
member since 1988.241 The Court ignored the fact that the United States had opted out of Article 
1(1)(b) by declaration under Article 95.242   
This behaviour is also found in other jurisdictions such as Australia. For instance in Kotsambasis v 
Singapore Airlines Ltd243 the courts referred to The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical 
Co244 and stated that ‘It is only if the interpretation of certain words by a national court assists in 
the interpretation of the same words that appear in an international Convention that any 
significant weight can be imported to the municipal law.’245 
These wrongful interpretations result in miscarriage of justice, ultimately defeating the purpose 
of the CISG.    
However an examination of the case trajectory both in Germany and the U.S. show that with 
time the interpretational challenges abated and interpretations are now more aligned to the CISG. 
The actors in these jurisdictions showed more adaptability by recognising not only the 
applicability of the Convention in disputes but also by recognising the errors of the courts in 
previous decisions and calling for the right interpretation.  
Presently, Nigeria has not adopted a lot of international treaties and as such there is a dearth of 
cases on their interpretation. However, the application of the purposive approach in the 
interpretation of a statute is widely recognised and acknowledged by the courts. This suggests 
there is a foundation for interpreting the CISG according to its aims and purposes. In AG Lagos 
State v AG of the federation & ors,246 the issue was whether the court is entitled to consider materials 
or information used during legislative process in enacting a law to determine the true intendment 
of a statutory or constitutional provision. The court found that it is  
…entitled to take account of, and use such materials or information 
which it considers will help it determine the true intendment of a 
statutory or constitutional provision in a purposive interpretative 
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approach or which will lead it to assess the correctness of a meaning it 
has, through the usual canons of interpretation, given to such a 
provision.247 
The courts also recognised the paramountcy of the purposive approach in Fbn Plc. & Ors. v 
Maiwada & ors, where it was stated that ‘it is not in doubt that in deserving situations, purposive 
interpretation should be employed by the court. The purpose of legislation is of paramount 
factor.’248  
The adoption of the purposive approach in the interpretation of laws by Nigerian courts 
demonstrates their ability and willingness to recognise the aims of the CISG and avoid domestic 
interpretation, where it is adopted. The cases also show that the courts will consider the materials 
and information used during the legislative process in drafting a law. This suggests that where 
there is controversy or ambiguity in the interpretation of the CISG, the courts will not only 
consider the purpose of the CISG but look to its historical materials, thus, eschewing domestic 
laws. This is particularly important since a recognised method of interpreting the CISG is 
through consultation with its antecedents, ULIS and ULF, and considerations of the proceedings 
of the draft committee.  
Some Nigerian cases have had recourse to international law to resolve domestic legal issues.249 In 
Mojekwu v Ejikeme the Court of Appeal invoked the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women250 in the context of determining a native law and custom.251 
This willingness of courts to adopt international treaties in interpreting domestic law is indication 
that they will have no problem resorting to precedents from courts of other jurisdiction i.e. 
CISG jurisconsultorium, in determining the right interpretation of the CISG, thus ensuring 
uniform interpretation.  
The court’s attitude in giving priority to international treaties in Nigeria where they have been 
properly domesticated, as in Abacha v Fawehinmi, where the court pointed out that owing to its 
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international flavour the African Charter Act has a greater strength and vigour than ordinary 
legislation,252 also demonstrates that where justified, the courts will give priority to the CISG.  
ii. Avoidance of the CISG  
The fear of application of new laws especially where there is existing law means that the new law 
will be avoided at all costs. Judges avoided the CISG at the initial stages of its adoption in other 
jurisdictions. In Raw Materials,253 there was not only misinterpretation of the CISG but avoidance. 
The court did not distinguish the CISG from the domestic law, but treated the Convention as 
irrelevant, albeit finding it as the governing law-as if it ‘were in some unexplained fashion 
superseded by US domestic law’.254 As stated by one commentator  
Not one word of this discussion would have to be changed if UCC 
Article 2 had actually been the applicable law. A more flagrant and 
depressing example of a court ignoring its obligations under CISG 
article 7(1) and indulging – nay, wallowing in- the homeward trend is 
hard to imagine. The court’s methodology should mean that its analysis 
will properly be ignored by other courts-both U.S and foreign- that are 
called upon to apply CISG article 79…255    
The avoidance of the CISG by judges at the initial stages of adoption, though prevalent in the 
US was not in Germany. The polarization in the approaches of judges suggests it is possible 
from the outset, where the CISG is adopted in Nigeria, despite unfamiliarity, not to shun it.  
There is also an imperative for judges to apply the CISG and where they apply it, to do so 
autonomously. This is part of their functions as umpires, simply called to apply the rules. 256 
Therefore, Nigerian judges are constrained to act with integrity where it is clear that the CISG is 
the appropriate law. Avoidance or misapplication of the CISG may hinder administration of 
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justice. It is suggested that Judges should leave aside their preferences and adopt the CISG where 
it ought to be applied.  
5.6.1.2 Lawyers 
 
iii. Avoidance of the CISG 
One of the effects of transplanting the CISG is that lawyers may exclude it from their contracts. 
This may be considered a safe option where lawyers have little or no awareness of the 
Convention. The uncertainty and unpredictability will result in minimal or no application. Thus, 
‘what the peasant does not know, the peasant will not eat’.257  
The experience of other jurisdictions with respect to the CISG evidences this. In Australia, 22 
cases were recorded after 20 years of adoption.258 Justice Finn of the Federal Court of Australia 
suggested “it is fair to say that the CISG is scarcely known in this country”. 259  Anecdotal 
evidence also supports the routine exclusion of the CISG. The Federal Defence Department of 
Australia in their supply contracts routinely exclude the CISG. 260   
This avoidance is also practiced in Germany and the U.S, where legal practitioners insist on 
excluding the CISG from their contracts.261 The reasons for this practice include; little awareness 
of the Convention, legal uncertainty especially because of unforeseen solutions, clients being 
unaware of the CISG and the notion that the German law comparatively is more advantageous. 
Habits and traditions such as the practice of excluding the predecessors of the Convention 
within the business circle also carried through.262   
It is predicted that this same avoidance based on a majority of the reasons above may be 
experienced amongst lawyers in Nigeria. However this can be avoided and it must be 
remembered that despite sympathy for the excuses, there are consequences for avoidance.  
Firstly, failure to consider the CISG when advising clients on choice of law issues, and absence 
of utilisation of the CISG in arguments is detrimental to the interests of clients. An important 
                                                          
257 Eckart Brödermann, ‘The practice of excluding the CISG: time for change? Comment on the limited use of the 
CISG in private practice (and on why this will increasingly change)’ (Modern Law for Global Commerce Congress 
to celebrate the fortieth annual session of UNCITRAL Vienna, 9-12 July 2007). 
258 Lisa Spagnolo, ‘The Last Outpost: Automatic CISG Opt Outs: Misapplications and the Costs of Ignoring the 
Vienna sales Convention for Australian Lawyers’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 141, 142.   
259  P Finn, ’National Contract Law and Transnational Norms and Practices’ (Cross-Border Collaboration, 
Convergence and Conflict Conference, Sydney, 9 February 2010) 9.   
260 Spagnolo (n 258) 141. 
261 See Chapter 4.  
262 MF Kohler, Das UN-Kaufrecht (CISG) und sein Anwendungsausschluss (2007)310 et seq.; J. Meyer, U.N-
Kaufretch in der deutschen Anwaltspraxis, RabelsZ 69 (2005) 457et seq in Ulrich Magnus, ‘Germany’ in Franco 




duty of the Nigerian lawyer is to provide clients with proper service and representation. 
Accordingly, the Rules of Professional Conduct263 provide that ‘The lawyer owes entire devotion 
to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defence of the client's rights and 
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld 
from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied…’264 Entire devotion in this context includes 
devotion to understanding any new laws which might be beneficial to client and offering clients 
the option of that law where it may be applicable. Failing to do this leaves the practitioner open 
to legal suits for negligence, recognised under the new S4 (1) of the Legal Practitioners Act.265 
It is suggested that in the interest of the clients, and for the avoidance of negligence claims, 
where applicable, the CISG should be offered to clients. 
Avoiding the CISG is also detrimental to the lawyers in that it could hinder the ability of the 
Nigerian legal practitioners to compete on a global scale with other practitioners. In developing 
countries where commercial laws are desperately in need of reform, the CISG will increase the 
financial gains of lawyers. Empirical evidence suggests that majority of the contracts drafted by 
commercial lawyers in Nigeria are governed by the English SGA 1979.  
This means that most of the disputes will be referred to English lawyers resulting in reduced 
participation in international trade disputes for Nigerian lawyers. The effect of the CISG in this 
regard is that it would provide a neutral framework, which creates a level playing field for lawyers 
in Nigeria, who because of scepticism associated with legal infrastructure of any developing 
country, and the fact that the SMEs in Nigeria are by virtue of governing law clause puts lawyers 
representing them at a disadvantage. This will ensure that international trade disputes are fairly 
distributed, meaning more pecuniary benefits. It is no wander that the UK has not adopted the 
CISG, with the anxiety that London will no longer retain its status as the commercial hob of the 
world.266  
Avoidance of the CISG can be resolved by creating awareness of the CISG, and unfamiliarity 
abates with time and continuous usage. Moreover, business associations in different jurisdictions 
are now beginning to recommend non-exclusion of the CISG in contracts.  
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5.6.1.3 Traders  
An impediment faced by businessmen in Nigeria is understanding the foreign legal framework in 
international trade transactions. This is because of the difficulty in accessing the foreign law, and 
the distribution of bargaining power, which often makes them the weaker bargaining party. 
When these contracts are breached, the choice of law and jurisdiction clauses will favour the 
stronger party. The Nigerian party usually unwilling to pursue remedies through a law, and in 
another country unfamiliar to him bears the loss of the whole transaction. These losses are 
mitigated by increasing the price of subsequent goods, to make up for the lost money from the 
previous non-conforming batch. The astronomical price is paid by the consumer who is left with 
hardly any choice. 
As a result of the unstructured nature of trade in Nigeria, businessmen sign contracts with 
foreign counterparts ignoring the details of the contract. It is usually in the event of the breach 
of contract that the unfavourable provisions are discovered. Where the CISG operates, the 
Nigerian businessman may redraft his standard terms and conditions to make provision for the 
requirements and stipulations of the Convention, knowing it will fit with the applicable legal 
system and mitigate drafting costs. The choice of opting out ensures he will not be constrained 
to the provisions of the Convention but can have his terms and conditions tailored to his needs. 
By providing a legal foundation with default terms familiar to parties while working to reduce 
transaction costs and ensuring certainty, the effect of the Convention will be the facilitation of 
international trade in Nigeria.  
The effect of transplanting the CISG in this regard is that the way international trade 
transactions are carried out by Nigerian businessmen will undergo a change, favourable to them. 
These traders have the ability to standardise their preferred position on choice of law. Thus, the 
CISG as a neutral law will ensure equal bargaining position of parties. By providing a standard 
legal language and a method of categorising and interpreting legal rules, the CISG invariably 
reduces legal knowledge costs for Nigerian traders, as the costs of resolving disputes are reduced.  
The effect of the CISG is that it also reduces the risk that the forum will misapply the law 
chosen, since the obligation of any of the courts seized with the interpretation of the CISG is the 
same, to apply the CISG as a uniform international law, having reference to CISG scholarship 
and cases. Because the CISG stands a better chance of being uniformly applied more than any 
other alternative choice of law, irrespective of the location or nature of the forum,267 the effect 
                                                          




for Nigerian traders is a more stable, predictable outcome for international trade transactions in 
Nigeria.   
Given its accessibility, the CISG has the effect of further simplifying trade for Nigerian 
businessmen, reluctant to consult with lawyers at the initial contractual stages. The simplicity of 
the Convention’s language means that traders at any level can understand the concepts. Materials 
on the CISG are easily accessible on internet sites dedicated to the dissemination of CISG cases 
and scholarship. Nigerian traders can consult precedents on the CISG to understand the 
implication of certain concepts and envisage the outcome of their cases in the event of dispute. 
When compared to the impracticability of accessing different foreign laws and their intricacies, 
the Convention is a preferred option.  
5.6.2 Broader Effects of the CISG in Nigeria 
As already discussed,268 the CISG has the effect of catalysing law reform for developing countries. 
It follows therefore that whatever reform the Convention engineers in Nigeria would lead to 
change in the mentality of actors in Nigeria. Firstly, because of the security, which comes from 
having a neutral law known to both parties, Nigerian traders will have more confidence when 
transacting with foreign traders. Thus, removing the fear of uncertainties and enabling more 
trade transactions.  
For the legal academia, the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria would provide an opportunity to 
engage with academics globally in the area of international sales, broadening their scope of 
research. The Convention where it is adopted will improve the syllabus of the Nigerian law 
school, exposing and preparing potential lawyers to laws and concepts, which they will use in 
practical transactions. The CISG will expose actors to concepts of different legal systems e.g. 
civil legal system. This is more relevant in light of globalisation and convergence of legal systems.         
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the CISG which embodies the qualities of different legal transplants 
can be adopted in Nigeria. The Convention’s flexibility makes it the most suitable framework for 
international trade, particularly for the sole traders and SMEs. Adoption of the CISG to Nigeria 
will facilitate trade whilst serving as a model for law reform in Nigeria. Recognising the 
justifications for the CISG in Nigeria, makes it arguably, the best law for international trade in 
Nigeria.  
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The CISG also proves to be the better framework amongst the available alternatives such as the 
OHADA, for Nigeria. The Convention’s flexibility to private parties and States means it can 
function complementarily with the OHADA.  
Factors such as motivation, availability of substitutes, the commonality of legal transplants, 
willingness by actors to engage with the CISG and legality and neutrality of the CISG all suggest 
that the Convention will be successful where adopted in Nigeria. 
Having examined the potential effects of the Convention in Nigeria, it is suggested that the 
positive effects outweigh the negatives. Furthermore, these effects can be counteracted with 
certain tools and solutions accepted by users of the CISG worldwide. The experiences of other 
jurisdictions that have adopted the Convention demonstrate the functionality of the Convention 



















       CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to understand the reasons why Nigeria has not adopted the CISG, and to 
explore the possibility and implications of adopting the Convention in Nigeria. The study was 
necessary, given the burgeoning and continuous desire for growth of international trade in 
Nigeria, and the fact that the trade environment, including trade policies are unstructured, 
consequently, putting the Nigerian trader in a disadvantaged position. Such factors, invariably 
detrimental to economic growth in Nigeria, emphasise the need for enhancing international trade 
laws and policies in Nigeria.  
A framework capable of promoting and enhancing international trade in Nigeria is the CISG. 
The Convention offers a coherent and comprehensive legal framework for working through 
complex transactional issues related to international trade by ensuring certainty and reducing 
transaction costs. Besides providing a sturdy and general framework for trade, the provisions of 
the Convention are particularly useful for Nigeria as a developing country because they are 
designed to reduce ex post transaction costs for sole traders and SMEs, dealing with a high level 
of importation, requiring them to contract more with manufactured goods.  
Given the perceived needs in international trade and the possible benefits of the CISG in Nigeria, 
it is surprising that it has not yet been adopted. Based on this, an assessment of the Convention 
has been undertaken in the thesis to determine its legitimacy, the reasons why it has not been 
adopted in Nigeria, the need, if any, for the Convention, and the interaction of the Convention 
with the Nigerian legal system. 
Having considered literature on the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in different 
countries, it is shown that although there is some similitude for the non-adoption of the CISG in 
Nigeria and other countries, the distinctive reasons for Nigeria’s non adoption evidences the 
individuality of each jurisdiction.  
Although the Convention is considered successful by certain accepted measures, this success is 
measured in the Nigerian context to determine its implications for Nigeria. Through empirical 




draws up a typology based on the legal transplant theories to evaluate the successful interaction 
of the Convention in Germany and the U.S, both civil and common law jurisdictions where the 
Convention has been adopted. This analysis also helped to assess the effects of the CISG as a 
legal transplant on actors and the legal system. This is used to conceptualise the interaction of 
the CISG in Nigeria. 
By recognising the distinctiveness of each jurisdiction in their economic development and 
requirements, the thesis provides answers to the following questions on the CISG bearing in 
mind possibilities and implications of adopting it in Nigeria. 
1.1 Is the CISG a successful framework? 
1.2 Why has Nigeria not adopted the CISG? 
1.3 Does Nigeria need the Convention? 
1.4 Can the CISG be transplanted to Nigeria?  
6.2 Findings 
6.2.1 On the Success of the Convention  
The thesis began by providing an overview of Convention, through an examination of its history, 
and the purposes, for which it was birthed. The goals and aims of the CISG show that the 
Convention promotes uniformity by establishing a common legal standard for governing 
international transactions worldwide, through a framework. The Convention also promotes 
harmonisation because it encourages consonance and accord. The Convention merges both the 
uniformity and harmonisation concepts to ensure the attainment of functional uniformity, where 
absolute uniformity is an impossible goal. As a unification endeavour, the CISG is more suited to 
Nigeria because it can subject Nigerian traders and their foreign counterparts to a single set of 
rules with an expectation of conformity.  
Through the historical analysis of the Convention, it is shown that the drafting style of the 
Convention and constituency of the UNCITRAL, particularly given the failure of the 
Convention’s precursors, the ULIS and the ULF, was representative of the diverse legal families 
and their different levels of development. The structure and content of the CISG shows that it 
was drafted in order to allow flexibility in the exclusion and application of the Convention. The 




The thesis has also shown that the Convention has functionally fulfilled and still continues to 
fulfil its goals. Indicative of its success in this regard is the number of ratification, currently, 83. 
This evidences final legal commitment by States and acceptance of the CISG as a mechanism for 
addressing common problems. The ratification also shows acceptance by countries from a wide 
spectrum of development. Acceptance of the CISG is also a signification of legislative success, as 
well as success in terms of practical application. This indicates a substantial level of agreement 
with the text of the Convention, thus making its successful. 
Ratification of the CISG by top trading nations and powerful economies including China, the 
U.S, Germany, Japan, France, Netherland, Russia, Italy and South Korea, further accentuates 
acceptance and validation of its purposes and aims. This hints at the credibility of the 
Convention and is an incentive for Nigeria to adopt it. This is more significant given that most 
of these countries are Nigeria’s most important trading partners, and the fact that the 
Convention applies to two thirds of international trade. 
The Convention is also successful as a model for domestic law reform and a paradigm for other 
international law projects, within the field of commercial and general contract law. As a 
legislative instrument, the Convention represents neutrally and sufficiently, the distinctive 
characteristics of different legal families, and variance in development indices, making its 
successful. The Convention was a model for the Scandinavian law reform. The Scandinavian 
States, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, except Denmark all reformed their domestic sales laws in 
accordance with the CISG. These reforms and the processes are particularly useful for Nigeria as 
the adoption of the CISG could spur the efforts towards the reform of the 1893 SGA whilst still 
functioning as the primary instrument for international trade transactions. The reform of the 
German law of obligations and sales law based on the CISG and the New Code of Obligations 
of China, Contract Law of the PRC, are evident of Convention’s success as a model for law 
reform.  
The CISG also influenced subsequent uniform commercial laws; both soft and hard law 
instruments, in Africa, Europe and Asia and its basic concepts have influenced and continue to 
influence several initiatives worldwide. The EU laws such as the Consumer Sales Directive and 
other EU Directives, soft laws such as the UNIDROIT Principles were drafted on the merits 
and shortcomings of the Convention. The provisions of the CISG resonate through the articles 
of the PECL and the Draft Common Frame of Reference was also influenced by the CISG. The 




It has been shown that there is a functional level of uniformity in the application of the CISG. 
This enables the achievement of the Convention’s goals; supporting international trade and 
exchange of goods, taking into account the different social, economic and legal systems, despite 
being hampered by interpretative challenges, political interpretative challenges, gaps, issues of 
homeward trend, several language versions, reservation effects, vague provisions and 
applicability to transactionally diverse range of deals. Although these problems frustrate the 
Convention’s uniformity goals, the mechanisms and the on-going efforts towards systemising 
and unifying the issues, ensure attainability of functional uniformity. The use of interpretive 
mechanisms and guidelines such as Article 7, the ability of interpreters to use foreign decisions 
whether as voluntary binding precedent or as persuasive precedent for guidance and the 
reconciliation of conflicting decisions on specific issues through use of the CISG’s interpretive 
methodology are the ways which the Convention maintains its success.  
Where the CISG is adopted, keeping in mind article 7(2), the general principles of the CISG, 
Nigerian interpreters would be able to exclude the homeward trend and rules of private 
international law that seek solution outside the Convention. The use of other instruments such 
as the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL for resolving the problems of the CISG are also 
workable mechanisms which enable the continued success of the Convention. Thus, Nigerian 
interpreters can gain from the juriosconsultorium of the CISG, which allows for consultation 
across borders and legal systems with the aim of producing autonomous and uniform 
interpretations and applications of a given law. In undertaking to share a uniform legal text like 
the CISG, contracting States are also undertaking to pursue the goal of uniformity in unison. The 
provision of the website dedicated to the CISG, and the continued improvement on translation 
of cases, demonstrate success by overcoming the effects of translation.  
The Travaux Préparatoires recognised by Article 32 of the Treaties Convention is a means of 
interpretation, albeit restrictively, which allows recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. 
This includes the usual conference materials such as drafts at prior stages and records of the 
conference at which the treaty was concluded. The ULIS and the ULF, which predate the CISG, 
can also be used as interpretive mechanisms.  
By collectively evaluating the goals of the Convention against the parameters accepted, and the 





6.2.2 On Why Nigeria has not adopted the CISG? 
 
Having considered and determined the functionality of the CISG based on the parameters above, 
and considering the desirability of the CISG as a suitable framework for governing international 
trade in Nigeria, by overcoming contradictions in the character of contracts on the international 
sale of goods and the regulation of these contracts by individual states, thus, eliminating 
transaction costs for parties dealing with distinctive legal systems and consequently allowing for a 
seamless flow of trade, the thesis, through surveys and interviews considered the factors 
affecting the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria.  
It is found that the foremost reason for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria is a lack of 
awareness of the Convention. At least 73% of the interviewees, a majority of them legal 
practitioners in the commercial law sector were not aware of the CISG. 64% of the respondents 
(legal practitioners) of the survey were also not aware of the Convention. Legal practitioners 
suggested that this lack of awareness was because of the deficiency and inertia by the 
government agencies whose obligations are with respect to international treaties. This lack of 
awareness hinders the adoption of the CISG since it is hardly possible that the Convention can 
be evaluated without knowledge of its existence.  
For the government agencies lack of awareness of the Convention is attributed to administrative 
problems such as the disproportionate levels of work assigned to officers, lack of expertise in 
commercial law and funding. The want of expertise in the area of commercial law is 
characteristic in developing countries and the lack of funding hinders participation in the drafting 
stages of international treaties. The disconnection between the ministries responsible for the 
recommendation and adoption of international treaties in Nigeria inhibits awareness of the 
Convention. There has also been no request by the Ministry of Trade, obligated to suggest 
relevant trade laws to the DICL, Federal Ministry of Justice, normally in charge of ratification of 
international laws in Nigeria.  
Respondents suggested that the CISG is hardly known in these agencies because of the lack of 
expertise of staff in commercial law, resulting in the inability to make informed 
recommendations on international treaties, consequently causing lack of awareness of the CISG. 
This makes it hardly possible for the UNCITRAL to work effectively in Nigeria to promote 




Respondents stated that the lack of awareness amongst the legal academia is because the 
Convention is not part of the Nigerian domestic laws. This they suggested is the reason why the 
NUC did not include it in the Nigerian syllabus. The fact that international trade law is not 
taught at the undergraduate level, and neither is it discussed in the Nigerian textbooks, means 
there is hardly any opportunity to discuss the Convention with the students, further limiting the 
possibility of creating awareness.  
Social problems in Nigeria such as lack of funding for the implementation of government 
policies on education, and for carrying out curriculum innovations in various disciplines and at 
various levels of education, and poorly funded teaching and research institutions which hinder 
access to international laws, also stifle awareness of the Convention.  
There is no awareness of the Convention amongst traders in Nigeria because of familiarity with 
the unstructured nature of trade and the disadvantaged position of Nigerian traders in 
international trade transactions, which has been accepted as normative. This suggests some level 
of ignorance of their anomalous transactional position. This, coupled with inaccessibility of laws 
capable of creating parity in the international transactions contributes to their lack of awareness. 
The UNCITRAL is also a contributory agent in the continued lack of awareness of the CISG in 
Nigeria. By decreasing attention on commercial law matters and focusing disproportionately on 
other perceived priorities, developing countries such as Nigeria may continue to stay uninformed 
about the CISG. Although this is a result of discordant relationships between the UN Systems 
and disproportionate allocation of funds, functional initiatives are needed to promote awareness 
of the Convention in Nigeria.  
Other reasons for lack of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria are; familiarity with the extant laws 
which makes actors hesitant to seek new laws and the dominance and preference for English 
laws in commercial transactions in Nigeria which respondents and traders were more familiar 
with. The inertia of the legislature and the tedious legislative process also results in complacence 
regarding global laws meaning that laws such as the CISG will not be considered priority. Other 
issues are; the wariness of developing countries such as Nigeria towards international laws which 
they feel are unduly representative of developed countries, comprehensively drafted contracts 
and the freewill of parties, nonchalance of Nigerian transactors towards contractual details in 
international trade transactions, the limited scope and the nature of transactions dealt with by 
CISG, i.e. sale of goods, the fact that the Convention deals with substantive contract law not 




capitalise on this by insisting on their terms in contracts, thus hardly leaving any room for the 
Nigerian trader to negotiate his terms, the underdeveloped credit system which has resulted in 
cash and carry transactions between international traders, leaving  the Nigerian trader with hardly 
any possibility of obtaining remedies and the Nigerian political history marked by instability and 
abuse of human rights, leading to minimal focus on international commercial laws such as the 
CISG. All these factors contribute to the lack of awareness of the CISG in Nigeria.  
The thesis shows that despite the validity of these reasons, they are insufficient to justify the 
non-adoption of the Convention in Nigeria, and can be surmounted. 
6.2.3 On Whether Nigeria Needs the Convention? 
Although there is still a significant amount of international trade going on in Nigeria without the 
CISG, more could be done towards ensuring a more structured trade environment, which will 
invariably promote trade growth. The thesis has identified that the CISG although appropriate 
for all parties in international trade is most germane for sole traders and SMEs, particularly 
considering their weak bargaining position. 
The growing interdependence in the relation of states, the increase in global trade and global 
markets suggest an inevitable pull towards uniformity in laws. This interdependence has resulted 
in increased international trade transactions in Nigeria. New market opportunities however 
creates challenges for international traders in Nigeria, who having the opportunity of a wider 
market and a broader range of goods, grapple with complexities of foreign laws of different 
jurisdictions. The overwhelming flurry of commercial activities is substantially and continuously 
hindered by national laws, suggesting the need for the CISG, capable of minimising transaction 
costs in international trade, while encouraging globalisation. Adopting the CISG can also be a 
signal to Nigeria’s trading partners of her commitment to improve and engage in structured trade. 
It also signals a commitment to international businessmen that Nigeria is committed to 
promoting international trade transactions and encouraging foreign investment.  
The CISG is able to provide legal certainty through laws that are accessible operable, legible, 
intelligible and up to date for international traders in Nigeria. It is imperative that traders are able 
to ascertain with clarity, the applicable law governing their transactions, the availability of the law 
and the outcome of their transaction at any given time. The CISG will facilitate commerce in 
Nigeria by lifting barriers resulting from the complexities of different legal regimes. It also 




In Nigeria, the environment of trade and the calibre of traders are such that the majority of them 
are unaware of general contracting issues. The structure of trade also makes them handicapped 
to negotiate their own terms and more importantly, the governing law clauses, which stipulates 
the sellers’ laws, makes them incapable of choosing their preferred law.  
The CISG is able to provide neutrality in international trade contracts for the parties. The sole 
traders and SMEs in Nigeria tend to do away with legal formality when transacting because the 
trade transaction is considered more important, and parties are eager to conclude the trade 
contract without conscientiousness. The CISG can serve as a protective measure and safeguard 
in the event of breach of contract and resultant dispute, where parties have hastily concluded 
contracts without any caution. 
Admittedly, there is the option for Nigerian traders of unification of private international rules, 
which means that the laws of a particular country are applicable. However, this gives unfair 
advantage to lawyers from that jurisdiction with the necessary expertise. Such exclusivity 
deprives Nigerian lawyers of pecuniary benefits from legal disputes and participation in 
international dispute resolution. The CISG is preferred in this case because it provides uniform 
substantive laws applicable to all parties and in all contracting jurisdictions, and will ensure an 
even distribution of participation in cross border transactions and pecuniary benefits, giving 
parties equal access and opportunity.  
For the Nigerian exporter, every transaction potentially raises issues of a different legal regime, 
which means that transacting will especially be costly. The costs of learning a new law are simply 
unaffordable in Nigeria, as lawyers must spend time acquainting themselves with the laws of 
foreign jurisdictions. Transaction costs are increased if the governing law is English law because 
clients have to engage English lawyers in the event of disputes. The CISG will help reduce these 
transaction costs since the Nigerian lawyer would only have to familiarise himself with the 
Nigerian 1893 SGA and the CISG.  
Considering that the trade environment is a disadvantage to the Nigerian party, having neither 
the knowledge of, nor resources to litigate in a foreign country, the goals and aims of the CISG 
and the fact that it is a common legal standard for governing international transactions 
worldwide, indubitably makes it suited to international trade transaction in Nigeria. This is 
because it will subject both parties to a single set of rules and principles with the expectation that 
they will conform to these rules. In Nigeria, the sole traders and SMEs deal largely with 




As a cost saving transplant, the CISG is an ideal model for law reform in Nigeria. This has been 
proved in different national and regional spheres. This is the ideal time for adopting the CISG 
because the SGA is presently in the legislative house and has been proposed for law reform. The 
CISG can serve as one of the laws, which will influence the reform of the SGA in Nigeria. This 
function of the CISG is evidenced in the reform of domestic laws in other states where it has 
been ratified. Since the CISG is designed specifically for international sales, it is preferable to the 
out-dated SGA, derived from earlier laws and principles, which are not based on harmonised or 
transparent standards and increase commercial risks, thus hampering the activities of commercial 
entities. Given the slow process of law reform in Nigeria, the CISG can act as an interim law 
before the law reform is completed. 
6.2.4 Regarding the Transplantability of the CISG 
The thesis explored the CISG as a legal transplant, since it entails the movement of a system of 
law from one country to another. The CISG is a legal transplant capable of being transplanted 
but with considerations of social interactions. The interaction of the CISG with domestic laws is 
plausible, given that interpretations based on domestic knowledge surface during the application 
of the CISG. Since the Convention has been a catalyst for reform of domestic laws in various 
jurisdictions, an effect of its interaction with the legal system, there is no denying its ties with the 
legal systems and cultures of the countries where it is transplanted. 
It is recognised that the interaction of the Convention with domestic laws may be a source of 
irritation on the legal system to which it has been transplanted. Two jurisdictions, Germany and 
the U.S were examined to determine this. The interaction of the CISG with the legal culture of 
the jurisdictions in the context of the thesis meant the interaction of the CISG with the actors. 
That is, the extrapolation of legal methods, legal styles and techniques and interpretation borne 
out of interaction with pre-existing frameworks to the CISG. Legal culture was taken to mean 
the effects of the concepts, the interaction with the pre-existing legal frameworks and the effect 
of the CISG on domestic law. 
The success of the CISG as a legal transplant was measured against several criteria; actual 
movement and ease of movement of the CISG. The CISG proved to be a successful transplant 
considering that Germany and the U.S, and all the countries that signed into it have ratified it. 
The ease of transplanting the CISG is attested to by the fact that the CISG was adopted in both 
countries with enthusiasm and without legislative issues. This is partly because private 
international trade law historically have shared similarities transcending state borders. Based on 




The thesis measured the success of the CISG in Germany and U.S against the second criterion 
which is the operation of the CISG according to its purpose. That is, the way the drafters 
intended that the Convention should function, to provide a modern, uniform and fair regime for 
contracts for the international sale of goods. The CISG ought to introduce certainty in 
commercial exchanges and decreasing transaction costs by ensuring uniform interpretation and 
application of its provisions amongst member states as mandated by article 7 which requires that 
regard must be had to the international character, the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade. In the U.S, although at the 
preliminary stages of adoption, the courts at a loss regarding what to make of the Convention, 
applied the domestic UCC principles to the CISG.  However, in time the Courts began to apply 
the Convention independent of domestic interpretations. 
The interpretation of the CISG by the German courts at the initial stages, despite tilting slightly 
towards the homeward trend, normalised almost immediately, thus evidencing consideration of 
the Convention’s purpose. In terms of interpretation and uniformity amongst the judiciary, from 
1988-1994 records showed that the judges generally adhered to the CISG and applied it when 
the need arose. The courts recognised the need for autonomous and purposive application of the 
Convention.  
The thesis found the Convention to be successful in both jurisdictions based on the second 
criterion. Although the pace of interpretation of the CISG according to its purpose varied in 
both jurisdictions, with Germany having a faster pace, the Convention is currently being 
successfully applied. 
The third criterion, which the CISG is measured against, is the congruence with societal needs 
and legal infrastructure of transplant countries. The thesis examined whether the CISG was able 
to fill gaps in the legal systems of Germany and the U.S, which domestic laws cannot achieve. 
The Convention fills the gap and needs of both jurisdictions by providing a neutral law, which 
allows the parties to save costs and accrue benefits to social actors. The way the CISG 
complements the domestic law in Germany and the U.S and the extent of their differences was 
considered. In the U.S, although the principles of the CISG were distinct to concepts of the 
UCC, causing interpretive problems, with time, the courts began to dissociate from the use of 





The fact that the CISG served as a model for domestic law reform in Germany makes it a 
successful transplant. That it served as a fertile soil for the reform of not only the Civil Code but 
the Travel Contract Act shows it met the needs of the German jurisdiction. The extent of fit 
between the CISG and the German law can be seen in the fact that the interpretation of the 
domestic law is in light of the CISG model. In terms of fit with the legal infrastructure, the 
approach of the courts to discrepancies between the Convention and the German domestic 
principles shows harmonious fit. Even in the face of conflict with already accepted and practiced 
principles, the courts esteemed the Convention by interpreting it according to its overarching 
principles and purpose. The CISG served as a gap filler and a trigger for law reform in Germany, 
making it successful.   
The interaction and reaction of the actors in both jurisdictions towards the CISG is used to 
measure its success. In the U.S, legal practitioners and interpreters initially showed lack of 
engagement with the CISG. They showed a lack of familiarity, lack of usage and willingness to 
use the CISG. Although these reactions are symptomatic of the CISG as a failed transplant, they 
were only at the initial adoption stages of the Convention. There has been a steady decline in the 
opt out practice by lawyers in the U.S which is evidence of familiarity and willingness to engage 
with the law. 
The number of cases recorded in Germany on the CISG is illustrative of engagement with the 
Convention, although not at an optimal level. Thus, even though users take it seriously, they still 
exclude it in their transactions. However, increasingly business associations recommend non-
exclusion of the CISG. Scholarly interest in the CISG in Germany is particularly impressive 
showing acceptance of the Convention. Considering the growing usage of the CISG in both 
jurisdictions, it is considered successful.  
The last criterion on which the CISG’s success was measured is its duration in Germany and the 
U.S. Thus, considering that a characteristic of an unsuccessful transplant is that it is short-lived, 
the existence and continued application of the CISG in the U.S means that it is successfully 
transplanted. That the Convention has been in Germany for 24 years, since its adoption and is 
still currently being applied in recent cases evidences sustained usage by actors, making the 
Convention successful. 
The successful transplantation of the CISG in Germany and the U.S is an indication of the 




6.2.5 On how to Transplant the CISG into Nigeria and the Implications? 
The CISG will function as a cost saving transplant because it is a readymade model for law 
reform, particularly considering the on-going plans to reform the 1893 SGA. With the rise in 
globalisation, and converging legal systems, borders are fading and laws such as the CISG are 
exemplar models for Nigeria especially towards achieving a standard for international trade 
transactions. The CISG can be considered an externally dictated transplant in Nigeria, because it 
emanates from the UNCITRAL as a framework for promoting seamless and fair trade. 
Considering that the Convention’s success in Nigeria may be dependent upon the willingness of 
exporters to provide the capital, and importers interested in the import, it can also function as an 
entrepreneurial transplant. 
Qualifying the CISG as a prestigious law emanating from the UN makes it a legitimacy-
generating transplant because it will provide economic efficiency by saving transaction costs 
associated with international trade in Nigeria. The association between economic development 
and legality means that the CISG will help in promoting long-term economic growth.  
The thesis considered the possibility of other legal frameworks for international trade in Nigeria 
such as the OHADA, a regional framework. However, because the OHADA laws retain a strong 
French flavour and have a set of laws preponderantly based on civil laws and tradition, it was 
suggested that it will prove challenging for the Nigerian user conversant with common law 
tradition. As the CISG incorporates both civil and common-law concepts, and is used by 
countries from both jurisdictions, it is a better choice for Nigeria. This combination and 
recognition by countries ensures the collation of a substantial body of uniform interpretation 
that allows equality for users from either jurisdiction. Moreover the Convention deals with only 
one area of law and can be opted out of.  
The OHADA laws are also not the best for the Nigerian business environment because the 
existent common law is more flexible, and this flexibility contributes to the level of economic 
output of countries. Opting for the OHADA also means that Nigeria would forgo all her rights 
to legislate on domestic business laws, and further, that the discordance in interpretation, 
resulting from translation may be problematic for Nigeria. On these bases the CISG is a better 
alternative to OHADA for Nigeria.  
Irrespective of these problems, the CISG can coexist with the OHADA, because its scope and 
sphere of application ensures that other instruments can be accommodated. This is through its 




limited sphere of application, respect for other international instruments through Art 9(2) and 
the similarity in substantive issue of law and similarity in outcome.  
The thesis measured the likelihood of the CISG succeeding as a legal transplant in Nigeria. It is 
shown that the pervasiveness of legal transplantation around the world is suggestive of the ease 
of transplantation. This indicates an innate ability of legal systems to assimilate transplants, an 
ability from which Nigeria is not exempt. The CISG as a medium for developing international 
trade law, thereby facilitating trade and catalysing the reform of extant trade laws, thus, 
encouraging development in Nigeria makes it appealing. 
As the success of a transplant is not dependent on the level of development of the country of 
transplant, the CISG a much developed and international legal order can be successfully adapted 
to the Nigerian legal system. Although the principles of the CISG may be marginally dissimilar to 
those governing trade in Nigeria, because of the Convention’s mixed nature it would still be 
successful. This is because of minimal distinctions between civil and common-law legal systems. 
And the practicality of modern business laws and their problem solving nature minimise the 
variance from country to country.  
The commercial nature of the CISG means that it can easily and successfully be transplanted to 
Nigeria. Thus, it will be less affected by political, social and cultural factors important in 
determining the patterns of legal migration for constitutional and human rights laws, ideas and 
institutions. The CISG is non-ideological yet, instrumental to economic development, making 
for easier borrowing and receptivity of the CISG in Nigeria.  
Through empirical research, the thesis demonstrates that legal practitioners in Nigeria show a 
high degree of willingness and likelihood to learn about a new Convention, and also the 
willingness to offer it to businessmen in international trade transactions. This attitude, borne out 
of the motivation to have a better legal framework for international trade, for law reform and the 
desire to be esteemed with her trading partners, indicates a positive disposition towards the 
Convention, thus increasing the likelihood of success.  
The thesis has shown that the CISG is also compatible with common law concepts applicable in 
Nigeria. Where there are divergences, established solutions by the jurisconsultorium over the years 
may be used. These solutions will ensure that there will hardly be hindrances in the application of 
the Convention where it is adopted. Although challenges for actors in the application of the 
CISG such as avoidance and misinterpretations exist, these issues can be worked through as seen 




Adopting the CISG means that the way international trade transactions are carried out by 
Nigerian businessmen will undergo a change, favourable to them. Given its accessibility, the 
CISG will simplify trade for Nigerian businessmen. The simplicity of the Convention’s language 
also means that traders at any level can understand the Convention’s concepts. Materials on the 
CISG are easily accessible around the world on Internet sites dedicated to the dissemination of 



























The main thrust of the thesis, given the reasons for the non-adoption of the CISG in Nigeria, is 
that the Convention is beneficial to Nigeria, in that it can provide legal certainty, reduce 
transaction costs and strengthen the bargaining position of Nigerian traders in international trade 
contracts.  
Based on the above, the following recommendations are made, 
1. Adoption of the CISG in Nigeria  
The CISG should be adopted in Nigeria particularly since it would be beneficial for sole traders 
and SMEs by strengthening their bargaining positions and providing them with the opportunity 
to pursue remedies in the event of breach.  
Although it is recognised that the CISG is not a radical framework, the argument for adoption is 
based on the improvement of Nigerian trade structure and the traders position in Nigeria 
through cost effective means. The CISG provides this means. 
2. Creating Awareness of the CISG in Nigeria   
In order to facilitate the adoption of the CISG in Nigeria, it is suggested that the UNCITRAL 
should allocate more resources towards promoting its awareness in Nigeria. Given the lack of 
expertise in commercial law in Nigeria, the UNCITRAL equipped with more expertise is in a 
better position to initiate contact.  
There should be more interaction between the UNCITRAL and the relevant agencies in Nigeria 
to promote awareness of the CISG. The FMTI, which is in charge of policies on trade, should 
actively work with the UNCITRAL towards dispersing information of the CISG in Nigeria. 
They can liaise with the MAN to disseminate information on the CISG. This is one way of 
ensuring that traders affiliated with the MAN become aware of the CISG. Understandably, 
funding for the commercial law sector is limited in the UN. However, such contact and 
communication may be done via the Internet. This will ensure that the CISG is more familiar to 
the users before it is ratified. Ultimately, the benefits of the CISG may be recognised, leading to 




The UNCITRAL should also consider programs involving the legal academia and working with 
them towards incorporating UN laws into the law curriculum would bring about awareness on a 
broad-spectrum. 
Given the functions of the department of international and comparative law as advisors on the 
ratification of international laws in Nigeria, they can work with the UNCITRAL by providing 
funding to assist in the implementation of commercial law reform.   
Legal practitioners in Nigeria should be more proactive towards globally recognised laws such as 
the CISG. This will enable more informed decisions regarding its adoption. Their exposure and 
input is vital, given the lack of expertise in commercial law within the government agencies in 
Nigeria and their access to the traders who are potential beneficiaries of the CISG.  
Considering the global nature of commercial law, it is important that the Nigerian law syllabus 
should include and be more reflective of laws such as CISG, and it should be discussed. This is a 
way of keeping budding lawyers informed about global laws and promoting awareness of the 
CISG. It also provides the relevant exposure to international laws and sets the stage for timely 
assessments of foreign legislations that may be relevant in Nigeria.  
The CISG should be discussed more in the trade and commerce textbooks as this will serve to 
educate the Nigerian legal populace. Despite the possibility of lack of awareness amongst the 
legal academia, they are a significant group with respect to dispersing knowledge of the 









APPENDIX 1: Interviewees 
1. Mr Anthony Emioma, Legal Practitioner, Streamsowers & Köhn Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria June 
2013) 
2. Mr Godwin Etim, Legal Practitioner, Aelex Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
3. Mr Khrushchev Ekwueme, Partner, Olaniwun Ajayi 
4. Mr Nnamdi Dimgba, Partner, Olaniwun Ajayi Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
5. Mrs Jumoke Arowolo, Legal Prtactitioner, G Elias Firm (Lagos, Nigeria July 2013) 
6. Mr Dipo Okorubido Banwo & Ighodalo Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
7. Mr Ekwere, Partner, Alliance Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
8. Mr Humphrey Onyeukwu, Legal Practitioner, Alliance Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
9. Mr. Okorie Kalu, Legal Practitioner, Punuka Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, June 2013)  
10. Mr Ken Etim, Partner, Banwo & Ighodalo Law Firm (Lagos, Nigeria July 2013) 
11. Mr Olufemi Banwo, Partner, Banwo & Ighodalo Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
12. Mr Fumibara, Legal Practitioner, Aelex Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
13. Mr Gbolahon Elias, Partner, G Elias Firm (Lagos, Nigeria July 2013) 
14. Mr Emuwa, Partner, Aelex Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
15. Mrs Oghogho Makinde, Partner, Aluko & Oyebode (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013)  
16. Mr Olufemi Lijadu, Partner, Ajumogobia & Okeke Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, August 2013) 
17. MR Olasupo Shasore, Partner, Ajumogobia & Okeke Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, August 2013) 
18. Dr Nat Ofo,  Lecturer, Igbinedion University Okada, Edo State Nigeria (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
19. Dr Adewale Olawoyin, Partner, Olawoyin & Olawoyin (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
20. Mr Rasheed Adegbenro, Acting Director of MAN (Manufacturers Association of Nigeria) (Lagos 
Nigeria, August 2013) 
21. Dr Oni (Assistant Director) Federal Ministry Of Justice, The Department Of International and 
Comparative Law (Lagos Nigeria, August 2013) 
22. Mrs Itanyi, Commercial Law Lecturer, University of Nigeria Enugu Campus (UNEC) (Abuja 
Nigeria, August 2013) 
23. Tominiyi Owolabi, Partner, Olaniwun Ajayi Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
24. Shafiu Adamu Yauri Esq Principal Assistant Registrar, Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment 
(Abuja, Nigeria, December 2013) 
25. Professor Nnona, University of Nigeria Enugu Campus (UNEC) (Abuja Nigeria, 23rd December 
2013) 
26. Sunday Oguchie, Commercial Officer, Bilateral Trade Division, Department of Trade, FMTI 
27. Luca Castellani, Legal Officer, UNCITRAL, Durham, England, 13 February 2014) 
28. I K Mohammed, Acting Director, Bilateral Trade Division, Department of Trade, FMTI (Abuja, 




29. Nduka Ekeyi, Lecturer, University of Nigeria Enugu Campus 
30. Ugo Ugorji, Legal Practitioner, Aelex Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 
31. Mr Uwa, Partner, Streamsowers & Kohn Law Firm (Lagos, Nigeria July 2013) 
32. Babatola Akpata, Legal Practitioner, G Elias & Co Law Firm (Lagos Nigeria, July 2013) 









APPENDIX 2: Consent Form  
 












APPENDIX 4: Introduction and Request for Interview 
 
[Name of Interviewee] 
[Address of Interviewee] 
 
Dear [Name of Interviewee] 
 
  
I am currently undertaking a PHD program in International Trade and Commercial Law at the Durham University 
Law School. 
  
My research examines the reasons for the non-adoption of the United Nations Convention on Contract for 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) in African Nations with a focus on Nigeria. The research also seeks to 
understand the current role and effectiveness of the 1893 English Sales of Goods Act (applicable in Nigeria through 
the Statutes of General Application) in international trade and commerce in Nigeria. 
  
As part of the research, experts in key organisations and parastatals in Nigeria including the Department of 
International and Comparative Law-Ministry of Justice, In House Lawyers in business and trade organisations, 
international trade and commercial lawyers, International trade and commercial law lecturers in the top ten 
universities, The Council of Legal Education, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Nigerian Law Reform 
Commission and Judges in Nigeria will be consulted and interviewed. This is in order to obtain their opinions and 
disposition towards uniform international conventions and their possible impact on trade in Nigeria. 
  
As a specialist in commercial law, your opinion will be invaluable in understanding the role a uniform commercial 
law such as the CISG will play in international trade in Nigeria and consequently the economy. This is especially in 
light of the antiquated nature of the 1893 SGA and its role in commercial trade in Nigeria. 
 
I currently in Lagos, Nigeria for this purpose and I will be very grateful if you could arrange a suitable date and time 
for the interview. The interview is estimated to last 20 minutes. To arrange this interview, you may contact me by 
email (u.g.anyamele@durham.ac.uk) or by phone on 08091594908.  
  
Any information or opinion given will be used solely for the purpose of the research and will be accorded utmost 
confidentiality. 
  
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your response. 
  
Kind Regards 
Uche Anyamele (PHD Student) 
Durham Law School 















APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW GUIDE  
 
1. Personal Questions  
i. What is your name?  
2. Professional Career 
ii. How many years are you at the bar? 
iii. How long have you worked for this firm? 
iv. What type of Contract does the Firm handle? 
v. What is your area of specialisation? 
3. Knowledge and Awareness of the CISG  
i. Have you heard of the CISG, if yes, where and where did you hear about it? 
ii. If NO, give an overview of the Convention and start asking for opinions of why the Convention, 
given its nature has not been ratified in Nigeria  
iii. Do you think there is sufficient awareness of international laws in Nigeria amongst lawyers and law 
enactors? 
4. Opinion on Uniform Laws? 
i. What is your opinion of Uniform laws?  
ii. What is your attitude towards uniform laws?  
iii. Do you have any reservations on uniform laws adopted? 
iv. What are your reservations about uniform laws and their applicability in Transactions? 
v. Have you heard of the OHADA 
 
5. The Non Ratification of the CISG in Nigeria  
i. Why do you think we have not ratified the CISG? 
ii. Why do you think there is no awareness of the CISG? 
iii. Do you think the CISG would be useful if adopted? 
iv. Should Nigeria adopt the CISG? 
v. Who do you the Convention would be useful for when adopted? 
vi. If the CISG is adopted what do you envisage would be challenges of applying it? 
vii. Applicable Laws/Frequently used laws  
i. What laws have you come across more frequently in practice? 




iii. Do you have concerns regarding foreign laws? 
iv. What happens in the event of a breach of contract? 
v. What sort of contracts does the firm/solicitor deal with? 
vi. Would you say your clients are generally satisfied with English law? 
vii. Are governing laws a barrier to your transactions?   
6. The Role of legal practitioners in the ratification process  
i. Why is there no pressure by Legal Practitioners to the Government to ratify the Convention? 
ii. What is the role of lawyers in Law Reform?  
7. The Experience with the Nigerian Sale of Goods Acts  
i. What is your opinion and experience with the Nigerian SGA/ SGL 1893? 
ii. Do you think our domestic laws are a barrier to trade? 
iii. Do you think our domestic laws affect the bargaining strength of Nigerian Traders? 
iv. What happens when you have to apply laws from other jurisdictions? 
8. International Commercial and Trade Law in the Curriculum  
i. Did you study any international trade laws whilst in school? 


















The research seeks to understand the role, which the English Sales of Goods Act (1893) (applicable in Nigeria 
through the Statutes of General Application) plays in trade. It is aimed at evaluating the current usefulness and 
applicability of the SGA in commercial transactions. The research also seeks to understand the reasons for the non-
adoption of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sales of Goods (CISG) in Nigeria. 
The questionnaire also seeks to evaluate the level of awareness of the CISG as an international trade convention in 
Nigeria. The questionnaire also seeks to understand the disposition of legal practitioners towards the Convention 
(CISG) and the English Sales of Goods Act (1893). The questionnaire will also draw on the opinions of legal 
practitioners involved in international trade and commercial law towards the CISG and the SGA. 
The Practitioner’s likelihood and level of willingness to accept the Convention is also measured to access the success 
of the Convention where and if it is adopted in Nigeria. 
 
b. QUESTIONS  
 
PART A: THE NIGERIAN SALES OF GOODS ACT (SOGA) 1893 
 
i. Can you tell me a bit about yourself- your name, year of call, how long you have been in active practice? 
 
 
ii. How long have you worked for this law firm? 
 
 
iii. Does the firm handle international trade disputes/deal with international commercial law? 
 
 
iv. In your experience, what laws have been used to settle international commercial/ trade disputes? 
 
 









vii. In your experience with sales contracts and disputes, how often has the 1893 SOGA been used as the governing 
law? 
 
a. Very often - Most of the contracts I have come across and cases in courts have incorporated it. (If you have 







a. Often - Some of the contracts I have come across and cases in courts have incorporated it. (If you have ticked 
this box, please go to question vii) 
 
a. Hardly - Barely any of the contracts I have come across Nor cases in courts have incorporated it. (If you 
have ticked this box, please go to question vi) 
 
b. Never- None of the contracts I have come across and Nor cases in courts have incorporated it. (If you have 
ticked this box, please go to question vi) 
 
 
viii. Why do you think it is not frequently referred to? 
 
ix. Do you think the SGA is still useful? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
 




PART B: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACT FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SALES OF GOODS (CISG) 
 
i. Have you heard of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)?  If 
No, Please Continue to Question iv. 
Yes 
 




iii. Do you think the CISG should be adopted in Nigeria? 
 
YES   NO 
 
iv. Are you likely to learn a new international convention? 
 
YES   NO 
 
v. How likely are you to learn a new international convention? 
Very Likely 
Likely 
Can’t be bothered 
Not Likely  
vi. Are you willing to learn a new international convention? 
 






















vii. How willing will you be to learn a new international convention? 
Very Willing (I will do all that is necessary to attend conferences and symposia related to the 
Convention. I will carry out research and educate myself on the Convention and its applicability.) 
Willing (I will not go out of my way, but I will attend conferences and symposia related to the 
Convention. I will carry out research and educate myself on the Convention and its applicability.) 
Can’t be bothered (I do not care, unless the need arises in my law firm or in practice to acquire the 
relevant knowledge) 
Not Willing (I am not willing to learn any conventions or laws, the Nigerian laws on trade are fine.) 
 
viii. Would you be willing to offer the CISG as an option to business men? 
 
YES   NO 
 
  
ix. Have you heard of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA)? Where, 
When and How? 
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